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PETITIONER: G. PONNIAH THEVAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NELLAYAM PERUMAL PILLAI AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/12/1976

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH RAY, A.N. (CJ) SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1977 AIR  244            1977 SCR  (2) 446  1977 SCC  (1) 500  CITATOR INFO :  D          1989 SC1110  (18)

ACT:             Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, s, 2(e)         "Landlord",    whether   relates   only   to   creator    of         lease---Section 3(1)  whether protects tenancy rights creat-         ed    by   life-estate   holder   extending    beyond    his         life-time--Provisions of Act, whether prospective.

HEADNOTE:              The plaintiffs-respondents who became owners of the land         in dispute, as remainder-men, sued to evict the appellant, a         cultivating  tenant, on the ground that his  tenancy  rights         created by Annamalai Ammal, a life-estate holder had  ceased         with  her death.  The appellant claimed protection under  s.         3(1) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955.         The  respondents  contended that such  protection  was  only         available  against  the creator of a lease, to  persons  who         were  cultivating  tenants in 1955 when the  Act  came  into         force,  and  not to the appellant who became  a  cultivating         tenant  in 1961.The eviction suit was decreed. by  the  Dis-         trict Court and the High Court.         Allowing the appeal, the Court,             HELD:  (1 ) The statutory definition of the term  "land-         lord"  relates not only to the person who created the  lease         but  contemplates and takes in every successive  holder  who         could be entitled to evict a tenant.  That. person can  only         one  who has the right, at the time of filing the  suit,  to         realise  rents  or  evict persons  in  wrongful  occupation.         [449G-H]             (2)  The terms of the statutory protection apply to  all         tenancies governed by the Act irrespective of the nature  of         rights  of  the person who leased the land so  long  as  the         lessor was entitled to create a tenancy. [447E]         The Court observed--             The  Madras High Court’s view that a life estate  holder         cannot create  a. tenancy which could last beyond his  life-         time,  applied to statutory tenancies runs counter not  only         to  the principles underlying creation of statutory  tenancy         rights in agricultural land, through out the country, but is         in  conflict with the particular statutory  protection  con-

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       ferred  upon  cultivating tenants in the  State  of  Madras.         [447E-F]             (3)  The provisions of the Act’ are  prospective  except         for section 4(1) and even s. 4(1) shows that the  protection         was not meant merely for those who were cultivating  tenants         in  1955.  The provisions became enforceable as soon as  the         Act became operative and there is nothing in the Act to show         that it ceased to be operative at any time or was limited in         its  operation  only as  a protection given to  persons  who         were cultivating tenants in 1955. [450B-C]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICION: Civil Appeal No. 523 of 1976.             (Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment  and   Order         dated  29-1-1976 of the Madras High Court in  Second  Appeal         No..468/75).         K.S. Ramarmurthi and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan, for the  appel-         lant.             T.S. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and Miss         Veena Devi Khanna, for respondents Nos. 2---4.         447         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by         BEG, J.--This appeal by special leave raises quite a  simple         question  interpretation  of the provisions  of  the  Madras         Cultivating  Tenants   Protection  Act,  1955,  (hereinafter         referred to as ’the act’) which we think, have been  ignored         entirely  by  the Madras  high court in the  judgment  under         appeal.             The  undisputed  facts are: one  Annamalai  Pillai  died         leaving  behind  two  widows, namely,  Annamalai  Ammal  and         Veerayee.  The last mentioned lady instituted a suit No. 482         of  1927 in the Court of the District  Munsif,  Periyakulam,         for partitioning the properties of the deceased,  impleading         the  other  widow and a nephew of  the  deceased  Annammalai         Pillai as defendants.  That suit ended in a compromise dated         6th  July, 1935. Under the terms of the  compromise  decree,         some land was given to Annamalai Ammal for enjoyment  during         her  life time, and, thereafter, absolutely to the  sons  of         the  second  defendant of suit No. 482  of  1927.  Annamalai         Ammal died on 26th July, 1968.  She had, however, during her         life time, inducted a tenant, G. Ponniah Thevar, the  appel-         lant before us, by means of a lease dated 27th March,  1961.         After the death of Annamalai Ammal, the  plaintiffs-respond-         ents,  as  remainder-men, sued to evict the  appellant,  the         cultivating tenant, on the ground  that  his tenancy  rights         did not enure beyond the life time of Annamalai Ammal.             The suit for eviction, decreed by the District Court and         the  High Court, is now before us.  It is not disputed  that         the provisions of the Act conferring protection upon  culti-         vating tenants govern the rights of the appellant.  We  are,         therefore,  not concerned with any rights under any  general         or personal law which may enable the remainder--men to evict         a tenant of a life estate holder.   The terms of the  statu-         tory  protection apply clearly to all tenancies governed  by         the  Act irrespective of the nature of rights of the  person         who  leased the land so long as the lessor was  entitled  to         create a tenancy.  It is not disputed before us that Annama-         lai  Ammal  was entitled to create a   tenancy.   The   only         question, on which there is a dispute, is whether a  tenancy         created  by  her could legally extend beyond her  life.  The         Madras  High Court had, apparently, followed  certain  deci-         sions  of that Court which had applied the principle that  a         life  estate  holder cannot create a  tenancy   which  could

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       last beyond the life of a life-estate holder. The view taken         by the Madras High Court and applied to statutory  tenancies         runs counter not only to the principles underlying  creation         of statutory tenancy rights in agricultural land, throughout         the  length and breadth of the country, but, it seems to  us         to  be obviously in conflict with the  particular  statutory         protection conferred upon cultivating tenants  in the  State         of  Madras. These enactments are really meant for  the  pur-         poses proclaimed by them.  The obvious effect of such statu-         tory  provisions  cannot be taken away or whittled  down  by         forensic  sophistry.  Courts should not allow themselves  to         become  tools  for  defeating  clearly  expressed  statutory         intentions.                       Section 2(aa) of the Act lays down:                            "2(aa)  ’cultivating tenant’ in  relation                       to any land-                        (1)  means a person who carried  on  personal                       cultivation  on  such land,  under  a  tenancy                       agreement, express or implied, and                       448                       (2) includes--                          (i)  any such person as is referred  to  in                       sub-clause (1) who continues in possession  of                       the land after the determination of the tenan-                       cy agreement,                          (ii) in the district of Tiruchirappalli,  a                       Kaiaeruvaramdar  or a muttuvaramdar who  works                       on  the  land  under an  engagement  with  the                       landlord  for remuneration by a share  in  the                       crop in respect of which the work is done, and                         (iii)  the  heirs of any such person  as  is                       referred   to  in subclause (1) or  sub-clause                       (2) (i) and (ii): but does not include a  mere                       intermediary or his heirs.                             Explanation.---A  sub-tenant  shall   be                       deemed  to  be  a cultivating  tenant  of  the                       holding  under the landlord if the  lessor  of                       such sub-tenant has ceased to be the tenant of                       such landlord;’                       Section 3 (1 ) of the Act lays down:                             "3 ( 1 ) Subject to the next  succeeding                       sub-sections,  no cultivating tenant shall  be                       evicted from his holding or any part  thereof,                       by or at the instance of his landlord, whether                       in  execution of a decree or order of a  Court                       or otherwise".         Section 3(2) deals with the exceptional circumstances,  such         as  default in payment of rent, in which the statutory  pro-         tection  is lifted.  Section 3(3) relates to  other  matters         with which also we are  not  concerned here.  Section 3  (4)         lays down the procedure for the eviction of tenants in those         cases in which the statutory protection is removed.  It runs         as follows:                             "4(a) Every .landlord seeking to evict a                       cultivating  tenant falling under  sub-section                       (2)  shall, whether or not there. is an  order                       or decree of a Court for the eviction of  such                       cultivating tenant, make an application to the                       Revenue  Divisional Officer and such  applica-                       tion  shall  bear  a Court-fee  stamp  of  one                       rupee.                             (b) On receipt of such application,  the                       Revenue Divisional Officer shall, after giving                       a  reasonable.opportunity to the landlord  and                       the cultivating tenant to make their represen-

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                     tations,  hold  a  summary  enquiry  into  the                       matter  and-pass an order either allowing  the                       application  or  dismissing it and in  a  case                       falling  under  clause (a) or clause  (aa)  of                       sub-section  (2) in which the tenant  had  not                       availed  of the provisions contained  in  sub-                       section  (3), the Revenue  Divisional  Officer                       may allow the cultivating tenant such time  as                       he considers just and reasonable having regard                       to the relative circumstances of the  landlord                       and the cultivating tenant for depositing  the                       arrears of rent payable under this Act  inclu-                       sive  of such costs as he may direct.  If  the                       cultivating  tenant  deposits   the  sum    as                       directed, he shall be deemed to have paid  the                       rent  under subsection (3) (b). If the  culti-                       vating tenant fails to deposit the                       449                       sum as directed the Revenue Divisional Officer                       shall pass an                       order for eviction".           Thus,  we see that the statutory  protection  from   evic-         tion,   in  this exhaustively  comprehensive self  contained         procedure  may  last even after the landlord has  filed  the         prescribed application for eviction an accrual of his  cause         of action.                       Section 2(e) defines the landlord as follows:                             "2(e) ’landlord’ in relation to a  hold-                       ing or part          thereof means the  person                       entitled to evict the cultivating tenant  from                       such holding or part;"            The  plaintiffs  respondents, on their own  showing,  are         landlords as defined by the Act because they claimed, as the         learned Counsel for the contesting respondents admitted,  to         be able to evict the appellant.            There  is no doubt whatsoever that the appellant was  the         lessee  whose  right to cultivate as a tenant had  not  been         determined  by anything in the lease or under any  statutory         provision. The learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out         that, even if there had been a determination of the  tenancy         under a lease, the appellant would still be  a   cultivating         tenant  as defined in the Act because of the  provisions  of         Section 2(aa) (2) (i) of the Act.  Apparently, such a statu-         tory  definition of a cultivating tenant and  an  exhaustive         procedure  for his eviction in certain cases only and in  no         other case, are there so as to carry out the purpose .stated         in the preamble as follows:                              "Whereas  it  is necessary  to  protect                       cultivating  tenants in certain areas  in  the                       State of Madras from unjust eviction".             The  plaintiffs  landlords could be entitled  to  resume         land only under section 4(A) of the Act added by the  Madras         Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act of, 1956, for         purposes of personal cultivation in the manner laid down  in         the Act itself. The tenant could also be evicted for arrears         of  rent as provided in Section 3 (2) of the Act,  be.cause,         in  that case, the protection given by Section 3 (1)   would         not  apply.   But, none of the conditions  for  eviction  is         fulfilled  in the case before us.  Moreover,  the  procedure         for  eviction is a special procedure provided by  Section  3         (4)  of the Act by proceedings in the Court of  the  Revenue         Divisional Officer.         Learned  Counsel for the contesting respondent had tried  to         advance two contentions in support of the view taken by  the         High  Court. Firstly, he submits that the  protection  given

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       under  Section 3(1) was for the landlord of the  cultivating         tenant.  In  view of the statutory definition  of  the  term         "landlord", we think that the suit itself would fail if  the         plaintiffs were not landlords.  The statutory definition  of         the term landlord relates not only to the person who created         the  lease  but contemplates and takes in  every  successive         holder who could be entitled to evict a tenant.  That person         can only be one who has the right, at the time of filing the         suit, to realise rents or evict persons in wrongful  occupa-         tion.  ’There is nothing in the Act itself to show that  the         protection given to         450         the  cultivating  tenant, as defined in the Act,  was  given         only  against  his  original lessor and did  not  extend  to         subsequent  holders  of land occupying the capacity  of  the         landlord.   Secondly, it was urged that the  protection  was         given only to those persons who were cultivating tenants  in         1955  when the Act came into force.  The argument  has  only         to  be stated to be rejected.  There is not a  scintilla  of         indication  in the provisions of the Act to support such  an         impossible  interpretation.  The provisions of the  Act  are         clearly prospective except for the provisions of Section  4(         1 ) of the Act, showing that even a person who was a  culti-         vating tenant of any land on 1st December, 1953. but is "not         in possession thereof at the commencement of the Act"  could         be  treated  if  he was in possession of  the  land  on  1st         December,   1953.  Even Section 4(1) of the Act  shows  that         the  protection  was  not meant merely for  those  who  were         cultivating  tenants  in 1955.  Provisions of the  Act  show         that  they  became  enforceable as soon as  the  Act  became         operative.  There is nothing whatsoever in the. Act to  show         that it ceased to be operative at any time or was limited in         its operation only as a protection given to persons who were         cultivating  tenants in 1955.  Hence, we are unable  to  see         any reason whatsoever for denying the appellant the  clearly         intended  protection conferred upon cultivating tenants,  as         defined  in  the Act, by the provisions of the Act  set  out         above.             Our  attention  has  been invited to  some  cases  which         relate to the. applicability of Section 76(a) of the  Trans-         fer  of Property Act.  It is. true that this  provision  has         been applied to tenancies  created  under various  statutory         provisions regulating the rights of tenants to  agricultural         lands  in States all over India.  But, we are not  concerned         here,  with  a  case in which the position  of  the  alleged         lessee is struck by Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Proper-         ty Act.  Such alleged lessees are not tenants at all at  the         time when they are inducted on the land as tenants  whatever         else they may be. We, therefore, need not even refer to  the         cases cited before us which relate either to this  provision         of law or to enactments of other States.             Consequently,  we  allow this appeal and set  aside  the         judgment and decree of the High Court.  But, in the  circum-         stances of the case the. parties will bear their own costs.         M.R.                                         Appeal allowed.         451