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PETITIONER: GAJRAJ SINGH ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNALAND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       12/09/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, B.L. HANSARIA, S.B. MAJMUDAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           W I T H    C.A.NOS. 12004,12007,12005-06,12008 AND 12002/96 11430   (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 412, 924, 490,/1913/96 and                          27355/95)                             AND              WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 146 OF 1996                      J U D G E M E N T K. Ramaswamy, J.      Common questions of law have arisen in all these cases. The facts in Gajraj Singh’s case are sufficient for disposal of  all   these  cases.   Though  notices   were  served  on respondents, Shri  Goel appeared  for  the  State  and  Shri Promod Swarup  for the  UPSRTU, none  is appearing  in other cases.      In 1988,  the appellant  was granted  a stage  carriage permit on the Meerut-Baraut route under Section 47(3) of the Motor Vehicles  Act,  1939  (4  of  1939)  (for  short,  the ’Repealed Act’) for a period of 3 years.  The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988  (59 of  1988) (for  short, the  ’Act’) came  into force w.e.f. July 1, 1989. The said permit was renewed under Section 81  of the  Act in  1991 for  a further  period of 5 years  and   the  second   renewal  was   granted  in  1995. Respondents 3  to 17  had applied under Section 70 for grant of stage  carriage permits  under Section  72 on the Meerut- Gangoh route which intersects part of the route on which the appellant  was   operating  his   stage  carriage.   Despite objections raised  by the  appellant,  the  State  Transport Authority (for  short, ’STA’)  granted permits  to  them  on November 23, 1992 which came be challenged by the appellants in  revision   filed  under  Section  90  before  the  State Transport  Appellate   Tribunal  (for  short,  ’STAT’).  The respondents questioned  the appellant’s  locus standi  under the preliminary  objection that  the renewal  granted  under Section 81  to the appellant was void. By order dated August 9, 1995,  the STAT upheld the preliminary objection and held that the  appellant has  no locus standi to object the grant of permits  to the  respondents, since  the renewal  of  the permit granted  to the  appellant was not valid in law as he had not  got any new permit under the Act. The High Court in the impugned  judgment dated  October 13,  1995 made in Writ

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Petition No.26132  of 1995 has upheld the order of the STAT. Thus, this appeal by special leave.      Shri K.K.  Venugopal, learned  senior counsel  for  the appellant, contended  that the  renewal of the permit of the appellant granted  under the  Repealed Act is a permit under the Act  and its  operation was  saved by Section 217(2) (a) read with  sub-section renewal  granted under Section 81 was valid in  law. There was no need for the appellant to obtain a  fresh   permit  under   the  Act  as  the  renewal  is  a continuation of the original permit which is a vested right. The effect  of saving provisions in Section 217(2) (a) is to allow all  the permits  granted under  the Repealed  Act  to continue after renewal under the Act. Section 217(2) (a) and sub--section (4),  thus, obviate  the need  to obtain  fresh permit  under   the  Act   and,  therefore,   it  would   be unnecessary. In  support thereof,  he placed strong reliance on M/s  Gurcharan Singh  Baldev Singh  vs. Vashwant  Singh & Ors. [(1992)  1 SCC  428 ].  He further  contended that this Court in  Secretary, Quillon Distt. Motor Transport Workers’ Cooperative Society  Ltd. vs. Regional Transport Authority & Ors. [(1994)  Supp (3)  SCC 210]  did not intend to lay down that after the Act came into force, all the holders of stage carriage permits  granted under  the Repealed  Act would  be required to  obtain fresh permits under the Act.Section 6 of the General  Clauses Act (for short, the ’GC Act’) read with Section 217(2)  (a) and  (4) saves  operation of  all  those permits which  were alive  when the  Act  came  into  force. Consequently, renewals  granted under Section 81 were valid. For contra  construction, an  argument of  inconvenience was forcefully projected.  He argued  that  Section  217(2)  (b) would be  applicable only if the permit is inconsistent with the provisions  of the  Act in  which event  the life of the permit granted under the Repealed Act gets extended only for the balance period of permit.      Shri S.K.  Dhaon, learned  Counsel appearing  in C.A. @ SLP (C)  No.27335/95, contended  that the permits granted to the existing  operators under  the  nationalised  scheme  in Chapter IV-A  of the  Repealed Act  are not  required to  be renewed under  Section 81  of the  Act as  they have already been saved  being existing  permits. So  the need  to obtain fresh permits  under the  Act would be inconsistent with the scheme of  the  Repealed  Act  as  well  as  the  Act.  Shri Venugopal buttresses  the contention  emphasising  that  the renewal is  only  a  continuation  of  the  existing  permit granted under  the Repealed  Act. The  need for fresh permit arises  only   if  the  renewal  is  inconsistent  with  the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the view of the High Court is clearly  not sustainable in law. In support thereof, Shri Venugopal places  strong reliance on D.Nataraja Mudaliar vs. The State  Transport Authority,  Madras [(1978)  4 SCC 290], State of  Punjab vs.  Manohar Singh  [(1955) 1  SCR 893] and M/s.  Universal   Imports  Agency   &  Anr.  vs.  The  Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors. [(1961) 1 SCR 305]. Shri Harish  N.Salve, appearing  for some  of  the  existing operators in  the nationalised  schemes, contended that they were not paid compensation since permits in their names were saved  with  corridor  restrictions.  They  are,  therefore, entitled to renewal of permits as a matter of right.      Shri Adarsh  Kumar Goel, learned counsel for the State, resisted the  contentions. According  to him,  the scheme of the Act  in many a provision is inconsistent with the scheme of operation  in the  Repealed  Act.  When  the  Legislature manifested its  intention as  to its  inconsistency  in  the operation of  the Act  with the  provisions of  the Repealed Act, the  STA  or  the  Regional  Transport  Authority  (for

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short,’RTA’), as  the case  may be, would be devoid of power and jurisdiction  to grant  renewal of permit under the Act. Consequently, the  erstwhile holders of permits are required to obtain  fresh permits under the Act. The Repealed Act has been saved  only to  the extent of validating, under Section 217(2) (b), the continuation of the permit for the unexpired period granted  under the  Repealed Act.  The owner  of  the vehicle,  thereby,  became  entitled  to  operate,  for  the balance period,  stage carriage  on the respective route. On its expiry,  the erstwhile  holder of  the permit  ceases to have the  permit under the Act until he obtains afresh stage carriage permit  under the Act. To obviate the difficulty of running the  stage carriage  between the date of application for permit and the date of grant, the Act provides for grant of temporary permits. There is no hiatus in the operation in that behalf  and any  grant of permit or renewal should only be consistent with the provisions of the Act. Otherwise, the Repealed Act  continues to  remain in operation, in spite of its express  repeal by  Section 217(1) of the Act. The ratio of this Court in Secretary, Quillon District Motor Transport Worker’s  cooperative   Society  Ltd.’s   case  (for  short, ’Quillon’s case)  would be  applicable to the situation. The ratio in Gurucharan Singh’s case (supra) would be applicable only to  a pending  application for renewal filed before the Act came  into force which would be disposed of by operation of Section 217(2) (a) as saved by Section 217(4) of the Act. If so  understood, there is no inconsistency in the ratio of the aforesaid  two decisions of this Court and the operation of the provisions of the two Acts.      We issued  notice to  Shri Promod  Swarup to  appear on behalf of  STUs and  argue on  the question  of  renewal  of permits covered  by the  schemes. He contended that they are not entitled to renewal under Chapter VI of the Act. Chapter V does  not apply  to them. Therefore, they have no right to apply or  obtain permit  under Section  72 or  renewal under Section 81.      We may  make it  clear at  this juncture  that when the cases had  come up  for admission  and  Shri  Venugopal  had pointed out to plausible misapprehension in the operation of the ratio laid down by this Court in the above two cases, we had referred  the matter  to three  Judge Bench.  Thus,  the matter has come before this Bench.      The question  for consideration  is: whether the holder of a  stage  carriage  permit  under  the  Repealed  Act  is required to  obtain fresh  permit or a renewal of the permit as per  the  provisions  of  the  Act?    To  appreciate  to contentions in proper perspective, it would be profitable to refer  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  extent  of  their operation and their inconsistency with the provisions in the Repealed  Act  so  as  to  focus  the  true  intentment  and operation of  the Act.  Section 2(31)  of  the  Act  defines "permit" to  mean a  permit issued  by the State or Regional Transport Authority  or  an  authority  prescribed  in  this behalf under the Act (emphasis supplied) authorising the use of motor vehicle as a transport vehicle. "Transport vehicle" has been  defined under  Section  2(47)  to  mean  a  public service  vehicle,   a   goods   carriage,   an   educational institution  bus   or  a  private  service  vehicle.  "Stage carriage" has been defined under Section 2(40) to mean motor vehicle constructed  or  adapted  to  carry  more  than  six passengers excluding  the  driver  for  hire  or  reward  at separate fares  paid by or for individual passengers, either for the  whole journey or for stages of the journey. "Route" has been  defined under  Section 2(38)  to mean  a  line  of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by

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a motor  vehicle between  one terminus  and another. "Public service vehicle"  has been  defined by Section 2(35) to meas any motor  vehicle used  or  adapted  to  be  used  for  the carriage of  passengers for  hire or  reward, and includes a maxicab, a  motorcab, contract carriage, and stage carriage. These definitions  similarly had found place in the Repealed Act with slight variations.      Chapter V  of the  Act under  the heading  "Control  of transport vehicle"  regulates use  of, or permission for use of, the vehicles and the necessity to obtain permits in that behalf by  an owner  of motor  vehicle. Section  66  enjoins every owner of a motor vehicle to obtain permit and no owner shall use  the motor  vehicle as  stage carriage  except  in accordance with  the conditions  of the  permit  granted  or countersigned by the prescribed authority for its use in the public place. The manner in which the vehicle should be used gets regulated  by the  conditions of  the permit, the rules and the  law; the  details thereof are not material. Section 67 empowers  the State Government to control road transport. Section 68 enumerates the manner in which the RTA or the STA or other authorities under the Act would exercise the powers and perform  functions specified  under the  Act. Section 69 enjoins the  owner of  a vehicle  to  make  application  for permit.      Section  70  specifies  the  procedure  for  making  an application  to   obtain  stage   carriage  permit  and  the conditions subject  to which  the application is required to be dealt  with. Section  71 prescribes the procedure for STA or RTA  to consider  such applications  for grant  of  stage carriage  permits.   It  envisages,  under  sub-section  (3) thereof, that  subject  to  the  number  of  vehicles,  road conditions and  other relevant matters, the State Government shall, by a notification, direct and STA or RTA to limit the number of  stage carriages  generally or  of any  specified, type as  may be  fixed and  specified in  the  notification, operating on  city routes  in towns with a population of not less than  five lakhs.  Its operation  is subject to clauses (b) and  (c) thereof.  The proviso  to  sub-section  (3)  of Section 71  envisages that  other  conditions  being  equal, preference shall  be given  to applications for permits from (i)  State   transport   undertakings;   (ii)   co-operative societies registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment  for  the  time  being  in  force;  (iii)  ex- servicemen; and (iv) any other class or category of persons, as the  State Government  may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, consider  necessary. On  other routes,  except town service, no restrictions are imposed unlike in Section 47(3) of the Repealed Act to grant stage carriage permits. Section 72 empowers  the RTA  or STA  to decide  an application  for grant of  a permit  to operate a stage carriage with any one or more  of the  conditions enumerated under sub-section (2) thereof or the rules or conditions attached to the permit.      Section 80  prescribes procedure to apply for and grant of renewal  of permits. Sub-section (2) envisages that on an application made  under sub-section (1) at any time, the STA or RTA  or any  prescribed authority  under Section 66,shall not ordinarily  refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind  made  under  the  Act.  (emphasis  supplied).  The proviso lifts  the embargo  of sub-section  (2) and  permits summary refusal  of the  application, if  such a grant would have the effect of "increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed  and specified  in a  notification"  under  Section 71(3)  (a)  or  of  the  contract  carriages  as  fixed  and specified in a notification under Section 74(3(a). Under the proviso to Section 71 (1), prior to its amendment thereof by

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Section 23  of Amendment  Act 54  of 1994,  the RTA/STA  was prohibited to  grant permit  for a route of 50 kilometers or less to all juristic persons and to grant permit "only to an individual or  a State Transport undertaking". The Amendment became operative  from  November  14,  1994  and  the  above prohibition no longer operates.      Section 81  regulates renewal  of permits  and duration thereof, sub-section  (1) visualises  that a  permit,  other than a  temporary permit  issued under Section 87 or special permit issued  under Section  88(8), shall be effective from the date  of issuance  or renewal  thereof for a period of 5 years. Under the proviso, the period of countersigned permit is coterminus  with the validity of the primary permit. Sub- section  (2)  prescribes  the  limitation  within  which  an application for  renewal should  be made  before  expiry  of original grant  or renewal. Sub-section (3) gives discretion to condone  the delay  in making  the  application  for  the grounds mentioned  thereunder.  Sub-section  (4)  enumerates grounds for  refusal of  renewal of a permit for one or more of  the   grounds  enumerated   thereunder.  The  terms  and conditions  subject   to  which  stage  carriage  permit  is required to  be renewed  are different from those of Section 58 of  the Repealed  Act except  the procedural  part.  Sub- section  (2)  of  Section  58  of  the  Repealed  Act  gives preferential treatment  for renewal of a permit in favour of the holder  of the  permit, while Section 81 of the Act does not give  such preferential  right to  renewal. On the other hand, if  the permit  granted under  Section 72  exceed  the limit prescribed  by the  State Government for town service, there would  be danger  of refusal  of  renewal  subject  to giving reasons  in support  thereof. Equally, in relation to other routes,  discretion is  given to  reject renewal  of a permit for reasons to be recorded in the order.      Chapter VI  deals with  special provisions  relating to State Transport  Undertakings (for  short, ’STU’)  which  is equivalent to Chapter IV-A of the Repealed Act. By operation of Section  98, Chapter  VI and  the rules  and orders  made thereunder   shall   have   overriding   effect   over   the inconsistent provisions  contained in  Chapter V  or in  any other law  for the  time being in force or in any instrument having effect  by virtue  of any  such law.  The  STU  shall provide an  efficient,  adequate,  economical  and  properly coordinated road  transport service  on the notified area or route or  portion thereof  to the  exclusion of  the private operators except  as exempted  in the  scheme  itself  which itself is a self-operative law. The details are not material for the  purpose of  this case  except that  under the  said Chapter, there  is no  specific provision,  like Section 68F (1D) for  renewal in  favour of  any person  or any class in relation to  an area  or route or portion thereof covered by such scheme  for renewal,  or Section  68F (1E) in favour of STU.      Section 217  repeals the  existing  laws  and  provides savings from  its operation.  Sub-section  (1)  specifically repeals Act  4 of 1939 and any law corresponding to that Act in force  in any  State before July 1, 1989. Sub-section (2) with a  non obstante  clause  provides  certain  savings  as provided thereunder:      Clause   (a)    of   Section   217(2)   provides   that notwithstanding the  repeal of  Act 4  of 1939  or any other analogous enactments  in operation, any notification issued, rule, regulation  made, order passed or notice issued or any appointment or declaration made, or exemption granted or any confiscation made,  or any  penalty  or  fine  imposed,  any forfeiture, cancellation  or any  other thing done (emphasis

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supplied) or  any other  action taken under the Repealed Act and in  force immediately  before July 1, 1989 shall, so far as it  is not  inconsistent with  the provisions  of the Act (emphasis supplied)  be deemed  to have  been issued,  made, granted, done  or taken under the corresponding provision of the Act.  In other  words, clause  (a) saves  such of  those enumerated  events   under  the   Repealed  Act   which  are consistent with the provisions in the Act.      Clause  (b)   of  Section   217(2)  provides  that  any certificate of  fitness or registration or licence or permit (emphasis supplied)  issued or  granted under  the  repealed enactment  shall   continue  to   have  effect   after  such commencement under  "the same  conditions and  for the  same period"  as  if  the  Act  had  not  been  passed  (emphasis supplied). In  an  emphatic  manner,  the  saving  provision provides that,  notwithstanding the  repeal of Act 4 of 1939 or any  corresponding  law,  the  permit  issued  under  the Repealed Act  should continue to operate proprio vigore till its life  expires under the same conditions and for the same period as  if the Act was not passed.  Other clauses are not relevant. Hence they are not dealt with.      Clause (e)  deals with the scheme under Section 68-C or under the  corresponding law  in operation,  which shall  be disposed  of  under  Section  100  of  the  Act.  Similarly, temporary permits  issued under  sub-section (1A) of Section 68F  of   the  Repealed   Act  or  under  the  corresponding provisions shall,  because of use of clause (f), continue to remain in  force until  approved scheme  under Chapter VI of the Act  is published. The omission to provide similar right of renewal  of permanent  permit like  one  available  under Section 68F(1D)  to a  private  operator  or  to  STU  under Section 68F(1F)  is significant and deliberate. It should be presumed that  the Parliament  having made similar provision in Section  81 for renewal of permits issued in Chapter V of the Act,  the omission  thereof in Chapter VI in relation to the  private   operators  manifests  the  intention  of  the Parliament that  the right  to obtain stage carriage permit, contract carriage permit or temporary permit on the notified area or  route or  a portion  thereof has been frozen to all private operators  except to  the extent of the right to ply stage carriage  on the  basis of  the  permits  saved  under Chapter IV-A  of the  Repealed Act.  Therefore,  the  result would be  that even the private operators whose permits were saved also would have limited operation under Section 217(2) (b) to  ply their  stage carriages  for the unexpired period only. So, limited validity of permits to run stage carriages etc, on  the nationalised routes or notified area or portion thereof in  the approved scheme was saved so that the holder of the  stage carriage  permits will  have  full  course  of unexpired life  of the  permits granted  under the  Repealed Act. In other words, Section 217(2)(b) breathed limited life into all permits granted under the repealed Act except those granted to  STU under  approved or  draft schemes to run its full course.  It was  so manifested  by Section  217(4)  and Section 6 of the GC Act. The operation of law in Chapter IVA of the  Repealed Act  as declared  by this Court would be of much assistance for interpretation in this behalf.      In Mysore  State Road  Transport Corporation vs. Mysore State Transport  Appellate Tribunal  [(1974) 2  SCC 750], it was held  that no  licence can  be granted  to  any  private operator whose  route traversed  or overlapped any part of a notified route  or routes  as prohibited  in Chapter IV-A of the Repealed  Act. An applicant seeking grant of a permit on a route  which overlapped  even on  a portion  of a notified route was  held to  be not  entitled to  the  grant  of  the

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permit. In  Adarsh Travels Bus Service and Another vs. State of U.P.  & Ors.  [(1985) 4 SCC 557], a Constitution Bench of this Court  approved the  above law  and had held that under Sections 68FF, 68B, 68C, 68D read with Section 2 (28A), once a scheme  was published under Section 68D in relation to any area  or   a  route  or  portion  thereof,  whether  to  the exclusion,  complete   or  partial,   of  other  persons  or otherwise, no  person than  the State  Transport Undertaking may operate on the notified area or notified route except as provided in  the scheme  itself.  No  private  operator  can operate his  vehicle on  any portion of the notified area or notified route  unless authorised  to do  so by terms of the scheme itself. Therefore, corridor shelter was impermissible on a  notified area, route or a portion of the route. It was further held  that unless  the scheme provides for exempting operators already  having permit  for common sector from the scheme by  incorporating appropriate  conditional clauses in the scheme  to enable them to ply their vehicles over common sectors without picking up or setting down passengers on the common sectors,  it was  not open to the RTA or STA to grant permits on  the notified  area or  notified route  providing corridor shelter.      In T.V.  Nataraj &  Ors. vs.  State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1994) 2  SCC 32],  a Bench  of two  Judges of  this  Court considered the  integrity of  the route,  the effect  of the notification of the scheme under Section 68C of the Repealed Act and  held that  on publication  of the  approved  scheme under Section  68A, the  private  operators  were  excluded, unless saved  by the  scheme under  Section 68A, the private operators were  excluded, unless saved by the scheme itself, to operate on an approved area or route by obtaining permits to run  the stage  carriage on  the approved route under the scheme. In  the absence  of any  express  exemption  in  the scheme, the  exclusion of  the private  operators to operate the stage  carriage on  the approved  scheme  is  total  and complete. It was only for the State Government to take steps to put  vehicles on  approved schemes  so as  to  avoid  any inconvenience to the travelling public.      In Ram  Krishan Verma  & Ors. vs. State of U.P. &  Ors. [(1992)  2   SCC  620]  another  Bench  of  two  Judges  had considered the  scheme of  Chapter IV-A  of the Repealed Act and Sections  80 and  98 of  the Act.  It was  held that the scheme published  under Section  68D  of  the  Repealed  Act (Chapter VI  of the  Act) is  a law  and it  has over-riding effect over Chapter IV of the Repealed Act (Chapter V of the Act). The  scheme operates  against everyone  unless  it  is modified. It  excluded private  operators from  the notified area or  notified route  or a  portion thereof covered under the scheme  except to  the extent  saved  under  the  scheme itself. The  right of the private operators to apply for and to obtain  permits under  Chapter IV  of  the  Repealed  Act (Chapter  V   of  the  Act)  had  been  totally  frozen  and prohibited. The result was that on the approved nationalised route or area, the private operators were totally prohibited to obtain  permits under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 of  the Act to ply their stage carriages.  This ratio was reiterated by  another Bench in Nisar Ahmad & Ors. vs. State of U.P.  & Ors.  [(1994) Supp.  3 SCC  460] holding that the approved scheme  is a law by itself and everyone, whether or not party  to the  earlier order  of this Court K.K. Verma’s case, was bound by the law laid down and directions given by this Court under Article 142(2) of the Constitution.      It is  seen that  Chapter VI of the Act empowers STU to frame schemes which have over-riding effect, by operation of Section 98,  on Chapter V and other laws. Section 101 with a

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non obstante  clause gives  power  to  the  STU  to  operate additional services  for the conveyance of the passengers on special occasions  such as  to and  from fairs and religious gatherings. Section  102 empowers  the State  Government  to modify or  cancel the  approved scheme  only in  the  public interest. Section  103 gives  exclusive right  to the STU to apply  for  and  obtain  stage  carriage  permits  or  goods carriage permits  or contract carriage permits in respect of a notified  area  or  notified  route  or  portion  thereof. Section 104  prohibits STA or RTA to grant any permit except in accordance  with the scheme. Thus private operators whose named permits were saved from the scheme, became entitled to operate  their   stage   carriages   subject   to   corridor restrictions of  picking up  and setting down the passengers enroute on the overlapped route.      It would,  thus, be  clear that  there is  no provision like Section  68F(1D) of  the Repealed Act to obtain renewal of a  permit saved under the scheme to private operators. In contrast, sub-section  (2) of Section 103 gives power to the STA or RTA, on application made by the STU under Section (1) thereof, either  to grant  any  other  permit  or  reject  a pending application  or to  cancel an  existing permit or to modify the  terms  of  an  existing  permit  in  the  manner indicated in  clause (c)  of sub-section (2) of Section 103. It would,  thereby,  indicate  the  inconsistency  with  the provisions contained in Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act.      Whenever an  Act is  repealed it  must  be  considered, except as  to transactions  past and  closed, as  if it  had never existed.  The effect  thereof is to obliterate the Act completely from  the record  of the  Parliament as if it had never been  passed it,  it  never  existed  except  for  the purpose of  those actions  which were  commenced, prosecuted and concluded  while it  was existing  law. Legal fiction is one which  is not  an  actual  reality  and  which  the  law recognises and the court accepts as a reality. Therefore, in case of  legal fiction the court believes something to exist which in  reality does  not  exist.  It  is  nothing  but  a presumption of  the existence  of the state of affairs which in actuality  is non-existent.  The effect  of such  a legal fiction is  that a position which otherwise would not obtain is deemed to obtain under the circumstances. Therefore, when Section 217(1)  of the  Act repealed Act 4 of 1939 in effect came to  be non-existent except as regards the transactions, past and closed or saved.      In Crawford’s Interpretation of Law (1989) at page 626, it is  stated that  "[An  express  repeal  will  operate  to abrogate an existing law, unless there is some indication to the contrary,  such as a saving clause. Even existing rights and pending  litigation, both  civil and  criminal,  may  be affected although  it is not an uncommon practice to use the saving clause  in order  to preserve  existing rights and to exempt pending  litigation". At  page 627, it is stated that "[ Moreover,  where a repealing clause expressly refers to a portion of  a prior  Act, the remainder of such Act will not usually be  repealed, as  a presumption  is raised  that  no further repeal  is necessary, unless there is irreconcilable inconsistency between them. In like manner, if the repealing clause is  by its terms confined to a particular Act, quoted by title, it will not be extended to an act upon a different subject". Section  6 of  the GC  Act enumerates, inter alia, that where the Act repeals any enactment, unless a different intention appears,  the repeal shall not (a) revive anything not in  force or  existing at  the time  at which the repeal takes effect;  or (b)  affect the  previous operation of any enactment so  repealed or  anything duly  done  or  suffered

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thereunder; or  (c) affect  any right, privilege, obligation or  liability   acquired,  accrued  or  incurred  under  any enactment so  repealed, and  any such  investigation,  legal proceeding  or   remedy  may  be  instituted,  continued  or enforced. In  India Tobacco  Co. Ltd. vs. The Commercial Tax Officer, Bnavanipore  & Ors.  [(1975) 3  SCC 512  at 517] in paras 6 and 11, a Bench of three Judges had held that repeal connotes abrogation  and  obliteration  of  one  statute  by another from  the statute  book as  completely as  if it had never been  passed. When  an Act  is repealed,  it  must  be considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it had  never existed.  Repeal is  not a matter of mere form but is  of substance,   depending  on the  intention of  the Legislature. If  the intention indicated either expressly or by necessary  implication in  the subsequent  statute was to abrogate or wipe off the former enactment wholly or in part, then it would be a case of total or pro tanto repeal.      When there  is a  repeal and simultaneous re-enactment, Section 6  of the  GC Act  would apply to such a case unless contrary intention  can be  gathered from the repealing Act. Section 6  would be  applicable in such cases unless the new legislation  manifests   intention  inconsistent   with   or contrary  to   the  application   of   the   section.   Such incompatibility  would  have  to  be  ascertained  from  all relevant provisions  of the  new Act.  Therefore,  when  the repeal is  followed by  a  fresh  legislation  on  the  same subject, the  Court would  undoubtedly have  to look  to the provisions  of   the  new   Act  only  for  the  purpose  of determining whether  the new  Act only  for the  purpose  of determining  whether   the  new   Act  indicates   different intention. The  object of  repeal  and  re-enactment  is  to obliterate the  Repealed Act  and  to  get  rid  of  certain obsolete matters.      On "Saving  of rights  acquired", in  the Principles of Statutory Interpretation  by G.P.  Singh [(Sixth  Edition) - 1996] at  page 413,  the learned  author has stated that the effect of  clauses (c)  to (e)  of Section  6 of  GC Act is, speaking briefly,  to prevent  the obliteration of a statute in spite  of its  repeal to  keep intact  rights acquired or accrued and  liabilities incurred  during its  operation and permit continuance  of institution  of any legal proceedings or recourse  to any  remedy which  may have  been  available before  the  repeal  for  enforcement  of  such  rights  and liabilities.   At page  418, the  learned author  has stated that the privilege to get an extension of a licence under an enactment is  not an accrued right and no application can be filed after  the repeal  of the enactment for renewal of the licence. In Legislation and Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup (1974 Ed,)  at page 539, it is stated that the power to lake advantage of  an enactment may without impropriety be termed as a  "right", but  the question  is whether  it is a "right accrued". A  mere right  (assuming  it  to  be  properly  so called) existing  in the  members of the community or any of them to take advantage of an amendment, without any act done by an  individual towards  availing himself  of that  right, cannot properly be deemed a "right accrued".      In Bishambhar  Nath Kohil  & Ors..  v. State  of  Uttar Pradesh &  Ors. [AIR  1966 SC  573] a  Constitution Bench of this Court  was to  consider application of Section 6 of the GC Act  to Section  27  of  the  Administration  of  Evacuee Property Act,  1950.  Regarding  saving  of  rights  accrued thereunder by  operation of  section 6  of the  GC Act  this Court, after  an elaborate  consideration, had  held that by Section 58 (3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act the Legislature  had not  expressed any  reservation in  the

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application of  that section  and none  can be  implied. The order  of   the  Deputy  Custodian  was  declared  final  by operation of  Section 30 (6) of Ordinance 1 of 1949, but the liability was  subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) to (5) of Section 30. If fictionally order is deemed to have been passed  under Act 31 of 1950 (Administration of Evacuee Property Act  ) as  if the  Act were in operation on October 12, 1949,  it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the order would  be  subject  to  the  appellate  or  revisional jurisdiction of  the authorities  who have  the appellate or revisional power  by virtue  of provisions  conferring those powers and  which must  also be deemed to have been in force on the date when the impugned order was passed.  It was held that Section  6 was  inapplicable to  revive  the  Act  that became final.      The question, therefore, is: what rights were preserved by saving  provisions in  Section  217(2)  of  the  Act?  In Crawford’s  Statutory  Interpretation  it  is  stated  under Section 322 at page 657 thus:      "Often the  legislature instead  of      simply  amending   a   pre-existing      statute,  will   repeal   the   old      statute in  its entirety and by the      same enactment pre-existing law. Of      course, the problem created by this      sort of legislative action involves      mainly the  effect  of  the  repeal      upon rights  and liabilities  which      accrued under the original statute.      Are those  rights  and  liabilities      destroyed   or    preserved?    The      authorities are  divided as  to the      effect of  simultaneous repeals and      re-enactments. Some  adhere to  the      view   that    the    rights    and      liabilities  accruing   under   the      repealed act  are destroyed,  since      the statute  from which they sprung      has   actually   terminated,   even      though for only a very short period      of time.  Others, and  they seem to      be  in   the  majority,  refuse  to      accept this  view of the situation,      and consequently  maintain that all      rights and  liabilities which  have      accrued under  the original statute      are preserved  and may be enforced,      since the  re-enactment neutralizes      the repeal,  thereby continuing the      law in  force without interruption.      Logically, the  former attitude  is      correct, for  the old  statute does      cease to  exist as  an  independent      enactment,   but    all   practical      considerations favour  the majority      view. This  is so  even  where  the      statute involved is a penal act."      In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Ed.) it is  stated at  page 17  that the effect of repealing Acts passed after  August 30,  1889, is now dealt with by Section 38(2) of  the Interpretation  Act. Such  repealing Acts are, unless the  contrary intention appears, not to..."(b) affect the previous  operation of  any  enactment  so  repealed  or anything duly  done  or  suffered  under  any  enactment  so repealed; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or

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liability acquired,  accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed;  or (d)  affect  any  penalty,  forfeiture,  or punishment incurred  in respect  of  any  offence  committed against  any  enactment  so  repealed;  or  (e)  affect  any investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy in respect of any such  right,   privilege,  obligation,  liability,  penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid".      In Sutherland Statutory Construction (3rd Edition) Vol. I by Horack, in paras 2043 to 2045, it is stated that:           "Under common  law  principles      of construction  and interpretation      all rights, liabilities, penalties,      forfeitures and  offences which are      of purely  statutory derivation and      unknown  to   the  common  law  are      effaced  by   the  repeal   of  the      statute   which    granted    them,      irrespective  of   their   accrual.      Likewise,  where   a   common   law      principle   is    abrogated,    its      effective  existence  is  destroyed      both as  to  past  actions  and  to      pending  proceedings.   However,  a      right of  a common law nature which      is further  embodied  in  statutory      terms  exists   as  an  enforceable      right  exclusive   of  the  statute      declaratory of  it,  and  therefore      the right  is not  expunged by  the      repeal of the statute.           Since the  effect of  a repeal      is to obliterate the statute and to      destroy its  effective operation in      future, or to suspend the operation      of the  common law  when  it  is  a      common  law   principle  which   is      abrogated,  any  proceedings  which      have  not  culminated  in  a  final      judgment prior  to the  repeal  are      abated at  the consummation  of the      repeal. When,  however, the  repeal      does  not   contemplate  either   a      substantive common law or statutory      right,  but  merely  the  procedure      prescribed    to     secure     the      enforcement of the right, the right      itself is  not annulled but remains      in existence  enforced by  applying      the new procedure.      Effect on vested rights      Under  common   law  principles  of      construction and interpretation the      repeal  of   a   statute   or   the      abrogation   of    a   common   law      principle operates  to  divest  all      the  rights   accruing  under   the      repealed statute  or the  abrogated      common  law,   and  to   halt   all      proceedings not  concluded prior to      the repeal.  However, a right which      has become  vested is not dependent      upon the  common law or the statute      under which it was acquired for its      assertion, but  has an  independent      existence. Consequently, the repeal

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    of the statute or the abrogation of      the  common   law  from   which  it      originated does not efface a vested      right, but  it remains  enforceable      without regard to the repeal.      In  order  to  become  vested,  the      right must  be a  contract right, a      property right,  or a right arising      from a transaction in the nature of      a   contract   which   has   become      perfected to  the degree  that  the      continued existence  of the statute      cannot    further    enhance    its      acquisition.      Effect up On inchoate rights      Rights   of    action   which   are      dependent upon a statute, and which      are still  inchoate and not reduced      to possession or perfected by final      judgment, are lost by the repeal of      the statute  from which  they stem.      This rule of construction is simply      a restatement  of  the  common  law      principle of  construction that the      repeal of  a  statute  operates  to      divest all  rights  accruing  under      the  repealed   statute   and   all      proceedings not  concluded prior to      the repeal,  since inchoate  rights      are by definition not vested rights      such as  to escape  the common  law      rule of  effacement.  The  inchoate      rights are  but an  incident to the      statute and fall with its repeal."      In Francis  Bennion’s Statutory  Interpretation (Second Edition) it is stated at page 210 thus:           "Where  an  Act  passed  after      1978  repeals   and  re-enacts   as      enactment    (with    or    without      modification)  then,   unless   the      contrary     intention     appears,      anything done,  or having effect as      if  done,   under   the   enactment      repealed, in  so far  as  it  could      have been  done under the provision      re-enacted, has  effect as  if done      under that provision."      In Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation (3rd Edition) by Randall, A.E., 1924, it is stated at page 531-32 thus:      "Their lordships...  conceive that,      in dealing  with  a  statute  which      professes merely to repeal a former      statute of  limited operation,  and      to reenact  its  provisions  in  an      amended   form,    they   are   not      necessarily to presume an intention      to extend  the operation  of  those      provisions to  classes  of  persons      not  previously  subject  to  them,      unless the  contrary is  shown, but      that they  are to  determine  on  a      fair  construction   of  the  whole      statute, considered  with reference      to the  surrounding  circumstances,      whether such an intention existed."

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    Brown v.  Mc Lachlan (1872), L.R. 4      P.C. 543,  at p.  550; 42  L.J.P.C.      18,  at   p.23,  Sir  W.  Colville,      delivering  the   judgment  of  the      Judicial Committee.           "Where you  have a repeal, and      you have  also a saving clause, you      have  to   consider   whether   the      substituted   enactment    contains      anything  incompatible   with   the      previously existing  enactment. The      question is,  Aye or  No. is  there      incompatibility  between  the  two?      And in  those cases  the judges, in      holding that  there  was  a  saving      clause large  enough to  annul  the      repeal,  says  that  you  must  see      whether  the  true  effect  was  to      substitute  something  incompatible      with  the   enactment  in  the  Act      repealed; and  that  if  you  found      something  in   the  repealing  Act      incompatible   with   the   general      enactments  in  the  repealed  Act,      then    you    must    treat    the      jurisdiction under the repealed Act      as pro  tanto wiped  out.  That  is      settled  by  the  cases  of  In  re      Busfield (1886),  32 Ch. D. 123; 55      L.J. Ch.  467; and Hume V. Somerton      (1890), 25  Q.B.D. 239;  59 L.J. Q.      B. 420."  In re  R., (1906)  1  Ch.      730, at  p. 736; 75 L.J. Ch.421, at      p.423, Collins, M.R."      It is  already seen  that the  operation of sub-section (1) of  Section 217  is to  obliterate the Act 4 of 1939 and any corresponding  law in  force in any State from operation with effect  from 1st  July, 1989. However, repeal shall not affect any right or liability acquired, accrued or incurred. Sub-section (2)  enumerates and  saves from the obliteration of Act  4 of  1939 and corresponding law by fiction with its non obstante clause. Ex abundenti cautela clauses (a) to (e) elaborate the  enumeration of  rights. They  would apply  to specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or  other of the events specified in the statute. Clause (a)  preserves  continued  operation  of  any  notification, rules, regulations,  order or  notice issued  etc,  and  any appointment or  declaration made etc, under the Repealed Act in force  immediately before  July 1, 1989. Those enumerated acts or  actions shall  be deemed to have been issued, made, granted, done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act  which are  not inconsistent  with the provisions of the Act.  In other  words, Section  217  (2)  (a)  gives  an elongated operation as regards all transactions, which being consistent with  the provisions  of the Act should be deemed to have  been issued, made, granted, done or taken under the corresponding  provisions  of  the  Act.  Existence  of  the corresponding provisions  similar to the repealed provisions is a condition precedent. If the operation of the provisions in  the  Act  is  inconsistent  and  incompatible,  it  gets obliterated and  the earlier  provisions no longer revive or survive. If analogous provision in the Repealed Act does not find place  in the  Act,  the  rights  accrued  or  acquired thereunder would  not continue  under the  Act unless  fresh rights are acquired under the Act.

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    By operation  of clause (b), any certificate of fitness of a  motor vehicle or its registration or licence issued or permit granted under the repealed enactments, shall continue to have  effect  after  such  commencement  under  the  same conditions and  for the  same period  as if this Act had not been passed.  In other  words, a  permit granted  under  the Repealed Act  4 of  1939 shall  continue to  have  the  same operation under  the Act under the same terms and conditions and for  the same  period, as  if the  Repealed Act  was  in operation and as if the Act had not been passed. This is the fiction of law by which, though Act 4 of 1939 was wiped out, its operation  gets revived. The intention, thereby, appears to be  that the  Act breaths life into the dead permits etc, and allows  full play  to  the  permits  granted  under  the Repealed  Act,  even  if  inconsistent,  till  their  period expired by efflux of time.      On expiry  of the  period of permit granted under Act 4 of 1939  or corresponding  law what would be the consequence is the question. It is true, as contended by Shri Venugopal, that by  operation of  sub-section (4)  of Section 217, read with clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 217, Section 6 of the  GC Act  steps in  and the conjoint operation thereof leaves no  manner of  doubt that  the  notification  issued, rules or  regulations made, orders passed, notice issued, or any appointment  or a declaration made, exemption granted or any confiscation  made or  any penalty or find imposed in or any other  thing done  or any  other action  taken under the repealed  enactment   in  force   immediately  before   such commencement shall,  as far  as it  is not inconsistent with the  provisions   of  the   Act,  be  deemed  to  have  been correspondingly issued,  made, granted,  done or taken under the  Act   and  their   operation  thereby   gets  saved  by appropriate clause  in Section  6 of  the GC  Act read  with Section 217(2)(a)  to  (e)  of  the  Act.  In  other  words, proceedings initiated  before Act  4 of  1939 was  repealed, would be continued and concluded under the Act as if the Act was not  enacted. However, four things would emerge from its operation.     First,  there   must  exist  a  corresponding provision under  the Act pari materia with the Repealed Act; secondly, that the order or permit granted must exist and be in operation  as on  July 1,  1989- the day on which the Act had come  into force:  thirdly, it  must not be inconsistent with the  provisions of  the Act; and fourthly some positive acts should  have been  done before  July 1, 1989 to further secure   any right.   All  the  four  conditions  should  be satisfied as conditions precedent for application of Section 6 of  the GC  Act by operation of sub-section [4] of Section 217 and  then clause  [a] of  sub-section [2] of Section 217 steps in  and starts  operation thereof.   We  are concerned with permits, let it be said that a permit is preceded by an order granting  permit by  the concerned  RTA or STA, as the case may  be, under  the Repaled Act.  The said order stands merged with the grant of permit and gets exhausted.      This  may   be  angulated   from  yet   another   legal perspective, namely,  consequences that  would flow from the meaning of  the word  ‘renewal’ of a permit under Section 81 of the  Act.    Black‘s  Law  Dictionary  defines  the  word ‘renewal’ at page 1296 thus:      "The act  of renewing  or reviving.      A revival  or rehabilitation  of an      expiring  subject;  that  which  is      made anew  or re-established.   The      substitution  of  a  new  right  or      obligation for  another of the same      nature.   A change of something old

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    to something  new.    To  grant  or      obtain extension of;"      In P.  Ramanatha Aivar’s  "The  law  Lexicon"  [Reprint Edition 1987], the word ‘renewal’ is defined at page 1107 to mean "a  change of  something old  for something  new.   The renewal of a ‘license’ means a new license granted by way of renewal".   The renewal  of a  negotiable bill  or  note  is regarded simply  as a  prolongation of the original contact. The office  of a  "renewal", as  it is  termed,  of  a  life policy, is to prevent discontinuance of forfeiture.      In Provash Chandra Dalui & Anr. v. Biswanath Banerjee & Anr.   [[1989] Supp.   1  SCC 487  at 496]  in para 14, this Court drew  the distinction between the meaning of the words extension and  renewal.   It was  held  that  a  distinction between extension and renewal is chiefly that in the case of renewal, a  new lease  is required  while  in  the  case  of extension  the   same  lease   continues  in   force  during additional period  by the performance of stipulated act.  In other words,  the word  ‘extension’ when  used in its proper and  usual   sense  in   connection  with   a  lease,  means prolongation of the lease.      It is  settled law  that grant  of renewal  is a  fresh grant though  it breaths  life into  the  operation  of  the previous  lease   or  licence   granted  as   per   existing appropriate provisions  of the  Act, rules or orders or acts intra vires or as per the law in operation as on the date of renewal.  The right to get renewal of a permit under the Act is not a vested right but a privilege subject to fulfillment of the conditions precedent enumerated under the Act.  Under Section 58  of the  Repealed Act,  renewal of  a permit is a preferential right and refusal thereof is an exception.  But the Act  expresses different intention.  Sections 66, 70, 71 and  80  prescribe  procedure  for  making  application  and compliance of  the conditions  mentioned therein.  Existence of the  provisions of  the Act  consistent with the Repealed Act is  a pre-condition.   Grant of renewal under Section 81 is a  discretion given to the authority [STA or RTA] subject to the  conditions and  the requirement  of law.  Discretion given  by   a  statute  connotes  making  a  choice  between competing considerations  according to  rules of  reason and justice and  not arbitrary  or whim  but legal  and regular. Sections 70  and 71  read with  Section 81  do indicate that grant of  permit or renewal thereof is not a matter of right or course.   It  is subject  of rejection  for reasons to be recorded in support thereof.  Therefore, right to renewal of a permit  under Section  81 is not a vested or accrued right but a privilege to get renewal according to law in operation and after compliance with the pre-conditions and abiding the law.      In Ambika  Quarry Workis  v. State of Gujarat [[1987] 1 SCC 213]  this Court  was to deal with right to renewal of a mining  lease   under  the   Gujarat  Mines   and   Minerals Concessions Rules.   When  the renewal  of the lease was not granted, due  to statutory  embargo created  by Section 2 of the Forest  [Conservation] Act,  1980, this  Court had  held that though  the right to renewal was in accordance with the rules, with the interposition of the Act for conservation of the forests,  it puts  an embargo  on the  right to renewal. Therefore, the refusal to grant renewal of lease was upheld.      In Rural  Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [[1989]  Supp.   1 SCC 504 at 523-24] after considering the above  ratio, it was held that though the lessees of the mines were  entitled to apply for renewal as per the law and clauses in  the lease,  this Court  prohibited obtaining  of renewals applying  Section 2  of the  Forests [Conservation]

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Act, 1980.      In State  of M.P.  & Ors. v. Krishnadas Tikaram [[1995] Supp.  1 SCC 587] this Court had held that it is settled law that renewal is a fresh grant and must be granted consistent with law in operation as on that date.  In that case, it was held that  renewal of  mining lease  in the  forest area for extraction of  minerals under Mining and Mineral Concessions Rules should  be consistent  with Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.   Section 2  mandates the  State  Government,  renewal granted without  prior approval  was subsequently cancelled. When its  validity was  questioned the  High Court set aside the order.   On appeal, this Court reversed the High Court’s order and  had held that the Government was not precluded to cancel the  renewal of  the lease  granted without obtaining prior approval  of the  Central Government.   The  order  of cancellation was, therefore, upheld.      There  is  a  distinction  between  right  acquired  or accrued, and privilege, hope and expectation to get a right, as rightly  pointed out  by the  High Court  in the impugned judgment.   A right  to apply  for  renewal  and  to  get  a favorable order  would not  e deemed  to be  a right accrued unless some  positive acts  are done, before repeal of Act 4 of 1939  or  corresponding  law  to  secure  that  right  of renewal.   In Gujarat  Electricity Board  vs.Shantilal  [AIR 1969 SC 239], this Court had pointed out that before Section 71 of  the Electricity  Supply Act was amended the appellant had issued  a notice under Section 7 thereof, exercising the option to  purchase the  undertaking.   It was  held that  a right to  purchase  the  electrical  undertaking  which  has accrued to  the Electricity  Board was saved by Section 6 of the GC Act.      So, if  no action  under the  Repealed Act  was set  in motion before  July 1,  1989, by  a  valid  application  for renewal of  a permit, there was no right acquired or accrued to pursue the remedy under the Act.  The privilege to obtain renewal of  a permit is not an accrued right.  Section 58(2) of the  Repealed Act  gives, as  stated super,  preferential right to  a holder of a permit for renewal thereof.  Section 71 of  the Act gives preferential right in favour of STU for grant of  permit in  Chapter V  which is not available under the Repealed  Act.  Therefore, even for grant of a permit or a renewal  under Section  72 or  81, the  STU is entitled to preferential right  over the private citizens.  Thereby, the Act manifests  intention inconsistent  with and incompatible to that  in Chapter IV of the Repealed Act.  Similarly, even on the approved routes under a scheme framed in Chapter IVA, an exception  has been  carved out  in the scheme with a non obstante clause in favour of STU, which is a self-operatiive law by  itself.   The rights  of the  existing operators for renewal thereof under Section 68F(1D) under the repealed Act were saved.   But,  under the Act, Chapter VI does not speak of renewal  of the  permits to the private operators, though permits were  saved in  the scheme  itself.  In other words, Chapter VI  manifested inconsistency  in its  operation from the law  in Chapter  IVA of  the Repealed  Act.   Similarly, other provisions  are inconsistent  with those  in Act  4 of 1939 which exist in the Act as are apparent but they are not relevant  for   our  present   purpose  and  hence  need  no elaboration.  Therefore, clause (a) of sub-section (2) would not get  attracted, even  if it  were to  apply to  grant of permit being  a "thing done" as contended by Shri Venugopal. So, any  permit issued to operate a stage carriage under the Repealed Act  would survive, by virtue of clause (b) of sub- section (2) of Section 217 of the Act by fictional operation of law; and this would be on the same conditions and for the

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same period  mentioned under the Repealed Act, as if the Act was not  enacted.    Any  other  view  would  tantamount  to allowing  the   Repealed  Act  to  remain  in  operation  in perpetuity simultaneously  with the  operation of  the  Act. Both cannot co-exist in the same shelter.      In State  of Punjab  v. Hohar  Singh [1955 SCR 893] the facts were  that the  respondent filed a claim as an evacuee under EP (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948.  The claim was investigated  into and  it was found to be false; it was held to  be an  offence under the Act.  At the trial, on his confession, the  respondent was  convicted and was sentenced to  imprisonment.    On  suo  motu  revision,  the  District Magistrate found  the sentence to be inadequate and referred the case  to the  High Court  to be dealt with under Section 437, Cr.P.C.   The High Court found that since the Ordinance was repealed,  he could  not be convicted under Section 7 of the Act.   This  Court, on appeal, reversed the decision and upheld the  conviction applying  Section 6  of the  GC  Act. Interpreting that  section, this  Court had  held  that  the words "anything  done"  occurring  in  Section  11  of  1948 Ordnance did  not mean  act done by a person but an official act  done  by  the  authority  in  exercise  of  the  powers conferred by  or under  the ordinance.  Far from helping the appellants, the  ratio would  apply to official acts done or orders issued  etc, covered by Section 217(2)(a) of the Act. As stated  earlier, after  permit was  in fact  issued,  the order passed by STA or RTA outlived its purpose and grant of the permit  and  its  operation  was  saved  to  the  extent provided in clause (b) of Section 217 (2).      The ratio  of M/s. Universal Imports Agency and Anr. v. The Chief  Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors.  [(1961) 1 SCR  305] also  is not  of assistance  to the  appellants. Therein, before  the Government of India issued notification applying the  French Establishments’  (Application of  Laws) Order, 1954  to the  territory of Pondicherry, the appellant had entered  into a contract with the foreign buyers for the import of  the goods which, after the said order came   into force, were imported into Pondicherry.  The question therein was whether Section 6 of the GC Act would apply, Majority of three judges,  dissented by  minority opinion of two judges, had held  that the  words "things  done" in  para 6  of  the French  Establishments’  (Application  of  Laws)  order  was comprehensive enough  to take  within  its  ambit  not  only things done  but also  the effect  of the legal consequences flowing therefrom.   The  ratio is  not at all applicable to the facts of this case.      We, therefore  hold that  grant of renewal of the stage carriage permit should necessarily be preceded by a grant of a permit  to stage  carriage under Section 72, in accordance with the  procedure laid  down in  Sections 70  and 71. This should be made before the expiry of the period prescribed in the permit   granted under the Repealed Act.  Therefore, for stage carriage  permits granted  under  Chapter  IV  of  the Repealed Act,  if they  stand to expire or expired after 1st July, 1989,  without any  pending  application  for  renewal having been  made under  Section 58  as on  1st July,  1989, fresh applications  under Section  70 should  be  filed  and after consideration under Section 71, permits be obtained as per law  under Section  72.  If there is any delay to obtain permits pending  consideration, by  operation of Section 76, to avoid  hiatus in  continued operation  of providing stage carriage service,  section 87 gives power to grant temporary permit without  following the procedure laid down in Section 70.   In Mithilesh  Garg &  Ors vs.  Union of  India &  Ors. [(1992) 1  SCC 168],  this Court  had  laid  down  different

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criteria  for   grant  of   inter-region,  intra-region  and interstate permits  under the Act under Section 88 and 80 of the Act  which did  not find  place in the Repealed Act.  It was   held that  such distinction was neither discriminatory nor violative  of Article  14 of  the  Constitution.    Thus considered, the argument of arbitrariness, discrimination or avoidable inconvenience to the holders of permits etc, under the Repealed  Act and  to the  travelling  public  would  be hypothetical and without force.      The appeals  arising out  of SLP Nos.  924/96, 1913/96, 27355/95 relate  to renewal of stage carriage permits of the appellants, whose  permits were saved under the nationalised schemes.  It is an admitted position that before the Act had come into force on July 1, 1989 they had their permits saved by the  schemes approved  and published under Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act and renewable under Section 68F (1D) of the Repealed Act  and were  renewed under  Section 81 of the Act without obtaining  fresh permits under the Act.  The extreme contention of  Sri S.K.  Dhaon was  that the  definition  of "permit" under  Section 2(31)  of the  Act is  so wide as to include permits  granted under  the  Repealed  Act  and  the approval and publication of the schemes under Section 68D of Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act stands nullified since there is no saving thereof under the Act.  Therefore, every one is free to  obtain permits  under the nationalised scheme after expiry of  the period for which the permit was granted under the Repealed  Act.   We find it difficult to give acceptance to the  extreme contention.   It  is settled  law  that  the scheme approved  under Chapter  IVA, which  is equivalent to Chapter VI  of  the  Act,  is  a  self-contained  and  self- operative scheme  and is  a  law  by  itself.    The  scheme operates to  the exclusion  of private  operators  with  non obstante clause  that the  STU should  obtain permits to run stage carriages  in the  notified area,  routes or a portion thereof  to  provide  coordinated  efficient,  adequate  and economical road  transport service.   Thereby  the right  to apply for and obtain a stage carriage permit has been frozen to   all private operators, except as saved under the scheme itself.   Until the scheme gets modified or cancelled by the State it  would continues  to be  in operation.   We find no inconsistency under  the Repealed  Act and  the Act  in this behalf, Resultantly,  all  schemes  remain  operative  under Section 217 (2) (a) of the Act.      The question, therefore, is: whether a private operator saved under  the scheme  is not  liable to get permits under Section 72  and renewal  of the  permits under Section 81 of the Act?   It  is true that Section 68F (1D) and Section 68F (1F) of  the Repealed Act had prescribed that renewal of the permits granted  to the  private operators and STU should be renewed under  the   scheme; similar  provision do  not find place in  Chapter  VI  of  the  Act.    Rules  do  prescribe procedure to  apply for  renewal by the private operators as well as  STU but  the  rules  or  procedure  do  not  confer substantive right  to renewal   of the permits granted under the scheme;  when Chapter  VI is  sub silentio,        rules cannot travel beyond the Act.      The question,  therefore, is:  whether the named holder of a  specified stage  carriage  permit  has  the  right  of renewal under  the  Act  after  the  expiry  of  the  period mentioned in the permit granted under the Repealed Act?  Did the Parliament  intend to put an end to and denude the right of a  private named  operator to operate the stage carriage; or to  that extent  the right to apply for and obtain permit under Sections  70 to  72 or  renewal under  Section 81  was preserved?

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    Two views  are plausible  under the  scheme of the Act. The first  is that after the expiry of the permit or renewed permit under  the Repealed  Act, the  named private operator saved under  the scheme gets denuded of his right of renewal of his  permit under  the Act,  since "permit" defined under Section 2(31) would mean permit granted under the Act, which occasion does  not arise  as  the  field,  occupied  by  the exclusive right to operate stage carriages was given to STU. Thereby, he ceases thereafter to have any right to ply stage carriages, though  saved under  the  self  operative  scheme which continues  to be  in existence after the Act came into force.   The other  view is  that the  rights of the private named operators whose specified permits were saved under the respective schemes,  were not expressly taken away under the Act.   Being private  operators, they  would be  entitled to avail of the right and remedy given in Chapter v of the Act, with exclusion  of other  private competitors.  Thereby they should apply  for and  obtain permit afresh under Section 72 and renewal thereafter under Section 81.  In this behalf, it is relevant  to note  the contention of S/Shri Venugopal and Salve.   Their contention  is that in the scheme, such named operators whose  specified permits  were  mentioned  in  the scheme alone  were given exclusive rights to ply their stage carriages  on   the  named   routes  subject   to   corridor restrictions mentioned  in the  scheme.  Other persons whose permits were  nationalised were  paid compensation under the Repealed Act  or under  Section  105  of  the  Act  but  the appellants were  not paid compensation as their permits were saved.   By operation of Section 217 (2) (e) and Section 100 of the  Act, even  pending schemes should be finalised under the Act within the limitation prescribed therein.  Until its finalisation, the  existing operators  are  allowed  to  ply their vehicles  and to obtain temporary permits.  This would indicate the     legislative intention  that the Act did not intend to  destroy the  rights, saved  under the  respective schemes, of  the named operators in respect of the specified permits.     The  contention   of  Mr.   Pramod  Swarup  for U.P.S.R.T.U.  is   that  after  the  expiry  of  the  period mentioned in  the permits  granted to the named operators of the specified  permits, they  lost their right to renewal of their permits since the right to renewal, similar to Section 68F (1D),does  not find  place in  Chapter VI.  The grant of renewal to them, unless modified by the scheme under Section 102 of  the Act,  is inconsistent  and, therefore, the their permits.  The exclusive right, thereby, was given to the STU to ply  their stage  carriages, goods  carriages or contract carriages so  as to  avoid inconvenience and hardship to the travelling public.      After giving  careful and  anxious consideration to the respective contentions,  we find that there is some force in the contention of the respective counsel for the appellants. It bears  repetition to state that the approved scheme under the Repealed Act or in the Act is a self-contained and self- operative scheme.   It  is a  law by  itself.   The  schemes published under the Repealed Act, as held earlier, are saved by Section  217 (2)  (a) of the Act.  Therefore, until  they are modified  or cancelled  under Section  102,  the  scheme should continue  to be  in operation  in the  notified area, route or  part thereof.   The  right to apply for and obtain permit in  the notified scheme     was totally frozen to the private operators giving exclusive right to the STU to apply for and  obtain  permits  to  run  the  stage  carriages  or additional service  under Section  101 of  the  Act  on  the notified area,  route or a part thereof and none else.  With a non  obstante clause  in Section  101, the  right to apply

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for and obtain temporary permits under Section 87 by private operators was taken away. There is no need for STU to obtain such permits,  as an  intimation to  concerned  RTA  of  its providing such  additional service  on special occasion like fair or  religious gatherings  for conveyance of passengers, is sufficient.   Yet  the scheme  itself saved and preserved the rights  of the  named existing  operators in  respect of over lapping routes in the specified permits, subject to the corridor restrictions  of picking  up and  setting down  the passengers en  route the  prescribed prohibited route.  They became entitled  to run their stage carriages subject to the law.   Though, their  permits are saved, the named operators being private  operators,  the  Parliament  appear  to  have though that  there was  no necessity  to expressly retain in Chapter VI  itself there  right of  renewal as  the same was already provided  in Section  81 of the Act corresponding to Section 68F(1D)  of Chapter  IV-A of  the Repealed Act.  The Reason appears to be obvious.  Every private operators falls within the  field covered by Chapter v of the Act.  It would seem   that the  Parliament is  of the  view that  the named operators, being  saved under  the schemes,  are entitled to apply for  and obtain necessary permit or renewal thereof to ply their  stage carriages only on ovrelapped routed subject to the corridor restrictions mentioned in the scheme itself. It may  be stated that we do not find any express indication of their  rights being  taken away  under the Act; nor do we find it  by necessary implication in that behalf and to that effect.  This view does justice also to all  concerned.      As far  as the  STU is  concerned, they  having had the monopoly to  ply stage  carriages, goods carriages, contract carriages or special services in the notified areas or route or part  thereof under the scheme, it was though unnecessary to bother  them to  obtain renewal  of permits  for of stage carriages etc.   Section  101 itself  provides for  such  an intention.   Resultantly, the  Legislature appears  to  have obviated the  need to  obtain periodical renewals of permits for stage  carriages etc,  run by  the STU.   Parliament was aware of  the need  to obtain  the renewal of permits by the STU under  Section 68F  (1F) of the Repealed Act and absence of such a provision in the Act is further eloquent and self- explanatory.      In Krishan  Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [(1991) 4 SCC  258], a  contention was  raised  that  since  Section 100(4) of  the Act  prescribes limitation  within which  the State Government  should here and consider the objections on the draft  scheme, finalise  the scheme and publish the same in the  official Gazette, after the Act had come into force, the limitation  of one  year stood  lapsed.   Though Section 217(2)(e) empowers  the State  Government  to  finalise  the pending draft  schemes, they  stood lapsed  from the date on which draft  scheme  was  published.    The  contention  was rejected by  this Court  for the  obvious  reason  that  the Repealed Act  did not  prescribe any  limitation to finalise the draft  scheme as indicated in sub-section (4) of Section 100 of  the Act.   As  years rolled  by  from  the  date  of publication of draft scheme for finalisation, the Parliament for the  first time  prescribed limitation in Section 100(4) putting a  fetter on  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  the Government in  approving the  draft scheme  and  publication thereof after  complying with  the requirements of law.  The right  of   the  private   operators  and   the  remedy   of finalisation  of   the  draft   scheme   were   harmoniously interpreted by this Court and it held that the limitation of one year  starts running from the date the Act had come into force, namely,  July 1,1989.   We  are of the view that same

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harmonious interpretation  is required to be adopted in this case also.   Applying the same harmonious interpretation, we hold that the rights of named private operators to apply for and obtain  permits  and  renewal  of  the  specified  stage carriage permits  are saved  and they  alone are eligible to avail of  that right  and remedy under Chapter V of the Act, while preserving the monopoly of the STU in Chapter VI.      In Chapter  V, permits  are required  to be obtained on non-nationalised routes. The STU also has the right to apply for and  obtain permits  to run  the stage  carriages, goods carriages or  contract carriages on permits, as the case may be, and  in some  instances the preferential right under the Act is  given to  the STU.   In respect of permits had under the Repealed  Act or  the Act,  the need  to apply  for  and obtain  renewals   of  the  stage  carriage  permits,  goods carriages or  contract carriage  permits for  plying on non- nationalised  routes   was  to  comply  with  the  procedure prescribed in  Chapter V,  which should be adhered to.  This is in  relation to  non nationalised  routes only.   But  as regards the  approved schemes,  in Chapter  VI or  continued schemes saved by section 217(2)(a) read with sub-section (4) read with Chapter IVA of the Reopeaked Act, there is no need for STU  to obtain  periodical renewals  of permits of stage carriages, contract carriages, or goods carriages in respect of  the   notified   area,   route   or   portion   thereof, notwithstanding anything  contained in  Chapter V.   The STU retains its  exclusive right  to ply  the stage carriages or special service  or goods  carriage or  contract carriage on the notified area or route or part thereof, until the scheme is  duly  modified  or  cancelled  in  accordance  with  law prescribed in Section 102 of Chapter VI.      It is  required  to  be  stated  that  along  with  the application under  Section 70  filed  for  grant  of  permit under Section  72 or  renewal under  Section 81  made by the named holder of a specified permit in an approved scheme, he should enclose an authenticated copy of the approved scheme, the details  of the  route on  which he was plying his stage carriage with corridor restrictions.  The RTA or STA, as the case may  be, should  verify the original scheme under which the  named  operator,  whose  specified  permit  was  saved, whether he is entitled to ply the stage carriage in approved scheme with  the  condition  of  the  corridor  restrictions imposed in  the notified  scheme and  if so  to what extent. What is  the duration  of his  right saved  in the  approved scheme?    Whether  he  had  plied  his  stage  carriage  on complying with  the law in force?  His right to permit under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 cannot be higher than the original  right saved  in the  approved scheme.  The STU also should  be heard  in that  behalf.  On consideration of these and  all other  relevant facts in relation to grant of stage carriage  permit or  renewal thereof,  the appropriate authority may  grant or  reject.   In the  later event,  for reasons to be recorded in support of the rejection.      In Mithilesh  Garg’s case  (supra)  a  Bench  of  three Judges considered  the right  of the  existing operators  in conformity with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and the procedure prescribed  under the  liberal policy for grant of permits to the new entrants, while continuing the same right to existing  operators under  the new provisions in the Act. It was harmoniously interpreted and this Court had held that there was  no cause  for complaint by the existing operators when the  liberal policy  had given  right to  apply for and obtain permits  under  Chapter  V  on  the  non-nationalised routes  to   augment  facility  to  the  travelling  public. Section 104  does not  stand in the way of the named private

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operators whose  specified permits  were/are saved  in  that behalf.  On the contrary, it would say "except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme".      Thus considered,  we are of the view that the rights of the  existing  named  operators  saved  in  the  appropriate approved schemes  in respect  of specified  permits were not destroyed.   By necessary  implication of  Section 104, they were saved.  They became entitled to avail of their right to apply for  grant of  permit in accordance with the procedure prescribed under  Sections 70  and 71  and to  obtain permit under Section 72, before the expiry of the permit or renewed permit saved  under the  approved scheme  and should  obtain permit afresh  to ply their stage carriages before expiry of the period  mentioned therein; periodical renewals from time to time  should be  obtained under  Section 81 of the Act in accordance with  the operation  of the law.  The RTA or STA, as the case may be, should consider and may grant permits or renewal of  permits as  per law  or  rejection  thereof  for reasons to be recorded in that behalf.      It is true that some renewals of stage carriage permits to the  holders of  permits or  renewed  permits  under  the Repealed Act  were granted  under Section  81.  Some of them are still  in operation.   With  a view to prevent hiatus in operational efficacy  we would  declare that though renewals of state  carriage permits  were granted  under Section  81, they must  be deemed  to be  temporary permits granted under Section 87,  till regular  permits are  granted or  refused. The ratio  of Gurucharan’s  case (supra),  does not help the appellants.   Therein the  application for  renewal of stage carriage permit under section 58 (2) of the Repealed Act was pending consideration  as on  1st July, 1989.  Consequently, Section 6  of the  GC Act  saved its  operation.  This Court had, therefore,  held that  applications for  renewal  filed under Section  58 of  the Repealed  Act must  be disposed of under section  80 read with section 81 of the Act.  However, it is  stated that  disposal must  be taken  to be, not of a permit granted  under the Act, but one under deemed fiction. There would  be no  further fiction of law created under the Act to be a deemed renewal of permit under the Act.      In Quillon’s  case (supra)  this Court did not have the occasion to  consider the  effect of section 6 of the GC Act and clause  (a) of  sub-section (2) of Section 217 since the case fell  under  clause  (b).    Therein,  the  proviso  to unamended Section  71(1) prohibited  the Society to obtain a permit.   Consequently, it could not obtain renewal of stage carriage permit,  being inconsistent  with the provisions of the Act.   It was held that the stage carriage permit issued under the Repealed Act would remain operative for the period for which  it was granted as if the Act had not been passed. After its  expiry, the  appellant therein  was  required  to obtain a  permit under  Section 72  of the Act.  Thereby, it was held  that the  Society was  not entitled to the renewal under Section  81 of  the Act.  In view of the consideration of the operation of the relevant provisions mentioned herein before, there  is no conflict between Gurcharan Singh’s case and Quilon’s  case.   The interpretation in Quilon’s case is also consistent with the consideration herein before made.      The next  contention of  Shri Venugopal is that the Act intends that all permits issued under the Repealed Act would be continued  under the  Act and  be given effect in toto so long as  such of  those permits  or certificates or licences are not  inconsistent with  the provisions  of the  Act.  To that extent,  their  operations  are  saved  giving  limited operation under  clause (b)  of sub-section  (2) of  Section 217.   However, notifications etc, issued under the Repealed

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Act and saved by clause (a) of sub-section 217, as mentioned earlier, are distinct from the permits issued in furtherance of the  orders passed by the STA or RTA, as the case may be. The further  contention that such a construction creates and brings about  invidious discrimination  offending Article 14 of the  Constitution is without force.  Section 217(2)(a) of the GC  Act read with Section 217(4) of the Act manifest the distinction  between   the  acts   done  or   actions  taken consistent with  the previsions  of  the  Repealed  Act  but inconsistent t  with the  Act.  The Act saves only acts done or actions  taken  etc.    Which  are  consistent  with  the provisions.   By implication,  all inconsistent acts done or actions taken,  except those completed and closed, would not be considered  to  be  done  or  taken  under  the  Act  and consequently could not be operative under the Act.  They are obliterated completely from statute as if they never existed except to  the extent  of limited  operation provided in the appropriate clauses in sub-section (2) of Section 217 of the Act.      Accordingly, we hold that the named transport operators whose permits  were saved in the relevant scheme shall apply for permits  under Section  70 and  71  and  obtain  permits afresh under  Section 72 of the Act before the expiry of the period mentioned  in the  permit issued either under Section 47 or  Section 48  or renewal  under Section  58 or  Section 68F(1D)  of  the  Repealed  Act.    No  third  party/private operators are  entitled to  apply for  permits on  the  same notified route  or part  thereof, nor  are they  entitled to compete with  them for  grant of  permit, since the right of all other  private operators to apply for and operate in the approved notified  area, route  or a  part thereof, has been frozen.  The right is reserved only in relation to the named operators and  that too for specified permit, and none else. Along with  the application under Section 70 filed for grant of permit  under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 made by the  named holder  of a  specified permit  in an approved scheme, he  should enclose  an  authenticated  copy  of  the approved scheme,  the details  of the  route on which he was plying his stage carriage with corridor restrictions on over lapping routes.   The RTA or STA, as the case may be, should verify the  original scheme  under which the named operator, whose specified  permit was saved, whether he is entitled to ply the  stage carriage  in the  approved  scheme  with  the condition of  the  corridor  restrictions  on  the  notified scheme and  if so  to what  extent.  What is the duration of his right  saved in  the approved  scheme?   Whether he  had plied his stage carriage on complying with the law in force? His right  to permit  under  Section  72  or  renewal  under Section 81 cannot be higher than the original right saved in the approved  scheme.   The STU also should be heard in that behalf.   On consideration  of these  and all other relevant facts in  relation to  grant of  stage  carriage  permit  or renewal thereof,  the appropriate  authority  may  grant  or reject; in  the later  event, for  reasons to be recorded in support of  the rejection.   The authorities should consider their applications  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  the prescribed procedure and may grant new permits under Section 72 and  later on  before the  expiry thereof, to renew it in accordance with  the procedure  prescribed in Section 80 and 81, that  too on  compliance with  law, until  the scheme is duly modified  or cancelled  in accordance  with  law.    We reiterate that  this right  is available  exclusively to the named private  operators and  that too  in  respect  of  the specified permits  and with  same restrictions  continued in the scheme and none else and no more.

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    Since the appellants had obtained permits by mistake of the law  and  misconception  of  law  on  the  part  of  the competent authorities  applied under Section 81 and had been granted renewal of their respective permits under Section 81 after July  1, 1989,  such grant  of renewal  of the permits should be  treated to  be temporary permits under Section 87 of the  Act.   Therefore, the  private  operators,  be  they covered by  Chapter V  or VI,  should apply  for and  obtain afresh permits  before the expiry of the period mentioned in their respective  permits or renewed for consideration under Section 71  and grant under Section 72 of the permits afresh consistently with  Section 2(31)  of the  Act.   Such permit alone would  be a  permit defined  in Section  2 (31) of the Act.   Thereafter, before  expiry thereof,  they shall apply for and  the concerned STA/RTA person authority may grant or refuse renewals  of permit  for reasons to be recorded under Section 81 of the Act.      This interpretation  of the  law  would  relieve  undue hardship to  all the operators and at the same time it would also be  consistent with  the scheme  of the Act to subserve the rights  and protection  provided under  the Act so as to avoid rigour in the operation of the law.      Thus considered,  for the reasons given above, the view taken by  the High  Court is  in  conformity  with  law  but subject to above modification in the judgment.      The appeals  and  the  writ  petition  are  accordingly disposed of but, under the circumstances, without costs.