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PETITIONER: GIRDHARI LAL & SONS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BALBIR NATH MATHUR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/02/1986

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) KHALID, V. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 1499            1986 SCR  (1) 383  1986 SCC  (2) 237        1986 SCALE  (1)272  CITATOR INFO :  D          1987 SC2173  (3)  RF         1988 SC1737  (98)

ACT: DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958:      Sections 17  &  18  -  ’Sub-tenant’  when  entitled  to protection against  eviction -  Consent of  landlord to  the sub-tenancy and  notice of  creation of  sub-tenancy  to  be evidenced in  writing-letter of  sub-tenancy -  Attested  by landlord - Whether sufficient. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES :      Statute -  Interpretation of  - Primary  duty of  court Ascertain intention  of  legislature  -  Actual  or  imputed Thereafter interpret  statute so  as to  promote and advance its object  and purpose by supplementing the written word if necessary.

HEADNOTE:      The respondent-landlord, Balbir Nath Mathur had let out the demised  premises to a firm M/s. Om Prakash & Co., whose three partners  were  close  relations  of  the  respondent- landlord. The tenant-firm in turn leased out the premises to the appellant-firm. A letter executed by the tenant-firm and attested by  the respondent  land-lord was  passed on to the appellant-firm had confirmed the lease and further undertook to pay  to the appellant-firm as damages a sum calculated at the rate  of Rs. 2,500 per month for the unexpired period of the lease  if the  appellant-firm had to vacate the premises before  the  expiry  of  the  lease  period  of  two  years. Simultaneously, the  appellant-firm also  executed a  letter addressed  to   the  respondent-landlord,  in  which,  after referring to  the lease  of the premises in their favour, it was stated  that they  would pay a sum of Rs.8,400 per annum as donation  to the  trust of  which respondent-landlord and others were  trustees, if  they stayed  on in  the  premises after the  expiry of  the period of lease. By a letter dated June 10. 1975 the tenant-firm had 384 demanded payment  of arrears  of rent  from  appellant-firm. This letter was signed by the respondent-landlord himself on behalf of the tenant-firm.      The respondent-landlord obtained an ex parte decree for

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eviction against the tenant-firm and one of its partners. In the execution  proceedings,  the  appellant-firm,  in  whose occupation the  premises were,  filed an  objection petition before the  Rent Controller  under 8.25  of the  Delhi  Rent Control Act,  1958. The  objection petition  was rejected by the Rent  Controller and his order was confirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal as well as by the High Court.      In appeal  to this  Court lt was contended on behalf of the appellant-firm/sub-tenant  :  (1)  that  they  were  not subtenants but  the direct tenants of respondent-landlord as he himself  and negotiated  the lease and inducted them into possession; (11)  that even  if they  were sub-tenants only, they were  entitled to  the protection of sections 17 and 18 of  the   Act;  (111)   that  the  decree  obtained  by  the respondent-landlord was  a collusive decree and that a fraud had been  played upon the Court to get rid of the appellant- firm and  (lv) that  there was  consent in  writing  by  the landlord to  he sub-tenancy, as well as notice in writing to the landlord  of  the  sub-tenancy  within  the  meaning  of sections 17  and 18  of the  Act and,  therefore, they  were entitled to be protected against eviction.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD : (By the Court)      The appellant/sub-tenant  is clearly  entitled  to  the protection of  s. 17  and 18  of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and  he cannot,  therefore, be  evicted in execution of the decree  obtained by  respondent-landlord against tenant- respondent. [396 F]      (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J.)      1. The  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958  is  primarily devised to  prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenants and subtenants   from    demised   premises   and   unreasonable enhancement of 385 rent. Showing  an awareness  of the problems of sub-tenants, the Legislature enacted 88. 17 and 18 for their protection. [395 C-D; E-F]      2. me  Legislature while  offering protection to a sub- tenant who  has been  inducted into possession by a landlord has  limited  the  protection  to  the  sub-tenant  who  can establish  the   consent  of  the  landlord  by  documentary evidence to  which the  landlord and  the tenant or the sub- tenant are  parties. So  it is  provided that  the  previous consent of  the landlord  has to  be in  writing and  that a notice in  the prescribed  manner has  to be  given  to  the landlord by the tenant or the sub-tenant. The essence of the requirement, therefore,  18 that the consent of the landlord to the  sub-tenancy and  the notice  of the  creation of the sub-tenancy have  to be evidenced by writing. The writing is to be  such as  to  indicate  clearly  the  consent  of  the landlord to  the creation of a sub-tenancy and his knowledge of  the  particular  sub-tenancy  after  its  creation.  The writing relating  to the consent and the writing relating to the knowledge (notice) may be by different documents or they may telescope into the same document. [395 H; 396 A-C]      3. There  is no magical form in which the consent is to be given  nor any  charmed form in which the notice is to be sent. The  essence of  the matter is that the consent to the sub-tenancy and  the notice  of the sub-tenany in respect of the premises  must be  evidenced by  written consent  of the landlord and the tenant or the sub-tenant. [396 D-E]      Where, as  in the  instant case,  the agreement  or the letter of the sub-tenancy in respect of the demised premises is attested by the landlord himself, there can be w question

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that the landlord has given his previous consent and that he has notice  in writing  of the sub-tenancy in respect of the particular premises.  The requirements of sections 17 and 18 of the  Act both as regards to his consent and the notice to him are satisfied. [396 C-D]      4.  The  primary  and  foremost  task  of  a  court  in interpreting a  statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature,  actual  or  imputed.  Having  ascertained  the intention, the  court must  then strive  to so interpret the statute as  to promote and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this  purpose, where  necessary the court may even depart 386 from  the  rule  that  plain  words  should  be  interpreted according to  their plain meaning. There need be no meek and mute submission  to the  plainness of the language. To avoid patent  injustice,   anamoly  or   absurdity  or   to  avoid invalidation of  a law, the court would be well justified in departing from  the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing, the written word, if necessary. [391 B-D]      Hawkins v.  Gatbercole, 43, English Reports 1129, Comet Radio Vision  Services v. Farnell Trand Bord, [1971] III All E.R. 230; Seaford Court Estate Limitd v. Ashor, [1949] 2 All B.R. 155; Ruggy Joint Water Board v. Fottit, [1972] 1 A.E.R. l057; K.P.  Verghese v.  I.T.O., [1981]  4 S.C.C. 173; State Bank of  Travancore v.  Mohd. M.  Khan [1981] S.C.C. 82; Som Prakash Rathi v. Union of India, [1981] S.C.C. I 449, Ravula Sobba Rao  v. C.I.T., [1956] S.C.R. 577; Govindlal v. Market Committee, [1976]  1 S.C.R. 482 and Babaji Kondaji v. Nhasik Merchants Coop. Bank, [1984] 2 S.C.C. 50 relied upon.      (Per Khalid, J.)      In normal  cases a  sub-tenant under  the Delhi  Rent e Control Act  1958 can get relief under the provisions of the Act only if he satisfies the twin conditions in s. 17 viz. there must  be  the  previous  consent  to  writing  by  the landlord of the creation of the sub-tenancy, and a notice in the prescribe  manner by  the sub-tenant  of the creation of the sub-tenancy to the landlord within one month of the date of such  creation. It  is only then these two conditions are satisfied that  the consequences  mentioned in  s.  18  will follow. [398 B-C]      Normally, 8.  17 should  be strictly complied with, for the sub-tenant to get the benefit under s.18. [398 F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2153 of 1980.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  22.9.1980  of  the Delhi High Court in S.A. No. 287 of 1980.      M.K. Mukhi,  Girish Chandra  and Mrs. Sarla Chandra for the Appellants. 387      F.S.   Nariman,    R.N.   Karanjawala,    Mrs.    Manik Karanajawala, Ejaz  Maqbooi, M.L.  Lahoty, S.P.  Singh, K.P. Gupta and Miss Helevs Marc for the Respondents.      The following Judgments of the Court were delivered      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J. Balbir  Nath  Mathur  obtained  an exparte decree  for  eviction  against  M/s.  Om  Prakash  & Company and  Kusum Rani,  a partner  of M/s.  Om  Prakash  & Company in respect of the ground floor of premises of No.90, Sunder Nagar,  New Delhi.  Three of  the partners of M/s. Om Prakash &  Company, it  must be mentioned at the outset, are

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the sister-in-law and the two minor daughters of Balbir Nath Mathur himself.  When Balbir  Nath Mathur  sought to execute the decree for eviction, M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons who are in occupation of  the  premises  filed  an  objection  petition before Rent  Controller, purporting  to do  so under 8.25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The objection petition was rejected by  the Rent  Controller. The  order  of  the  Rent Controller was  confirmed an  appeal, by  the  Rent  Control Tribunal and,  by the  High Court  on further revision. M/s. Girdhari Lal  & Sons have filed this appeal with the special leave of this court.      The Rent  Controller  and  the  Rent  Control  Tribunal concurrently found  that Balbir Nath Mathur was the owner of the premises,  that Om  Prakash & Company was the tenant and that Girdhari  Lal &  Sons were  the  sub-tenants  under  Om Prakash &  Company. The  case of  the appellants was that lt was  Balbir  Nath  Mathur  that  negotiated  the  lease  and inducted them  into possession  and that  they were not sub- tenants but  the direct  tenants of Balbir Nath Mathur. Even if they  were sub-tenants  only, they claimed that they were entitled to  the protection  of sections  17 and  18 of  the Delhi  Rent  Control  Act.  They  alleged  that  the  decree obtained by  Balbir Nath  Mathur was  a collusive decree and that a  fraud had  been played  upon the court to get rid of the appellant,  M/s. Girdhari  Lal &  Sons. In  view of  the concurrent findings that Om Prakash & Company was the tenant and M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons were the sub-tenants, we accept that finding  and proceed  to consider  the question whether the appellants are entitled to the protection of sections 17 and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 388      At the  time when the premises was leased by Om Prakash & Company  to M/s.  Girdhari Lal & Sons a letter executed by Om Prakash  & Company and attested by Balbir Nath Mathur was pass ed  on to  M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons. By this letter, Om Prakash &  Company confirmed the lease and further undertook to pay  to the  appellant as damages a sum calculated at the rate of  Rs.2500 per  month for  the unexpired period of the lease if the appellant had to vacate the premises before the expiry of  the lease period of two years Simultaneously M/s. Girdhari Lal  & Sons  executed a  letter addressed to Balbir Nath Mathur  in which  they stated,  after referring  to the lease of  the house in their favour by Om Prakash & Company, that they  would pay  a sum of Rs.8400 per annum as donation to the  Shre  Visheshwar  Nath  Memorial  Public  Charitable Trust, a  trust of  which Balbir Nath Mathur and others were trustees, if they stayed in the premises after the expiry of the period  of lease. Another important document to which we may make  a reference  is a  letter dated  June 10,  1975 by which Om  Prakash &  Company demanded  payment of arrears of rent from  M/s. Girdhari  Lal & Sons. This letter was signed by Balbir  Nath Mathur  himself  on  behalf  of  Om  Prakash Company. The  contention of the appellants is that there was consent in  writing by  the landlord  to the sub-tenancy, as well as  notice and  writing to  the landlord  of  the  sub- tenancy within  the meaning  of sections  17 and  18 of  the Delhi Rent  Control Act  and therefore  the sub-tenants M/s. Girdhari Lal  & Sons  were entitled  to be protected against eviction.      In order  to appreciate the contention of the appellant it is  necessary to  set out sections 17(1) and 18(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 :-           "17(1) Where,  after the commencement of this Act,           any premises  are sub-let  either in  whole or  in           part by  the tenant  with the  previous consent in

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         writing of  the landlord,  the tenant  or the sub-           tenant to  whom the  premises are  sub-let may, in           the prescribed manner, gave notice to the landlord           of the  creation of  the  sub-tenancy  within  one           month of  the date  of such sub-letting and notify           the termination  of such  sub-tenancy  within  one           month of such termination.           (2).......................................... 389           (3)..........................................           18(1) Where  an order  for eviction  in respect of           any premises  is made  under section  14 Against a           tenant but not against a sub-tenant referred to in           section 17  and a  notice of  the sub-tenancy  has           been given  to the landlord, the sub-tenant shall,           with effect  from the date of the order, be deemed           to become  a tenant  holding  directly  under  the           landlord  in   respect  of  the  premises  in  his           occupation on  the same  terms and  conditions  on           which  the   tenant  would   have  held  from  the           landlord, if the tenancy had continued.           (2)........................................."      Rule 21  of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 provides that a  notice of the creation or termination of sub-tenancy required under  s.17 shall  be in Form "E". Rule 22 provides that unless  otherwise provided  by the  Act, any  notice or intimation required or authorised by the Act to be served on any person  shall be  served (a)  by delivering  it  to  the person; or  (b) by forwarding it to the person by registered post with  acknowledgement due.  Form  "E"  provides  for  a statement of  full particulars of the demised premises, such as the street, municipal ward and house number, names of the tenant and  the sub-tenant,  details of  the portion sublet, rent payable by the sub-tenant, date of creation of the sub- tenancy, etc.      It may  be worthwhile  to restate  and explain  at this state certain  well known  principles of  Interpretation  of Statutes: Words  are but  mere vehicles of thought. They are meant to  express or  convey one’s  thoughts.  Generally,  a person’s words  and thoughts  are coincidental.  No  problem arises then,  but, not  in frequently,  then are  not. It is common experience with most men, that occasionally there are no adequate  words to  express some of their thoughts. Words which very  nearly express the thoughts may be found but not words which  will express  precisely. There  is then a great fumbling for words. Long   winded   explanations   and,   in conversation, even gestures are resorted to. Ambiguous words and words which unwittingly convey more than one meaning are used. Where  different interpretations  are likely to be put on words and a question 390 arises what  an individual meant when he used certain words, he may  be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say that he  meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws and difficulties arise  in interpreting what the legislature has said, a legislature can not be asked to sit to resolve those difficulties.  The   legislatures,  unlike  on  individuals, cannot come  forward  to  explain  themselves  as  often  as difficulties  of   interpretation  arise.  So  the  task  of interpreting the  laws by  finding out  what the legislature meant is  allotted to  the courts.  Now, if  one person puts into words  the thoughts  of another  (as the draftsman puts into words  the thoughts  of the  legislature) and  a  third person (the  court) is  to find  out what  they meant,  more

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difficulties are  bound to  crop up.  The draftsman  may not have caught  the spirit of the legislation at all; the words used by  him may  not adequately  convey what 18 meant to be conveyed; the  words may  be ambiguous;  they may  be  words capable  of   being  differently   understood  by  different persons. How  are the  courts  to  set  about  the  task  of resolving difficulties  of interpretation  of the  laws? The foremost task  of  a  court,  as  we  conceive  it,  in  the Interpretation of  Statutes, 18 to find out the intention of the legislature.  Of  course,  where  words  are  clear  and unambiguous no  question of  construction  may  arise.  Such words ordinarily  speak for themselves. Since the words must have spoken  as clearly  to legislators as to judges, lt may be safely  presumed that  the legislature  intended what the words plainly  say. This  is the real basis of the so called golden rule of construction that where the words of statutes are plain  and unambiguous  effect must  be given to them. A court should  give effect  to plain words, not because there is any  charm or  magic in  the plainness  of such words but because plain  words may  be expected  to convey plainly the intention of  the Legislature  to other  as well  as judges. Intention of the legislature and not the words is paramount. Even where  the words  of statutes  appear to be prima facie clear and unambiguous it may some times be possible that the plain meaning  of the  worts does  not convey  and may  even defeat the intention of the legislature; in such cases there is no  reason why  the true  intention of  the  legislature, if it  can be determined, clearly by other means, should not be given  effect. Words are meant to serve and not to govern and we  are not  to add  the tyranny  of words  to the other tyrannies of the world. 391      Parliamentary intention  may be  gathered from  several sources. First,  of course,  it must  be gathered  from  the statute itself,  next from the preamble to the statute, next from the  Statement of  Objects and Reasons, thereafter from Parliamentary debates, reports of Committees and Commissions which  preceded   the  legislation   and  finally  from  all legitimate and  admissible sources  from where  there may be light. Regard must be had to legislative history too.      Once Parliamentary  intention is  ascertained  and  the object and  purpose of  the legislation  is known,  it  then becomes the  duty  of  the  court  to  give  the  statute  a purposeful or  a functional  interpretation. this is what is meant when,  for example,  it is said that measures aimed at social amelioration  should receive  liberal  or  beneficent construction. Again,  the words  of a  statute  may  not  be designed  to   meet  the   several  uncontemplated  forensic situations that  may arise.  The draftsman may have designed his words  to meet  what Lord  Simon of  Glaisdale calls the ’primary situation’.  It will  then become necessary for the court to  impute an  intention to  Parliament in  regard  to ’secondary situations’.  Such ’secondary  intention’ may  be imputed in  relation to  a secondary situation so as to best serve the  same purpose  as the  primary statutory intention does in relation to a primary situation.      So we see that the primary and foremost task of a court in interpreting  a statute  is to ascertain the intention of the legislature,  actual or  imputed. Having  ascetained the intention, the  court must  then strive  to so interpret the statute as  to promote  or advance the object and purpose of the enactment.  For this  purpose, where necessary the court may even  depart from  the rule  that plain  words should be interpreted according  to their plain meaning. There need be no  neek  and  mute  submission  to  the  plainness  of  the

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language. To avoid patent injustice, anamoly or absurdity or to avoid  invalidation of  a law,  the court  would be  well justified in  departing from  the so-called  golden rule  of construction so  as to give effect to the object and purpose of the  enactment by  supplementing,  the  written  word  if necessary.      In an  old English  case,  Hawkins  v.  Gathercole,  43 English Reports  1129, Turner,  CJ., referred to two earlier cases reported by Plowden. In the first case of Stradling v. Morgan, 392 the Judges were reported to have said :           "That the Judges of the law in all times past have           so far  pursued the  intent of  the makers  of the           statutes, that they have expounded Acts which were           general in  words to  be but particular, where the           intent was particular ........ From which cases it           apears that  the sages  of the law heretofore have           construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in           some  appearance;   and   those   statutes   which           comprehend all  things in  the letter,  they  have           expounded to  extend but  to somethings; and those           which generally  prohibit all  people  from  doing           such an  act, they have interpreted to permit some           people to  do it;  and those  which include  every           person in  the letter, they have adjudged to reach           to  some  persons  only;  which  expositions  have           always  been   founded  upon  the  intent  of  the           Legislature, which they have collect ed, sometimes           by considering  the cause  and necessity of making           the Act,  sometimes by  comparing one  part of the           Act  with   another,  and   sometimes  by  foreign           circumstances, so  that they have ever been guided           by the  intent of the Legislature, which they have           always taken  according to  the necessity  of  the           matter, and  according to  that which 18 consonant           to reason and good discretion. Turner, CJ himself added,           "The  passages  to  which  I  have  referred  have           selected only  as containing the best summary with           which I acquainted of the law upon this subject In           determining  the   question  before  us,  we  have           therefore, to  consider not  merely the  words  of           this Act  of Parliament,  but the  intent  of  the           Legislature, to  be collected  from the  cause and           necessity of the Act being made, from a comparison           of its  several parts,  and from  foreign (meaning           extraneous)  circumstances  so  far  as  they  can           justly be  considered  to  throw  light  upon  the           subject."           In a forthright pronouncement Goulding, J. said in Comet Radio Vision & Services v. Farnell Trand Borg, [1971] 393 All E.R. 230.           "...The language  of parliament  though not  to be           extended beyond  its fair  construction, is not to           be interpreted in so slavishly literal a way as to           stultify the manifest purpose of the legislature."      In Seaford  Court Estates Limited v. Ashor [1949] 2 All E.R. 155  Lord Denning,  who referred  to Plowden’s  Reports already mentioned by us, said :           "Whenever a statute comes up for consideration, it           must be  remembered that  it is  not within  human           powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which           may arise,  and,  even  if  it  were,  it  is  not

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         possible to  provide for  them in  terms free from           all ambiguity.....  A Judge cannot simply fold his           hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work           on the  constructive task of finding the intention           of Parliament,  and he  must do this not only from           the language  of the  statute,  but  also  from  a           construction of  the social  conditions which gave           rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed           to remedy  and then he must supplement the written           word so as to give force and life to the intention           of the  legislature. Put  into homely metaphor, it           is this:  A judge  should ask himself the question           how, if  the makers of the Act had themselves come           across this  ruck in  the contexture  of  it  they           would have  straightened it  out? He  must then do           what they  would have  done. A  judge  should  not           alter the  material of which the Act is woven, but           he can and should iron out the creases."      In Rughy Joint Water Board v. Foottit [1972] 1 A.E.R. 1057, Lord Simon of Glaisdale said :           "The task  of the  courts is to ascertain what was           the intention  of  Parliament,  actual  or  to  be           imputed, in  relation to the facts as found by the           court....But on scrutiny of a statutory provision,           it will  generally appear  that a  given situation           was  within   the  direct   contemplation  of  the           draftsman as 394           the situation  calling for  statutory  regulation:           this may  be called  the primary  situation. As to           this, Parliament will certainly have manifested an           intention -’The  Primary Statutory Intention’. But           situations other  than the  primary situation  may           present   themselves    for   judicial   decisions           secondary situations.  As regards  these secondary           situations, it  may seem likely in some cases that           the draftsman had them in contemplation; in others           not.  Where  it  seems  likely  that  a  secondary           situation   was   not   within   the   draftsman’s           contemplation, it  will be necessary for the court           to impute  an intention to Parliament in the way I           have described,  that is,  to determine what would           have  been   this  statutory   intention  if   the           secondary situation  had been within Parliamentary           contemplation (a secondary intention)."      It may not be out of place to refer here to what Harold Laski said  in his  Report of  the Committee  on  Ministers’ powers:           "The present  methods of  statutory interpretation           make the  task of  considering the relationship of           statutes, especially  in the realm of great social           experiments, to the social welfare they are intend           ed to  promote one  in which  the end involved may           become unduly  narrowed, either  by reason  of the           unconscious assumptions of the Judge or because he           is  observing  the  principles  of  interpretation           devised  to   suit  interests  we  are  no  longer           concerned  to   protect  in  the  same  degree  as           formerly...The method  of interpretation should be           less analytical  and more functional in character;           it should  seek to  discover  the  effect  of  the           legislative precept  in action  so as to give full           weight to  the social  value  it  is  intended  to           secure."      In 1981,  the Australian Parliament added a new section

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15AA(1) to the Acts Interpretation Act, 1901, requiring that in  statutory  interpretation  "A  construction  that  would promote the  purpose or  object" of  an  Act  (even  if  not expressed in  the Act),  be preferred  to one that would not promote that purpose 395 or object. Julius Stone in his ’Precedent And Law - Dynamics of Common Law Growth’ also refers to this provision.      Our  own  court  has  generally  taken  the  view  that ascertainment of  legislative intent  is  a  basic  rule  of statutory construction  and  that  a  rule  of  construction should be preferred which advances the purpose and object of a legislation  and that  though a construction, according to plain  language,   should  ordinarily  be  adopted,  such  a construction  should  not  be  adopted  where  it  leads  to anomalies, injustices  or absurdities, vide K.P. Varghese v. I.T.O. [1981] 4 S.C.C.173, State Bank of Travsncore v. Mohd. M.Khan [1981]  4 S.C.C.82,  Som Prakash  Rathi v.  Union  of India [1981] 1 S.C.C. 449, Ravula Subba Rao v. C.I.T. [1956] S.C.R. 577, Govindlal v. Market Committee  [1976]  1  S.C.R. 482 &  Babaji Kondaji v. Nasik Merchants Coop. Bank [1984] 2 S.C.C. 50.      Bearing these  broad principles  in mind if we now turn to the  Delhi Rent  Control Act, it is at once apparent that the  Act   is  primarily  devised  to  prevent  unreasonable eviction  of   the  tenants  and  sub-tenants  from  demised premises  and   unreasonable   enhancement   of   rent.   In particular, the  purpose of sections 17 and 18 is clearly to protect the  sub-tenants  from  eviction  where  a  landlord obtains a  decree for eviction against the principal tenant. In  an  action  for  eviction  by  a  landlord  against  the principal tenant,  the sub-tenant  has no defence of his own under the  ordinary law,  even if  he has been inducted into possession with  the consent  of the  landlord. He has to go with the  tenant. He  can claim  no  right  to  sit  in  the premises apart and distinct from the right of the tenant. Showing an  awareness of  the problems  of sub-tenants,  the legislature enacted sections 17 and 18 for their protection. The protection  was afforded  to sub-tenants  who  had  been inducted into possession with the consent of the landlord. While so  extending a protecting hand to the sub-tenants who had genuinely  obtained the  consent of  the landlord  alone should be  entitled  to  that  protection.  The  legislature wanted to  prevent persons  who had  somehow managed  to get into possession,  having been  inducted into such possession by the  tenant or  otherwise from  putting forward  baseless claims that  they were  inducted into  possession  with  the consent of  the landlord.  So the legislature while offering protection to  a  sub-tenant  who  has  been  inducted  into possession by a landlord 396 has  limited  the  protection  to  the  sub-tenant  who  can establish  the   consent  of  the  landlord  by  documentary evidence to  which the landlord and the tenant or sub-tenant who can establish the consent of the landlord by documentary evidence to  which the landlord and the tenant or sub-tenant are parties.  So it is provided that the previous consent of the landlord  has to  be in writing and that a notice in the prescribed manner  has to  be given  to the  landlord by the tenant or the sub-tenant.      The essence  of the requirement, therefore, is that the consent of the landlord to the sub-tenancy and the notice of the creation  of the  sub-tenancy have  to be  evidenced  by writing.      The writing  is to  be such  as to indicate clearly the

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consent of the landlord to the creation of a sub-tenancy and his  knowledge  of  the  particular  sub-tenancy  after  its creation.      The writing  relating to  the consent  and the  writing relation to  the knowledge  (notice)  may  be  by  different documents or  they may  telescope into  the  same  document. Where, as  in the  present case, the agreement or the letter of the  sub-tenancy in  respect of  the demised  premises is attested by  the landlord  himself, there can be no question that the landlord has given his previous consent and that he has notice  in writing  of the sub-tenancy in respect of the particular premises. The requirements of sec. 17 and 18 both as regards  to  his  consent  and  the  notice  to  him  are satisfied. There  is no magical form in which the consent is to be  given nor  any charmed form in which the notice is to be sent.  As we  said, the essence of the matter is that the consent to the sub-tenancy and the notice of the sub-tenancy in respect  of the  premises must  be evidenced  by  writing signed by  the landlord and the tenant or the sub-tenant. In this view  of the  matter, the appellant in the present case is clearly  entitled to the protection of secs. 17 and 18 of the Delhi  Rent Control  Act and  he cannot,  therefore,  be evicted in  execution of  the decree obtained by Balbir Nath Mathur against  Om Prakash  & Company. We do not consider it necessary to embark into a discussion of the two cases cited before us Jagan Nath v. Abdul Aziz A.I.R. 1973 Delhi p.9 and Murari Ial v. Abdul Ghafar I.L.R. 1974 1 Delhi 45.      During the  pendency of  the appeal  in this  court, an order was  made to  the effect  that from  January  1,  1985 onwards, the  appellant should  deposit a  sum  of  Rs.3,600 every month out of which the respondent would be entitled to draw  out   a  sum  of  Rs.1,800  only.  On  behalf  of  the appellants, it was also 397 undertaken  that   the  suit   filed  by  them  against  the respondents for  fixation of fair rent would be withdrawn by them. We  are informed  that  the  suit  has  not  yet  been withdrawn. We  declare that  the suit filed by the appellant for the  fixation of  fair rent  shall  stand  dismissed  as withdrawn. We  further direct  that with effect from January 1, 1985 onwards, the rent for the premises shall be Rs.3,600 per month  and it  will be  so paid and adjusted. The amount now in  deposit may  be drawn  out by  the respondents.  The appeal is  allowed in the manner indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.      KHALID, J. I have gone through the Judgment prepared by my learned  brother. I  agree with  the conclusion  that the appeal has to be allowed.      We have  before us two parties, both affluent. No tears need be  shed either  for the  one or  the other. The tenant before us,  or to be precise the sub-tenant, is a firm which does not  deserve any  sympathy from  us  and  that  for  an excellant reason.  They had given an undertaking before this Court that  they would  withdraw the  suit filed by them for fixation of fair rent. This undertaking they did not respect till now,  obviously with  the oblique  motive of compelling the landlord  to get  the rent  reduced and at the same time walk away  with an  order from this Court avoiding eviction. Left  to  myself,  I  would  have  declined  relief  to  the appellants or  at least  directed  them  to  pay  a  sum  of Rs.5,000 every month as rent. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances  of this  case, where  the conduct  of the landlord is  anything but wholesome, I agree with my learned brother in the order passed by him allowing the appeal. But, I would  like to  make my position clear regarding the scope

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and purpose of section 17 and 18 of the Act.      The normal  rule is that all rights created by a tenant disappear along with the disappearance of his tenancy unless there are  special  satisfactory  safeguards  for  the  sub- tenants. A  sub-tenant has  no independent existence de-hors the tenant  who inducted  him into  possession. In  the  Act before  us  a  subtenant  is  given  a  special  right,  not available to  him under  the general  law, but that right is circumscribed by  specific conditions  laid down  in section 17. We  have chosen  to rescue the appellants before us only because of the hide and seek 398 conduct displayed  by the so-called tenant and the so-called land-lord in this case. The facts speak for themselves. Even a man  who runs  can see  that the  so-called tenant in this case is the alter ego of the so-called land-lord. There is a total identification between the two. It is their attempt to over reach  the appellants  by dubious  methods that has, in fact, imperilled  their case, and it is for this reason that the appellants  get  relief  from  us,  even  though  strict adherence to  the conditions  imposed under  section  17  is absent.      In normal  case a  sub-tenant under  the  Act  can  get relief under  the provision  of the Act only if he satisfies the twin  conditions laid  down in  section 17,  viz.,  that there must  be the  previous consent in writing by the land- lord, of the creation of the sub-tenancy and a notice in the prescribed manner  by the  sub-tenant of the creation of the sub-tenancy to the land-lord within one month of the date of such creation.      It is only when these two conditions are satisfied that the consequences  mentioned in  section 18(1) will follow. I should not,  therefore, be understood to hold the view that, as a  general rule,  in all cases where the sub-tenant some- how  secures   the  signature   of  the  land-lord  in  some communication relating  to tenancy,  a  consent  in  writing satisfying the requirements of the section is to be assumed. In this  case, Messrs  Om Prakash  & Company and Balbir Nath Mathur have  been hand  in gloves with one another to defeat the appellants.  It is the attestation by Balbir Nath Mathur on behalf of Messrs Om Prakash & Company in the letter dated June 10,  1975, that  has found  favour with  us  to  assume consent in  writing in the peculiar facts of the case. This, according to  me, is an exceptional case with facts peculiar to its own. Normally, section 17 should be strictly complied with, for  the sub-tenant  to get  the benefit under section 18. A.P.J.                                  Appeal allowed. 399