REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 160  OF 2006

G.V. Siddaramesh                        ………….. Appellant

Versus

State of Karnataka                       …………..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of common judgment  

and order passed by the Karnataka High Court in Criminal  

Appeal No. 1755 of 2003 and Criminal Appeal No. 665 of  

2004, whereby and whereunder the court has partly allowed  

the appeal, and in so far as the appellant is concerned,  

while maintaining the conviction for offences punishable  

under  Section  4  of  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961  and  

Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,  

has modified the sentence for the offence punishable under  

Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 from 5 years  

and a fine of Rs. 2,50,000/- to   2 years and a fine of  

Rs.  1,25,000/-  and,  in  default,  to  undergo  simple  

imprisonment for 6 months.   

1

2)          The learned Additional Sessions Judge  

had  sentenced  the  appellant  under  the  

following heads : -  

(i) To  undergo  R.I  for  5  years  and  a  fine  of  Rs.  

2,50,000/- and in default, to undergo R.I for two  

years for the offence punishable under Section 3 of  

the Dowry Prohibition Act.

(ii) To undergo S.I for two years and to pay a fine of  

Rs.  10,000,  in  default,  to  undergo  S.I  for  one  

month for an offence punishable under Section 4 of  

the Dowry Prohibition Act.

(iii)To undergo S.I for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs.  

10,000/-, in default, to undergo S.I for one month  

for an offence punishable under Section 498-A of  

the Indian Penal Code.

(iv) To  undergo imprisonment  for life  for an  offence  

punishable under section 304-B of IPC.

3)     On appeal, the High Court has allowed the  

appeal in part and has modified the sentence  

as  stated  earlier.   The  appellant  has  

preferred this appeal against his conviction  

and  sentence  of  imprisonment  for    life  

under    Section  304-B  of  the  Indian  Penal  

Code.  

4)      The facts of the case in brief are,  that  

the complainant K.G Lingappa’s daughter Usha  

(deceased)  had  been  married  to  Siddaramesh  

2

(appellant) on 13.12.1997. The deceased went  

to  her  matrimonial  home  on  15.1.1998.  On  

17.1.1998, the deceased committed suicide by  

hanging herself. In order to prove its case,  

the prosecution has examined as many as twenty  

eight witnesses. The case of the prosecution  

in brief is that, at the time when there were  

talks of the marriage in November 1996, the  

appellant and his family demanded 20 tolas of  

gold, Rs. 2 lakhs in cash and a motorcycle as  

dowry. Ultimately as negotiations progressed,  

the money was settled at Rs. 1,65,000 in cash,  

18  tolas  of  gold,  and  a  motorcycle.  These  

demands were met with by the complainant and  

in  furtherance  the  marriage  took  place  on  

13.12.1997.  The  case  of  the  prosecution  

further is that, the deceased Usha was taken  

to her matrimonial home on 15.1.1998, despite  

protests by the family of the complainant that  

it was pushyamasa which was inauspicious for  

the bride’s entry into her matrimonial home.  

On  17.1.1998,  the  elder  sister  of  the  

deceased,  Karibasamma  PW-3,  went  to  the  

matrimonial home of the deceased along with  

sweets  and  other  eatables.  The  deceased  

confided  to  her  elder  sister  that  she  was  

3

being  treated  cruelly  by  the  accused.  The  

deceased  further  confided  that  there  were  

fresh demands on her to get Rs. 50,000/- more  

as  dowry. On  her reluctance,  she was  being  

beaten by her husband and the husband was not  

keen  on  maintaining  a  physical  relationship  

with her. Karibasamma later returned home and  

confided  to  her  father  the  torture  and  

harassment meted out to her sister (deceased)  

by the appellant on account of non-fulfilment  

of dowry demand. The complainant sent his son  

Karibasappa, the brother of the deceased PW-2  

to enquire into the matter. The brother of the  

deceased also found out from her sister that  

she was being ill-treated and was unhappy. On  

the same night, the complainant received the  

news that her daughter had committed suicide  

by  hanging  herself.  After  reaching  the  

matrimonial home of their daughter and seeing  

that  their  daughter  had  committed  suicide,  

they  informed  the  police.  A  complaint  was  

lodged  by  the  complainant  to  the  police  

alleging that it was the dowry harassment on  

the part of the family of the appellant that  

led to the suicide of her daughter. A case was  

registered  in  Cr.  No.  18/1998,  against  the  

4

appellant and his father under Section 498-A  

and 304 B of the IPC and Sections 3,4 and 6 of  

the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Learned Chief  

Judicial Magistrate committed the case to the  

Court  of  Sessions,  as  it  involved  offences  

exclusively  triable  by  the  Sessions  Court.  

When  the  matter  was  pending  before  the  

Sessions Judge, the case was transferred to  

Fast Track Court, Devangere in accordance with  

a notification issued by the High Court.  

5)       The case of the appellant is that giving  

money  or  taking  money  is  not  dowry  and  

further, money demanded after marriage is not  

dowry. The appellant further submits that the  

facts of the case do not disclose commission  

of an offence punishable under Section 498-A  

and 304-B of the IPC. The appellant contended  

that  most of  the witnesses  examined by  the  

prosecution were interested witnesses who were  

closely related to the deceased. The appellant  

further contended that the police officer had  

no power to charge-sheet as per the provisions  

of  Section 7  of the  Dowry Prohibition  Act.  

Another important contention of the appellant  

was that, it was he who first made a complaint  

5

to  the  police  about  the  mishap  after  he  

brought his father, and therefore he cannot be  

guilty of any wrongdoing.

6)      The learned Additional Sessions Judge has  

taken into consideration the testimony of the  

complainant   PW-1 and that of Karibasappa and  

Karibasamma (PW-2 and PW-3 respectively),  the  

brother and the sister of the deceased. It has  

also   relied  upon  the  testimony  of  other  

witnesses to conclude that there was a demand  

for dowry and there was acceptance of dowry on  

the part of the appellant and his father. The  

trial court also took into consideration, the  

suspicious  conduct  of  the  appellant.  The  

appellant had alleged that the deceased had  

committed suicide because she was in love with  

another  person  before  marriage  and  was  

frustrated when she could not marry him. Again  

in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC,  

the appellant stated that since coming to her  

matrimonial home, she compared the house of  

the appellant to that of a “railway bogie”,  

which,  according  to  her,  did  not  

satisfactorily compare to her father’s house  

and  her  sister’s  house.  The  trial  court  

6

however observed that the appellant produced  

nothing on record to prove that the deceased  

had an affair before the marriage with another  

person.  Further  the  trial  court  refused  to  

believe the version of the appellant contained  

in Ex. D-3. The time of writing this letter,  

which was  addressed to the Sub-Inspector of  

the  Devangere  Police  Station,  was  shown  as  

12.30 in the midnight of 17.1.98. However, by  

his own admission, he had left his shop at  

10.30 PM. He had stated that after reaching  

home, he noticed that his wife has committed  

suicide by hanging, and thereafter went and  

informed the sister of the deceased and then  

went to Kogganooru to inform his father and  

after his return went to the police station.  

The trial court has inferred that it was not  

possible for the appellant to reach the Police  

Station before  1 AM or 2 AM.  Also according  

to the trial court, the natural reaction of  

anyone seeing a dead body would be that of  

shock  or  disbelief.  This  according  to  the  

trial court was indicative of the suspicious  

conduct of the appellant who wanted to hush up  

the matter. Further this document was never  

called for from the Police Station and only a  

7

photocopy of the same was produced. The trial  

court also relied upon the post mortem report  

which revealed that death was caused due to  

asphyxiation  due  to  hanging  and  there  were  

also some unexplained scratches in the body  

which,  according  to  the  trial  court  was  

evidence of the harassment of the deceased by  

the appellant and, hence, concluded that the  

cruel treatment and harassment of the deceased  

by the appellant led her to commit suicide.  

Section  113B  of  the  Evidence  Act  raises  a  

presumption against the accused. The onus lies  

on the accused against whom the presumption  

lies  to  discharge  it.   The  appellant  has  

failed to discharge the burden satisfactorily.  

Based on these findings, the trial court has  

convicted and sentenced the accused to undergo  

R.I for 5 years and a fine of Rs. 2,50,000/-  

and in default, to undergo R.I for two years  

for the offence punishable under Section 3 of  

the Dowry Prohibition Act; to undergo S.I for  

two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-,  

in default, to undergo S.I for one month for  

an offence punishable under Section 4 of the  

Dowry Prohibition Act; to undergo S.I for   3  

years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in  

8

default, to undergo S.I for one month for an  

offence punishable under Section 498-A of the  

Indian Penal Code; to undergo imprisonment for  

life for an offence punishable under Section  

304-B of IPC. The trial court however went on  

to  acquit  the  accused  no.2  (father  of  the  

appellant) of all the charges.

7)       The appellant (accused No. 1) preferred  

appeal  before  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  

challenging  his  conviction  and  sentence  and  

the State has preferred appeal challenging the  

acquittal  of  the  appellant  for  the  offence  

punishable  under  Section  6  of  the  Dowry  

Prohibition Act and accused No. 2 (father of  

the  appellant)  for  all  the  offences.   As  

stated  earlier,  the  High  Court  has  partly  

allowed the appeals.  

8)     This court while entertaining the special  

leave petition has issued notice confining to  

the  offence under  Section 304-B  of IPC.  We  

have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  

regarding the same.  

9)       Section 304-B of the IPC reads:-

9

(1)Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns  or  bodily  injury  or  occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal  circumstances  within  seven  years  of  her  marriage and it is shown that soon before her death  she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her  husband or any relative of her husband for, or in  connection with, any demand for dowry, such death  shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or  relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation:-For the purpose of this sub-section,    "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2   of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).  (2)Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with  

imprisonment for a  term  which shall not be less  than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend  to  imprisonment for life.

10)    The essential ingredients which need to  

be proved in order to attract the offence of  

dowry death is as follows:-

(i) Death is caused in unnatural circumstances.

(ii) Death must have occurred within seven years of the  

marriage of the deceased.

(iii)It needs to be shown that soon before her death,  

the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment  

by her husband or any relative of her husband for,  

or in connection with, any demand for dowry.

11)     Coming to the first ingredient, the post  

mortem report suggests that the body of the  

deceased was bearing the mark of hanging and  

there is the indication of an injury mark 8  

inches  long  around  the  neck.  The  cause  of  

death was shock and  asphyxia as a result of  

hanging. There are also unexplained traces of  

scratches around the neck region. This raises  

1

serious  doubts  about  the  possibility  of  

strangulation of the deceased, as opined by  

Dr. T. Parashuramappa PW-24. Therefore, it is  

beyond doubt that the death was an unnatural  

death. The second ingredient is also proved as  

the marriage between the deceased took place  

on 13.12.1997 and the death of the deceased  

took place on 17.1.998, which is within the 7  

year timeframe.

12)     To prove the third ingredient, we need  

to peruse the testimony of the witnesses. The  

complainant  PW-1  asserts  that  the  appellant  

and his family demanded 20 tolas of gold, Rs.  

2 lakhs in cash and a motorcycle as dowry.  

Ultimately  as  negotiations  progressed,  the  

money      was      settled       at  

Rs. 1,65,000 in cash, 18 tolas of gold and a  

motorcycle.  These  demands  were  met  by  the  

complainant.  Also  against  the  will  of  the  

family of the deceased, the deceased was taken  

to her matrimonial home on 15.1.1998, which  

coincided with Pushyamasa, which is considered  

as an inauspicious time by the family of the  

deceased.  There is no reason to disbelieve  

the  statement  of  the  complainant,  as  the  

1

appellant  himself  in  his  statement  under  

Section 313 of Cr.PC has stated, that, there  

were  negotiations  taking  place  as  to  the  

amount of money and gold, which will change  

hands during the course of the marriage, but  

he  is  unclear  as  to  the  place  where  the  

negotiations  took  place.  The  brother  and  

sister of the deceased also testify this fact.  

In addition to this, Umapathy, a friend of the  

family  of  the  deceased      PW-10,  M.G  

Shankarappa  PW-15,  Maheshwaraiah  PW-16  also  

testified  that  there  were  indeed  serious  

negotiations which took place as to the amount  

of  dowry  prior  to  the  marriage.  The  

prosecution  also  brought  on  record  the  

testimony of Narayan PW-6, the goldsmith who  

testified that 18 tolas of gold were given to  

him  by  the  complainant  to  prepare  various  

ornaments  like  bangles,  mangalya  chain,  ear  

hangings, nose rings etc for the bride. Some  

of these ornaments were recovered during the  

investigation and some were found on the body  

of  the  deceased.  The  prosecution  has  also  

established through Karibasappa PW-2 that he  

was instrumental in arranging a loan of Rs.  

50,000/-  from  his  friend  Shivakumar  who  in  

1

turn had withdrawn money from Andhra Bank and  

in  this  regard,  the  receipt  has  also  been  

produced. Umapathy PW-10, Maheshwariah PW-16  

and  Shivakumar  PW-9  have  also  stated  being  

present at the medical store of the appellant,  

where the money to the tune of Rs. 1,65,000/-  

changed hands. Therefore, there is no doubt  

that there was a demand for dowry prior to the  

death of the deceased, which was met by the  

family of the deceased.

13)    Karibasamma PW-3, the elder sister of the  

deceased has also stated in her evidence that  

when she went to the matrimonial house of the  

deceased on 17.1.1998, the deceased confided  

in her that there is further demand of Rs.  

50,000/- by way of dowry by the appellant, and  

on account of the failure to meet the demand,  

she  is  being  treated  with  cruelty  and  is  

harassed physically and mentally. She has also  

stated that the deceased also requested her  

elder  sister  not  to  disclose  these  

developments to their father as he had health  

problems related to high blood pressure. When  

the brother of the deceased Karibasappa PW-2,  

went to the house of the deceased, he also  

1

came back with the same version. The testimony  

of these two witnesses is consistent and very  

clear that the deceased was indeed mentally  

disturbed, the day she committed suicide by  

hanging herself. Cruelty can either be mental  

or physical. It is difficult to straightjacket  

the  term cruelty  by means  of a  definition,  

because  cruelty  is  a  relative  term.  What  

constitutes  cruelty  for  one  person  may  not  

constitute  cruelty  for  another  person.  This  

court in the case of V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat,  

(AIR 1994 SC 710), has observed that mental  

cruelty  is  such  that  if  the  wronged  party  

continues to stay with his/her spouse there is  

reasonable  apprehension  of  injury  to  the  

wronged party. The circumstances surrounding  

the present case, where there was pressure on  

the deceased to arrange a further sum of Rs.  

50,000/- and the consequent misdemeanor on the  

part of the appellant no doubt puts serious  

apprehension  on  the  mind  of  the  deceased,  

that,  if  she  continues  to  stay  with  the  

appellant, she might be assaulted physically  

and mentally.  It is difficult how different  

people  react  to  different  situations.  The  

threats by the husband of the deceased over  

1

the course of two days, when the deceased was  

in her matrimonial home might have been enough  

for the deceased who was in a fragile state of  

mind to reach breaking point and end her life.  

Therefore all the ingredients of Section 304-B  

have  been  satisfied,  pointing  towards  the  

guilt of the appellant.

14)     Section 113-B of the Evidence Act raises  

a presumption against the accused and reads :-

“When the question is whether a person has  committed the dowry death of a women and it  is shown that soon before her death such   woman had been subjected by such person to   cruelty or harassment for, or in connection  with, any demand for dowry; the court shall  presume  that  such  person  had  caused  the   dowry death. Explanation - For the purposes of this  section, "dowry death" shall have the same  meaning as in section 304B of the Indian   Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

15)        A reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act  

shows that there must be material to show that soon before  

the death of woman, such woman was subjected to cruelty or  

harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry, then  

only  a  presumption  can  be  drawn  that  a  person  has  

committed the dowry death of a women. It is then up to the  

appellant  to  discharge  this  presumption.  The  appellant  

however has not brought on record anything substantial to  

dispel  the  theory  of  the  prosecution.  In  fact,  while  

1

filing application for grant of bail, the appellant had  

stated that the deceased was having an affair with another  

person before her marriage and since she could not marry  

him,  she  was  in  distress  and,  therefore,  committed  

suicide. However there was no evidence brought on record  

to  prove  this  theory.  Further  in  his  statement  under  

Section 313 of Cr.P.C. he has stated that the deceased was  

not happy with the house of the appellant and stated that  

the house of her sister and father were bigger and better.  

Further his theory of intimating the police and lodging a  

complaint before the Sub-Inspector of the Police Station  

at 12.30 AM fails as he had closed his shop at around  

10.30 PM. After that by his own admission, he went and  

informed the sister of the deceased and then went outside  

the town to bring his father before lodging the complaint.  

Therefore, it is very much likely that the accused after  

witnessing the dead body of the deceased tried to hush up  

the matter and went to the Police Station much later. If  

this  theory  is  to  be  true,  this  brings  the  suspicious  

behaviour of the appellant more to light, as the natural  

reaction to seeing the dead body of a wife who had come to  

her matrimonial home only 2 days earlier would be that of  

disbelief or shock. Instead by his own admission, he went  

and informed the sister of the deceased. The prosecution  

witnesses have also testified that the appellant came to  

the paternal house of the deceased and made a statement to  

1

the  effect  that  it  would  be  detrimental  to  both  the  

families if a complaint was to be lodged and to bury the  

past.  The  appellant  has  also  not  produced  anything  on  

record to dispel the theory of the prosecution that there  

was a further demand of Rs. 50,000/- on his part. He has  

also failed to prove that there were demands for dowry  

immediately  before  the  marriage  and  there  were  

negotiations which took place involving both the families.  

All  these  circumstances  point  to  the  fact  that  the  

appellant has not rebutted or discharged the presumption.  

Therefore we have no doubt in holding that the appellant  

is guilty for the offence punishable under Section 304-B  

of the IPC, for being responsible for the death of his  

wife.  

16)             On the point of sentence, learned  

counsel for the appellant pointed out that the  

appellant is in jail for more than six years.  

The appellant was young at the time of incident  

and therefore, the sentence awarded by the trial  

court and confirmed by the High Court may be  

modified.  In  so  far  as  sentencing  under  the  

section  is  concerned,  a  three  Judge  Bench  of  

this court in the case of Hemchand v. State of  

Haryana, has observed that “Section 304-B merely  

raises  a  presumption  of  dowry  death  and  lays  

1

down  that  the  minimum  sentence  should  be  7  

years,  but  it  may  extend  to  imprisonment  for  

life. Therefore, awarding the extreme punishment  

of imprisonment for life should be used in rare  

cases and not in every case.” Keeping in view  

the facts and circumstances of the case, this  

court  reduced  the  sentence  from  life  

imprisonment  awarded  by  the  High  Court  to  10  

years R.I on the above principle.

17)In  conclusion,  we  are  satisfied  that  in  the  

facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  

appellant  was  rightly  convicted  under  Section  

304-B  IPC.   However,  his  sentence  of  life  

imprisonment imposed by the courts below appears  

to us to be excessive.  The appellant is a young  

man  and  has  already  undergone  6  years  of  

imprisonment  after  being  convicted  by  the  

Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court. We  

are of the view, in the facts and circumstances  

of  the  case,  that  a  sentence  of  10  years  

rigorous  imprisonment  would  meet  the  ends  of  

justice.  We,  accordingly  while  confirming  the  

conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B  

IPC,  reduce  the  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  

life  to  10  years  rigorous  imprisonment.   The  

1

other conviction and sentence passed against the  

appellant  are  confirmed.   In  the  result,  the  

appeal  is  dismissed  subject  to  the  above  

modification of sentence.  

                                   …………………………………J.                                  [ P. SATHASIVAM ]                                      

…………………………………J.  [ H.L. DATTU ]

New Delhi, February 05, 2010.

1