21 January 1964
Supreme Court


Case number: Appeal (civil) 972 of 1963






DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/01/1964


CITATION:  1966 AIR  175            1964 SCR  (6) 279  CITATOR INFO :  D          1968 SC1210  (3)  F          1972 SC 873  (9)  RF         1979 SC1073  (9)

ACT: State Police Service--Sub-Inspectors included in eligibility list     of     Circle     Inspectors--Reorganisation     of States--Appointment    as   Circle   Inspectors    in    new State--Reversion on return of senior officers--If  reduction in  rank--Mysore Seniority Rules, 1957,  r.  2(c)--Hyderabad District Police Manual, ss. 399, 403, 486. 280

HEADNOTE: All  the  petitioners were appointed Sub-Inspectors  in  the former Hyderabad State.  They were considered for  promotion as  Circle Inspectors and their names were included  in  the eligibility list.  On account of the merger of certain areas of  the  former State of Hyderabad into  Mysore  petitioners were  transferred to Mysore.  The petitioners were  promoted ad hoc Circle Inspectors from the eligibility list  received from  the former Hyderabad State and they continued  to  act for varying periods as such.  When certain confirmed  Circle Inspectors  who were on leave or on deputation  outside  the State  returned  to  the new  State,  the  petitioners  were ordered to be reverted.  When that happened, the petitioners filed writ petitions in the Mysore High Court in which  they claimed that as they had been put in the eligibility list by the  former Hyderabad State, they were entitled as of  right to  promotion as Circle Inspectors and to continue  as  such thereafter  and  the order of their  reversion  amounted  to reduction  in  rank.   They  prayed for  a  writ,  order  or direction quashing the orders of reversion and directing the State  Government to continue them as Circle Inspectors  and confirm  them as such.  Their writ petitions were  dismissed by  the  High Court and they came to this Court  by  special leave.   They  also filed writ petitions in  this  Court  in addition  to the appeals.  Two others who had  not  appealed against  the  orders  of  the High  Court  also  filed  writ



petitions in this Court. The contentions raised before this Court were that as  their names  were  put  in  the  eligibility  list,  they  got  an indefeasible  right to promotion as Circle Inspectors,  that after promotion on a temporary or officiating basis they got a right not to be reverted under any circumstances, that  as they  had worked for more than two years on probation,  they became  automatically  confirmed under R.  486,  that  their reversions amounted to reduction in rank in view of R. 2 (c) and  that they should be considered senior to  other  Circle Inspectors  who  were promoted after they were  promoted  as Circle  Inspectors and therefore they should not  have  been reverted  but the other Circle Inspectors who were  promoted After them as Circle Inspectors should have been reverted on the  principle that junior most officiating persons must  be reverted.  Dismissing the appeals and writ petitions, Held:     The mere fact that a Sub-Inspector’s name is  once put   in  the  eligibility  list  does  not  give   him   an indefeasible  right  to  promotion as  a  Circle  Inspector. Moreover,  after  promotion on a  temporary  or  officiating basis, he does not get a right not to be reverted under  any circumstances. Rule  486 does not contemplate automatic confirmation  after the  probationary period of 2 years.  The provision  in  the rule that promoted officers will be confirmed at the end  of their  probationary  period, is qualified by the  words  "if they have given satisfaction".  The competent authority must be satisfied about their work and the order of  confirmation must be passed by that authority. Reversion  in the present case does not amount to  reduction in  rank  because the petitioners were  never  confirmed  as Circle  Inspectors and had no right to that post  and  their reversion was on account of exigencies of  281 service  and  not  on account of any fault  on  their  part. Reversion  on  account of exigencies of  service  as  senior officers  had come back from deputation or from  leave,  did not amount to reduction in rank. The  petitioners could not rely on R. 2(c) in  the  peculiar circumstances prevailing in the State after  re-organisation because promotions were made ad hoc without regard to  inter se  seniority of officers from different States.  It  cannot be  said  that reversion of the petitioners was  on  act  of discrimination. Sukhbans  Singh V. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1962  S.C.  1711, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.  Civil Appeal Nos. 972-977  of 1963. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated April  3,  1963 of the Mysore High Court in  Writ  Petitions Nos. 1380, 1179, 1246, 1259 and 1312 of 1962.                             AND Petitions   Nos.   64,  90  to  94  and  173  and   174   of 1963. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Purshottam   Trikamdas  and  R.  Gopalakrishnan,   for   the appellants  (in C.A. Nos. 972-977/1963) and the  petitioners (in Petitions Nos. 64 and 90 to 94 of 1963). R.   Gopalakrishnan,  for the petitioners (in Petition  Nos. 173 and 174 of 1963).



S.   V.  Gupte,  Additional  Solicitor  General,  B.  R.  L. lyengar  and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent (In  C.A. Nos.  972-977 of 1963 and Petitions Nos. 64 and 90 to 94  of 1963). B.   R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent (in Petitions Nos. 173 and 174 of 1963). January  21, 1964.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by WANCHOO  J.-These  appeals and writ petitions  raise  common questions  and  will be dealt with  together.   The  appeals arise out of six writ petitions filed in the Mysore 282 High Court and six of the writ petitions filed in this Court are  by the same petitioners who applied in the Mysore  High Court.   Two  writ petitions (Nos. 173 and  174)  have  been filed by two others.  They also filed writ petitions in  the High  Court,  though they have not filed  appeals  from  the decision of the High Court.  They will all be referred to as petitioners hereafter. The  case before the High Court was briefly this.   All  the petitioners  were  appointed sub-inspectors  in  the  former Hyderabad State, under s. 6 of the Hyderabad District Police Act  (No.  X of 1329 Fasli).  Under r. 399 of the  Hyderabad District   Police  Manual,  issued  by  the  Government   of Hyderabad Linder s. 10 of the Hyderabad District Police Act, posts  of circle inspectors were to be filled  by  promotion from  the  rank  of sub-inspectors.   The  subsequent  rules provided  for the procedure for this purpose.  The names  of selected   sub-inspectors  who  were  considered   fit   for promotion  were  sent by the Deputy  Inspectors  General  of Police  and the Commissioner of City Police of Hyderabad  to the  Inspector  General  of  Police.   Thereafter  a   Board consisting  of the Inspector General of Police and  all  the Deputy  Inspectors General of Police, Commissioner  of  City Police, Hyderabad and Assistant Inspector General of  Police interviewed the candidates and prepared an approved list  of sub-inspectors  fit for promotion.  This approved list  used to be called the eligibility list and promotions to the post of  circle  inspector used to be made from this  list.   The case  of  the petitioners in the High Court was  that  their names were included in the eligibility list published in the month of October 1956 before. the States Reorganisation  Act (No.  XXXVII of 1956) came into force on November, 1,  1956. They therefore contended that in view of the entry of  their names in the eligibility list they were entitled as of right to  promotion  to the post of circle inspector as  and  when vacancies occurred.  On the coming into force of the  States Reorganisation Act, certain areas from the States of Bombay, Hyderabad,  Madras and the whole of Coorg were made part  of the new State of Mysore in addition to the existing State of Mysore.   In consequence, certain public servants  belonging to these States from which areas were added to the old State of Mysore were transferred to the new State 283 of Mysore thus formed out of the old State of Mysore and the areas added to it.  Among these were the petitioners. Under  s.  115  of the  States  Reorganisation  Act,  public servants  so transferred were deemed to serve in  connection with   the  affairs  of  the  principal   successor   State. Provision was also made for the establishment of one or more advisory  boards for the purpose of assistance in regard  to the  division  and integration of services amongst  the  new states and the ensuring of fair -and equitable treatment  to all persons affected by the State Reorganisation Act.   Sec- tion  115  further provided that the conditions  of  service



applicable  immediately  before the appointed  day  (namely, November 1, 1956) shall not be varied to the disadvantage of any  person  transferred to the new State except  with  tile previous  approval of the Central Government.   Section  116 (1)  provided for the continuance of public servants in  the same posts; but sub-s. (2) thereof laid down that nothing in sub-s.  (1)  shall prevent a competent authority  after  the appointed  day from passing in relation to any  such  person any order affecting his continuance in such post or  office, thereby  recognising the right of the successor State  inter alia  to transfer officers anywhere in the new  State  after November 1, 1956. The  petitioners continued to serve in the new State and  as they  were  in the eligibility list referred to  above  they were  promoted as circle inspectors on various  dates  after November  1,  1956.  It may be  mentioned  that  eligibility lists were received in the new State of Mysore from all  the States from which areas had been transferred to it under the States  Reorganisation Act and these lists continued  to  be acted  upon  as  and when vacancies arose in  the  cadre  of circle inspectors.  It also appears that pending integration promotions were made from these eligibility lists ad hoc, or as they were called "out of seniority", and continued to  be so  made  pending integration.  The  petitioners  were  thus promoted ad hoc circle inspectors from the eligibility  list received  from the former Hyderabad State and  continued  to act  for varying periods as such.  It appears  further  that the  petitioners  were ordered to be reverted  when  certain confirmed  circle  inspectors  who  were  on  leave  or   on deputation outside the State 284 returned to the new State.  Thereupon the petitioners  filed writs  before the High Court in which they claimed  that  as they  had  been put in the eligibility list  by  the  former Hyderabad State, they were entitled as of right to promotion as circle inspectors and to continue as such thereafter  and the order of their reversion amounted to reduction in  rank. They  therefore  prayed  for  a  writ,  order  or  direction quashing the orders dated September 6, 1962, ordering  their reversion  and  directing the State Government  to  continue them  as  circle  inspectors and to confirm  them  as  such. Further  during  the  course of arguments  before  the  High Court, reliance was placed on r. 2(c) of the Seniority Rules framed  by  the  Governor of Mysore in  1957  and  the  writ petitions  before  this  Court  are  mainly  based  on  that seniority rule to which we shall refer in due course. The  case of the State Government was briefly this.  It  was admitted  that after November 1, 1956, these  officers  were transferred to the new State of Mysore and eligibility lists were received from all the States from which territories and officers  were  tarnsferred to the new State of  Mysore.  As however  integration of various services was bound  to  take time, the new State, by virtue of the powers conferred on it under  the States Reorganisation Act, started acting on  the eligibility lists received from the various States in  anti- cipation of integration and promoting sub-inspectors to  the rank of circle inspectors from those eligibility lists on an ad  hoc basis and this was made clear in the various  orders that  were passed from time to time by using the words  "out of seniority" when such promotions were made.  Eventually  a provisional integrated seniority list of all  sub-inspectors including  those  who were officiating as  circle  inspector (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  provisional  list)  was prepared  in  February  1958.  In 1962  when  senior  circle inspectors  returned  to  the State  from  deputation,  some



officiating  circle inspectors (other than the  petitioners) were  reverted.  They filed writ petitions before  the  High Court  in  1962 contending that even though  they  had  been promoted  later, they should not have been reverted in  view of their position in the provisional list and that that list should have been adhered to and those junior to them in  the provisional list should have been reverted.  This contention was accepted by the High                             285 Court  and  in consequence reversions began to  be  made  in accordance with the provisional list in compliance with  the view taken by the High Court.  That was why the,  juniormost sub-inspectors according to the provisional list who were in the  eligibility  list and who were  officiating  as  circle inspectors  were reverted.  In consequence -the  petitioners were  also  reverted when senior officers came back  to  the State.  It was further urged that the eligibility lists gave no  right  to the sub-inspectors whose names were  borne  on those lists to promotion as circle inspectors, though it was not  disputed  that only those who were in  the  eligibility lists could be promoted as circle inspectors.  But the  fact that a sub-inspector’s name was in the eligibility list  did not  confer  any right on him to promotion in  view  of  the Rules.   Further  it was contended that  officiating  circle inspectors  could  not claim confirmation  as  an  automatic right after they had worked for a certain number of years as such  and  that  they could  only  become  confirmed  circle inspectors when orders to that effect were expressly made by the  Government.  In the present cases the petitioners  were never confirmed by the Government as inspectors.  There  was therefore  no question of any reduction in rank.  It is  not in dispute that the petitioners were not reverted on account of  any  fault on their part; they had to be  reverted  only because  of exigencies of service as senior  inspectors  had come back to the State from deputation or had returned  from leave.  It was urged that the reversion in the present  case could  not amount to reduction in rank and was  in  ordinary course due to exigencies of service.  As to r. 2 (c) of  the Seniority  Rules, the case of the Government was  that  that rule  governed the seniority of inspectors while  they  were acting  as such and had nothing to do with the  question  of reversion,  and in any case considering that promotions  had been  made after November 1, 1956 on ad hoc basis, the  rule would  not  confer  any right on  the  petitioners  and  the Government  was justified in following the provisional  list in  view of the observations of the High Court  referred  to above.  It was therefore contended that the petitioners  had no  right  to the posts from which they  were  reverted  and there was no reduction in rank and they were not entitled to any benefit of r. 2(c). 286 The High Court accepted the contentions raised on behalf  of the  State and dismissed the petitions.   Thereupon  special leave  was  obtained by six of the petitioners in  the  High Court and that is how we have six appeals before us.   These six  appellants  have also filed six writ  petitions  before this Court in addition to two other writ petitions filed  by two  other petitioners in the High Court who had  not  filed appeals. The  first  two questions that fall  for  consideration  are whether  the fact that a sub-inspector’s name is put in  the eligibility  list  gives  an indefeasible right  to  him  to promotion,  and whether after such promotion on a  temporary or  officiating  basis he gets a right not  to  be  reverted under  any circumstances.  We are of opinion that  the  fact



that a subinspector’s name is in the eligibility list  gives him no right of the kind urged on behalf of the petitioners. The rules in that behalf that are relevant are 399 to 403 of the  Hyderabad  District Police Manual.  Rule  399  provides that  vacancies  in the rank of circle inspector are  to  be filled  by the promotion of selected sub-inspectors  and  r. 403  lays down that "no direct appointments to the  rank  of Circle  Inspector  will be made".  Rule 400  prescribes  the procedure  for  putting the names in the  eligibility  list. Rule 102 refers to sub-inspectors serving in the C.I.D. Rule 401 lays down that sub-inspectors whose names are entered in the  approved  list  will  be  interviewed  by  the   Deputy Inspector  General  of  Police in the  course  of  his  cold weather  tour and each sub-inspector’s work during the  year will  be  examined  and  report will then  be  made  to  the Inspector   General  of  Police  whether  the  officer   had maintained  his fitness for promotion or not.  Thus  r.  401 makes  it clear that even after the sub-inspector’s name  is put in the eligibility list, his fitness for promotion is to be decided year by year and a report has to be made  whether he  has maintained his fitness for promotion or  not.   This obviously means that where a subinspector has not maintained his  fitness  his name can be removed from  the  eligibility list.   It follows therefore that the mere fact that a  sub- inspector’s  name is once put in the eligibility  list  does not give him an indefeasible right to promotion as a  circle inspector.   Then there is r. 486 which  governs  promotions generally.  It lays down that promotion                             287 cannot be claimed as a matter of right, though officers  and men  of all ranks are entitled to expect promotion’ if  they have  good records, and if they are smart and efficient  and have  a  thorough  knowledge of their  duties.   This  again clearly shows that merely because a sub-inspector’s name  is put in the eligibility list, he cannot claim promotion as  a matter  of  right.   Rule  486  further  provides  that  all officers who are promoted will be on probation for a  period of two years.  They may be reverted at any time during  this period by the authority competent to promote them, if  their conduct and work are not satisfactory, or if they are  found unsuitable  for  the  appointment to which  they  have  been promoted.   This  clearly shows that even where  a  sub-ins- pector  has actually been promoted as circle  inspector  lie remains on probation for two years and during that period he is  likely  to be reverted if his work and conduct  are  not found satisfactory.  This again negatives the contention  on behalf  of  the petitioners that they  had  an  indefeasible right  to promotion because their names had been put on  the eligibility  list and that they could not be reverted  after they had once started acting as circle inspectors.   Lastly, r. 486 provides that promoted officers will be confirmed  at the  end  of their probationary period if  they  have  given satisfaction.   This clearly shows that it is only when  the probationary  period  is over and the promoted  officer  has given  satisfaction during the whole of that period that  he will  be confirmed.  It is clear therefore reading  rr.  401 and  486 together that the mere fact that a  sub-inspector’s name  is put in the eligibility list does not give  him  any indefeasible  right to promotion.  Further the fact that  he is  actually promoted, temporarily or as  officiating,  does not give him any right to continuance even during the period of  two years’ probation and he is liable to be reverted  at any  time even during those two years if his work  is  found unsatisfactory; it is only when the authority concerned  has found that his work and conduct are satisfactory during  the



probation  period that he can be confirmed.  The  contention of  the  petitioners  that  they had  any  right  under  the eligibility  list  for  promotion or  that  after  they  had actually been promoted, they had a right to continue in  the post of circle inspector, therefore, must be negatived. 288 It has further been urged on the basis of r. 486 that as the petitioners had worked for more than two years on probation, they became automatically confirmed under the said rule, and reliance  is  placed on the following sentence  in  r.  486, namely,  "promoted officers will be confirmed at the end  of their probationary period if they have given  satisfaction". The  law on the question has been settled by this  Court  in Sukhbans  Singh v. State of Punjab(1).  It has been held  in that case that a probationer cannot after the expiry of  the probationary  period automatically acquire the status  of  a permanent  member of a service, unless of course  the  rules under  which  he is appointed expressly provide for  such  a result.   Therefore  even  though  a  probationer  may  have continued  to  act in the post to which he is  appointed  on probation for more than the initial ’period of probation, he cannot  become a permanent servant merely because of  efflux of  time,  unless  the Rules of  service  which  govern  him specifically lay down that the probationer will be automati- cally  confirmed  after the initial period of  probation  is over.   It is contended on behalf of the petitioners  before us  that  the part of r. 486 (which we have set  out  above) expressly  provides  for automatic  confirmation  after  the period  of probation is over.  We are of opinion that  there is  no force in this contention.  It is true that the  words used  in  the sentence set out above are not  that  promoted officers will be eligible or qualified for promotion at  the end  of their probationary period which are the words to  be often found in the rules in such cases; even so, though this part  of  r.  486  says  that  "promoted  officers  will  be confirmed  at the end of their probationary period",  it  is qualified  by the words "if they have  given  satisfaction". Clearly  therefore the rule does not  contemplate  automatic confirmation after the probationary period of two years, for a promoted officer can only be confirmed under this rule  if he  has  given  satisfaction.   This  condition  of   giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promoted officer can be  confirmed under this rule and this  condition  obviously means that the authority competent to confirm him must  pass an  order  to the effect that the  probationay  officer  has given   satisfaction  and  is  therefore   confirmed.    The petitioners therefore cannot (1)  A.I.R. 1962.  S.C. 1711. 289 claim that they must be treated as confirmed circle  inspec- tors simply because they have worked for more than two years on   probation;  they  can  only  become  confirmed   circle inspectors  if an order to that effect has been passed  even under this rule by the competent authority.  The first  con- tention  therefore  that the petitioners before us  have  an indefeasible right to promotion once their names are put  in the eligibility list and that they are entitled to  continue as  circle  inspectors  thereafter if they  have  once  been promoted,  on  temporary  or officiating  basis,  cannot  be sustained. This brings us to the next question whether the reversion in the  present  cases can be said to amount  to  reduction  in rank.  In view of what we have said above on the first point raised  on behalf of the petitioners, it is clear  that  the petitioners   cannot   be  treated   as   confirmed   circle



inspectors.   It is not disputed that they have  never  been confirmed  as such.  It is also not disputed that they  have not  been  reverted on account of any fault in  their  work. The  reversion  has been made simply because  senior  circle inspectors   have  come  back  to  the  State  either   from deputation  or from leave and they have to be  accommodated. Such reversion therefore cannot amount to reduction in  rank for two reasons, firstly, because the petitioners before  us were  never confirmed as circle inspectors and had no  right to  that  post, and secondly, because the  reversion  is  on account  of exigencies of service and not on account of  any fault  their  part.  Reversion on account of  exigencies  of service,  as senior officers have come back from  deputation or from leave, cannot in our opinion amount to reduction  in rank.   The  contention  of  the  petitioner  that  by  this reversion they have been reduced in rank therefore fails. The next point that has been urged is that in any case  till final integration of service -was made, the State Government was  not entitled to take into account the provisional  list of sub-inspectors and could only proceed to give  promotions and   to   make  transfers  regionwise  according   to   the eligibility   lists   of  former  States  from   which   the territories  came to the new State and if that was done  the petitioners  being  senior  in their  region  could  not  be reverted.  We are of opinion that there is no force in  this contention.  It is 134-159 S.C.--19. 290 true that for some time the State Government did proceed  on this  basis for there was no integrated list,  whether  pro- visional  or final, available; but that does not  mean  that under the law it could not act on the provisional list  once it  was  made till it was made final or that there  was  any estopped against the State Government in view of its  having acted  regionwise for sometime.  We have  already  indicated that  territories from four States came to the old State  of Mysore to form the new State of Mysore and that  necessarily raised  difficult question of integration, and so the  State Government  made  ad  hoc promotions regionwise  or  out  of seniority as was stated by it in various government  orders. But  the  State  is  bound to be treated  as  one  unit  for purposes of administration.  We may also refer to s.  116(2) of the States Reorganisation Act, which makes it clear  that after  the appointed day the whole State will be treated  as one  unit and nothing would prevent the competent  authority after the appointed day from passing in relation to any such officer  allotted to the new State any order  affecting  his continuance  in  such post or office.  We  cannot  therefore accept  the contention that the State Government  was  bound till  the  final  list  of integration  was  made,  to  make transfers only regionwise.  We can see nothing in law  which prevents  the State Government from proceeding according  to the  provisional list after such list was prepared.  We  are of  opinion that the view taken by the Mysore High Court  in the  earlier  writ  petitions  after  the  framing  of   the provisional   seniority  list  is  correct  and  the   State Government would be entitled to act on that list subject  of course  to this that if the provisional list is in  any  way altered   when  the  final  list  is  prepared,  the   State Government  would  give  effect  to  the  final  list.   The contention  of  the petitioners that  the  State  Government should  have  continued  to make  promotions  and  transfers regionwise  only  even after the provisional list  was  made therefore  must  fail.   It  may be  added  that  the  State Government  would be entitled and bound after the  appointed



day  to  treat  the State as one whole unit  and  make  such orders  of transfer, as it thought fit, treating  the  whole State as one unit. Lastly,  we come to the contention based on r. 2 (c) of  the Mysore Seniority Rules which was argued before the                             291 High  Court  at the hearing though it was  not  specifically raised in the petitions there and this is the main basis  of the  writ petitions before us.  The rule was promulgated  by the  Governor of Mysore from February 1958 and is  in  these terms:-               "Seniority  inter se of persons  appointed  on               temporary  basis  will be  determined  by  the               dates of their continuous officiating in  that               grade  and where the period of officiation  is               the  same the seniority inter se in the  lower               grade shall prevail." The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that in  view of  this  rule, they should be considered  senior  to  other circle inspectors who were promoted after they were promoted as circle inspectors and therefore they should not have been reverted  but the other circle inspectors who were  promoted after  them as circle inspectors should have been  reverted, on the principle that junior-most officiating person must be reverted. Now  r.  2(c)  as it stands merely  provides  for  seniority between  persons officiating in a higher rank when they  are officiating  as  such; it is not an express rule as  to  the manner  in which reversion should be made  where  reversions are necessary on account of exigencies of service.  The rule therefore  cannot  be held as expressly  providing  for  the principle of "last come first go" with which one is familiar in   industrial  law.   Strictly  speaking   therefore   the petitioners cannot claim that r. 2 (c) has been violated  by their  reversion, for it does not provide for reversion  and only  provides  for  the  seniority  of  officers  who   are officiating in a higher grade.  Even so, it may be  conceded that when reversion takes place on account of exigencies  of public service, the usual principle is that the  junior-most persons  among  those  officiating in  clear  or  long  term vacancies are generally reverted to make room for the senior officers  coming  back from deputation or  from  leave  etc. Further  ordinarily  as promotion on  officiating  basis  is generally  according  to seniority, subject to  fitness  for promotion,  the junior-most person reverted is  usually  the person  promoted  last.   This  state  of  affairs  prevails oridinarily unless there are extraordinary circumstances, as in the present case.  We have 292 already  set  out  above that the new State  of  Mysore  was formed of the territories of the old State of Mysore And the territories  of four other States.  The consequence of  this was that officers from the other States as well as from  the old State of Mysore became officers of the new State and the question of their integration inter se had to be decided  in accordance  with  s. 115 of the States  Reorganisation  Act. That  matter had to take time and therefore in the  interest of administration ad hoc promotions continued to be made  by the new State of Mysore after November 1, 1956.  The  result of  this ad hoc promotion was that the normal  principle  of promotion  based on seniority subject to fitness in a  State where there is no question of integration could not work and that is why we find that orders were passed by the new State promoting sub-inspectors from various eligibility lists with regard  to  seniority  inter se  of  officers  from  various



States.   It was only in 1958 that the provisional  list  of sub-inspectors was prepared.  When this provisional list was prepared  it  was found that the promotions which  had  till then  been  made  out of  eligibility  lists  received  from various  States were not in accordance with the  provisional list  and it so happened in many cases  that  sub-inspectors who  were seniors in the provisional list and who were  also in the eligibility lists of the various States were promoted after sub-inspectors who were junior in the provisional list though  they  were also in the eligibility  lists.   It  was because  of these special circumstances arising out  of  the provisional  list  which began to be put into  effect  after 1958  that the situation arose that  officiating  inspectors who  had  been  officiating  for a longer  time  had  to  be reverted   before  officiating  inspectors  who   had   been officiating  for a shorter time because of the seniority  in the  provisional list.  We are therefore of opinion that  it was  because of the special circumstances after November  1, 1956  that  the  petitioners and those like  them  who  were really  junior  to other subinspectors  in  the  eligibility lists  came  to  be promoted earlier because  there  was  no provisional  list  available  or in actual  force  when  the promotions  were made ad hoc and out of seniority.   It  was only  when  the  provisional list was  made  that  inter  se seniority  of  officers coming from  various  States  became prima facie known.  Therefore when reversions had                             293 to be made de on account of exigencies of service in  accor- dance  with the provisional list it was bound to  happen  in view of the earlier ad hoc promotions that some  officiating inspectors who had been promoted earlier had to be  reverted in preference to others who had been promoted later in these circumstances.   It cannot therefore be said in view of  the special circumstances prevailing in the State consequent  on the  States Reorganisation Act that the departure  from  the normal method of reversion was unjustified after the  making of  the provisional list.  The petitioners therefore  cannot rely on r. 2(c) in the peculiar circumstances prevailing  in the  State after the reorganisation because promotions  were made ad hoc without regard to inter se seniority of officers from  different States.  It is only because of this  special circumstance  that  it  appears  as  if  r.  2(c)  is  being disregarded  in the matter of reversion for  the  promotions were  made  without  regard  to  integrated  seniority   and resulted  in sub-inspectors who were juniors  in  integrated seniority  being  promoted  earlier.  We  are  therefore  of opinion that r. 2(c) does not strictly apply in the  present case.   But  even on the basis that the  junior-most  should first  be  reverted in case reversion has to take  place  on account of exigencies of service, it cannot be said that the reversion  of the petitioners is an act  of  discrimination, for  the affidavit on behalf of the State  Government  shows that  they  are really junior-most in the  provisional  list though  they  might have in  the  exceptional  circumstances indicated above acted longer as officiating circle inspector than others who have not been reverted.  We are therefore of opinion  that  the  charge of discrimination  based  on  the violation of r. 2(c) cannot in the special circumstances  of this  case be sustained, for it is not in dispute that  they were the juniormost according to the provisional list,  when the orders of reversion were made. The  appeals and the writ petitions therefore fail  and  are hereby  dismissed.   In the circumstances of this  case,  we make no order as to costs. Appeals and petitions dismissed.