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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3086 of 2006

PETITIONER: Gian Dass

RESPONDENT: The Gram Panchayat, Village Sunner Kalan & Others.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/07/2006

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11715 of 2005)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.  

       Leave granted.

       The appeal relates to a judgment delivered by a learned  Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in  Regular Second Appeal No. 895 of 1984.  The Second Appeal  was filed by the defendants, in a suit for possession. The suit  had been decreed by both the trial court and the first appellate  court on the ground that the plaintiff (appellant) herein is the  Saunjidar of the land in dispute and he had been dispossessed  forcibly and illegally.  The High Court held that when a person  is claiming a title, right or interest in the property in dispute  either being a owner or a saunjidar or tenant, then the  jurisdiction of the civil court is barred.  Saunjidar right is an  interest claimed by the plaintiff-the appellant herein.   Therefore, the civil court cannot adjudicate upon the matter.   It is only the Collector under Section 11 of the Punjab Village  Common Lands  (Regulation) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to  as the ’Act’) who can decide whether the plaintiff had any  saunjidar rights in the property in dispute.  Accordingly the  appeal was allowed, judgment and decree passed by the courts  below were set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-appellant  herein were dismissed.

Though several points were urged in support of the  appeal, the basic issue which was urged was that the Second  Appeal in terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908 (in short the ’Code’) has been disposed of without  formulating substantial question of law by the High Court.  It  is, therefore, not necessary to deal with the factual aspects in  detail.

       Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the  High Court was not justified in disposing of the second appeal  without formulating the substantial question or questions of  law, as mandated by Section 100 of the Code.                  Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that  though the High Court has not formulated the questions of  law as required, yet on analyzing the evidence, it concluded  that the views expressed by the courts below were not tenable  in law, and the civil court had no jurisdiction to deal with the  suit.

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       It is further submitted that though no substantial  question of law was formulated before the Second Appeal was  adjudicated, yet that is permissible, because proviso to sub  Section (5) of Section 100 permits the High Court to decide a  second appeal on a different substantial question of law  subject to recording of reasons.   Section 100 of the Code deals with "second appeal". The  provision reads as follows: "100 (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided  in the body of this Code or by any other law for  the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to  the High Court from every decree passed in  appeal by any court subordinate to the High  Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the  case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from  an appellate decree passed ex-parte.  (3) In an appeal under this section, the  memorandum of appeal shall precisely state  the substantial question of law involved in the  appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a  substantial question of law is involved in any  case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question  so formulated and the respondent shall, at the  hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that  the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section  shall be deemed to take away or abridge the  power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be  recorded, the appeal on any other substantial  question of law, not formulated by it, if it is  satisfied that the case involves such question."

A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High  Court does not show that any substantial question of law has  been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the  question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment  cannot be maintained.  In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [2000 (1) SCC 434]  this Court in para 10 has stated thus: "10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the  1976 amendment, it is essential for the High  Court to formulate a substantial question of  law and it is not permissible to reverse the  judgment of the first appellate court without  doing so."

Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh [2000 (3) SCC 708]  this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court  is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law.  Para 7 of the said judgment reads: "7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100  CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain  a second appeal is confined only to such  appeals which involve a substantial question of  law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on  the High Court to interfere with pure questions  of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under  Section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of  disposing of the matter, the High Court did not  even notice the question of law formulated by  it at the time of admission of the second  appeal as there is no reference of it in the

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impugned judgment. Further, the fact finding  courts after appreciating the evidence held  that the defendant entered into the possession  of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a  tenant and his possession was permissive and  there was no pleading or proof as to when it  became adverse and hostile. These findings  recorded by the two courts below were based  on proper appreciation of evidence and the  material on record and there was no  perversity, illegality or irregularity in those  findings. If the defendant got the possession of  suit land as a lessee or under a batai  agreement then from the permissive  possession it is for him to establish by cogent  and convincing evidence to show hostile  animus Page 1532 and possession adverse to  the knowledge of the real owner. Mere  possession for a long time does not result in  converting permissive possession into adverse  possession (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind  Kumar) [1994 (6) SCC 591]. Hence the High  Court ought not to have interfered with the  findings of fact recorded by both the courts  below.

The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal v.  Anupkumar [2003 (1) SCC 430]. In Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram and Ors. [2004 (6) SCC  359], it was observed thus: "6. In view of Section 100 of the Code the  memorandum of appeal shall precisely state  substantial question or questions involved in  the appeal as required under Sub-section (3) of  Section100. Where the High Court is satisfied  that in any case any substantial question of  law is involved, it shall formulate that question  under Sub-section (4) and the second appeal  has to be heard on the question so formulated  as stated in Sub-section (5) of Section 100."

        The position was highlighted by this Court in Joseph Severane  and Others  v.  Benny Mathew and Others  [2005 (7) SCC 667].   Sasikumar and Others v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair and  Others. [2005 (12) SCC 588].

The plea about proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100  instead of supporting the stand of the respondent rather goes  against them. The proviso is applicable only when any  substantial question of law has already been formulated and it  empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded,  the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The  expression "on any other substantial question of law" clearly  shows that there must be some substantial question of law  already formulated and then only another substantial question  of law which was not formulated earlier can be taken up by  the High Court  for reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view  that the  case involves such question.

       Under the circumstances the impugned judgment is set  aside, we remit the matter to the High Court so far as it relates  to Second Appeal No. 895 of 1984 for disposal in accordance  with law.  The appeal is disposed of on the aforesaid terms  with no order as to costs.