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PETITIONER: G. V. RAMANAIAH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL JAIL, RAJAHMUNDRY AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/10/1973

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1974 AIR   31            1974 SCR  (1) 852  1974 SCC  (3) 531  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1990 SC 334  (31)

ACT: Constitution of India, 1950--Art. 161-VII Schedule--Entry  1 List  III, Entry 93, List I and Entry 64, List  II--Code  of Criminal  Procedure (Act 8 of 1898) .V.  402--Whether  State Government  can remit sentence in respect of offences  under ss. 489A to 489D, I.P.C.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner,  along  with  others,  was  convicted   and sentenced  of  offences tinder ss. 489-A  to  489-D,  I.P.C. relating to currency notes and bank notes.  On the  occasion of  Gandhi  Centenary the State Government  granted  special remission  of sentences to various categories  of  prisoners who  were  convicted of offences against  laws  relating  to matters to which the executive power of the State  extended. The jail authorities released some of the other accused  but the  petitioner was not released, because, according to  the respondent State, the State Government had no power to remit the  sentence  in respect of offences relating to  a  matter which  was within the sphere of the executive power  of  the Union and not of the State and that the release of the other accused was a mistake. Dismissing the writ petition under Art. 32, HELD:  (1)  Under  s. 402 (3),  Cr.   P.C.  the  appropriate Government  is  the Central Government in respect  of  cases where  the  sentence  is  for an  offence  against  any  law relating  to  a matter to which the executive power  of  the Union extends.  Under Art. 161, the Governor’s power to give pardon  etc., is with respect to an offence against any  law relating  to  a matter to which the executive power  of  the State  extends.   Currency, coinage and  legal  tender,  are matters  which are expressly included in Entry 36,  List  1, Schedule   VII.   Entry  93  specifically  confers  on   the Parliament  the power to legislate with regard to  "offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in the Union List".   Read  together, these entries put it  beyond  doubt that  currency  notes and bank note& are matters  which  are exclusively  within the legislative competence of the  Union Legislature.  The offences for which the petitioner had been convicted  were offences relating to a matter to  which  the

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executive  power  of the Union extends and  the  appropriate Government  competent  to remit the sentence  would  be  the Central Government and not the State Government. [855 B-D] (2)  Entry no.  I of List III would show that the  ambit  of criminal law was first enlarged by including in it the Penal Code and thereafter excluding all offences against laws with respect  to any of the matters specified in List I  or  List II, The reason for such inclusion and exclusion seems to  be that  offences  against  laws with respect  to  any  of  the matters specified in List I or List II are given a place  in Entry 93, List I and Entry 64, List II.  The Penal Code is a compilation of penal laws, providing to the various  entries in  the  different  lists  of VII  Schedule.   Many  of  the offences  in  the Code relate to matters  which  are  speci- fically  covered  by the entries in the  Union  List.   This excluding  clause  in  Entry no. I of  List  III  read  with Entries  36 and 93 of List I shows beyond all doubt that  in respect of offences falling under ss. 489A to 489D only  the Central  Government  is competent to suspend  or  remit  the sentence of a convict. [856 B-C] (3)  The Government Order in question could not  fall  under the head "Criminal Law".  It was an act done in the exercise of his executive functions by the Governor under Art. 161 of the Constitution. [857 C] (4)  The wrong release of the other accused did not  give  a right  to  the petitioner to claim the benefit of  the  G.O. [857 D] Re N. V. Nataraian A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 11 and R. L. Aurora  Ram Ditta Mal v.   State  of U.P. & Ors.  A.I.R. 1958  All.  126 distinguished.  853

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1435 of 1973. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for issue of a Writ in the nature of habeas corpus. P. K. Rao and K. R. Nagaraja, for the petitioner. P. Ram Reddy, P. P. Rao, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- SARKARIA, J.-The principal question of law that falls to  be determined  in this writ petition filed under Article 32  of the  Constitution of India by the petitioner is :  which  is tile appropriate Government-Central or the State Government- empowered  to  remit the sentence of a person  convicted  of offences under sections 489-A to 489-D of the Penal Code ? The material facts giving rise to this question. are not  in dispute and may be stated as under : G.  V.  Ramanaiah was convicted of offences  under  sections 489-A  to  4S9-D,  Penal Code, on 17th July,  1968,  by  the Sessions  Court, Nellore (Andhra Pradesh) and  sentenced  to rigorous  imprisonment for a period of 10 years.  Six  other persons namely, (1) B. Sitaramireddi; (2) M. Rangareddy; (3) Ch.   Somireddy; (4) K. E. Lakshman; (5) K. Balaram and  (6) T. Mallikharjundu, were also tried and convicted of offences under all or some of the sections 489-A to 489D, Penell Code and  were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment by  the same  Court.  On the occasion of Gandhi  Centenary  celebra- tions,  the  Governor  of.  Andhra  Pradesh,  purporting  to exercise  the powers under Article 161 of the  Constitution, issued G.O. No. Ms. 1321, Home (Prisons A) Department, dated 25th   September,  1969,  granting  special   remission   of sentences  to  various  categories  of  prisoners  mentioned therein.   The  preamble of this G.O. expressly  limits  its

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operation  to  "prisoners  who  are  convicted  of  offences against  laws  relating to matters to  which  the  executive power of the State extends".  The jail authorities obviously misinterpreting  the aforesaid G-O., granted the benefit  of remission  thereunder  to prisoners:  B.  Sitaramireddi,  M. Rangareddi,  K.  Balaram and T. Mallikhajundu  and  released them  from  jail.   The mistake came to the  notice  of  the Inspector-General  of  Prisons,  and, as  a  result  of  his intervention,  the  release of the  petitioner  and  another prisoner,  K.  E. Lakshman, was stopped and they  are  still undergoing  the  remaining terms of  their  sentences.   The petitioner  submitted  several  applications  to  the  State Government,  urging  it to release him in  exercise  of  its power  of clemency under section 401, Crime Procedure  Code, but without success.  The petitioner moved the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by application under section 491 (1) (a)  and (b)  of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was  dismissed by a judgment, dated 18th January, 1973. The  petition  has been opposed by the  respondents  on  the ground  that the State Government has no power to remit  the sentence  of the petitioner, who was convicted  of  offences relating to a matter, which 854 was  within the sphere of the executive power of  the  Union and  not  of the State.  It has also been averred  that  the aforesaid four prisoners were released owing to a mistake on the  part of the jail authorities and they are liable to  be remanded  to undergo the unexpired terms of their  sentence, if  the  State Government cancels the remission  granted  to them by mistake, Section 401(l), Criminal Procedure Code, gives power to  the appropriate  Government  to  suspend the  execution  of  the sentence,  or  to  remit  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the punishment  to  which a person convicted of an  offence  has been sentenced.  Its subsection (6) provides :               "The  appropriate Government may,  by  general               rule or special orders. give directions as  to               suspension of sentences and the conditions  on               which petitions should be presented and  dealt               with.........."               Section 402(3) of the Code defines appropriate               Government’ thus :               "  In  this section and in  section  401,  the               expression appropriate Government’ shall mean-                (a)  in  cases where the sentence is  for  an               offence  against, or the order referred to  in               sub-section  (4A)  of section  401  is  passed               under,  any law relating to a matter to  which               the executive power of the Union extends., the                             Central Government; and                (b) in other cases, the State Government." Article 161 of the Constitution gives power to the  Governor of  a  State,  "to grant  pardons,  reprieves,  respites  or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against  any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends".  Article 72 confers powers on the President, to be exercised within the sphere of the executive power  of the Union. As  under  the Government of India Act 1935,  so  under  the Constitution,  the distribution of executive powers  follow, in  substance, the distribution of legislative powers.   The provisions primarily concerned with such distribution are to be   found  in  Articles  73  and  162.   Subject  to   the, limitations  mentioned in these Articles (73 and  162),  the

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executive power of the Union or the State. broadly speaking, is   co-extensive  and  co-terminus  with  ;,Is   respective legislative power. The  question is to be considered in the light of the  above criterion.  Thus considered, it will resolve itself into the issue : Are the provisions of sections 489-A to 489-D, Penal Code,  under  which  the petitioner  was  convicted,  a  law relating  to a matter to which the legislative power of  the State or tile Union extends? 855 These four sections were added to the Penal Code under  tile caption,  "Of  Currency Notes and Bank Notes",  by  Currency Notes forgery Act, 1899, in order to make better  provisions for  the  protection  of Currency  and  Bank  Notes  against forgery.   It is not disputed, as was done before  the  High Court  in  the application under  section  491(1),  Criminal Procedure  Code,  that this bunch of sections is  a  law  by itself.   "Currency, coinage and legal tender" are  matters, which  are expressly included in Entry No. 36 of  the  Union List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.  Entry No. 93  of  the  Union List in the  same  Schedule  specifically confers on the Parliament the power to legislate with regard to "offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in  the Union List".  Read together-, these entries  put  it beyond  doubt that Currency Notes and Bank Notes,  to  which the  offences  under  sections 489-A to  489-D  relate,  are matters   which  are  exclusively  within  the   legislative competence  of the Union Legislature.  It follows  therefrom that  the  offences  for  which  the  petitioner  has   been convicted,  are offences relating to a matter to  which  the executive  power of the Union extends, and the  "appropriate Government"   competent  to  remit  the  sentence   of   the petitioner,  would  be the Central Government  and  not  the State Govern- Mr. P. K. Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner,  however, contends  that  the  entire  Indian  Penal  Code,  including sections  489-A  to  489-D, as at the  commencement  of  the Constitution,  would  fall under the  Head  "Criminal  law", which  finds a place in Entry No. 1 of the Concurrent  List. According to the learned counsel in that Entry, the  clause, "excluding offences against laws with respect to matters  in List  I or List 11", takes effect and operates only so  long as  no  law  is  made in respect of  any  of  those  matters specified  in  List I or List II, and since in  the  present case, the Governor has made the G. O., which is a  "criminal law",  the  aforesaid excluding clause in Entry I  does  not operate.   In support of this argument the  learned  counsel has relied on certain observations of a Bench of the  Madras High  Court in Re.  N. V. Natrajan.(1) He has also  referred to   paragraph   22.128,  page  965  of  H.   M.   Seervai’s Constitutional  Law  of India; Articles 245 and 246  of  the Constitution  and  R. L. Aurora Rain Ditta Mal v.  State  of U.P. & others(2). In   reply,  Mr.  Rama  Reddy,  learned  counsel   for   the respondents,  maintains that the G. 0. in question does  not fall under the head "Criminal law" and that this position is crystal  clear on a combined reading of Entry I of List  III and  Entries 36 and 93 of List 1. According to  the  learned counsel, even if the G. 0. is assumed to fall under the head "Criminal law" in Entry I of List 111, then also the proviso to  Article 162 read with Articles 72 and 73 of the  Consti- tution  would  prevent this matter from falling  within  the executive  power of the State.  Our attention has also  been invited in this connection to the Government of India letter No.  40/58-Judl.T, dated 31st December, 1958,  addressed  to

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all State Governments (Annexure R. 1). (1) A. I. R. 1965 Madras 11 (2) A. I. R. 1958 Allahabad 126. 856               Entry 1 of the Concurrent List reads thus               "Criminal  law including all matters  included               in  the Indian Penal Code at the  commencement               of  this Constitution but  excluding  offences               against  laws  with  respect  to  any  of  the               matters  specified  in List I or List  II  and               excluding  the use of naval, military  or  air               forces or any other armed forces of the  Union                             in aid of the civil power."                            (emphasis supplied) A plain reading of the above Entry No. I would show that the ambit  of ’Criminal law’ was first enlarged by including  in it  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  and,  thereafter,  from  such enlarged ambit all offences against laws with respect to any of  the  matters  specified  in  List  I  or  List  II  were specifically  excluded.  The reason for such  inclusion  and exclusion  seems  to  be that  offences  against  laws  with respect to any of the matters specified in List I or List II are given a place in Entry No. 93 of List I and Entry No. 64 of  List 11 in the Seventh Schedule.  The Indian Penal  Code is  a  compilation  of penal laws,  providing  for  offences relating to a variety of matters, which are referable to the various  Entries in the different Lists of the 7th  Schedule of the Constitution.  Many of the offences in the Penal Code relate,  to matters, which are specifically covered  by  the Entries in the Union List.  Examples of such offences are to be found in Chapter VII, offences relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force; Chapter IX-A, offences relating to Elections; Chapter  XII,  offences  relating  to  coin  and  Government stamps;  Chapter  XIII,  offences relating  to  Weights  and Measures; and the bunch of sections 489-A to 489-E, offences relating   to  Currency-Notes  and  Bank-Notes,  which   are referable   to   Entries  Nos.  4,  72,  36,  50   and   36, respectively,  of  List  I of the  Seventh  Schedule.   This excluding clause in Entry No. 1, List III read with  Entries Nos. 36 and 93 of the Union List, shows beyond all manner of doubt  that  in respect of offences failing  under  sections 489-A to 489-D, only the Central Government is competent  to suspend or remit the sentence of a convict. In N. V. Natarajan’s case (supra), the High Court of  Madras was considering the constitutional validity of section 5  of the  Madras  Prevention of Insults to National  Honour  Act, 1957.   The primary question before that court was,  whether the  impugned  provision  related to  a  matter  covered  by ’public  order’ in Entry 1, read with Entry 64 of  List  11. After  answering  this  question  in  the  affirmative,  the learned Judges considered, in addition, whether that  matter would also fall under the head, "Criminal law" in Entry I of List  111.   There, it was contended that  because  National honour falls under the residuary Entry 97 in the Union List, it  is  excluded from the purview of "Criminal law"  in  the Concurrent List.  This contention was negatived and, in that context. the learned Judges observed :               "Our  understanding  of  the  effect  of   the               exclusion  by  the words  ’excluding  offences               against  laws  with  respect  to  any  of  the               matters  specified  in List I or List  II’  is               that,  till a law is made with respect to  any                             of the matters, in List I or List 11, no  limit               is  placed  upon and the  exclusion  does  not

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             operate 857               to limit the ambit of the power under the head               of ’Criminal law’ in List Ill." It  will be seen that the precise question for  decision  in that  case  was  materially  different.   The  occasion  for examining  the limits of the executive powers of  the  Union and a State with reference to the various types of  offences in  the Indian Penal Code never arose in that case.  It  is, therefore, not a profitable task to cull out an  observation from  the  context of that case and use it for  a  different purpose.   Moreover,  in  that  case  the  High  Court   was considering the validity of a statutory provision enacted by the State Legislature.  In the instant case, the  Government Order in question cannot fall under the head "Criminal Law". It is an act done in the exercise of his executive functions by the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution.   The observations  in N. V. Natarajan’s case, therefore,  are  of little assistance in determining the question before us. Nor do the general observations in paragraph 22.128 of H. M. Seervai’s  Constitutional Law of India advance, the case  of the  petitioner.   The learned author did not  comment  with regard  to the scope and the effect of the excluding  clause in Entry 1 of List III. The facts of R. L. Aurora Ram Ditta Mal’s case (supra)  were entirely  different  and we do not propose  to  discuss  the same. Mr.  P.  K.  Rao next contends in  a  somewhat  half-hearted manner  that even if the State Government had  extended  the benefit  of  its  G.O., owing to a  mistake  to  four  other persons, similarly placed, it was not fair to deny the  same treatment  to  the  petitioner.   This  contention  must  be repelled for the obvious reason that two wrongs never make a right. For  the  foregoing  reasons,  the  petition  fails  and  is dismissed P. B. R.               Petition  dismissed. 858