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PETITIONER: GOPALAKRISHNA MENON AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D. RAJA REDDY AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/09/1983

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1983 AIR 1053            1983 SCR  (3) 836  1983 SCC  (4) 240        1983 SCALE  (2)236

ACT:      Code of Criminal procedure, 1973-S. 195(1)(b)(ii)-Scope of-In absence  of complaint  from  appropriate  civil  court prosecution for  offence punishable  under s. 467 I.P.C. not sustainable.      Indian Penal  Code-S. 467  read with  s. 463-Scope  of- offence punishable  under. s. 467 is offence described in s. 463.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellants   filed  a   civil  suit   against  the respondents for  recovery of  certain amount  of  money  and produced some  original documents with the plaint. The first respondent filed a complaint against the appellants alleging forgery of  his signature  on one  such document and thereby commission or offences punishable under sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. The  appellants objected  to maintainability  of  the criminal action  and later moved the High Court for quashing the said  proceedings. The  appellants contended that in the absence of  complaint from  the civil  court the prosecution was barred  in view  of s.  195 (1)(b)(ii)  of the  Code  of Criminal Procedure. The High Court dismissed tho application and observed  that s.  463 I.P.C.  cannot  be  construed  to include s. 467.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: The prosecution would not be sustainable. [842 B]      Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that  no Court shall take cognizance of any offence described in  s. 463... Of the Penal Code, when such offence is alleged  to have  been committed in respect of a document produced ..  in a  proceeding in any Court ... except on the complaint in writing of that Court. Section 463 of the Penal Code in  a sense  defines the  offence of  forgery  and  the offence which  is made punishable under s. 467 is in respect of an  offence described in s. 463. Once it is accepted that s. 463  defines forgery  and s.  467 punishes  forgery of  a particular category,  the provision  in s.  195(l)(b)(ii) of the  Code   of  Criminal   Procedure  would  immediately  be attracted and on the basis that the offence punishable under s. 467  of the Penal Code is an offence described in s. 463, in the  absence of  a complaint by the Court the prosecution

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would not be maintainable.                              [839 E-G, 840 D, E, H, 841 A-B]      Patel Laljibhal  Somabhai  v.  The  State  of  Gujarat, [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 834; and S. L. Goswami v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh ar Jabalpur, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 385 referred to. 837

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 307 of 1983      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  8th November,  1982 of  the Andhra  Pradesh  High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1936 of 1982.      A. Subba Rao for the Appellant.      B. Kanta Rao for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RANGANATH MISRA, J.- The short question arising in this appeal by  special  leave  is  whether  in  the  absence  of necessary complaint by the Civil Court where a money receipt alleged to  have been  forged was  produced, prosecution for offences punishable  under sections 467 and 471 read with s. 34 of  the Indian  Penal Code  would  be  maintainable.  The accused are  the appellants and they challenge the dismissal of their  application under  section  482  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure  (’Code’ for  short) by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.      The appellants  are father  and son  respectively. They took a printing press from the 1st respondent in terms of an agreement dated December 3, 1980, with a view to carrying on the printing  business. The  agreement stipulated  that  the appellants would  have to  deposit Rs.  20,000 with  the 1st respondent and  pay Rs.  500 p.m.  as also  50% of  the  net profits to 1st respondent. Dispute arose between the parties over the  compliance of the terms of the agreement whereupon the 1st  respondent filed  against the  appellants O.S.  No. 609/81 for  mandatory injunction  and O.S.  No. 1140/81  for recovery of  damages. Appellants  filed O.S.  No. 358/81 for refund of Rs. 20,000 claimed to have been deposited with 1st respondent and  for recovery of RS. 8638 on the footing that the same  had been  paid to 1st respondent by cheques and in cash.  Along  with  their  plaint  appellants  produced  the original contract  as also  the money receipt for Rs. 20,000 in support of the claim in the suit. After production of the money receipt  in Court,  1st respondent  filed a  complaint against the  appellants alleging forgery of his signature on the  money   receipt  and  thereby  commission  of  offences punishable under  sections 467  and 471, I.P.C. On receiving summonses  from   the  Court,  the  appellants  objected  to maintainability of the criminal action and 838 later move the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for quashing the said proceedings  by  contending  that  in  the  absence  of complaint from  the Court the prosecution was barred in view of s.  195 (1)  (b) (ii)  of the  Code. In  support of  this contention reliance  was placed  on s.  340 of the Code. The High Court referred to the provisions of ss. 463 465 467 471 and 474 of the Penal Code and observed.           "From  the  above  provisions,  It  is  quite      manifest that  the offence  which is  mentioned in      the complaint  carries greater punishment, namely,      10  years  imprisonment,  whereas  under  s.  463,      I.P.C. the  punishment is  infinitely lesser  than      the one  under s.  467, namely  2 years of fine or

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    both. That  apart, in a case reported in 1979 Crl.      L.R. at  228, it has been held by the Gujarat High      Court that  the offences  laid down  under ss. 474      and 471,  I.P.C. are distinct. In that case it was      contended that a complaint by A to police under s.      474 that  was in  possession of  forged  documents      with intention  to use  them in  Court proceedings      and thereafter  producing documents  in Court  and      thereby committing  offence under  s. 471  did not      wipe out  the offence under s. 474. The High Court      held under these circumstances that the Magistrate      can  proceed   with  case  under  s.  474  against      grounding the  reason that  s. 195 (1) (b) (ii) is      not attracted.           The penal  provisions as it is fairly settled      ought  to   be  interpreted   very  strictly   and      therefore on  the foregoing  analysis  I  have  no      hesitation  in  holding  that  s.  463  cannot  be      construed  to   include  s.   467  as   well  and,      therefore,  certainly  it  is  competent  for  the      Magistrate to  take cognizance of and try the same      as it  is needless  to follow  the case. Hence the      contention on  the basis  of the  provisions in s.      340 of  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure fails and      the same is rejected".      There is  no dispute  that the  alleged forged document was produced  in the suit brought by the appellants. Section 340 of the Code provides:           "340. (1)  When, upon  an application made to      it in  this behalf  or otherwise,  any Court is of      opinion that  it is  expedient in  the interest of      justice that an inquiry 839      should be  made into  any offence  referred to  in      clause (b)  of sub-section  (1)  of  section  195,      which appears  to have  been committed  in  or  in      relation to  a proceeding in that Court or, as the      case may  be, in respect of a document produced or      given in  evidence in  a proceeding in that Court,      such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if      any, as it thinks necessary-      (a)  record a finding to that effect;      (b)  make a complaint thereof in writing;      (c)   send it  to a  Magistrate  of  the  class  having           jurisdiction;      (d)  take sufficient security for the appearance of the           accused before  such Magistrate, or if the alleged           offence is  non-bailable and  the Court  thinks it           necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to           such Magistrate; and      (e)   bind over  any person to appear and give evidence           before such Magistrate".      The relevant  part of  s. 195  referred to in s. 340 of the Code reads thus:           "195. (1) No Court shall take cognizance-      X                X                X               X           (b)(ii) of  any offence  described in section      463, or  punishable under section 471, section 475      or section  476,  of  the  said  Code,  when  such      offence is  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in      respect  of   a  document  produced  or  given  in      evidence in  a proceeding in any Court, ... except      on the  complaint in  writing of that Court, or of      some  other   Court  to   which  that   Court   is      subordinate". (underlining is ours).

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    If s. 195 (1) (b) (ii) is attracted to the facts of the present case,  in the  absence of  a complaint in writing of the Civil  Court where  the alleged  forged receipt has been produced, taking  of cognizance  of the offence would be bad in law  and the  prosecution being  not maintainable,  there would be absolutely no justification to harass 840 the appellants  by  allowing  prosecution  to  have  a  full dressed trial. Section 195  (1) (b)  (ii) uses two different expressions: in regard to s. 463 of the Indian Penal Code it says, "offence  described", while  in regard  to ss. 471 and 475 or  476 of  the I.P.C.  it says,  "punishable". The High Court has  not made  any reference to s. 471 of I.P.C. while rejecting  the  submissions  of  the  appellants  apparently because s. 471 in terms has been mentioned in the provision. So far  as s. 463 is concerned, the High Court has taken the view as  we have  already indicated that "section 463 cannot be construed  to include  s. 467". Section 463 of the I.P.C. provides:           "463.   Forgery-Whoever   makes   any   false      document or  part of  a document,  with intent  to      cause damage  or injury  to the  public or  to any      person, or  to support  any claim  or title  or to      cause any  person to  part with  property,  or  to      enter into  any express  or implied  contract,  or      with intent  to commit  fraud or that fraud may be      committed, commits forgery".      It is the opening section of Chapter XVIII of the Penal Code dealing  with offences  relating to  documents  and  to property marks.  This opening section in a sense defines the offence of forgery. Section 467 of the Penal Code provides:      "467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.- Whoever forges a  document which  purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give  authority to  any person  to make  or transfer  any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest, or dividends thereon,  or to  receive  or  deliver  any  money, movable property,  or valuable  security,  or  any  document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of  money, or  an acquittance  or  receipt  for  the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either  description for  a term  which may  extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine". The purpose  of our extracting the two sections of the Penal Code is  to show  the offence which is made punishable under s. 467 of 841 the Penal  Code is  in respect of an offence described in s. 463. Once  it is accepted that s. 463 defines forgery and s. 467 punishes forgery of a particular category, the provision in s.  195 (1)  (b) (ii)  of the  Code would  immediately be attracted and on the basis that the offence punishable under s. 467  of the Penal Code is an offence described in s. 463, in the  absence of  a complaint by the Court the prosecution would not be maintainable. We have no doubt in our mind that the High Court took a wrong view of the matter.      We may briefly refer to two decisions of this Court. In Patel Laljibhai  Somabhai v.  The State  of Gujarat,(1)  the accused had  filed a  suit for  recovery of certain money on the basis  of a  forged cheque  and a  private complaint had been filed  before the  Court  of  the  Judicial  Magistrate alleging offences  under ss.  467 and  471 of the I.P.C. The appellant raised an objection that in view of s. 195 (1) (c) of the  Code of Criminal Procedure cognizance of the offence

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could not  be taken  on a  private complaint. The High Court upheld the  order of commitment by finding that though there would be a bar for prosecution for offences punishable under ss. 467 and 471 of the I.P.C. On a private complaint, in the facts of the case that question did not arise and this Court refused to  interfere by  holding that  the alleged offences had been  committed at  a time  when the  accused was  not a party to  the civil  proceeding. Not  the conclusion but the ratio supports our view.      In S.L.  Goswami v.  High Court  of Madhya  Pradesh  at Jabalpur,(2) to  which one  of us  was a  party. it was held that an  offence under  s. 466, I.P.C. was covered by clause (c) of s. 195 (1) of the Code and it came within the purview of the  section as the offence under s. 463, I.P.C. is dealt With in  s. 466,  I.P.C. Section 466, I P.C., it was pointed out, was  an aggravated  form of forgery in that the forgery should relate  to a  document  specified  in  that  section. Section 466,  I.P.C. was, therefore, an offence as described in s.  463, I.P.C.  which was  committed in  relation  to  a record or  proceeding of  or in a Court of justice. What was said in  the aforesaid  decision in  regard to  the  offence under s.  466, I.P.C.  has full  application to  an  offence under s;  467, I.P.C. Therefore, the ratio of the last cited decision has full application to the present case. 842      In view  of what we have said above, the prosecution in the instant  case on the basis of a private complaint and in the absence  of a complaint from the appropriate civil court where the  alleged fraudulent  receipt  has  been  produced, would not  be sustainable. As we are of the view that if the prosecution is  allowed to  continue serious prejudice would be caused to the appellants and they would be called upon to face a  trial which  would not be sustainable, we allow this appeal and  set aside  the decision  of the  High Court  and quash the complaint case filed against the appellants. H.S.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 843