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PETITIONER: G. NARAYANAPPA AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/10/1991

BENCH: KANIA, M.H. BENCH: KANIA, M.H. KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR  135            1991 SCR  Supl. (1) 514  1992 SCC  (1) 197        JT 1991 (4)   258  1991 SCALE  (2)904

ACT:     Hindu  Law--Illatom  adoption---Existence in  the  Reddi caste  in Andhra--Creature of custom---Judicial  recognition of.     Hindu  Law---Illatom adoption---Illatom son-in-law  when entitled  to  a share in  father-in-law’s  property--Illatom son-in-law and natural son/adopted son--Distinction.     Andhra  Pradesh  Land Reforms  (Ceiling  on  Agriculture Holdings)  Act,  1973--Section  4A---Legislative   intention Illatom son-in-law not be regarded as a major  son---Reasons indicated.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellants, who belonged to the Reddi caste  in  an area of Andhra Pradesh, which originally formed part of  the Madras Presidency filed their respective declarations  under Section  8  of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms  (Ceiling  on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973.     Appellant  No. 2 in his declaration claimed an  increase in  the  ceiling  unit permitted to be held by  him  on  the ground  that appellant No. 1, as his illatom son-in-law  who had attained the age of majority, had a share in the proper- ties.     In the inquiry held Appellant No. 2 deposed that  appel- lant No. 1 was entitled to a half share in his properties as his illatom son-in-law.     Both  the  appellants claimed that appellant No.  1  was entitled to a share under an agreement.     The  Land  Reforms Tribunal rejected the  claim  of  the appellants and held that the declarant, appellant No. 2 held surplus  holding  and directed him to surrender  the  excess land.  Appellant No. 1 was declared as not holding any  land in excess of ceiling limit.   The  appellants preferred an .appeal to the  Land  Reforms Appellate 514 515 Tribunal, which was dismissed.     The  appellants filed a Civil Revision Petition  in  the High Court, which was also dismissed.     This  appeal  by  special leave is one  of  the  appeals

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directed against the common judgment of the High Court..     The  appellants  contended that appellant No.  1  as  an illatom sonin-law of appellant No. 2, was entitled to a half share  in the property of appellant No. 2; that  an  illatom son-in-law  who had attained the age of majority was in  the same  position  as a major son and hence, the  ceiling  area permitted  to appellant No. 2 was liable to be increased  by one  ceiling unit as appellant No. 1 did not hold  any  land independently  nor in any manner specified under Section  4A of the Ceiling Act. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  1. The institution of illatom adoption, that  is, affiliating a son-in-law and giving him a share, is purely a creature  of custom and judicial recognition has been  given to  it.  It  prevails among the Reddi and  Kamma  castes  in territories  which  earlier formed part of the  then  Madras Presidency. [518 G, 517 F]     2. An illatom son-in-law becomes entitled to a share  in the  property of his father-in-law as his heir, that is,  on his death. [521 C]     3. Although an illatom son-in-law has some rights  simi- lar to those of a natural son born after the adoption of the illatom son-in-law, his rights are not identical to those of conferred  by  law on a son or an adopted son.  The  illatom son-in-law  does  not  succeed  to  the  properties  of  his father-in-law by survivorship, but only on account of custom or  an agreement giving him a share in the property  of  his father-in-law.  His position is not identical to that of  an adopted  son  because he does not lose his  rights  in  his’ natural family on being taken as an illatom son-in- law  and continues  to be entitled to a share in the property of  his natural  father.  It is not possible to  equate  an  illatom son-in-law  who has attained majority with a major  son  for the purposes of Section 4A of the Ceiling Act. [520 F-G, 521 E] 516     4. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  Amending Act  whereby  Section 4A was inserted into the  Ceiling  Act indicate  that an illatom son-in-law, who does not lose  his fights in his own family, cannot be regarded as a major  son of his father-in-law for the purposes of the Ceiling Act. If he was so regarded, there would be a double benefit, because of  his  presence as the ceiling area of  his  father-in-law would be increased as well as the ceiling area of his  natu- ral father. That Certainly could not have been the intention behind the amendment. Since there is no custom of having  an illatom  among  Muslims and Christians such  a  construction would lead to disparity between the position of Muslims  and Christians  on  the one hand and Hindus on the  other.  That would  be contrary to the very purpose for which the  amend- ment was made. [522A-C]     Nallun  Kristnamma and another v. Kamepalli  Venkatasub- bayya  and others, (1918-19) L.R. 46 I.A. 168;  Hanumantamma v.  Rami Reddi, (1882) L.R.4 I.A. Madras Series  272;  Nara- sayya and others v. Ramachandrayya and others, AIR [1956] 43 A.P.  209; Penumatsa Koti Ramachandra Raju v. State of  A.P. (1980) 1 (H.C.) Andhra Pradesh Law Journal 307, referred to.     Peech Ramaiah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1976)  2 (H.C.) Andhra Pradesh Law Journal 278, distinguished.     Mayne: Hindu Law and Usages, 13th Edition, Chapter  VII, Paragraph  242, N.R. Raghavachariar; Hindu Law 8th  Edition, Paragraph  176;  Mulla: Hindu Law, 16th Edition,  Para  515, Page 534, referred to.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3850 of 1991.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  21.4.1978  of  the Andhra  Pradesh  High Court in Civil Revision  Petition  No. 3974 of 1977. A.  Subba Rao, G. Narasimhulu and A.D.N. Rao for the  Appel- lants. T.V.S.N. Chari and Ms. Manjula Gupta for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J. Leave granted. Counsel heard.     As  we are in agreement with the conclusions arrived  at by  the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, we propose to set  out the  few facts necessary for the appreciation of  the  argu- ments before us very briefly. 517     The  parties  belong to the Reddi caste in  an  area  of Andhra  Pradesh which originally formed part of  the  Madras Presidency.  Appellant  No. 1 is the illatom  son-in-law  of Appellant  No.  2.  The appellants  filed  their  respective declarations  under  Section 8 of the  Andhra  Pradesh  Land Reforms  (Ceiling  on  Agricultural  Holdings)  Act,   1973, (hereinafter  referred  to  as "the Ceiling  Act").  In  his declaration,  appellant  No. 2 claimed an  increase  in  the ceiling unit permitted to be held by him on the ground  that appellant  No. 1 as his illatom son-in-law who had  attained the  age  of majority had a share in the properties  of  his father-in- law, appellant No. 2. Appellant No. 2 deposed  in the inquiry held that appellant No. 1 was entitled to a half share  in his properties as his illatom son-in-law. Both  of them claimed that appellant No. 1 was entitled to the afore- said  share under an agreement (Exhibit A-I). The  Land  Re- forms  Tribunal,  Anantapur by its judgment  dated  May  31, 1977, rejected the claim of the appellants and held that the declarant, appellant No. 2 held surplus holding to an extent of  0.4109 standard acres and directed him to surrender  the excess land. Appellant No. 1 was declared as not holding any land in excess of ceiling limit. The appellants preferred an appeal  to  the Land Reforms Appellate  Tribunal,  Anantapur which  was dismissed on November 4, 1977. Aggrieved  by  the order of dismissal made by the said Tribunal, the appellants filed a Civil Revision Petition No. 3974 of 1977 in the High Court  of  Andhra Pradesh which was dismissed by  a  learned Single  Judge of the High Court by a common  judgment  along with other connected matters on April 21, 1978. This  appeal by special leave is one of the appeals directed against  the common judgment of the said High Court.     An  illatom  son-in-law  is in a sense,  a  creature  of custom.  It is well settled by a series of decisions that  a custom  of  illatom adoption prevails among  the  Reddi  and Kamma castes in territories which earlier formed part of the then  Madras Presidency. It is stated in Mayne’s  Hindu  Law and  Usages, 13th Edition, Paragraph 242 in Chapter VII,  as follows:               "A  custom known as that of  illatom  adoption               prevails  among the Reddi and Kamma castes  in               the  Madras  Presidency. It  consists  in  the               affiliation of a son-in-law, in  consideration               of assistance in the management of the  family               property. No religious significance appears to               attach  to the act. Neither the  execution  of               any document nor the performance of any  cere-               mony is necessary. The incidents of an illatom               adoption  have  now become  crystallized  into

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             fixed  rules of law by a long course of  deci-               sions.  To constitute a person an  illatom,  a               specific agreement is necessary  .....   After               the death of the adop-               518                        ter he is entitled to the full rights               of  a son even as against natural sons  subse-               quently  born  or a son  subsequently  adopted               in the usual manner."       It has also been stated by Mayne that an illatom  son- in-law  has no right to claim partition with his  father-in- law  unless there is an express agreement or custom to  that effect.  An illatom son-in-law is not an adopted son in  any sense. In N.R. Raghavachariar’s Hindu LaW, 8th Edition, in paragraph 176, it is stated that an illatom son-in-law loses no  rights  of  inheritance in his natural  family  and  the property he takes in the adoptive family is taken by his own relations to the exclusion of those of his adoptive  father. The position, as set out in Mulla’s Hindu law, 16th  Edition is no  different. Regarding the position of an illatom  son- in-law it has been inter alia observed by Mulla at para  515 (page 534) as follows:               "He does not lose his right of inheritance  in               his  natural  family. Neither he nor  his  de-               scendants become coparceners in the family  of               adoption though on the death of the adopter he               is  entitled to the same rights and  the  same               share as against any subsequently born natural               son  or a son subsequently adopted in  accord-               ance with the ordinary law. He cannot claim  a               partition  with  the  father-in-law  and   the               incidence of a joint family, such for instance               as  right  to take by.  survivorship,  do  not               apply.  In  respect of the property  or  share               that he may get he takes it as if it were  his               separate and self-acquired property."     To  cite just a few decisions, the custom of  having  an illatom  son-in-law  in the Kamma Castes and the  Reddis  in Madras Presidency has been recognised in Nalluri  Kristnamma and another v. Kamepalli Venkatasubbayya and others.  (1918- 19)  L.R. 46 I.A. 168. The same custom has also been  recog- nised by the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court  in  Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi. (1882)  L.R.  4  I.A. Madras  Series, 272. In Narasayya and others  v.  Rammachan- drayya and others A.I.R. [1956] 43 A.P. 209 it has been held that the institution of illatom adoption, that is, affiliat- ing  a son-in-law and giving him a share, is purely a  crea- ture  of custom and judicial recognition has been  given  to it.      Learned Counsel for the appellants contends that appel- lant No. 1 as an illatom son-in-law of appellant No. 2,  was entitled to a half share in the property of appellant No. 2. He submitted that an illatom son-in-law who had attained the age of majority was in the same position as a major son  and hence,  the  ceiling area permitted to appellant No.  2  was liable to be increased by one ceiling unit as appellant  No. 1  did  not hold any land independently nor  in  any  manner specified under Section 4 A of the Ceiling Act. 519     Before  examining the correctness of these  submissions, we may refer to the relevant provisions of the Ceiling  Act. The Ceiling Act which provided for a ceiling on agricultural holding in Andhra Pradesh was enacted in 1973 and amended by Act No. 10 of 1977 which was reserved tot the assent of  the President and received the same on April 29, 1977. The  said

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amending Act was made effective from January 1, 1975.     Section  3  of the said Act is the  definition  section. Sub-section (c) of Section 3 defines the term ’ceiling area’ after the amendment as meaning the extent of land  specified in  Section 4 or 4A to be the ceiling area. Sub-section  (5) of  Section 3 defines the term "family unit" and clause  (i) thereof  provides  that in case of an individual who  has  a spouse  or  spouses such individual, the spouses  and  their minor  sons  and their unmarried minor  daughters,  if  any, constitute  his  family  unit. Section 4  provides  for  the ceiling area. After Section 4 of the said Act, the following Section 4A was inserted in the Act.               "4A. Increase of ceiling area in certain cases               :-               Notwithstanding  anything in section 4,  where               an individual or an individual who is a member               of  a family unit, has one or more major  sons               and  any  such major son either by himself  or               together with other members of the family unit               of  which  he is a member, holds  no  land  or               holds an extent of land less than the  ceiling               area,  then, the ceiling area, in the case  of               said  individual or the family unit  of  which               the  said individual is a member  computed  in               accordance with section 4, shall be  increased               in respect of each such major son by an extent               of  land equal to the ceiling area  applicable               to such major son or the family unit of  which               he is a member, or as the case may be, by  the               extent of land by which the land held by  such               major. son or the family unit of which he is a               member falls short of the ceiling area."     Section  5 prescribes how the standard holding for  dif- ferent  categories  of  land is to be  computed.  Section  8 provides for declaration of holding by persons whose holding on the notified date together with the other lands mentioned therein exceeds the specified limit. Section 9 provides  for the  determination  of  the ceiling area  by  the  Tribunal. Section  10  inter alia provides that if the extent  of  the holding  of a person is in excess of the ceiling  area,  the person shall be liable to surrender the land held in excess. The  question which arises is whether, for the  purposes  of Section 4A   520   of the Ceiling Act, an illatom son-in-law can be  regarded as  a major son,  that is, whether an illatom son-in-law  is covered  in  the definition of the term ’major son’  as  em- ployed  in  Section 4A of the Ceiling Act. It has  been  ob- served  in the impugned judgment that an illatom  son-in-law is  a creature  of custom and hence, his rights are such  as recognised by the custom or  under an agreement duly proved.       It has been pointed out in the impugned judgment  that the  Land   Reforms Tribunal held, on consideration  of  the evidence, that half share in property of appellant No. 2 was bequeathed  to him and hence, he would  be entitled to  half share  only  after  the demise of appellant No.  2.  It  was further  pointed out that all the lands stood registered  in the  name of appellant No. 2 and hence, appellant No. 1  was not  entitled to any share in  the properties  of  appellant No. 2 during the life-time of appellant No. 2.  It has  been held  in the impugned judgment that appellant No. 1  who  is the  illatom  son-in-law could not be regarded as a  son  of appellant  No.  2,  although he had some rights  which  were similar  to the rights of a natural  born son or an  adopted son.  The  agreement (Exhibit A) which was set  up   by  the

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appellants and under which appellant No. 1 given a share the land  belonging to appellant No. 2 in presenti has not  been accepted  by the  courts below on consideration of the  evi- dence.  It  has  been held that the  said  agreement  was  a document brought into existence merely with a view  to avoid the  ceiling  law. In this appeal, we are  not  inclined  to interfere   with these findings of the appeal. It  was  also held  in the impugned judgment that in the aforestated  cir- cumstances,  the  ceiling limit of appellant No. 2  was  not liable  to be increased on the ground that appellant  No.  1 was his illatom son-in-law who had attained majority on  the relevant date.      Coming  to the position in law, the discussion  in  the text books, which we have referred to in some detail  earli- er,  makes it clear that although an illatom son-in-law  has some rights similar to those of a natural son born F   after the  adoption of the iliatom son-in-law, his rights are  not identical to those of conferred by law on a son or an adopt- ed son. To cite two main differences, he does not succeed to the  properties  of his father-in-law by  survivorship,  but only on account of custom or an agreement giving him a share in  the property of his father-in-law. His position  is  not identical to that of an adopted son because he does not lose his  rights  in his natural G family on being  taken  as  an iliatom  son-in-law and continues to be entitled to a  share in  the  property of his natural father. It  is,  therefore, difficult  to regard an iliatom son-in-law who has  attained majority  as a major son for the purposes of Section  4A  of the Ceiling Act.       Learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance  on the  decision    of  a learned Single Judge  of  the  Andhra Pradesh High Court in Peechu   521 Ramaiah  v.  Government of Andhra Pradesh  [1976]  2  (H.C.) Andhra Pradesh Law Journal 278, where it has been held  that after  the death of the father-in-law an iliatom  son-in-law is entitled to the rights of his son. If there is an  agree- ment to that effect, the illatom son-in-law is also entitled to half share in the property of the adoptive  father-in-law even during his lifetime. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment  has not accepted the correctness of the  aforesaid judgment.  In  our opinion, the view taken by  the  Division Bench  in the impugned judgment appears to be correct.  From the  texts which we have cited earlier it is clear that  the general  recognised position is that an  illatom  son-in-law becomes  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  property  of   his father-in-law  as his heir; that is, on his death, it  being well-settled  in law that there can be no heir to  a  living person. Moreover, in Peechu Ramaiah v. Government of  Andhra Pradesh  the  conclusion arrived at by  the  learned  Single Judge  that  the illatom son-in-law was entitled to  a  half share in presenti, that is, even during the lifetime of  his father-in-law,  was  based on an agreement  to  that  effect which  was duly proved. In the present case,  the  agreement (Exhibit A) has been disbelieved by the authorities below as well as the High-Court. It has been pointed out by the  Land Reforms Tribunal that the half share to which appellant  No. 1  would  be entitled was bequeathed to him in the  Will  of appellant No. 2 and he would be entitled to that share  only on  the  death of appellant No. 2. In fact,  it  was  fairly conceded  by learned Counsel for the appellants that he  was not in a position to show any evidence on the basis of which it  could be said that there was a custom applicable to  the parties by which appellant No. 1 as an illatom son-in-law of appellant  No. 2 was entitled to a share in the property  of

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appellant No. 2 during the latter’s lifetime.     In our opinion, it is not possible to equate an  iliatom son-in-  law who has attained majority with a major son  for the  purposes of Section 4A of the Ceiling Act.  As  pointed out  in  Penumatsa Koti Ramachandra Raju v. State  of  A.P., (1980) 1 (H.C.) Andhra Pradesh Law Journal, 307, it is quite apparent  from the language of the Statement of Objects  and Reasons  of the Act 10 of 1977, whereby Section 4A  was  in- serted  in the Ceiling Act, that Section 4A was inserted  in order  to  obviate the hardship caused to  the  Muslims  and Christians among whom the concept of a joint family did  not obtain  and  even major sons did not have any share  in  the ancestral property during the lifetime of the father  unlike in  the  case of Joint Hindu Families. It appears  that  the intention which lay behind the amendment was to put  Muslims and Christians at par with Hindus in respect of the  ceiling law. It was with this point of view that it was provided  in Section  4A of the Ceiling Act that, although the  limit  of the   father’s holding would be increased on the  ground  of his having a major son that increase would 522 be  limited to the extent by which the land holding  of  the major  son  and his family unit fell short  of  the  ceiling unit.  In our opinion, the Statement of Objects and  Reasons of  the  said amending Act whereby Section 4A  was  inserted into  the  said Act lends support to the view  that  we  are taking,  that an illatom son-in-law, who does not  lose  his rights in his own family, cannot be regarded as a major  son of his father-in-law for the purposes of the Ceiling Act. If he was so regarded, there would be a double benefit, in  the sense  that because of his presence the ceiling area of  his father-in-law would be increased as well as the ceiling area of his natural father and that certianly could not have been the  intention  behind the amendment inserting  Section  4A. Since there is no custom of having an illatom among  Muslims and  Christians such a construction would lead to  disparity between  the position of Muslims and Christians on  the  one hand and Hindus on the other. That would be contrary to  the very purpose for which the amendment was made.     In the result, we are of the view that there is no merit in the appeal and it must fail. Appeal dismissed.     However,  looking to the facts and circumstances of  the case there will be no order as to costs. V.P.R                                                 Appeal dismissed. 523