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PETITIONER: SHRI GANESH NARAYAN HEGDE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI S. BANGARAPPA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/04/1995

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (4)  41        JT 1995 (4)   124  1995 SCALE  (2)748

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.: 1.   Leave granted.  Heard counsel for both  the parties. 2.   The  appeal  arises from the judgment and  order  of  a learned  Single Judge of the Karnataka High  Court  quashing the charge framed by the learned Magistrate. 3.   A  complaint  was filed by the  appellant  against  the three  respondents  herein under Section 500 of  the  Indian Penal Code.  After receiving the evidence of the prosecution as  contemplated  by  Section 244,  the  learned  Magistrate framed the charge against the respondent-, under Section 500 of  the  Indian Penal Code.  While framing the  charge,  the learned  Magistrate has recorded his reasons  therefor.   In this  order,  he referred to the objections  raised  by  the accused and his reasons for rejecting the same.  The learned Magistrate  observed:  "(O)n  going  through  the   evidence adduced before court by the complainant at this stage, I  am of the considered opinion that there exist grounds to  frame charge against A. 1 to 3 for the offence punishable U/S. 500 I.P.C." The first respondent preferred a Revision  (Criminal Revision   Petition  No.104  of  1989)  before   the   First Additional  Sessions Judge, Hubli against the order  of  the learned  Magistrate.  The learned Sessions  Judge  dismissed the   Revision  observing  that  inasmuch  as  the   learned Magistrate  has framed the charge on a consideration of  the evidence  adduced by the complainant, oral and  documentary, and  on  being satisfied that there was a prima  facie  case made out against the accused, his order is not liable to  be interfered  with in Revision. He observed that a  Revisional Court  can interfere with the order of the trial  magistrate framing  charges only where it finds that the order  of  the trial magistrate is illegal, capricious or perverse.  There- upon  the first respondent approached the High  Court  under Section  482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for  the quashing  of the charge.  The learned Single  Judge  allowed the petition on the Following basis:

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             "From the discussion made above, it has to  be               said that the approach of the Courts below  in               ordering   to   frame   charge   against   the               petitioner  and the other two accused  for  an               offence  punishable under Section 500  IPC  is               the  resultant of non- application of mind  to               the  material  available on  record  and  also               resultant    of    incorrect    exercise    of               jurisdiction  conferred.   The  Courts   below               should have borne in mind that a person can be               charged  only  when  the  allegations  alleged               against  him are established prima  facie  and               not  otherwise, because in criminal cases  the               Courts  must  be  very  cautious  and  careful               before   proceeding   to   frame   charge   as               unnecessary framing of charge on the one  hand               may  result in affecting the  persons  liberty               and on the other hand cause continuous and               128               unnecessary harassment, as it has happened  in               the instant case.               From the allegations made in the complaint and               the  intention  to prosecute  the  accused  by               pursuing the complaint the material placed  on               record  and  the information gathered  at  the               trial it is clear that it is a matter of  mere               prestige for both the parties who according to               their   own   version  belong   to   different               political faiths.  It is not a genuine case of               one making any inputation against the other or               the other being defamed or his reputation low-               ered  in the estimation of the  public.   This               prolonged   and  protracted   litigation   and               harassment to both the parties would have been               ended  in the beginning itself if  the  courts               below had taken into consideration the  effect               of  Section 245 Cr.P.C. and its  applicability               to the necessary material on record keeping in               mind   the   basis  of  the   complaint,   the               admissibility of the documents in evidence and               the  circumstances  and context in  which  the               alleged   imputations   were   made   by   the               petitioner." 4.   The  learned  Judge quashed the charge  not  only  with respect  to the first respondent-accused, who alone was  the petitioner before him, but also with respect to  Respondents 2  and  3 (Accused 2 and 3 respectively),  who  had  neither filed  a Revision before the Sessions Judge nor had  applied to the High Court for quashing the charge. 5.   The  complainant-appellant, Shri Ganesh Narayan  Hegde, says  that  he belongs to a highly  reputed  and  well-known family  of  North Kanara district whose main  occupation  is agriculture and sericulture.  Some members of the family are running  a rice mill and one of the sons of the  complainant is running a chemical factory.  The complainant says that he is  the  founder and President of  various  cooperative  and educational  institutions and that he is also  the  founder- President  of Sahakari Shikshan Prasarak  Samithi,  Siddapur and  is connected with certain other  educational  societies and  banks.  He says that by sincere and selfless work  done in  these  institutions he has acquired a  high  status  and position in the society and that though he is the cousin  of Shri  Ramakrishna  Hegde,  the  former  Chief  Minister   of Karnataka,  he is not associated with his  political  party. According  to the complainant, the first  respondent-accused

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is an active politician.  During the relevant period, he was the  President of a political party -called  ’Kranthiranga’. The first respondent aspired to become the Chief Minister of Karnataka  but  he  was frustrated in his  efforts  by  Shri Ramakrishna Hegde who became the Chief Minister.  The  first respondent  was,  therefore, waiting for an  opportunity  to tarnish   the  image  of  Shri  Ramakrishna   Hegde.    Shri Ramakrishna Hegde contested to the Legislative Assembly from Kanakapura  Constituency.  The first respondent  set-up  his candidate against Shri Hegde.  In the course of the election campaign,  the first respondent held a press  conference  on April 28, 1983 at his residence at Bangalore.  Respondents 2 and 3 who are the Editor and Chief Reporter respectively  of the  newspaper "Samyukta Karnataka", a daily, also  attended the press conference.  The first respondent made  scandalous and  false  imputations against the complainant  during  the said  press conference and requested the  correspondents  to publish  the  same in their newspapers.  The  news  item  as published  in  "Samyukta  Karnataka"  daily  (in  its  Hubli edition) reads thus:               "Involvement   of  Hegde’s  Brother  in   Rice               smuggling’?"               129               "Bangalore   -   28,  Sri   S.Bangarappa   the               President   of  Kanriataka  Krantiranga,   has               accused  to  day  that Sri  Ganesh  Hegde  the               brother of the Chief Minister Sri  Ramakrishna               hegde  is  involving in smuggling of  rice  to               Goa.   Talking at a press conference, he  said               that  the  authorities are not dared  to  take               action  against  the  mill  owner  Sri  Ganesh               Hegde."                 (Translation from Kannada) 6.   The  complainant submitted that the said imputation  is false to the knowledge of the first respondent and was  made with  intention  to defame and harm the  reputation  of  the complainant.   The allegation of smuggling of  rice  leveled against  the  complainant is absolutely false and  that  the said false news item has lowered the prestige and reputation of the complainant and his family in the eyes of the public. His  case is that he is not the brother of Shri  Ramakrishna Hegde as made out in the news item but only a cousin. 7.   The  learned counsel for the appellants submitted  that the   framing  of  charge  by  the  Magistrate  is   neither misdirected  in  law nor can it be said that  there  was  no evidence  before  him  upon which he could  have  formed  an opinion that there is ground for presuming that the  accused has  committed  the offence within the  meaning  of  Section 246(1).  The learned Magistrate, it is submitted, considered the  oral and documentary evidence, the decisions  cited  by both  the  sides  and under a reasoned  order  rejected  the objections  raised  by the first respondent and  framed  the charge.   The learned Sessions Judge dismissed the  Revision filed  by  the  first respondent holding  that  the  learned Magistrate has acted properly and in accordance with law  in framing  the  charge  and  that there  are  no  grounds  for interfering with his orders.  A second Revision does not lie under the code, and though an application under Section  482 of  the Code of Criminal Procedure is not barred,  the  High Court  cannot  sit and act as the  second  Revisional  Court while  exercising  the  powers  under  Section  482.    This provision  can  be invoked only where there is an  abuse  of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Learned counsel complained that the learned Single Judge has examined  the  matter as if he were an appellate  court  and

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quashed the charge on that approach and that he has exceeded his  jurisdiction  in  doing so and  in  interfering  at  an interlocutory stage. 8.   Shri Sheshagiri Rao, the learned counsel for the  first respondent  justified  the reasoning and conclusion  of  the learned  Single Judge.  He submitted that the  complaint  is the  result of political vendetta, that it is not a  genuine grievance  and that the first respondent was not acting  out of any extraneous motives in making the statement complained of.  Learned counsel submitted that the first respondent  is an  active politician, that subsequently he has also  become the  Chief Minister of Karnataka and that he made the  said- statement  under  the bonafide belief that it is  true.   He made  the said statement, submitted the learned counsel,  in good faith and in public interest.  The first respondent was not  actuated  by any motives of personal gain  or  personal animosity.  Learned counsel further submitted that the  said publication  was  in the year 1983, that twelve  years  have passed  by  since  then and that any  interference  at  this distance  of time may not be called for in the interests  of justice. 9.   the complaint has been tried, it is 130 stated,  according to the warrant procedure, at the  request of  the  first  respondent.  Section  244(1)  provides  that "(W)hen, in any warrant-case instituted otherwise than on  a police  report, the accused appears or is brought  before  a Magistrate,  the  MagistratE  shall  proceed  to  hear   the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution." SeCtion 245(1) says that "(1)f, upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 244, the Magistrate  considers, for reasons to be recorded,  that  no case  against  the  accused  has been  made  out  which,  if unrebutted,  would  warrant his conviction,  the  Magistrate shall  discharge him." Section 246(1) then says "(1)f,  when such  evidence has been taken, or at any previous  stage  of the case, the magistrate is of opinion that there is  ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence tri- able under this Chapter, which such magistrate is  competent to  try,  and  which, in his opinion,  could  be  adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge  against the accused.  " 10.  Section  399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  confers upon  the Sessions Judge the power to revise any order  made by  the Magistrate but sub-section (3) thereof  declares  at the same time that "(W)here any application for revision  is made  by  or  on behalf of any person  before  the  Sessions Judge,  the  decision  of  the  Sessions  Judge  thereon  in relation  to  such  person shall be  final  and  no  further proceedings  by  way  of revision at the  instance  of  such person  shall be entertained by the High Court or any  other Court." 11.  Section  482 of the Code saves the inherent  powers  of the High Court.  It reads:               "482.  Saving of inherent powers of High Court               -  Nothing  in this Code shall  be  deemed  to               limit  or  affect the inherent powers  of  the               High  Court  to  make such orders  as  may  be               necessary  to give effect to any  order  under               this Code, or to prevent abuse of the  process               of  any Court or otherwise to secure the  ends               ofjustice." 12.While  it  is  true that availing of the  remedy  of  the revision  to the Sessions Judge under Section 399  does  not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under

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Section  482, it is equally true that the High Court  should not  act  as  a second Revisional Court under  the  garb  of exercising  inherent powers.  While exercising its  inherent powers  in  such a matter it must be conscious of  the  fact that the learned Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory  power  in  the  matter.   The  High  Court  should interfere  only where it is satisfied that if the  complaint is allowed to be proceeded with, it would amount to abuse of process of Court or that the interests of justice  otherwise call  for quashing of the charges.  A few decisions of  this Court   may  usefully  be  referred  at  this   stage.    In Mrs.Dhanalakshmi  v.  R.Prasanna  Kumar  &  Ors.  (AIR  1990 S.C.494) this Court stated in a case of similar nature:               "Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure               empowers  the  High  Court  to  exercise   its               inherent  powers  to  prevent  abuse  of   the               process  of Court.  In proceedings  instituted               on complaint exercise of the inherent power to               quash  the proceedings is called for  only  in               cases  where the complaint does  not  disclose               any  offence  or is  frivolous,  vexatious  or               oppressive.  If the allegations set out in the               complaint  do  not constitute the  offence  of               which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it               is open to the High Court to quash               131               the  same in exercise of the  inherent  powers               under  Section  482.   It  is  not,   however,               necessary  that there should be  a  meticulous               analysis of the case, before the trial to find               out  whether the case would end in  conviction               or  not.   The complaint has to be read  as  a               whole.   If it appears on a  consideration  of               the allegations, in the light of the statement               on oath of the complainant that ingredients of               the offence/ offences are disclosed, and there               is  no material to show that the complaint  is               mala  fide  frivolous or  vexatious,  in  that               event  there  would be  no  justification  for               interference by the High Court.               The  High Court without proper application  of               the  principles  that have been laid  down  by               this Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State  of               Bihar, (1977) 2 SCR 357 : (AIR 1977 SC  1754),               Trilok  Singh v. Satya Deo Tripathi, 1980  Cri               LJ  822: AIR 1979 SC 850 and Municipal  Corpn.               of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala, (1983)               1  SCR  895: (AIR 1983 SC  158)  proceeded  to               analyse  the  case of the complainant  in  the               light  of  all the probabilities in  order  to               determine   whether  a  conviction  would   be               sustainable and on such premises arrived at  a               conclusion  that  the proceedings  are  to  be               quashed against all the respondents.  The High               Court  was clearly in error in  assessing  the               material  before  it and concluding  that  the               complaint  cannot be proceeded with.  We  find               there  are  specific allegations in  the  com-               plaint  disclosing the ingredients of the  of-               fence  taken  cognizance of.  It  is  for  the               complainant to substantiate the allegations by               evidence at a later stage.  In the absence  of               circumstances  to  hold prima facie  that  the               complaint is frivolous when the complaint does               disclose the commission of an offence there is

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             no   justification  for  the  High  Court   to               interfere.  " 13.      To  the  same  effect is  the  holding  in  another decision  in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan &  Ors.  (1988 (4) S.C.C.655). This Court said:               "It  is trite that jurisdiction under  Section               482,  Cr.P.C., which saves the inherent  power               of the High Court, to make such orders as  may               be  necessary to prevent abuse of the  process               of  any Court or otherwise to secure the  ends               of justice, has to be exercised sparingly  and               with   circumspection.   In  exercising   that               jurisdiction the High Court should not  embark               upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the               complaint  are  likely to  be  established  by               evidence or not.  That is the function of  the               trial  Magistrate  when  the  evidence   comes               before him, Though it is neither possible  nor               advisable to lay down any inflexible rules  to               regulate   that   jurisdiction,   one   thing,               however, appears clear and it is that when the               High  Court  is called upon to  exercise  this               jurisdiction  to  quash a  proceeding  at  the               stage  of the Magistrate taking cognizance  of               an  offence  the High Court is guided  by  the               allegations,  whether those  allegations,  set               out  in the complaint or the charge-sheet,  do               not in law constitute or spell out any offence               and that resort to criminal proceedings would,               in the circumstances amount to an abuse of the               process of the court or not.  " 14.  Examined from the above stand point,it would be evident that  the learned Single Judge of the High Court has  really gone  beyond  the  purview of Section 482  in  quashing  the charge.   He has not held that the evidence adduced  by  the complainant, oral and documentary, if unrebutted, would  not have  warranted  the conviction of the  accused  within  the meaning  of  Section  245(1) nor has he  held  that  on  the evidence  adduced,  the learned Magistrate  could  not  have reasonably  formed  an  opinion that  there  is  ground  for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, as 132 contemplated by Section 246(1).  The learned counsel for the respondent  has laid great stress upon the  observations  of the learned Magistrate in para 26 of his order, which reads: "A.   1 has challenged the evidence of all  these  witnesses generally  and more particularly of the evidence of  P.W.  1 the  complainant.   In  my  opinion,  at  this  stage,   the evidentiary  value  of the documents  and  creditability  of witnesses  cannot  be  considered in  view  of  the  settled principles by Supreme Court of India in the decisions  cited supra.   All the contentions advanced on behalf  of  accused persons,  could be weighed at the time of final disposal  of the  matter.  Therefore I am rather constrained  to  refrain from  examining  any of the contentions  canvassed  for  the accused  or  considering  the repercussions  made  of  cross examination  of witnesses, lest any observations made by  me may  prejudice either of the parties at the time  of  trial. Further the evidence referred to in Section 245, relates  to evidence  before  charge.   Therefore I do  not  propose  to examine  any  of  the contentions urged for  accused  No.  1 during the course of arguments and about the decisions cited at the Bar on behalf of accused persons." 15.  The   learned   counsel  contended   that   the   above observations  indicate that the learned Magistrate  has  not

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applied his mind to the evidence before him at all and  that he has mechanically framed the charge.  We do not think that the  learned counsel is right.  The said  observations  were made  by  the  learned  Magistrate  with  reference  to  the decision of the Supreme Court in Akbar Dar v. State of Jammu and  Kashmir  (1982  SCC  (Criminal)  148)  referred  to  in preceding  para 21 and should not be read in  isolation.   A reading  of the order does show that the learned  Magistrate has  considered the oral and documentary evidence at  length and finally expressed his opinion in paragraph 30 thus:               "On going through the evidence adduced  before               court by the complainant at this stage.  I  am               of  the  considered opinion that  there  exist               grounds  to frame charge against A.1 to 3  for               the  offence  punishable U/S.  500  I.P.C.  In               coming  to  conclusion that charge  should  be               framed  against  A- 1 to 3, I  should  not  be               understood  that I have expressed any  opinion               if made by me during the course of discussions               will not come in the way of either parties  at               the  final  disposal of the  case  on  merits.               Therefore,  for  these reasons, I  answer  the               point in the ’AFFIRMATIVE’." 16. The learned Sessions Judge who examined the order of the learned Magistrate has also expressed the opinion that since the   magistrate   has  framed  the  charge  on   a   proper consideration  of  oral  and  documentary  evidence  and  on forming  the  requisite opinion, no interference  is  called for.  As against this, the judgment of the High Court  shows that  it  has  entered  into the  merits  of  the  case  and pronounced  upon the truth and correctness of the  complaint and  the  defence, as would be evident  from  the  following observations: In  Para 23 the learned Judge states that the oral  evidence should  have been considered alongwith the documentary  evi- dence and that if that had been done, the learned magistrate would  have came to the conclusion that the imputation  made by  the accused is "neither intentional nor it  amounted  in lowering the reputation of the complainant in the estimation of general public and the context in which such a  statement was  made."  In Para 24 the learned Judge  states  that  the courts below