14 July 1995
Supreme Court
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GHAZIABAD DEV. AUTHORITY Vs VIKRAM CHAUDHARY

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: C.A. No.-006481-006481 / 1995
Diary number: 5151 / 1995


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PETITIONER: GHAZIABAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS .

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SRI VIKRAM CHAUDHARY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/07/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 2325            1995 SCC  (5) 210  JT 1995 (5)   636        1995 SCALE  (4)545

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:           ORDER      Delay condoned.      Shri Pramod  Swarup,  Advocate  takes  notice  for  the respondents.      Leave granted.      We have  heard the  counsel on  either side. The appeal arises from  the order  of single  Judge of  Allahabad  High Court  dated 28.2.1994 made in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11535 of  1991. The  appellant in its planned development of urban areas, pursuant to U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, had engaged the respondents on daily wages in the project on  hand. They filed a writ petition claiming parity in appointment  and pay  with the regular employees and also for regularisation  of their  services.  The  single  Judge, while  negating   the  relief   of   regularisation,   given directions to  follow the  principles in  ss. 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act.      Objention taken  by the  appellants is that ss. 25F and application. It  is stated that as regards the State of U.P. there is  a local Industrial Disputes Act and the provisions therein would be attracted, if Industrial Disputes Act is at all applicable  to the  appellant. It  is contended that the appellant is  not  an  industry  and  that,  therefore,  the principles contained in pari materia provisions in the local Act have no application.      We have  gone through  the judgment  of the High Court. The learned  judge did  not intend  to  lay  down  that  the appellant is  an industry  and that the principles contained in the  Industrial Disputes  Act, Central  or the  State Act stands attracted.  What the  learned Judge  appears to  have intended to  lay down  is that  so long as the appellant has work on  hand, it  appellant has  no power  to terminate the contingent employees  engaged on daily wages and that in the event the  appellant needs  to terminate  their services the principle of  last come  first go  should be followed and in

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the event  of there being need for re-employment, preference be given  to the displaced respondents. The observation made by the learned Judge is consistent with the well-established principles of  natural justice and equity, justice  and good conscience. Therefore,the learned Judge had rightly extended those principles  with regard to the persons employed by the appellant on daily wages.      It is  stated that by implication of the order there is need for the appellant to keep engaging the respondents even though there are no projects on hand. That apprehension also does not  appear to  be correct. The appellant needs to take the services  of the persons according to the requirement in the projects on hand. On completion of the existing projects in which  the respondents  are  working,  if  the  appellant undertakes any fresh project, instead of taking the services of fresh  hands  at  the  place  of  the  new  project,  the appellant  needs  to  take  the  services  of  the  existing temporary daily  wage  respondents.  In  the  event  of  the appellant not  having any project on hand, the obligation to pay daily  wages to the respondents does not arise. However, the appellant  shall maintain  the order of seniority of the daily wage  employees and  shall take  the services  of  the senior most  persons in  the order of seniority according to the requirement of work.      Since they  are temporary daily wage employees, so long as there  is no regular posts available for appointment, the question of  making pay  on par  with the  regular employees does not  arise. But the appellant should necessarily and by implication, pay  the minimum  wages  prescribed  under  the statute, if any, or the prevailing wages as available in the locality.      The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.