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PETITIONER: GIANI BAKSHISH SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GOVT.  OF INDIA & ORS

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1973

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1973 AIR 2667            1974 SCR  (1) 662  1973 SCC  (2) 688  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1990 SC 231  (10)

ACT: Maintenance of internal Security Act, 1971-s. 3(1) and  (2)- Foreigner If could be detailed.

HEADNOTE: The appellant, a British citizen, was detained under s. 3(2) read  with section 3 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) of Maintenance  of Internal  Security Act, 1971. The grounds of detention  were that he was engaged in subversive activities by  instigating and  creating  hatred between the Hindus and  Sikhs  and  by calling  upon the Sikhs to establish a separate homeland  by resorting   to   violent   methods.    In   reply   to ,I representation  by  the Akali party for the release  of  the appellant from detention the Chief Minister of Punjab stated in the State Assembly that the appellant was in Pakistan  in November.  1971 alongwith a Pakistani official, that he  had been  photographed getting down from a Pakistani plane,  and that he had made a statement to a newspaper that ’India  was a prison house for Sikhs; but, he did not mention any of the grounds contained in the order of detention. The  appellant’s petition for the issue of a writ of  habeas corpus on the ground that he had made arrangements to  leave the country was dismissed by the High Court. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD : Clauses, (a) and (b) of s. 3(1) of the Maintenance of Internal  Security  Act  deal with two  different  kinds  of powers.   Under  clause (a) power is given to the  State  to detain any person including a foreigner for any of the  pur- poses mentioned therein and under el. (b) power is given  to detain  a  foreigner  either for  regulating  his  continued presence  in  India  or  for  making  arrangements  for  his expulsion  from  India.  It is not only in a  case  where  a foreigner  wants  to  continue in India that  the  power  to detain under el. (a) was available but it is available  even where, in order to avoid preventive detention, the foreigner offers to go out of the country.  [667 B-C] (2)It  is  not correct to say that el. (b) is  beyond  the legislative competence of Parliament, and, that,  therefore, the  order under el. (a) could only be made with a  view  to regulate the presence of the appellant in India and not when

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the appellant wanted to leave India.  It is well established that various legislative entries should be interpreted in  a broad manner and if any legislation could be brought  within the ambit of any one or other of the legislative entries the validity of the legislation cannot be questioned.  Entry 10, List I, Schedule VII to the Constitution deals with  foreign affairs and all matters which bring the Union into relations with  a  foreign  country, would certainly  cover  el.  (b). Therefore,  it  is within the competence  of  the  detaining authority to exercise the power conferred on it either under el. (a) or. el. (b). [667 C-D] (3)The  decision  of  this  Court  in  Hants  Muller-   of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency fail, Calcutta  that section 3(1)(b) of Preventive Detention Act which is exactly similar  to  s.  3 (1) (b) of the  Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act conferred power to use the means of  preventive detention as one of the methods of achieving expulsion of  a foreigner does not mean that s. 3 (1) (a) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act cannot be used for the purpose  for which it is plainly intended.  [667 E-F] (4)The  appellant,  taking advantage of the fact  that  by race  he  is an Indian, proposed to  indulge  in  activities which were a danger to the integrity and security 663 of tile country.  The first duty of the State is to survive. To  do  SO it had got to deal with enemies  both  overt  and covert  whether they be inside the country or outside.   The fact  that the appellant, if released, would go  to  England and from there continue to indulge in activities prejudicial to the security and integrity of this country was a relevant factor  in determining whether he could be detained when  he was found in this country.  It is true that there is no  law in this country providing for extradition of persons against whom  this  country would consider it necessary to  pass  an order  for preventive detention.  But if such a person  hap- pened  to come to this country he could be detained.  It  is not  correct  that  a person like  the  appellant  could  be detained only if it was apprehended that if not detained  he would indulge in prejudicial activities within the  country. [669 E-F, H] (5)Preventive  detention  is  not  a  punishment  for   an offence.  To accept the argument of the appellant that  only where  the  grounds of detention were based on  facts  which could be held to amount to an offence either in India or  in a foreign country, that he could be detained would make  the grounds  given  in s. 3(1) of the  Maintenance  of  Internal Security  Act,  meaningless.   Preventive  detention  is  an anathema to champions of individual liberty, but times being what they are, the Constitution makers in their wisdom  have provided for it in Art. 22.  In the absence of a law dealing with  the matter the courts will have to decide whether  the activities   for  which  a  person  was  detained  was   one prejudicial   to   the  defence  and  security   of   India. [669-D-E,H] (6)The District Magistrate who made the order of detention could  not  have known of the activities  of  the  appellant which   the  Chief  Minister  mentioned  in  the   Assembly. Moreover,  the  Chief Minister’s reply was in  answer  to  a demand  of  the  party for  the  appellant’s  release.   The grounds of the appellant’s detention must have been known to them.   The Chief Minister was, therefore, only giving  them additional   information   which  came  to   his   knowledge subsequently.   There fore, it could not be  contended  that the  grounds for approval of the appellant’s detention  were not  the  same  grounds on which he was  detained  but  some

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others, Hence no malice in law has been established. [670 C, E, F]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 116  of 1973. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated May  28,  1973  of  the Punjab and  Haryana  High  Court  at Chandigarh in Criminal Writ No. 9 of 1973. B.   K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for the appellant. V.   M.  Tarkunde,  S.   K. Mehta and R.  N.  Sachthey,  for respondents Nos.  1 and 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI,  J. This is an appeal against the judgment  of the   High  Court  of  Punjab  &  Haryana   dismissing   the appellant’s  petition under Article 226 of the  constitution of  India read with section 491 Cr. P.C. for the issue of  a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for his production before the Court and  to  be  set at liberty.  The  appellant  is  a  British citizen. employed in the Accounts Branch.  Head Post  Office Brimingham  and  General  Secretary of  the  United  Kingdom Akali  Dal.   He came to India oil 6-11-1972 to  attend  the Bhog ceremony of ’Sant Fateh Singh who died on 30th October, 1972.   He  was arrested on 16A-1 1972 in  pursuance  of  an order for his detention under the provisions of  sub-section (2)  of section 3 read with section 3 (1) (a) (i) & (ii)  of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.  This  order was  approved by the State Government oil  27-11-1972.   The Advisory 664 Board’s report in respect of the detention was made on  4-1- 1973  and  the State Government  confirmed  the  order  of detention  on 16-1-1973.  The grounds of detention  were  as follows :               (a)   That you on 11-11-72 held secret meeting               in Gurdwara Rani Bazar Sharifpura, Amritsar at               7.00 p.m........ In the meeting you told  them               that  the Sikhs could not get justice  at  the               hands  of Hindus in India.  Therefore, it  was               necessary  to  secure Home Land for  Sikhs  by               resorting  to  the use of force as  the  Bania               Government at the Centre could not accept  the               demand  of  Sikh Home Land  by  persuasion  or               other  peaceful  means.  You  further  assured               them  that there was no paucity of funds  with               U. K. Akali Dal and sufficient amount could be               made  available  which could be spent  in  the               achievement   of  Home  Land  on   the   lines               suggested above.  You also informed them  that               your organisation (U.K. Akali Dal) had made  ,               Rs. 50,000/available in India for use for  the               achievement  of the Home Land.   You  further               told  them  that you could also  be  receiving               sufficient  money  from your  organisation  in               U.K. in the near future.  You further exhorted               them to organise the movement in a  systematic               manner, raising volunteers and setting offices               at  suitable  places in Punjab.   You  further               directed them to collect arms, explosives  etc               for  use for the achievement of the object  at               the proper time.  You further instigated  them               to create hatred amongst Hindus and Sikhs  and

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             cause  communal disturbances in  Punjab.   You               also  advised them to enlist large  number  of               paid  workers  who  could  work  as   "suicide               squads" at the proper time and till then their               services could be used in doing propaganda  in               the villages for creating favorable atmosphere               amongst  the  Sikh masses in  support  of  the               creation of Sikh Home Land.               (b)   That you on 12-11-1972 again addressed a               secret meeting in Gurdwara        Rani  Bazar,               Sharifpura,  Amritsar at 8.00  p.m............               In  this meeting you instigated them that  the               Sikh  community could not survive in India  in               the  present Hindu Raj.  Therefore, the  Sikhs               must  secure  separate Home Land by  force  so               that they could live with honour and  dignity.               You  further  added  that  Sikhs  could   only               prosper  if  separate Home Land for  Sikhs  is               achieved.   You further instigated  them  that               they  would have to make all sorts of  efforts               including  use  of  arms  and  indulgence   in               violence  in order to achieve the  Home  Land.               You  further  exhorted  them  to  enlist   the               services of young elements in the Sikhs                                    665               who would work wholeheartedly for the achieve-               ment  of  the Home Land and were  prepared  to               make  big  sacrifices.  You  further  informed               them  that your Organisation (U.K. Akali  Dal)               would  be  prepared to provide them  with  any               amount they would be requiring for  organising               the movement and for purchasing the arms  etc.               You further suggested that they should  create               cells  in  the Sikh Units of Armed  Forces  of               India and police for enlisting their  sympathy               and  support which would be of great help  for               the  creation  of  the Home  Land.   You  also               instigated  them to create hatred amongst  the               Hindus  and Sikhs in order to  create  tension               and communal disturbances which would be great               help in achieving their object.               (c)   That  you again on 14-11-1972  addressed               another  meeting at  Jullundur............  In               this meeting you told the participants that if               the Sikh Home Land was not achieved the  Sikhs               would be reduced to status of ’Ghasiaras’  and               they  could not live an honorable life like  a               free  citizen of India and further  told  them               that  the  "Panth" created  by  sacrifices  of               great Gurus would be eliminated.  You  further                             instigated  them that the Sikhs would  have  to               make  all sorts of sacrifices to achieve  the               Home  Land for Sikhs.  You also  suggested  to               them that the active workers should  propagate               the  ideology  of Sikh Home Land  amongst  the               Sikh   masses   particularly  in   youth   and               students.   You further assured them that  you               would arrange funds for them from U.K. for the               purchase  of arms which could be used  in  the               struggle   for  the  Home  Land.    The   also               suggested that the Sikhs who go to U.K. should               be  asked  to get arms licenses in  India  and               they  would be provided arms in U.K.  by’  him               free  of cost.  They on return could make  use

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             of  these  arms in the struggle for  the  Home               Land.   You  also instigated  them  to  create               tension amongst the Hindus and Sikhs and cause               communal disturbances.  You also suggested the               participants that they should propagate in the               Sikh  masses that the Sikhs were  being  given               step-motherly  treatment  in  the  matter   of               selection  of services-in the ’Bania’  Govern-               ment  and to the Sikh agriculturists.  AR  the               participants assured you to work on the  lines               suggested by you." To complete the narration of facts it is necessary to  refer to  the  proceedings of the Punjab Legislative  Assembly  on 7-3-1973 in which the Chief Minister of Punjab replying to a representation  for  the  release  of  the  appellant   from detention  did not mention any of the grounds  contained  in the  order of detention, but sought to justify it by  saying that the petitioner was in Pakistan at Nankana Sahib at  the time  of Guru Nanak’s Birthday in November 1971 alongwith  a Pakistani 666 official, that he had been photographed getting down from  a Pakistani  plane,  and  that he had made a  statement  to  a newspaper  that  ’India was a prison house for  Sikhs.’  The petitioner  had also alleged in his writ petition that  when the Prime Minister of India visited England in 1971 the Sikh community  residing in the U.K. had staged a  .demonstration expressing  its  concern against the Government  of  India’s interference  in the management of Sikh Gurdwaras  of  Delhi State  by  taking over the management of the  Gurdwaras  and handing  over  the  same to a Board  nominated  by  it  from amongst  its own henchmen, that the Prime Minister of  India was  annoyed and irritated on account of this  demonstration and  the petitioner being one of the foremost organisers  of that  demonstration  incurred the displeasure of  the  Prime Minister’s partymen and under their direction a false  story has  been  concocted  to harass him and to  prevent  him  to return  to  England  to  join  his  service.   Nothing  was, however, said about this during the course of the arguments. Mr.  Garg did not seek to argue nor could he argue that  any of  the  grounds given for the  appellant’s  detention  were vague or irrelevant.  It is now settled law that  preventive detention  is not a punishment for the past activities of  a person  but is intended to prevent the person detained  from indulging  in  future in activities which  may  produce  the results  mentioned  in  section  3  of  the  Maintenance  of Internal  Security  Act.  It is also well settled  that  the Court will not go into the truth or .otherwise of the  facts alleged  as  grounds of detention.  The sufficiency  of  the grounds  for detention is not also a matter which the  court will  go  into.   There  can  also  be  so  doubt  that  the appellant’s activities detailed in grounds (a) to (c)  bring his case squarely within the ambit of sub-clauses (i) & (ii) of  clause  (a)  of  subsection (1) of’  Section  3  of  the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. The  argument,  however, was advanced that in respect  of  a foreign clause (a) of sub-section 3(1) should be read  along with clause (b) of that sub-section, and if so read an order of  detention  in respect of’ a foreigner can only  be  made with a view to regulate his continued presence in India  and to  making  arrangements for his expulsion from  India.   It was,  therefore,  urged  that  as  the  appellant  had  made arrangements for his departure to England on 18-12-1972, his detention  for  purposes other than that of  regulating  his presence  in India or making arrangements for his  expulsion

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from India was illegal.  It was also urged that even at this stage the appellant is anxious to go to England and that  he would  be satisfied if an order is made to take  him  wider- proper  escort and put him on a plane leaving  for  England. We  are  not impressed with this argument.  The power  of  a State to deal with foreigners committing offenses inside its territory is not ill dispute, The power of a State to detain even a foreigner who is found inside its territory in  order to  prevent  him from indulging  in  prejudicial  activities inside  its territory cannot also be questioned.   Mr.  Garg did  not  seek  to  question  the  power  of  Parliament  to legislate  with regard to that subject.  But  he  contended, however,  that  the  power  of  Parliament  in  respect   of preventive  detention  is  found  in  Entry  9  of  List  I, ’Schedule  VII  of the Constitution. and the  power  of  the Parliament 667 and the State Legislature in entry 3 of the Concurrent list, that  clause  (b)  of section 3(1)  of  the  Maintenance  of Internal  Security Act Will not fall under either  of  those entries and that only clause (a) will fall within the  ambit of  that  power  and  the power  given  by  clause  (b)  can therefore  be used only in aid of the power given  by  cause (a).   We  are  unable to  accept  this  contention  either. Clause  (a) and clause (b) deal with two different kinds  of powers.  Under clause (a) the power is given to the State to detain  any  person, including a foreigner for  any  of  the purposes  mentioned in that clause.  Under clause (b)  power is  given  to detain a foreigner either for  regulating  his continued  presence in India or for making arrangements  for his  expulsion irom India.  It is within the  competence  of the  detaining authority to exercise the power conferred  on it  under clause (a) or clause (b).  In this case the  order of  detention is made under clause (a) and therefore  clause (b)  does not come into picture at all.  We are not able  to agree  with the contention that clause (b) would  be  beyond the  legislative  competence  of  Parliament  unless  it  is interpreted  in the manner in which Mr. Garg wants it to  be interpreted.   It  is  well  established  that  the  various legislative entries should be interpreted in a broad  manner and if any legislation could be brought within the ambit  of any one or other of the legislative entries the validity  of that  legislation cannot be questioned.  Entry 10,  List  I, Schedule  VH: Foreign Affairs; all matters which  bring  the Union   into  relation  with  any  foreign  country,   would certainly  cover  clause  (b).  We may  also  refer  to  the Foreigners  Act,  1946  which confers  much  more  stringent powers  in relation to a foreigner than clause (b).  It  has not been argued that those powers are not valid or that  the Foreigners Act is not a valid piece of legislation.  We  may legitimately  presume that the laws of various countries  of the   world  confer  similar  powers  on  their   respective Governments  in relation to foreigners.  In Hans  Muller  of Nurenburg  v.  Superintendent Presidency  Jail,  Calcutta  & Ors.(1)  this  Court  held  that  section  3(1)(b)  of   the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which is exactly similar  to clause  (b) of section 3(1‘) of the Maintenance of  Internal Security Act, as well as section 3 (2)(c) of the  Foreigners Act  1946, on which it is based are not ultra vires  of  the Constitution.  It was also held that section 3(1) (b) of the Preventive  Detention  Act is reason. ably  related  to  the purpose  of the Act, namely preventive detention.,  inasmuch as  the right to expel a foreigner conferred by s. 3 (2)  of the  Foreigners Art on the Central Government and the  right to make arrangements for expulsion include the right to make

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arrangements  for  preventing any breach or evasion  of  the order; and the Preventive Detention Act confers the power to use the means of preventive detention as one of the  methods of achieving this end.  This decision does not mean that  s. 3 (1) (a) could not be used for the purposes for which it is plainly intended, We  are conscious that the whole question at issue  in  this case is not whether the appellant could be detained in order that  he might be expelled but whether he could continue  to be  detained  except for that purpose.  In the face  of  the very clear provisions of section 3 (1 ) (a), (1)  [1965] (1) S. C. R. 1284 668 we  have no doubt on that point.  Indeed the  Parliament  to have specifically contemplated the contingency and  provided for it. It is not only in a case where a foreigner wants  to continue  in  India that the power is,  available  but  even where in order to avoid preventive detention he offers to go out  of  the  country. it was urged that to  place  such  an interpretation  on  this  provision  would  be  contrary  to Article 51 of the Constitution, that if it all possible  the section should be so interpreted as not to conflict with the provisions of Article 51. We see no such contradiction if it is interpreted as we have done.  Reliance was placed upon  a statement in Starke’s Introduction to International Law (7th Edn.)  found at page 348 where it is stated that  "Detention prior  to  explosion  should be avoided,  unless  the  alien concerned  refuses to leave the State or is likely to  evade the  authorities.  Reference, was also made to  Oppoenheim’s International Law (7th Edn.) where at page 631 it is  stated that "Just as a State is competent to refuse admission to an alien, so, in conformity with its territorial supremacy,  it is  competent to expel at any moment an alien who  has  been admitted into its territory." It was urged that is the  only power which State has in dealing with an alien who had  come to  a  country under a passport which, as was held  by  Lord Alverstone,  C.J.  in  R.v. Brailsford, (1)  is  a  document issued in the name of the Sovereign on the responsibility of a  Minister of the Crown to a named individual, intended  to be presented to the Governments of foreign nations and to be used for that individual’s protection as a Britsh subject in foreign countries.  It was therefore, urged that to detain a foreigner who has come to the country with a passport  would be  a breach of international amity.  It is obvious in  this case that the appellant taking advantage of the fact that by race he is an Indian proposed to indulge in activities which are a danger to the integrity and security of this  country. The  first duty of a state is to survive.  To do so  it  has got to deal with enemies both overt and covert whether  they be  inside  the  country or outside.   This  fact  that  the appellant  if  released would go to England and  from  there continue  to  indulge  in  activities  prejudicial  to   the security and integrity of this country is a relevant  factor in determining whether he could be detained in this  country when  he is found in this country.  It is not necessary  for the  purposes  of  this  case to  consider  whether  if  the appellant had not come to this country at all and stayed  in England  and continued to indulge in activities  prejudicial to  the  integrity and safety of this  country  a  detention order could be passed against him and he could be brought to this  country.   Even  persons,  whether  they  are   Indian citizens  or foreigners. who have committed crimes  in  this country but have escaped to another country could be brought back  only  if there are extradition arrangements  with  the country  to  which they have escaped and the offence  is  an

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extraditable offence.  We are aware that there is no law  in this  country providing for extradition of  persons  against whom  this  country would consider it necessary to  pass  an order  for  Preventive detention.  It is not to  be  assumed that  this  country  Will indulge in  such  a  useless,  and pointless exercise.  But that is quite different from saying that there cannot be (1)  [1905] 2 K. B. 730. 669 a law in this country providing for such detention.  But  if such a person happens to come to this country we presume  he can  be  detained.   We do not accept the  argument  that  a person  like the appellant could be detained only if  it  is apprehended  that  if  not  detained  he  would  indulge  in prejudicial  activities  in  this country  and  not  if  his activities  are  outside this country even though  they  may have a prejudicial effect on this country.  Take the case of a person acting prejudicially to the security of a State  in this  country while residing in another State.  We  have  no doubt that he can be detained by the former State.  The same analogy  applies to this case.  International Law  does  not seem  to  deal  with the case of nationals  of  one  country acting in that country to the prejudice of the security  and integrity  of another country and whether anything could  be done  about them.  To allow a person like the appellant  to go bac k to England at his request in spite of the certainty that  while  in  England  he will  continue  to  indulge  in activities prejudicial to the security and integrity of this country would be like the action of some foolish people  who take  a rat caught in a trap in their house to the road  and release it. It  was urged that only where the grounds of detention  were based  on  facts which can be held to amount to  an  offence either  in India or in a foreign country for which he  could be  punished  could  he be detained.  We  are  not  able  to appreciate  the import of this argument.  As is well  known, preventive detention is not a punishment for an offence.  To accept  the argument on behalf of the appellant  would  make the grounds given in s. 3(1) of the Maintenance of  Internal Security   Act  meaningless.   Take  for   instance   action prejudicial  to the relations of India with foreign  powers. As far as we are aware, there is no law enabling anybody  in India to be punished for acting in a mannerprejudicial  to the relations of India with foreign powers. it cannothowever be   argued   that   detention  on  that   ground   is   not permissible.Take again the case of activities prejudicial to the  Defence of India.  For the present of course,  we  have the  Defence of India Act still in force.  Let us  assume  a period when it was not in force, does it mean that a  person acting  in  a  manner prejudicial to the  defence  of  India cannot be detained even though there is no law dealing  with that  question.  That is why the Preventive  Detention  Act, 1950,  which  was  passed  when there  was  no  war  and  no emergency, provided for detention on the same grounds as  in Maintenance  of Internal Security Act.  In the absence of  a law dealing with that question, naturally enough the   will have  to decide whether the activity for which a  person  is detained is one prejudicial to the defence of India; so also an  activity prejudicial to the security of India.   Defence of  a country or the security of a country is not  a  static concept.   The days are gone by when one had to worry  about the  security  of a country or its defence only  during  war time.   A  country  has  to  be  in  a  perpetual  state  of preparedness.   Eternal vigilance is the price  of  liberty. So it is that the founding fathers with considerable  wisdom

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and foresight provided for laws for preventive detention and the  limitations  thereon  mentioned in Article  22  of  the Constitution.   Preventive  detention  is,  of  course,   an anthema to champions of individual liberty.  But times being what they are, the Constitution makers in their wisdom have 670 provided  for  it.   It is not  necessary  to  give  further examples  to show that prejudicial  activities  contemplated under  section 3(1) of the Maintenance of Internal  Security Act  are  not  necessarily  activities  prohibited  or  made punishable by a specific provision of law.  The cases relied upon to support the contrary proposition should be  confined to the facts of those cases. The only other question that remains to be dealt with is the one  that arises out of the statement of the Chief  Minister of  Punjab  in the Legislative Assembly  on  7-3-1973.   The argument is that the Chief Minister’s reply shows that  the, appellant  has  been  detained  and  is,  continued  to   be detained, not for the reasons which were intimated to him in the form of grounds of detention but really for the  reasons mentioned  in the Assembly and the detention  is  therefore, bad.   It is pertinent to remember in this  context  firstly that  the order for the detention of the appellant was  made by  the District Magistrate of Amritsar.  He could not  have known  of  the activities of the appellant which  the  Chief Minister mentioned in the Assembly.  Secondly, the  approval by the Government of Punjab of the appellant’s detention was made  on 16-1-1973.  There. is nothing to show that on  that day  the Government of Punjab knew of the matters which  the Chief  Minister  brought up in the Legislative  Assembly  on 7-3-1973,  and the detention was approved by the  Government only  for those reasons.  We arc not prepared to assume,  as was urged on behalf of the appellant, that the three matters mentioned  in the Chief Minister’s speech should, have  come to the notice of the Indian High Commission as soon as  they took  place  and that they should have  alerted  the  Punjab Government  at  once.   There  is no  warrant  for  such  an assumption.  Except that one of the activities is said to be in 1971, we do not even know about the dates of the  others. Moreover,  the Chief Minister’s reply was in answer to  the demand  of the Akali Dal Party for the appellant’s  release. The grounds of appellant’s detention must have been known to them.   The  Chief  Minister should,  therefore,  have  been giving  them  additional  information  which  came  to   his knowledge subsequently.  We are not, therefore, prepared  to assume  that  the grounds for approval  of  the  appellant’s detention were not the same grounds on which he was detainedbut some   others,  and  therefore  malice  in  law   has   been established. Furthermore,   by   a   Presidential    order Articles-14, 19 and 22 of theConstitution     have     been suspended  during  the subsistence of  the  Proclamation  of Emergency.   This contention is based on decisions  of  this Court   interpreting  Article  22.   They  are,   therefore, irrelevant  in considering a petition under section 491  Cr. P.C. We  see  no  merit in the points raised  on  behalf  of  the appellant. The appeal is dismissed. P.B.R.                             Appeal dismissed 671