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PETITIONER: GHAZIABAD ENGINEERING CO. (P) LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CERTIFYING OFFICER, KANPUR AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/01/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1978 AIR  769            1978 SCR  (2) 534  1978 SCC  (1) 480

ACT: Constitution  of  India, 1950, Art.  136-Questions  of  fact cannot  be  canvassed for invoking the jurisdiction  of  the Supreme Court. Casual  leave, concept of and whether has nexus  with  total number  of  days leave that a worker  is  entitled-Value  of current  trend in a particular area  or  industry-Industrial Employment  (Standing  Orders)  Act 1946  r/w  S.  79(1)  of Factories Act, 1948.

HEADNOTE: As against the claim of twelve days casual leave (on a  paid basis) made by the workmen of the appellant company and  for modification  of  the Standing Orders under  the  Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act 1946, and the rules  framed thereunder,    the   certifying   officer,    taking    into consideration (a) the financial position of the  appellant’s undertaking  including  it  having paid  20%  bonus  to  its workers   (b)   the  prevalent  practice   in   neighbouring industries  in  that industrial belt of giving  paid  casual leave,  and  (c)  the  current  trend  in  that   particular industrial  area,  granted  the  modification  reducing  the number  of days to six, as being fair and  reasonable.   The appellate authority confirmed the said modification. Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court HELD : 1. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 136 cannot be exploited for canvassing pure questions of fact. [535 E] 2.   Casual  leave  is not an automatic,  advantage  to  the total  number  of  days’ leave that a  worker  is  entitled. Casual leave is not a matter of right and it is only in  the event  of sudden emergencies that casual leave  is  allowed. Unforeseen   circumstances   may   unexpectedly   prop    up necessitating  sudden  absence  of an  employee,  be  he  in Government  service or any other office or in an  industrial undertaking.    The  whole  concept  of  casual   leave   is calculated to provide for such contingencies. [535 G-H;  536 A] 3.   A certain number of days’ leave prescribed in S.  79(1) is  the  minimum and not the maximum.  Current  trend  in  a particular  area or industry has not the force of  law.   It may  have persuasive value but not more, in considering  the claim for casual leave.

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In the instant case; (1) There is nothing grossly unfair  or shockingly  violative  of  fairness  or  justice  warranting interference  by  this  Court by  exercise  of  its  special jurisdiction.  After all the excess is around three days  in a year over the current trend of granting an overall maximum of  thirty days, which circumstance the Tribunal  has  taken note of. [535 F, 536 C-D] Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [1963] 1 SCR  297 reiterated.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION  :  Civil  Appeal  No.   2171 of 1970. Appeal  by Special Leave from the Order dated  30-3-1970  of the  Appellate Authority Allahabad (Industrial Tribunal)  in Standing.  Order Appeal No. 8/69. K.   P. Gupta for the Appellant. 5 3 5 G. N. Dikshit and O. P. Rana for Respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.-This appeal by special leave raises a short question which has been decided adverse to the appellant  by the  certifying officer, Kanpur and the Industrial  Tribunal which  is  the appellate authority.  The narrow  point  that falls for decision is as to whether the modification of  the Standing  Orders under the Industrial  Employment  (Standing Orders)  Act,  1946  and the  rules  framed  thereunder  was illegally    made   by   the   certifying   officer.     The modification,itself  related  to grant of six  days’  casual leave  (on a paid basis) to the workers in  the  appellant’s factory in Ghaziabad.  The certifying officer has considered this  grant  of casual leave as fair and  reasonable  having regard  to  the  prevalent  practice  in  the   neighbouring industries of this industrial belt and also paying attention to  the financial position of the  appellant’s  undertaking. For this purpose he has relied upon the fact that 20%  bonus was  paid  under  the Payment of Bonus  Act,  1965  and  has ’further  stated  that  certain other  factories  have  been giving  paid  casual leave for their workers.   These  facts persuaded  him to grant the modification  although  reducing the  number  of  days to six as  against  twelve  which  the workers. originally claimed. The  appellate authority concurred by a separate  discussion in the same, conclusion.  We are requested by Shri Gupta  to reverse  this concurrent refinding of fact on  two  grounds. He states that the undertaking of the appellant is a  losing proposition and relies upon certain balance sheets stated to have  been produced before the certifying officer.  He  also argues  that there is no positive material to make out  that other  industries in the locality are graning  casual  leave for their workers. These   are  pure  questions  of  fact  and   this   Court’s jurisdiction   under  Art.  136  cannot  be  exploited   for canvassing  points  such  as these.  It is  clear  that  the modification  was within the jurisdiction of the  certifying officer and he has not contravened any provision of the  Act or  any statute.  The Factories Act, 1948 prescribes  in  S. 79(1)  a  certain  number of days’ leave  but  this  is  the minimum  and not the maximum as has been indicated  in  this Court’s  ruling  in  Alembic  Chemical  Works  Co.  Ltd.  v. Workmen(1).  Moreover, the model Standing Orders as well  as the Schedule to the Industrial Employment (Standing  Orders)

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Act,  1946  deal with casual leave.  In this view  there  is nothing  illegal in the order impugned nor are we  satisfied that  there is anything shockingly violative of fairness  or justice.  It is a notorious fact that casual leave is not an automatic advantage to the total number of days’ leave  that a  worker  is entitled.  It is only in the event  of  sudden emergencies  that  casual leave  is  allowed  and  so  the grievance of the appellant is exaggerated, if not imaginary. Apart   from   this,  it  is  elementary   that   unforeseen circumstances may unexpectedly prop up necessitating  sudden absence  of an employee, be he in Government service or  any other  ,offices or in an industrial undertaking.  The  whole concept of casual (1)  [1963] 1 S.C.R. 297. 536 leave is calculated to provide for such contingencies.   We, see  nothing unfair in the certifying officer according  six days  by way of casual leave to the workers.  After all  the contentment  of  the workers is an  essential  component  of their  efficiency  and  if the certifying  officer  and  the Appellate  Authority  who deal regularly with  such  matters have  felt that this step was fair and nothing is  shown  to our satisfaction that there is anything grossly unfair about this  modification, we should not interfere by  exercise  of the special jurisdiction of this Court. The third point put forward by Shri Gupta was that according to the appellate Tribunal, the current trend is to grant  an overall  maximum of thirty days leave while in this case  if the casual leave is also taken into account it may extend to 33-1/2 days leave.  As pointed out earlier, casual leave  is not  a  matter of right and a man may not got  casual  leave unless  circumstances  are sudden or which in  the  ordinary course cannot be met by taking regular leave.  Secondly,  we are  not  satisfied that the current trend in  a  particular area  or  industry  has  the force  of  law.   It  may  have persuasive  value  but not more.  That is why  after  taking note of that circumstance, the Tribunal has still chosen  to affirm  the claim for six days casual leave.  After all  the excess is around three days in a year. We,   therefore,   dismiss   the   appeal,   but,   in   the circumstances, without costs, S. R.          Appeal dismissed. 537