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PETITIONER: G.SADANANDAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/02/1966

BENCH:

ACT: Defence of India Rules, 1962 Rule 30(1) (b)-Detention  under Writ  petition  by detenu-Pleas that may be  entertained  by court  during operation of Emergency and President’s  Order- Obligation   of  detaining  authority  to   place   material justifying  detention before court-Proper affidavit must  be filed by authorised person.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner  was a wholesale dealer in Kerosene  oil  in Kerala  State.  The State Government detained him  under  r. 30(1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 on the alleged ground that he was likely to act in a manner prejudicial  to the  maintenance of supplies and services essential  to  the life  of the community.  By writ petition under Art.  32  of the  Constitution he challenged his detention as being  mala fide, making certain specific allegations against respondent No.  2, a police official.  In particular, it was  urged  on his  behalf  that  after the coming into  operation  of  the Kerala Kerosene Control Order, 1965 which permitted kerosene trade  to  be carried  only under a licence,  there  was  no justification for ha detention.  On :behalf of the State  an affidavit was filed by the Home Secretary generally  denying the  petitioner’s allegations.  The affidavit stated,  inter alia,  that  even after the passing of the  Kerala  Kerosene Control Order it was possible for the petitioner to obtain a licence and carry on the trade in a prejudicial manner. HEID   :   (i)  The  Proclamation  of  Emergency   and   the notification   ,subsequently   issued   by   the   President constitute a bar against judicial scrutiny in respect of the alleged  violation  of the fundamental rights of  a  detenu. Nevertheless a detenu can urge in his support such statutory safeguards as are permissible under the Rules, and when this Court  is  satisfied that the impugned  orders  suffer  from serious  infirmities on grounds which it is permissible  for the detenu to urge, the said orders would be set aside. [595 D, E] (ii) The  detention of a citizen under the Defence of  India Rules  is the result of the subjective satisfaction  of  the appropriate  authority; and so if a prima facie cam is  made Out  by  the petitioner that his detention  Is  either  mala fide, or is the result of a. casual approach adopted by  the appropriate  authority,  the  appropriate  authority  should place  before the court sufficient material in the  form  of prcper affidavit made by a duly authorised to show that  the allegations  made by the petitioner about the  character  of the decision or its mala fides, are not well-founded. [598F] In the present case no such material had been placed  before the court.  Respondent No. 2, though impleaded, had not come

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forward  to deny the specific allegations made against  him. The  Home  Secretary had taken it upon himself to  deny  the allegations against respondent No. 2, but his denials  were, at  best  based on hearsay evidence.  The  Home  Secretary’s affidavit  suffered from the formal defect that it  did  not distinguish  between datements based on  personal  knowledge and  those  made on the basis of  information  received.  it moreover gave no sufficient justification for the 591 continuance of the petitioner’s detention after’ the passing of the Kerala Kerosene Control Order. [596 E, F] Under  the  circumstances  there  was  no  escape  from  the conclusion  that the impugned order was clearly and  plainly mala fide. (iii)     It   is   the  paramount    requirement   of   the Constitution  that  even during Emergency,  the  freedom  of Indian  citizens cannot be taken away without the  existence of   the  justifying  necessity  specified  in  the   Rulesa themselves.   The  tendency  to treat  these  matters  in  a somewhat  and cavalier manner which may  conceivably  result from  the  continuous  use of such  unfettered  powers,  may ultimately  pose  a serious threat to the  basic  values  on which the democratic way of life in this country is founded. Cases  of  this kind may be rare; but even the  presence  of such   rare  cases  constitutes  a  warning  deserving   the attention of the authorities. [599 B, C]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 136 of 1965, Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for  the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. M.   K.  Ramamurthi,  S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg  and  D.  P. Singh, for the petitioner. Niren  De,  Solicitor-General,  A. G. Pudissery  and  M.  R. Krishna Pillai, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar,  C.J.  This petition was heard on  the  11th February, 1966; and at the close of the hearing, we  allowed the  petition  and directed that the  petitioner  should  be released  forthwith and indicated that our reasons would  be pronounced  later.  Accordingly, our present judgment  gives our reasons for the order ,which has already been passed  by us. The petitioner, G. Sadanandan, has been detained by  respon- dent No. 1, the State of Kerala, under Rule 30(1) (b) of the Defence  of  India  Rules,  1962  (hereinafter  called  "the Rules") by an order passed by it on the 20th October,  1965. The said order recites that from the materials placed before respondent  No.  1,  it was satisfied that with  a  view  to prevent  the petitioner from acting in a manner  prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life  of the community it was necessary to detain him.   The said order further shows that under Rule 30(4) of the Rules, respondent No. 1 had decided that the petitioner be detained in  the Central Prison, Trivandrum, under conditions  as  to maintenance,  discipline  and  punishment  of  offences  and breaches of discipline as provided in the  Travancore-Cochin Security  Prisoners Order, 1950.  The petitioner  challenges the  validity  of this order by his present  petition  filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The  petitioner  is a businessman who carries  on  wholesale business in kerosene oil as ESSO dealer and in provisions in his  places of business at Trivandrum.  In  connection  with

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his whole- 592 sale  business  of  selling  kerosene  oil,  the  petitioner receives kerosene oil either in bulk or in sealed tins  from the ESSO company.  When the kerosene oil is thus received by him, the petitioner transfers the kerosene oil from  barrels into empty tins purchased from the market and sells them  to his  customers.   Until the Kerala Kerosene  Control  Order, 1965  was  promulgated, and brought into force on  the  24th October,  1965,  the petitioner was not required to  take  a licence  for carrying on his business in kerosene  oil.   As from  the  24th October, 1965 the said trade  could  not  be carried  on  in Kerala without obtaining a licence.   It  is common  ground  that the petitioner has not been  granted  a licence  in  that  behalf.  To  his  present  petition,  the petitioner  has joined respondent No. 1 and  N.  Paramasivan Nair, Deputy Superintendent of Police (Civil) Supplies Cell, Crime Branch, Trivandrum, as respondent No. 2. The  petitioner alleges that respondent No. 2 caused  to  be initiated criminal proceedings against him in Criminal  Case No.  70  of 1965 in the Court of  the  District  Magistrate, Trivandrum.   These proceedings were commenced on  the  20th May, 1965.  The charge against the petitioner set out in the First  Information  Report  was  that  the  petitioner   had exhibited a board showing stock "nil" on the 20th May, 1965, at  about  7  .00  p.m. in his  wholesale  shop  at  Chalai, Trivandrum  when, in fact, there was stock available in  his shop.  The Police searched the shop that day in the presence of respondent No. 2, though in the relevant papers  prepared in  regard to the said search, no reference was made to  his presence.  According to the petitioner, the board indicating ’nil’  stock had been exhibited in his shop, because 7  tins out of the available stock had been sold to one D. N. Siktar in  regard to which a sale memo was being prepared when  the raid  took place, whereas the two remaining tins were  in  a damaged  condition and could not have been sold.   Even  so, the  raid was carried out and F.I.R. was lodged against  the petitioner  alleging  that he had committed  an  offence  by violating Rule 125(2) and (3) of the Rules read with  clause 4 of the Kerosene (Price Control) Order, 1963. The  petitioner  appeared  before  the  District  Magistrate before  whom the F.I.R. had been filed, and was released  by him  on  bail.   In this case, all  the  witnesses  for  the prosecution  had been examined, except the officer  who  had submitted  the  charge-sheet.  Except the  Sub-Inspector  of Police  (P.W.I.), and the Head Constable (P.W. 2), no  other witnesses supported the prosecution case, though in all five witnesses were examined for the prosecution. Pending  the  trial of this case, the Inspector  of  Police, Crime  Branch  (Food), Trivandrum, who is a  subordinate  of respondent  No. 2, initiated another case at  his  instance, being  case No. 332 of 1965 before the District  Magistrate, Trivandrum,  on the 29th September, 1965.  In this case,  it was alleged that the petitioner had                             593 violated  R. 125(A) of the Rules read with Rules 3 and 4  of the  Kerosene  (Price Control) Order, 1963, as well  as  had committed an offence under section 420, I.P.C. The F.I.R. in regard to this case was made by Narayan Pillai  Sivasankaran Nair  of Tampanoor, Trivandrum.  This Nair is a salesman  in his elder brother’s provision store at Trivandrum, and  both these brothers are close relatives of respondent No. 2. This case was initiated after the search of the petitioner’s shop at  Chalai.   The petitioner was then arrested  and  brought before the District Magistrate on the 30th September,  1965.

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On  this  occasion  also, when  the  petitioner’s  shop  was searched,  respondent No. 2 was present.  During the  course of  the  search, the police seized one tin weighing  16  200 kgs.   None of the other 899 tins which were stored  in  the two  rooms  of  the place of sale of  the  petitioner,  were seized.   The police party also searched the godown  of  the petitioner  and took into custody 632 tins of kerosene  oil. Six  barrels of oil were likewise seized.  According to  the petitioner,  all this was done at the instance of  N.  Siva- sankaran  Nair who is a close relative of respondent  No.  2 and  who  had purchased two tins of kerosene  oil  from  the petitioner  which were produced before the  police  officers for  the  purpose  of showing that the tins  were  short  of contents. The  petitioner  was  granted  interim  bail  on  the   30th September,  1965  by the District  Magistrate,  and  finally released  on  bail on the ,execution of a bail bond  on  the 21st  October,  1965.   When  the order  of  bail  was  made absolute  by the District Magistrate, the  Assistant  Public Prosecutor  did not oppose the release of the petitioner  on bail.   The  petitioner contends that though  the  case  was posted several times for the submission of the final  report by the prosecution, respondent No. 2 has so managed that the said  final report has not been submitted till the  date  of the present petition. After the petitioner was released by the District Magistrate on  the 21st October, 1965, he reached home at 4 o’clock  in the evening.  Immediately thereafter, respondent No. 2  came in  a jeep to the petitioner’s residence and took  him  into custody.   When the petitioner asked respondent No. 2 as  to why  he  was  being arrested, he  refused  to  disclose  the grounds.  Respondent No. 2 took the petitioner into  custody by force and carried him to jail. The  petitioner’s  wife thereafter instructed  a  lawyer  to contact  the  petitioner who in turn tried to get  in  touch with  the petitioner at Wanchiyoor Police Station,  but  did not  succeed.  Under these circumstances,  the  petitioner’s wife instructed her advocate to file a writ petition in  the Kerala  High  Court for the production  of  the  petitioner. Accordingly, a writ petition was filed on the 22nd  October, 1965. Later,  the  advocate engaged by the petitioner’s  wife  was able to get in touch with the petitioner with the permission of the Home 594 Secretary  in  the  Central Jail  at  Trivandrum.   At  this interview, the advocate was given the detention order  which had  been served on the petitioner, and instructed  to  take suitable action to challenge the said order.  In view of the fact  that the petition filed by the Advocate in the  Kerala High Court under the vague instructions of the  petitioner’s wife  contained  a  very limited  prayer,  the  petitioner’s advocate  withdrew  the said petition on the  27th  October, 1965.   Ultimately, the present petition has been  filed  in this Court on behalf of the petitioner on the 20th November, 1965.  That, in brief is the background of the present  writ petition. The petitioner challenges the validity of the impugned order of detention mainly on the ground that it is mala fide,  and has  been  passed  as a result of the  malicious  and  false reports  which  have  been  prepared  at  the  instance   of respondent  No.  2. The whole object of  respondent  No.  2, according to the petitioner, in securing the preparation  of these false reports is to eliminate the petitioner from  the field  of wholesale business in kerosene oil in  Trivandrum,

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so that his relatives may benefit and obtain the  dealership of  the ESSO Company.  The petitioner further  alleges  that the  order  of  detention has been passed  solely  with  the purpose  of  denying him the benefit of the  order  of  bail which was passed in his favour by the District Magistrate on the  21st  October, 1965.  In support of the plea  that  his detention is malafide, the petitioner strongly relies on the fact  that  on the 24th October, 1965, the  Kerala  Kerosene Control  Order, 1965 has come into force and in  consequence unless the petitioner gets a licence, it would be impossible for  him to carry on his business of kerosene oil; and  yet, the  detention  order  ostensibly passed against  him  as  a result  of  his  activities alleged  to  be  prejudicial  in respect  of  his business in kerosene oil, continues  to  be enforced  against him even after the Control Order has  been brought into, operation.  It is mainly on these grounds that the petitioner challenges the validity of the impugned order of his detention. The allegations made in the petition have been  controverted by  Mr. Devassy who is the Secretary in the Home  Department of  respondent  No. 1. In his  counter-affidavit,  the  Home Secretary has, in a general way, denied all the  allegations made in the petition.  The purport of the  counter-affidavit filed  by the Home Secretary is that the impugned  order  of detention  has been passed by respondent No. 1 bonafide  and after  full  consideration  of  the  merits  of  the   case. Respondent No. 1 was satisfied, says the  counter-affidavit, that the activity of the petitioner was likely to  prejudice supplies essential to the life of the community as a  whole; and so, the petitioner’s contention that the impugned  order is malafide is controverted. In dealing with writ petitions by which orders of  detention passed by the appropriate authorities under r. 30(1) (b)  of the Rules are                             595 challenged,  this  Court  has  consistently  recognised  the limited   scope,   of  the  enquiry  which   is   judicially permissible.   Whether or not the detention of a  detenu  is justified  on the merits, is not open to judicial  scrutiny; that  is  a  matter  left by the  Rules  to  the  subjective satisfaction  of  the appropriate authorities  empowered  to pass orders under the relevant Rule.  This Court, no  doubt, realises  in  dealing with pleas for habeas corpus  in  such proceedings  that  citizens  are detained  under  the  Rules without  a trial, and that clearly is inconsistent with  the normal  concept  of the Rule of Law in a  democratic  State. But  having  regard to the fact that an Emergency  has  been proclaimed  under  Art.  352 of  the  Constitution,  certain consequences  follow; and one of these consequences is  that the  citizens  detained under the Rules are  precluded  from challenging  the  validity of the Rules on the  ground  that their   detention  contravenes  their   fundamental   rights guaranteed  by Articles 19, 20 and 21.  The presence of  the Proclamation of Emergency and the notification  subsequently issued  by the President constitute a bar  against  judicial scrutiny  in  respect  of  the  alleged  violation  of   the fundamental rights of the detenu.  This position has  always been  recognised  by this Court in dealing  with  such  writ petitions. Nevertheless,  this Court naturally examines  the  detention orders  carefully  and allows full scope to the  detenus  to urge such statutory safeguards as are permissible under  the Rules,  and  it has been repeatedly observed by  this  Court that  in  cases  where  this Court  is  satisfied  that  the impugned  orders suffer from serious infirmities on  grounds

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which  it is permissible for the detenus to urge,  the  said orders  would be set aside.  Subject to this  position,  the merits of the, orders of detention are not open to  judicial scrutiny.   That is why pleas made by the detenus  that  the impugned  orders  have  been,  passed  by  the   appropriate authorities  without applying their minds, properly  to  the allegations  on  which  the impugned orders  purport  to  be based,  or  that  they have been  passed  malafide,  do  not usually   succeed,  because  this  Court  finds   that   the allegations made by the detenus are either not well-founded, or  have  been made in a casual, and  light-hearted  manner. But cases do come before this Court,. though not frequently, where  this Court comes to the conclusion that the  impugned order  of  detention  is  passed  without  the   appropriate authority  applying its mind to the problem, or that it  can well be regarded as an order passed malafide.  Having  heard Mr. Ramamurthi for the petitioner and the learned Additional Solicitor-General for respondent No. 1, we have come to  the conclusion that the impugned order in the present case  must be characterised as. having been passed malafide. The  first consideration which has weighed in our  minds  in dealing  with  Mr. Ramamurthi’s contentions in  the  present proceedings. is that respondent No. 2 has not chosen to make a counter-affidavit denying the several specific allegations made against him by the 596 petitioner.   Broadly  stated,  the  petition  alleges  that respondent No. 2 is responsible for the criminal  complaints made  against  the  petitioner, that respondent  No.  2  was present when his premises were searched, and that respondent No. 2 actually went to the house of the petitioner when  the petitioner  was forcibly taken into custody and  removed  to the  jail.   The petition further alleges  that  the  second criminal  complaint  filed against the  petitioner  was  the direct  result of the F.I.R. by Narayan Pillai  Sivasankaran Nair  who  and  his brothers are the  trade  rivals  of  the petitioner and are closely related to respondent No. 2.  The petition  likewise specifically alleges that the reports  on which the impugned order of detention has been passed,  were the  result of the instigation of respondent No. 2.  Whether ,or not these allegations, if proved, would necessarily make the impugned order malafide, is another matter; but, for the present, we are dealing with the point that respondent No. 2 who  has  been  impleaded to  the  present  proceedings  and against  whom specific and clear allegations have been  made in  the petition, has not chosen to deny them on  oath.   In our  opinion, the failure of respondent No. 2 to deny  these serious  allegations constitutes a serious infirmity in  the case of respondent No. 1. The  significance  of this infirmity is heightened  when  we look at the counter-affidavit filed by the Home  Secretary. This  affidavit  has not been made in a  proper  form.   The deponent does not say which of the statements made by him in his affidavit are based on his personal knowledge and  which are  the  result  of the information received  by  him  from documents or otherwise.  The form in which the affidavit has been  made  is  so irregular  that  the  learned  Additional Solicitor-General  fairly conceded that the affidavit  could be ignored on that ground alone.  That, however, is not  the only infirmity in this affidavit. It  is surprising that the Home Secretary should have  taken upon  himself to deny the allegations made by  the  petition against respondent No. 2 when it is plain that his denial is based on hearsay ,evidence at the best.  It is not easy  for us  to  appreciate  why  the  Home  Secretary  should   have

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undertaken the task of refuting serious allegations made  by the  petition against respondent No. 2 instead of  requiring respondent  No.  to  make a specific  denial  on  his own. Whether  or  not Narayan Pillai Sivasankaran Nair  and  his brother are close relatives of respondent No. 2 and  whether or  not  they  are the trade rivals of  the  petitioner  and expect to receive benefit from his detention, are matters on which  the Home Secretary should have wisely refrained  from making any statement in his .affidavit.  He should have left it  to  respondent No. 2 to make  the  necessary  averments. Besides,  it  is impossible to understand why  the  specific allegations made by the petition against respondent No. 2 in regard  to  the part played by him either in  searching  the petitioner’s  shop or in arresting him should not have  been definitely                             597 denied by respondent No. 2 himself.  The statements made  by the .Home Secretary in his affidavit in that behalf are very vague and unsatisfactory.  We have carefully considered  the affidavit  made by the Home Secretary and we  are  satisfied that  apart  from the formal defect from  which  it  plainly suffers, even otherwise the statements made in the affidavit do not appear to us to have been made by the deponent  after due deliberation. Take.. for instance, the statements made by the Home  Secre- tary  in  regard  to the petitioner’s  contention  that  the continuance  of  his  detention after  the  Kerala  Kerosene Control Order, 1965 came into operation on the 24th October, 1965, is wholly unjustified.  The petitioner’s grievance  is clear  and  unambiguous.  He says that unless a  licence  is granted  to  him,  he would no longer be able  to  trade  in kerosene  oil;  and since admittedly, no  licence  has  been granted  to him, his continued detention on  the  ostensible ground  that  his  dealings  in kerosene  oil  amount  to  a prejudicial  activity, is entirely unjustified.   Now,  what does  the Home Secretary say in respect of this  contention? On  the  date of the detention of the petitioner,  says  the Home  Secretary’s affidavit, the Control Order had not  come into  force, and that, no doubt, is true.  But the  question is  :  is  the continuance  of  the  petitioner’s  detention justified  after  the  said  Order  came  into  force?   The affidavit  says that the petitioner is not a licensee  under the Kerala Kerosene Control Order, 1965, and cannot  legally carry  on the business as a dealer in kerosene  at  present; but  there  is  nothing under the law  preventing  him  from applying for such licence to carry on the same business.  It is  difficult to understand the logic or the  reasonableness of this averment.  Indeed, we ought to add that the  learned Additional  Solicitor-General fairly, and we  think  rightly and wisely, conceded that this part of the Home  Secretary’s affidavit  could  not  be  supported  and  that  he  saw  no justification  for  the  continuance  of  the   petitioner’s detention after the Kerala Kerosene Control Order came  into operation on the 24th October, 1965.  It is remarkable  that in  the whole of his affidavit, the Homo Secretary does  not say  how  he  came to know all the facts  to  which  he  has purported  to  depose in his affidavit.  We  have,  however; assumed  that  as Home Secretary, the file relating  to  the detention  of the petitioner must have been handled by  him, though  the  Home Secretary should have   realised  that  he should himself have made a ’statement to that effect in  his affidavit.   We have had occasion to  criticise’  affidavits made by appropriate authorities in support of the  detention orders  in writ proceedings, but we have not come across  an affidavit which shows such an amount of casualness as in the

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present  case.  We have carefully examined all the  material and relevant facts to which our attention has been drawn  in the  present  proceedings  and we see  no  escape  from  the conclusion  that  the  impugned order  of  detention  passed against the petitioner on the 20th October, 1965, and more 598 particularly, the petitioner’s continued detention after the 24th  October,  1965, must be characterised as  clearly  and plainly  mala  fide.   This is a case in  which  the  powers conferred on the appropriate authority have, in our opinion, been abused. We are conscious that even if a subordinate officer makes  a malicious report against a citizen suggesting that he should be  detained,  the  malice  inspiring  the  report  may  not necessarily  or always make the ultimate order of  detention passed  by  the  appropriate  authority  invalid.   Even   a malicious  report  may be true in the sense that  the  facts alleged  may be true, but the person making the  report  was determined  to report those facts out of malice against  the party concerned.  But a malicious report may also be  false. In  either  case, the malice attributable to  the  reporting authority  cannot,  in law, be attributed to  the  detaining authority;  but  in  such cases, it  must  appear  that  the detaining  authority  carefully  examined  the  report   and considered  all the relevant material available in the  case before  passing the order of detention.   Unfortunately,  in the  present case, the affidavit made by the Home  Secretary is  so defective and in many places so vague  and  ambiguous that  we do not know which authority acting  for  respondent No.  1 in fact examined the case against the petitioner  and what  was  the  nature of the material  placed  before  such authority;  and the affidavit does not contain any  averment that  after  the material was examined  by  the  appropriate authority, the appropriate authority reached the  conclusion that it was satisfied that the petitioner should be detained with  a,  view  to  prevent him  from  acting  in  a  manner prejudicial  to  the maintenance of  supplies  and  services essential to the life of the community. A After all, the detention of a citizen in every case is the result  of  the subjective satisfaction of  the  appropriate authority;  and  so, if a prima facie case is  made  by  the petitioner that his detention is either malafide, or is  the result  of  the casual approach adopted by  the  appropriate authority, the appropriate authority should place before the Court  sufficient material in the form of  proper  affidavit made   by  a  duly  authorised  person  to  show  that   the allegations   made  by  the  petitioner  about  the   casual character  of the decision or its mala fides, are not  well- founded.  The failure of respondent No. 1 to place any  such material  before us in the present proceedings leaves us  no alternative  but to accept the plea made by  the  petitioner that  the order of detention passed against him on the  20th October,   1965,  and  more  particularly,   his   continued detention after the 24th October, 1965, are totally  invalid and unjustified. In  conclusion,  we  wish to add that when  we  come  across orders of this kind by which citizens are deprived of  their fundamental  right of liberty without a trial on the  ground that the Emergency proclaimed by the President in 1962 still continues, and the powers 599 conferred  on the appropriate authorities by the Defence  of India Rules justify the deprivation of such liberty, we feel rudely disturbed by the thought that continuous exercise  of the  very wide powers conferred by the Rules on the  several

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authorities  is  likely to make the conscience of  the  said authorities  insensitive,  if not blunt,. to  the  paramount requirement of the Constitution that even during  Emergency, the freedom of Indian citizens cannot be taken away  without the  existence of the justifying necessity specified by  the Rules themselves.  The tendency to treat these matters in  a somewhat  casual and cavalier manner which  may  concievably result  from the continuous use of such  unfettered  powers, may ultimately pose a serious threat to the basic values  on which the democratic way of life in this country is founded. It  is true that cases of this kind are rare; but  even  the presence  of such rare cases constitutes a warning to  which we  think  it  is our duty to invite the  attention  of  the appropriate authorities.  In the circumstances of this  case we  direct that respondent No. I will pay the costs  of  the petitioner quantified at RS. 500. Petition allowed- 600