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PETITIONER: G.   S. GILL AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/07/1974

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN RAY, A.N. (CJ)

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1898            1975 SCR  (1) 586  1975 SCC  (3)  73

ACT: Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 rr. 4  and 9--Members  of State Civil Service appointed to cadre  posts and equivalent posts and then reverted--Procedure under Art. 311, it should be followed.

HEADNOTE: Fundamental  Rule 9(19) provides that a  government  servant officiates  in  a  post when he performs  its  duties  while another  holds  a  lien on it, and  also  that  the  Central Government may appoint a government servant to officiate  in a  post on which another does not hold a lien.  The  proviso to  r.  4 (2) of the Indian Administrative  Service  (Cadre) Rules,  1954, provides that the State Government  may  under certain conditions and for a certain period, add to a  State or  joint  cadre one or more posts carrying duties  of  like nature to cadre posts; and r. 9 of the Indian Administrative Service  (Cadre)  Rules  provides that  subject  to  certain conditions the State Government may fill temporarily a cadre post in a State by a person who is not a cadre officer. Some   of  the  appellants  were  appointed  by  the   State Government  to  cadre  posts in  the  Indian  Administrative Service and others were appointed to senior duty posts which were  declared  as equivalent to cadre posts in  the  Indian Administrative Service.  All of them were reverted to  their substantive   posts  in  the  State  Civil  Service.    They challenged the reversion on the ground that it was  punitive and  that  the  procedure under Art. 311  should  have  been followed.  The High Court overruled the contention. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD  : (1) Unless a person has a right to a post, an  order of  reversion from that post cannot amount to  dismissal  or removal within the meaning of Art. 331 and, a person gets  a right  to a post only when he is substantively appointed  to it.   Therefore, if the appointments of the appellants  were officiating  appointments of either type mentioned in F.  R. 9(19), the revision to State Civil Service would not attract Art. 311. [588 G-589 A] Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958] S. C. R. 828, The  State of Bombay, v. F. A. Abraham [1962] Supp. 2 S.  C. R.  92,  at  97,  Divisional  Personnel  Officer,   Southern Railway, v. S. Raghavandrachar, [1966] 3 S. C. R. 106, Union

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of  India and Another v. Gajendra Singh etc. [1972] 3 S.  C. R. 660 and Union of India v. AT.  L. Capoor and Ors.  A.  1. R. 1974 S. C. 87, 103 followed. (2)Since  the appointees to the Cadre posts in the  Indian Administrative  Service  were appointed under r.  9  of  the Indian    Administrative   Service   (Cadre)   Rules,    the appointments could not have been made in any capacity  other than in an officiating capacity. [587 H-588 A] (3)As regards the other appellants also though tile  order of appointment does not indicate that the appointments  were in  officiating capacity, the fact that they retained  their lien  in their posts in the State Civil Services shows  that they  were  not appointed substantively to the  senior  duty posts but only in an officiating capacity. [588B-C, D-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1098 1970. Appeal  from the Judgment and Order dated 9th January,  1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No.  2301 of 1966. R.K.  Garg,  S. C. Agarawal, S. S.  Bhatnagar and  V.  J. Francis, for the appellants. 587 F.   S. Nariman, Addl.  Sol.  Gen. for Union of India, P. P. Rao, V.   C.  Mahajan,  B.  N. Sachthey and  Girish  Chandra  for respondent nos. 2 and 3. N. S. Bindra S. K. Mehta and 0. P. Sharma for respondent No. 1 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW.  J.-The appellants filed a petition before the  High Court   of  Punjab  under  Articles  226  and  227  of   the Constitution for quashing the orders passed by the State  of Punjab  reverting  them from the posts held by  them  in  an officiating  capacity  in the cadre and  ex-cadre  posts  of senior  scale  of  Indian Administrative  Service  to  their substantive posts in the State Civil Service from which they were promoted. The  appellants  contended before the High  Court  that  the orders  of  reversion  were  punitive  in  character   and,, therefore,  attracted the provisions of Article 311  of  the Constitution  and  since  they  were  given  no   reasonable opportunity  to  make  their  representations  against   the reversion,  the  orders were bad, and  prayed  for  quashing them.  The High Court overruled the contention and dismissed the petition.  This appeal, by certificate, is against  that order. The  case  of the appellants in the writ petition  was  that their names were included in the Select List prepared  under Regulation   4   of  the   Indian   Administrative   Service (Appointment  by Promotion) Regulations,  1955  (hereinafter referred  to  as the ’Promotion Regulations) and  that  they thereby acquired right to be appointed to the cadre and  ex- cadre  posts  in  the  Indian  Administrative  Service.   In paragraphs 11 and 13 of the writ petition, they said that in the  State  of Punjab there were two types of posts  in  the Senior  Duty  Scale,  namely,  (i)  Cadre  posts  which  are specified  in  the  Schedule to  the  Indian  Administrative Service  (Cadre) Rules, 1954 and, (ii) ex-cadre posts;  that the ex-cadre posts were created by the State Government from time  to  time  according to exigencies of  service  and  in matters  of pay, promotion and other benefits, the  ex-cadre posts were declared equivalent to a cadre post and that they

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were appointed to senior duty posts and ex-cadre in 1963 and 1964. The creation of ex-cadre posts by State Government can  only be  in  terms  of the second proviso to Rule 4  (2)  of  the Indian  Administrative  Service (Cadre) Rules,  1954.   That proviso reads as follows: ’Provided  further that the State Government  concerned  may add  for  a  period  not exceeding one  year  and  with  the approval of the Central Government for a further period  not exceeding  two years, to a State or Joint Cadre one or  more posts  carrying duties or responsibilities of a like  nature to cadre posts." Even  if  it  be assumed that  the  State  Government  could appoint any person to these ex-cadre posts, the  appointment must  necessarily  be  temporary  appointment.   So  far  as appellants  1, 3 and 5 are concerned, there can be no  doubt that   since  the  appointments  were  made  by  the   State Government to cadre posts in the Indian Administrative 588               Service, the appointments could not have  been               in  any capacity other than in an  officiating               capacity  under Rule 9 of the Indian  Adminis-               trative  Service (Cadre) Rules.  Mr. Garg  for               the appellants contended that-appellants 2,  4               and  6  to 12 were appointed  to  senior  duty               posts  which  were declared as  equivalent  to               cadre  posts  in  the  Indian   Administrative               Service  and as the orders of appointment  did               not  indicate ...that they were  appointed  in               any  officiating capacity, the  appointment.,,               must be deemed to be substantive in character.               No  doubt, the orders of appointment of  these               appellants do not say that they were appointed               in  an officiating capacity; and in  paragraph               15  of the writ petition, they said that  they               were  appointed to various senior  duty  posts               not in an officiating capacity.  This averment               was denied by the Government of India.  In the               affidavit in reply, the appellants stated that               it  was  wrong to equate  regular  officiating               appointments    with   stop-gap    or    local               arrangements.   They said that officiation  is               of   two   kinds,  one,   officiation   of   a               subordinate service official against a post in               a  superior  service in a  stop-gap  or  local               arrangement when the regular incumbent of  the               post   is,  say,  on  leave  and  the   other,               officiation   of   a   regular   recruit    on               appointment  to service in which he is  to  be               confirmed  and made substantive  permanent  in               due  course on availability of  a  substantive               vacancy and that "the officiating appointments               of  the appellants in the senior scale of  the               1.  A.  S.  was  of  the  second  type".   The               appellants also said that they retained  their               lien in their posts in the State Civil Service               which  would make it clear that they were  not               appointed  substantively  to the  senior  duty               posts,  but only in an  officiating  capacity.               The  judgment of the High Court also  proceeds               on  the  basis  that  these  appellants   were               appointed in an officiating capacity to senior               duty posts.  These appellants had no case that               they  were  substantively  appointed  to   any               posts.

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             There   can  be  two  types   of   officiating               appointments.     Fundamental    Rule    9(19)               provides:               "9(19)   Officiate.   A   Government   servant               officiates  in  a post when  he  performs  the               duties of a post on which another person holds               a  lien.   The Central Government may,  if  it               thinks  fit, appoint a Government  servant  to               officiate in a vacant ’post on which no  other               Government servant holds a lien".               If    the   appointments   were    officiating               appointments, whether of the type mentioned in               the  first portion of the meaning of the  word               ,officiate’  in  F.R. 9(19) or in  its  latter               part, there can be no doubt that the reversion               of  the appellants to their substantive  posts               in  the State Civil Service would not  attract               the  application  of Article  311  unless  the               orders  of  reversion cast  stigma  and  were,               therefore, punitive in character.  There is no               case that orders of reversion cast any  stigma               upon the appellants. Parshotam Lal Dhingra  v.               Union of’ India (1) is clear authority for the               proposition  that unless a person has a  right               to  a post, a simple order of  reversion  from               that  post  cannot  amount  to  dismissal   or               removal within the meaning of Article 311  and               that a person               (1) [1958] S.C.R. 828.               gets  a  right  to a post  only  when  lie  is               substantively appointed it.This  is   what               their Lordships said at p. 842:               "It   is,   therefore,   quite   clear    that               appointment   to   a  permanent  post   in   a               Government service, either on probation, or on               an officiating basis, is, from the very nature               of   such   employment,  itself  of   a   very               transitory  character and, in the  absence  of               any   special   contract  or   specific   rule               regulating the conditions of the service,  the               implied  term of such appointment,  under  the               ordinary law of master and servant, is that it               is terminable at any time.  ’In short, in  the               case of an appointment to a permanent post  in               a  Government  service on probation or  on  an               officiating  basis, the servant  so  appointed               does not acquire any substantive right to  the               post  and  consequently cannot  complain,  any               more  than  a  private  servant  employed   on               probation  or an officiating basis can do,  if               his service is terminated at any time’ . This passage was quoted with approval in The State of Bombay v.   F.  A.  Abraham  (1).   See  also  Divisional  Personal Officer  Southern  Railway v. S.   Raghavendrachar  (2)  and Union of India and Another v. Gajendra Singh etc. (3) As appellants 1, 3 and 5 were appointed under Rule 9 of  the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, there can be no doubt  that the State Government was competent to  terminate their appointments at any time (see Union of India v. M.  L. Capoor and Others (4). The appellants have not made out their case as specified  in the writ petition or as urged by them before the High Court. We hold that the High Court was right in its conclusion.  We dismiss the appeal.  No order as to costs. V.P.S.                   Appeal dismissed.

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(1)  [1968] Sup. 2 S.C.R. 92, it (2)  [1966] 3, S.C.R. 106. (3)  [1972] 3, S.C.R. 660. (4)  A.I.R. 1974 SC. 87, 103. 590