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PETITIONER: GANGARAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: N. SHANKAR REDDY

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/10/1988

BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) PATHAK, R.S. (CJ)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  302            1988 SCR  Supl. (3) 433  1988 SCC  (4) 648        JT 1988 (4)   100  1988 SCALE  (2)1017

ACT:      Andhra  Pradesh  Buildings (Lease  Rent  and  Eviction) Control Act, 196(5ection 10(3)(c)--Landlord entitled to seek eviction  of tenant occupying another portion  or  remaining portion  of  same  building and  not  occupying  portion  in another  building-What is envisaged is oneness  of  building and not oneness of ownership of two different buildings  one occupied by landlord and another by tenant.

HEADNOTE:      The respondent had acquired the building being premises No.   1.1.249  Chikkadpalli,  Hyderabad,  constructed   two storeys over this building and utilised the upper floors for his  residence  and  the  ground  floor  for  his  business. Subsequently,  he had purchased the adjacent building  being premises No. 1-1-250. The appellant was a tenant in the suit premises  No. 1.1.250 even before the  respondent  purchased it, and was running his shop in the front room and  residing in the rear portion.      The  respondent sought eviction of the appellant  inter alia on the ground of requirement of additional space  under section  10(3)(r) of the Andhra Pradesh  Buildings  (I,ease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, under which . landlord occupying only a part of a building was entitled to seek the eviction  of  a  tenant occupying  another  portion  or  the remaining  portion of the building if the landlord  required additional  accommodation  for residential  purpose  or  for carrying on his business.      The  Rent Controller held that the respondent  was  not entitled  to an order of eviction under s. 10(3)(c)  because the  leased   premises was a separate building and  did  not form  part  of  the building in  which  the  respondent  was carrying on his business.      The  Appellate Authority however held that even  though the leased premises had a separate municipal door number  it could  be  treated  as forming part of the building  in  the respondent’s  occupation  because both’ the  buildings  were owned by the respondent and were separated only by a  single wall.                                                   PG NO 433                                                   PG NO 434

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    The High Court in revision held that if the  respondent wanted   the    premises  bona  fide  as  an   additional accommodation  it did not matter whether it was  a  separate building or a portion of the same building.      Before this Court, the appellant contended that section 10(3)(c)  would not apply to a case where the  landlord  and the  tenant were occupying different buildings  even  though the  two   buildings were owned by the  same  landlord.  The respondent,  on  the  other hand,  contended  that  the  two buildings  could not be treated as independent and  separate buildings  because  both  the buildings were  owned  by  the respondent and were separated only by a single wall.            Allowing the appeal, it was,      HELD: (I) From a reading of clause (c) of section 10(3) it is obvious that provision has been made under that clause only  to  seek the eviction of a  tenant  occupying  another portion  or the remaining portion of the building  in  which the landlord is also residing or carrying on his business in one portion. [437F]      (2)  What s. 11)(3)(c envisages is the oneness  of  the building  and not the oneness of ownership of two  different buildings, one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant. [438G-H]            (3) The significant words used in s. 10(3)(c) are "the  landlord who is occupying only a part of  a  building" and  "any  tenant occupying the whole or an portion  of  the remaining part of the building." [438H; 439A]      (4) A practical test which can be applied o find out if two  adjoining buildings form part of the same  building  or two  different buildings would be to see whether one of  the two buildings can be sold by the landlord and the  purchaser inducted  into possession of the premises sold  without  the landlord’s  possession and enjoyment of the premises in  his occupation being affected. [439B-C]      (5) The identity of two separate building is not to  be judged  on the basis of the buildings being separated  by  a single wall or by two separate walls with intervening  space in between them. [439E]      (6)  There  is no room or scope for the  respondent  to invoke  section  2(iii), defining the  word  "building",  to contend  that two different premises should be treated as  a single  and integrated building for the purposes of the  Act if the two buildings adjoin each other and are owned by  the                                                   PG NO 435 same  person but under different occupation i.e. one by  the landlord and the other by the tenant. [440C-D]      (7) If the hardship experienced by landlords similar to the  respondent  is  to be alleviated, then it  is  for  the legislature  to  remedy  the situation  by  making  suitable amendments  to the Act and it is not  for the Court to  read s.  10(3)(c) beyond its terms, oblivious to the  limitations contained therein and hold that a separate tenanted building adjoining the building in the owner’s occupation would  also form part of the latter building. [44lA-B]      Balaiah  v.  Lachaiah, AIR 1965 A.P.  435;  Balaganesan Metals v. M.N. Shanmugham Chetty, JT 1987 2 S.C. 247 and  N. Ramaswamy Naidu v. P. Venkateshwarlu, Vol. Il 1961 1  A.W.R. page 400, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 537  of 1978.      From  the  Judgment and Order dated 13.10.1977  of  the

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Andhra Pradesh High Court in C . R . P . 250 of 1977 .      P.P. Rao, K. Ram Kumar and Mrs. Janki Ramachandran  for the Appellant .      A.S. Nambiar and B. Parthasarthi for the Respondent.      The Judgment ot’ the Court was delivered by      NATARAJAN,  J.  This appeal by special  leave  directed against  a  judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High  Court  lies within a narrow compass.      The respondent/landlord filed a petition under  Section 10(3)  of  the  Andhra Pradesh Buildings  (Lease,  Rent  and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short the Act’) to seek the eviction  of the tenant/appellant from premises bearing  No. 1-1-250 Chikkadpalli, Hyderabad. The appellant is running  a pan  shop  and a hire cycle shop in the  front room  of  the premises  and  residing  in the rear  portion.  Besides  the leased premises, the respondent owns the adjoining  building bearing No. 1/1/249. In the said building the respondent was running  a grocery shop in the ground floor and residing  in the  second  and third  floors subsequently  constructed  by him. It would appear that the respondent  has since  changed                                                   PG NO 436 over  his business to retail sale of liquor.  On the  ground of  requirement of- additional space for the  grocery  shop, the  respondent  sought the eviction of the  appellant.  The Rent Controller held that the respondent was not entitled to an  order of eviction either under Section 19(3)(a)(iii)  or Section 10(3)(c) because the leased premises was a  separate building and did not form part of the building in which  the respondent  was  carrying  on his business.  In  the  appeal preferred  by  the respondent, the Chief Judge,  City  Small Cause Court, Hyderabad, took a different view of the  matter and held that even though the leased premises had a separate municipal  door number it can be treated as forming part  of the building in the respondent’s occupation because both the buildings are owned by the second respondent and besides the two  buildings  are  separated only by a  single  wall.  For reaching such a conclusion, the Appellate Authority followed the  ratio laid down in Balaiah v. Lachaiah, AIR  1965  A.P. 435.  As  the  Appellate Authority further  found  that  the requirement of additional space by the respondent was a bona fide  one,  the Appellate Authority allowed the  appeal  and ordered  the  eviction of the appellant.  A  civil  revision filed  by the appellant to the High Court did not meet  with success and hence the appellant has preferred this appeal.      Though  the proceedings before the Rent Controller  and the  Appellate Authority were conducted on the footing  that the respondent was entitled to seek the appellant s eviction under  Section  10(3)(a)(iii)  as  well  as  under   Section 10(3)(c)  it was conceded before us by Mr. Nambiar,  learned counsel  for the respondent that the tenant’s  eviction  was sought  for only under Section 10(3)(c) vi.. requirement  of additional  space  for the respondent’s business.  In   such circumstances  the only factor for determination is  whether the  respondent can seek the appellant’s eviction  from  the tenanted   building  the  ground  he   requires   additional accommodation for his business.      Before  we  proceed to deal with the  question,  it  is necessary  to  state  a  few facts.  Originally,  a  row  of buildings comprised in door-numbers 1-1-248 to 1-1-251  were owned  by one R. Kistiyah and after him by one  Rambai.  The said  Rambai  sold  the buildings in the  row  to  different persons.  The  respondent and his brother were two  of  such purchasers and they purchased premises no. 1-1-248 and l- 1- 249. Subsequently, in a partition between them, premises No. 1-l-249  was allotted to the respondent and premises No.  l-

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1-248  was allotted to his brother. After the partition  was effected, the respondent constructed : two storeys over  his building  by erecting concrete pillars on both sides of  hiS building.  At that time, the suit premises bearing No.  1-1- 250  was  owned by an advocate by name Sri S.  Sitaram  Rao.                                                   PG NO 437 When   the  concrete  pillars  were  erected,  Sitaram   Rao complained of encroachment by the respondent and eventually, the   dispute  was  resolved  by  the   respondent   himself purchasing  Sitaram  Rao’s  house viz.  No.  1-1-250.  After constructing  the  two floors, the  respondent  shifted  his residence  to  those floors and utilised the  entire  ground floor for his business. he appellant who was a tenant of the suit  premises  even  before  the  respondent  purchased  it attorned his tenancy to the respondent.      Under  the Act, a landlord can seek the eviction  of  a tenant   from  a  non-residential  building  under   Section 10(3)(a)(iii)  if  he  is  not  already  occupying  a   non- residential  building  which  is either his own  or  to  the possession of which he is entitled or under Section 10(3)(c) by  way of additional accommodation if  the  non-residential building  occupied by him is not sufficient for the  purpose of the business he is carrying on. Since we are concerned in this appeal only with Section 10(3)(c), we need extract only that clause which reads as under:      "10(3)(c). A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building,  whether residential or non-residential, may  not- withstanding anything in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion  or  the  remaining part v he building  to  put  the landlord  in possession thereof, if he  requires  additional accommodation  for residential purpose or for purpose  of  a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.’                                         (           Emphasis supplied). From  a reading of clause (c), it is obvious that  provision has been made under that clause only to seek the eviction of a tenant occupying another portion or the remaining  portion of  the building in which  the landlord is also residing  or carrying on his business in one portion. Section 10(3)(c) of the  Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control  Act  1960 which  is  identically  worded as Section  10(3)(c)  of  the Andhra  Pradesh Buildings (Rent, Eviction and  Control)  Act came  to  be construed in a different context by this  Court in  Balaganesan Metals v, M.N. Shanmugham Chetty,  (JT  1987 (2)  S.C.  247). It was held in that case  that  a  landlord occupying only a part of a building for residential or  non- residential  purposes  may  seek the eviction  of  a  tenant ocCupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part  of the building if he requires additional accommodation for his residential  or  non-residential needs and that  it  is  not necessary  that there must be identical user of  the  leased portion  by  the tenant if the landlord wants  to  seek  his eviction for his residential ar business needs.                                                   PG NO 438     In  this  case,  the  controversy  centres  around   the question  whether a landlord can invoke Section 10(3)(c)  of the  Act  to  seek  the eviction of  a  tenant  who  is  not occupying a portion of the building occupied by the landlord himself  but is occupying another building belonging to  the landlord.  While  the  Rent Controller  held  that  the  two premises   viz.  1/1/249  and  1/1/250  are   separate   and independent, the Appellate Authority has taken the view that by reason of the unity of ownership of the two buildings  in the  respondent   and by reason of the two  buildings  being

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separated  only  by a single wall "it can be said  that  the mulgi constitutes additional accommodation to the appellant" and  the fact that the two mulgies bear different  municipal numbers  should not make any difference. The High Court  has not  construed  the  scope  of  Section  10(3)(c)  but   has sweepingly said that:      "Whether  both  can  be said to  be  same  building  or separate  buildings it does not matter, if’  the  respondent wants the premises bona fide as an additional accommodation; whether  it is a separate building or a portion of the  same building, he can require it on that ground." counsel for     Before  us  it was canvassed by Mr.  P.P.  Rao,  learned counsel  for  the  appellant  that  Section  10(3)(c)  would entitle  a landlord to seek the eviction of his  tenant  for purposes of additional accommodation for himself only if the portion  occupied  by  the tenant forms  part  of  the  same building occupied by the landlord and that Section  10(3)(c) will  not apply to a case where the landlord and the  tenant re  occupying  different  buildings  even  though  the   two buildings  may be owned by the same landlord.  Controverting this   argument  Mr.  Nambiyar,  learned  counsel  for   the respondent  contended  that  the premises  occupied  by  the appellant, though assigned a separate municipal door  number cannot  be treated as an independent and  separate  building because  both the buildings are owned by the respondent  and secondly the leased premises are separated from door  number l/ l/249 only by a single wall.      On  a  consideration of the matter, we  find  that  the contention of Mr. Nambiyar, which has found acceptance  with the  Appellate  Court  and the High Court is not  at  all  a tenable one. What Section  10(3)(c) envisages is the oneness of  the  building and not the oneness of  ownership  of  two different  buildings, one occupied by the landlord  and  the other  by the tenant. The significant words used in  Section 10(3)(c) are "the landlord who is occupying only a part of a                                                   PG NO 439 building"   and  "any  tenant occupying  the  whole  or  any portion  of the remaining part of the building".  Surely  no one can say that two adjoining buildings  bearing  different door numbers, one occupied by the landlord and the other  by the tenant would make them one and the same building if they are  owned by one person and separate buildings if they  are owned  by two different persons. A practical test which  can be applied to find out if two adjoining buildings form  part of the same building or two different buildings would be  to see  whether  one of the two buildings can be  sold  by  the landlord  and the purchaser inducted into possession of  the premises   sold  without  the  landlord’s   possession   and enjoyment of the premises in his occupation being  affected. Viewed  in  that  manner, it can at once be  seen  that  the leased  premises  in  the  appellant’s   occupation  can  be independently  sold and the purchaser  delivered  possession without  the  respondent’s possession of  door  no.  1-1-249 being  affected  in  any manner. As a matter  of  fact,  the previous  history of the building shows that before  it  was purchased by the respondent, it was owned by Sri Sitaram Rao and  the respondent was owning only door no.  1-1-249.  Such being  the case, merely because the appellant  has  acquired title  to door no. l- l-250 also, it can never be said  that the building under the tenancy of the appellant became  part and  parcel  of  the  respondent’s  building  no.  l-  1-29. Similarly,  the  fact that the two buildings  are  separated only by a single wall with no intervening space between them would  not  alter the situation in any  manner  because  the

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identity  of two separate buildings is not to be  judged  on the basis of the buildings being separated by a single  wall or  by two separate walls with intervening space in  between them.      Section  10(3)(c) which occurred as Section 7(3)(c)  in the  Madras Buildings (I ease and Rent Control) Act 1’4  has been  properly construed by Chandrasekhara Sastri, J. in  M. Ramaswamy  Naidu  v.  P. Venkateswarlu,  (Vol.  11)  1961(1) A.W.R. page. 400.  The learned judge has stated that Section 7(3)(c)  "applies  only  n  a case  where  the  landlord  is occupying  a  part  of a building  and  still  requires  the remaining  part  for  the purpose ot’ his  own  business  as additional  accommodation."  This  decision  has  not   been noticed  by the Appellate Authority and the High  Court  and they  have  proceeded solely on the basis that  as  per  the ratio  in  Balaiah  v. Lachaiah, (supra) the  respondent  is entitled  to  an  order  of  eviction  even  under   Section 10(3)(a)(iii) for additional accommodation despite the  fact that he is in occupation of a  building of his own. Mr.  Nambiyar  referred  to  the  definition  of  the   word "building"  in Section 2(iii) of the Act and argued that  if                                                   PG NO 440 for the purposes of the Act, where the context warrants  it, different  portions of the same building can be  treated  as separate  buildings,  it should conversely be held  that  if adjoining  building are owned by the same person and one  of them is in the occupation of the landlord and the other by a tenant,  then  for  purposes of  Section  10(3)(c)  the  two buildings  should be treated as an integrated and  composite building.  We  are unable to accept  this  argument  because firstly the terms of Section 2(iii) do not afford scope  for such a construction and secondly the argument  fails to take note  of the purpose and object lying behind the  definition of  "building" in the manner in which the clause is  worded. Section   2(iii)  has  been  provided  so  as  to  make  the provisions  of  the  Act  applicable to  the  whole  of  the building  as well as to parts of it depending  upon  whether the entirety of the building has been leased out to a tenant or  different portions of it have been let out to  different tenants.  There  is,  therefore, no room or  scope  for  the respondent  to  invoke Section 2(iii) to  contend  that  two different  premises  should  be treated  as  a   single  and integrated  building for the purposes of the Act if the  two buildings adjoin each other and are owned by the same person but under different occupation i.e. one by the landlord  and the other by the tenant.      Mr. Nambiyar then argued that if section 10(3)(c) is to be  construed  as  being  applicable  only  when   different portions  of the same building are in the occupation of  the landlord as well as one or more tenants, it would result  in a  landlord like the respondent who is genuinely in need  of additional accommodation being left with no remedy  whatever for  securing  additional  accommodation  for  his  business needs. We find it unnecessary to go into the merits of  this submission because however genuine the respondent s need for additional accommodation may be and whatever be the hardship resulting to him by non-eviction of the appellant, we cannot grant  any relief to the respondent under the Act as it  now stands.  As per the Act the relief of eviction of  a  tenant can  be given to a landlord only under two  situations  viz. (1) where the landlord is not in occupation of a building of his  own or to the possession of which he is entitled to  by an  order  of eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)  and  (2) where the landlord is in occupation of only a portion of his building   and   is  bona  fide  in   need   of   additional

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accommodation  and another or the remaining portion  of  the building  is  in the occupation of a tenant  or  tenants  by ordering  his or their eviction under Section  10(3)c).  The Legislature has not provided for Section 10(3)(c) being made applicable  to a landlord where he owns adjoining  buildings and is in occupation of only one of those two buildings  and the tenant is in occupation of the other and the land-lord’s                                                   PG NO 441 bona  fide  in  need of  additional  accommodation  for  his residential  or business needs. If the hardship  experienced by landlords similar to the respondent is to be  alleviated, then  it is for the Legislature to remedy the  situation  by making suitable amendments to the Act and it is not for  the Court to read Section 10(3)(c) beyond its terms oblivious to the  limitations contained therein and hold that a  separate tenanted  building  adjoining the building  in  the  owner’s occupation would also form part of the latter building.      In  the light of our conclusions, it follows  that  the judgment  and order of the Appellate Authority and the  High Court  cannot be sustained and have to be set aside. In  the result,  the  appeal  succeeds and the  order  of  the  Rent Controller dismissing the respondent’s petition for eviction will stand restored. There will, however, be no order as  to costs . R.S.S.                                       Appeal allowed.