GOPAL SWAROOP Vs KRISHNA MURARI MANGAL .
Bench: MARKANDEY KATJU,T.S. THAKUR, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-006801-006801 / 2003
Diary number: 11636 / 2002
Advocates: NIRAJ SHARMA Vs
PRATIBHA JAIN
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6801 OF 2003
Gopal Swaroop …Appellant
Versus
Krishna Murari Mangal & Ors. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, J.
1. This appeal by special leave arises out of a judgment
and order dated 4th March, 2002 passed by a Division Bench
of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, Gwalior
Bench, whereby Letters Patent Appeal No.75/1994 has been
allowed in part and the judgment and decree passed by the
First Appellate Court modified.
2. The facts giving rise to the filing of a suit for partition
and separate possession by the plaintiff-respondent no.1 in
this appeal have been set out in the judgment under appeal
hence do not bear repetition. All that need be stated is that
respondent no.1 the plaintiff in the suit claimed partition of
what was described by him as joint family property with his
father Shri Panna Lal-defendant no.1 as the ‘Karta’ of the
joint family. During the pendency of the suit Shri Panna Lal
died giving rise to an additional issue as regards the
devolution of the property left behind by him including his
share in the joint family property. The appellant set up a Will
allegedly executed by Shri Panna Lal according to which the
share of the deceased testator was to devolve exclusively
upon the former. The suit filed by the respondent was
eventually decreed by the Trial Court holding plaintiff-
respondent no.1 entitled to 1/5th share in the joint family
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property and the goodwill of the joint family business. The
Court also found that the Will set up by the appellant herein
had been duly proved and that in terms thereof the property
left behind by Shri Panna Lal would devolve exclusively upon
the appellant.
3. Both the parties filed appeals which were heard by a
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
who formulated the following two questions for
determination and finally dismissed the appeal by his orders
dated 26.9.1994:
(1) Whether the plaintiff took a sum of Rs.21,000/-
out of share in the capital of the defendants as
alleged or it was taken by him as his share in the
capital, house and other properties as claimed by
the defendants?
(2) Whether the plaintiff has got any share in the joint
property if any in dispute and if so to what extent?
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4. In so far as question no.1 is concerned, the learned
Single Judge affirmed the finding recorded by the Trial Court
that the plaintiff had taken his share in the capital and
interest etc. and not his share in the house and the other
properties. The finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff
had a share in the goodwill of the family business was also
affirmed.
5. Even in regard to the second question the findings
recorded by the Trial Court was affirmed. The High Court
held that the service of a notice by the plaintiff about his
intention to separate had brought about a division in joint
family shares and that the plaintiff was entitled to have his
share in the property in the joint family ascertained and
partitioned. The High Court noted that while the plaintiff and
his brothers had 1/5th share each, the plaintiff’s claim for a
larger share on account of the death of his father and
devolution of the latter’s estate upon all the brothers by
succession had to be seen in the light of the Will propounded
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by defendant-appellant Gopal Swaroop. The High Court then
proceeded to discuss the evidence relating to the execution
of the Will by Shri Panna Lal including the deposition of
DW-2 Shri Vilas Tikhe in support thereof and recorded a
finding that the execution of the Will had been satisfactorily
established. The High Court also rejected the contention that
there were any suspicious circumstances surrounding the
Will which the High Court noted was a registered document.
The High Court in conclusion held that the plaintiff had 1/5th
share in the house in question and the goodwill of the
business and affirmed the finding of the Trial Court to the
effect that the plaintiff had 1/8th share in the jewellery items
and the amount representing the share of Saraswatibai held
in deposit in the firm.
6. Dissatisfied with the view taken by the learned Single
Judge respondent no.1 preferred Letters Patent Appeal
No.75/1994 before a Division Bench of the High Court which
was allowed in part and the judgment and decree passed by
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the Courts below modified. The Division Bench held that the
execution of the Will by Shri Panna Lal had not been proved
in as much as the solitary witness DW-2 Vilas Tikhe did not
prove that Shri Panna Lal had signed the Will in the
presence of Manoj Kumar and that Manoj Kumar had also
singed the Will as a witness. The High Court accordingly held
that while the appellant-plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 will
get 1/4th plus 1/32nd i.e. 9/32nd share each in the joint family
property the rest will go to the other legal heirs of
Ghanshyamdas and Shyam Sunder and daughters of the
deceased Panna Lal. The High Court also directed the
partition of immovable properties with 9/32nd share each to
the branch of Ghanshyamdas and Shyam Sunder and three
sisters of the plaintiff-appellant herein.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at
considerable length. The only question that was debated
before us is whether execution of the Will propounded by the
defendant-appellant before the Trial Court had been
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satisfactorily proved. On behalf of the appellant it was
contended that the Division Bench was in error in reversing
the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court
and the Single Judge to the effect that the execution of the
Will stood satisfactorily proved. Reliance was also placed by
learned counsel for the appellant upon the testimony of
DW-2 Vilas Tikhe one of the attesting witnesses to the Will
to contend that the deposition of the said witness had
sufficiently proved the execution of the Will in question in
compliance with the provisions of Section 63 of the Indian
Succession Act. It was argued that the deposition of DW-2
Vilas Tikhe had not been properly appreciated by the High
Court in the Letters Patent Appeal and a hyper technical
view taken while holding that the said deposition was
insufficient to prove the execution of the Will in accordance
with law.
8. Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, counsel appearing for the
respondent contended that proof of a document purporting
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to be a Will had to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of
the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Indian
Evidence Act which requirements had not, according to the
learned counsel been satisfied in the instant case. It was
contended by the learned counsel that the mere fact that
the Will was a registered document did not mean that proof
regarding its execution in accordance with the provisions of
law could be dispensed with.
9. In a Letters Patent Appeal arising out of an order
passed by a Single Judge hearing a civil second appeal the
Division Bench of the High Court would not re-appreciate the
evidence to record a finding of fact. That is because the
Single Judge cannot himself do so in the light of the
limitations placed upon the Court by Section 100 of the
C.P.C. That may not, however, be true when the Single
Judge passes an order in a First Appeal filed before him.
Even when the finding of fact recorded by the Single Judge
may affirm the finding recorded by the Trial Court, there is
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no express bar to the examination of any such finding by the
Division Bench of the High Court hearing the Letters Patent
Appeal. Having said so, we must hasten to add that even in
the absence of any legal bar to the examination of a finding
of fact, a Letters Patent Bench will be slow in interfering with
the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Trial Court and
the Single Judge in the first appeal. The Court may interfere
where the finding is demonstrably erroneous in that it is
either irrational or perverse being without any evidence.
The jurisdiction exercised by the Court being discretionary
ought to be exercised along judicial lines. (See Smt. Asha
Devi v. Dukhi Sao and Anr. 1974 (2) SCC 492 and B.
Venkatamuni v. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh and Ors.
(2006) 13 SCC 449.
10. The Trial Court and the Single Judge of the High Court
had, in the present case, concurrently held the execution of
the Will to have been satisfactorily proved. The Letters
Patent Bench has, however, reversed that finding primarily
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on the ground that the execution of the Will is not proved in
terms of Section 68 of the Evidence Act read with Section 63
of the Indian Succession Act. Section 68 of the Evidence Act
reads as under:
“68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested - If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence:
Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specially denied.”
11. It is evident that in cases where the document sought
to be proved is required by law to be attested, the same
cannot let be in evidence unless at least one of the attesting
witnesses has been called for the purpose of proving the
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attestation, if any such attesting witness is alive and capable
of giving evidence and is subject to the process of the Court.
Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act deals with execution
of unprivileged Wills and, inter alia, provides that every
Testator except those mentioned in the said provision shall
execute his Will according to the rules stipulated therein. It
reads:
“63. Execution of unprivileged wills.- Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, or an airman so employed or engaged, or a mariner at sea, shall execute his will according to the following rules:--
(a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction.
(b) The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will.
(c) The will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the
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testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.”
12. From a conjoint reading of the two provisions extracted
above it is evident that a Will is required to be attested by
two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the Testator
signing or affixing his mark on the Will or has seen some
other person signing the Will in the presence and by the
direction of the Testator or has received from the Testator a
personal acknowledgment of the signature or mark or his
signature or the signature of such other person and that
each of the witnesses has signed the Will in the presence of
the Testator. Section 68 of the Evidence Act is against the
use of a Will in evidence unless one attesting witness has
been examined to prove the execution.
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13. The question, however, is whether the Will propounded
by the appellant and purporting to have been attested by
two witnesses, namely, Manoj Kumar and Vilas Tikhe has
been validly proved. It is not disputed that one of the said
witnesses namely, Vilas Tikhe has been summoned and
examined as a witness. What is to be seen is whether the
examination of the said witness satisfies the requirements of
Section 63 of the Evidence Act (supra). A careful analysis of
the provisions of Section 63 would show that proof of
execution of a Will would require the following aspects to be
proved:
(1) That the Testator has signed or affixed his mark to the
Will or the Will has been signed by some other person in the
presence and under the direction of the Testator.
(2) The signature or mark of the Testator or the signature
of the persons signing for him is so placed has to appear
that the same was intended thereby to give effect to the
writing as a Will.
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(3) That the Will has been attested by two or more
witnesses each one of whom has signed or affixed his mark
to the Will or has been seen by some other person signing
the Will in the presence and by the direction of the Testator
or has received from Testator a personal acknowledgement
of the signature or mark or the signature of each other
person.
(4) That each of the witnesses has singed the Will in the
presence of the Testator.
14. The decisions of this Court in Bhagwan Kaur W/o
Bachan Singh v. Kartar Kaur W/o Bachan Singh & Ors.
1994 (5) SCC 135, Seth Beni Chand (since dead) now
by L.Rs. v. Smt. Kamla Kunwar and Ors. 1976 (4) SCC
554, Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam
2003 (2) SCC 91, Gurdev Kaur and Ors. v. Kaki and Ors.
2007 (1) SCC 546, Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibema Devi
v. Yumnam Joykumar Singh and Ors., 2009 (4) SCC
780, Rur Singh (dead) Through LRs. and Ors. v.
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Bachan Kaur, 2009 (11) SCC 1 and Anil Kak v. Kumari
Sharada Raje and Ors. 2008 (7) SCC 695 recognize and
reiterate the requirements enumerated above to be essential
for the proof of execution of an unprivileged Will like the one
at hand. It is, therefore, not necessary to burden this
judgment by a detailed reference of the facts relevant to
each one of these pronouncements and the precise
contention that was urged and determined in those cases.
All that needs to be examined is whether the requirements
stipulated in Section 63 and distinctively enumerated above
have been satisfied in the instant case by the appellant
propounder of the Will. Our answer to that question is in the
affirmative. The deposition of Shri Vilas Tikhe clearly proves
that Panna Lal had executed a Will in favour of the
appellant, Gopal Swaroop and had signed and affixed his
signature in his presence. The Trial Court and the High Court
have concurrently held that the Will had been signed by the
Testator in the presence of the attesting witnesses. First and
the foremost requirement prescribed under Section 63 of the
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Indian Succession Act, 1925 is, therefore, clearly satisfied.
15. Coming then to the second requirement namely, the
placement of the signature of the Testator on the Will, we
find that the signature of the Testator appear at the right
hand bottom part of the Will. The placement of the signature
on the document is, therefore, appropriate and clearly
suggestive of the fact that the document was intended to be
given effect to as a Will. We must also mention that no
argument was advanced by learned counsel for the
respondent on the requirement of an appropriate placement
of the signature of the Testator on the document.
16. That brings us to the third requirement, namely, that
the Will must be attested by two or more witnesses each of
whom has seen the Testator signing and affixing his mark to
the Will or has seen some other person signing in the
presence and by the direction of the Testator. The deposition
of Shri Vilas Tikhe in our opinion satisfies this requirement
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also in as much as the witness has in clear and unambiguous
terms stated that not only he but Shri Manoj, the other
attesting witness to the Will was also present at the time the
Testator affixed his signature on the Will. It is noteworthy
that, the above statement has not been questioned in cross-
examination nor any suggestion made to the effect that
while Shri Vilas Tikhe, the witness may have been present,
Manoj was not so present at the time the Will was signed by
the Testator. As a matter of fact, the witness has made a
categoric statement that Manoj met the Testator in the
Court and was taken along and that not only at the time of
signing of the Will by the Testator, but even before the
Registrar, Manoj Kumar was present in person. The witness
has while answering a question in cross-examination
specifically stated that Manoj was present even at the time
the witness signed the Will in question.
17. On a careful and proper reading of the deposition of
Shri Vilas Tikhe DW-2, we are satisfied that the requirement
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of attestation of the Will by two witnesses each of whom has
seen the Testator signing or affixing his mark has been
satisfied in the present case. So also the fourth requirement
that the attesting witnesses sign the Will in the presence of
the Testator stands firmly established. In that view of the
matter, the Division Bench of the High Court fell in error in
holding that the requirement of Section 63 of the Indian
Succession Act had not been satisfied in the instant case. As
was observed by this Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v.
B.N. Thimmajamma AIR 1959 SC 443, in the matter of
proof of documents as in the case of the proof of Wills, it is
idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to
be applied always is the test of satisfaction of a prudent
mind in such matters. Applying that test to the case at hand
we have no manner of doubt that the Will executed by Shri
Panna Lal which is a duly registered document is not
surrounded by any suspicious circumstances of any kind and
is proved to have been duly and properly executed.
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18. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at
Jabalpur, Gwalior Bench, is set aside and the judgment and
order passed by the learned Single Judge of that Court is
restored. The parties shall bear their own costs.
……………………………J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)
……………………………J. New Delhi (T.S. THAKUR) November 25, 2010
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