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PETITIONER: G.M., BHARAT COKING COAL LTD., WEST BENGAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHIB KUMAR DUSHAD & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       02/11/2000

BENCH: M.B. SHAH, & D.P. MOHAPATRA,

JUDGMENT:

D.P.MOHAPATRA, J.

Leave granted.

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   We   have  heard  learned   counsel  for  the   parties. M/s.Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., which is a Govt.  Company and a subsidiary  of  Coal  India Ltd., was the  employer  of  the respondent - Shri Shib Kumar Dushad (hereinafter referred to as  ’the  respondent’).   The company  through  its  General Manager,  Chanch  Victoria  Area,   Post  Barakar,  District Burdwan,  West  Bengal  has filed the present  appeal.   The controversy  raised  in the case centres round the  date  of birth  of  the  respondent.  The  respondent  was  initially employed  in Chirkunda Coal Company which was under  private ownership.   At the time of entry into service, the year  of birth  of  the  said  respondent  was  entered  in  Form-’B’ register  maintained under the Mines Act, 1952 as 1932.   On coming  into  force of the Coal Mines  Nationalisation  Act, 1973,  the  ownership  of  the   coal  mines  in  which  the respondent  was  employed, vested absolutely in the  Central Govt.;   and thereafter it was transferred to the appellant, free  from all encumbrances.  The service of the  respondent was  taken  over  and  the  service  records  including  the Form-’B’  register  relating to the respondent  were  handed over  by the erstwhile management to the appellant.  As  the year  of birth of the respondent was entered in the Form-’B’ register  as 1932, he was to superannuate in 1992.  The said entry  of the date of birth was carried over to the Form-’B’ register maintained by the appellant.

   In  1973  the  respondent acquired certificates  of  Gas Testing  and Mining Sirdarship having come out  successfully in  the  examinations conducted by the Director  General  of Mines  Safety.  On the basis of the particulars submitted by the  said respondent, 9.2.1946 was mentioned as his date  of birth in the certificate.  In 1987-88 when the appellant was in  the process of preparing records of the employees  whose services   had  been  taken  over   under  the  Coal   Mines Nationalisation   Act,  the  respondent,   relying  on   the aforementioned  certificates claimed his date of birth to be 9.2.1946.   In view of the apparent discrepancy in the  date of  birth of the respondent entered in the Form-’B’ register maintained under the Mines Act and the date mentioned in the Gas  Testing  and  Mining   Sirdarship  certificates  ,  the

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appellant  as  per  the terms of the settlement  arrived  at between the management and the union representing workmen of the  company,  requested its Medical Board to determine  the correct  age of the respondent and asked the said respondent to  appear before the Medical Board.  The Medical Board,  on examining  the respondent, determined his age to be 52 years as on 13.10.1988.  On the basis of the report of the Medical Board  the  date  of birth of the respondent  was  taken  as 13.10.1936 and the date of his superannuation as 13.10.1996.

   After  about  three years the respondent filed the  writ petition  bearing  No.3537 of 1991 before the Calcutta  High Court  seeking  inter alia a direction to the  appellant  to enter  his date of birth as 9.2.1946.  He placed reliance on the  certificates  of  Mining   Sirdarship  and  Overmanship granted  by  the  Director  General of  Mines  Safety.   The learned  Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the writ petition   by  the  order   dated  20.1.1994  directing  the appellant  to consider the representation of the  respondent for  correction  of his date of birth.  On 14th March,  1994 the  respondent  made an application for correction  of  his date of birth as 9.2.1946.  Considering the said application of  the  respondent,  the  appellant,  by  the  order  dated 21/25.5.1994,  communicated  its decision that there was  no ground  to  re-open the question of the date of birth.   The respondent  filed another writ petition, Civil Writ Petition no.2717  of  1994 before the Calcutta High Court  seeking  a writ/order  for  cancellation  and withdrawal of  the  order dated  21/25.5.1994 and to direct correction of his date  of birth  as  9.2.1946.   He  also prayed  for  injuncting  the appellant company retiring him with effect from 1.7.1996 and to allow him to work till 9.2.2006.

   The  appellant in its counter affidavit contended, inter alia,  that  as  per the  Implementation  Instruction  No.76 issued  by  the  J.B.C.C.I.  the decision of  the  Board  is binding  and final in the matter and further contended  that the  claim of the respondent (writ petitioner therein)  that his  date  of birth is 9.2.1946 cannot be accepted  for  the reason that, according to that date, his age would have been about  14  years  when he entered service in 1960  which  is against   the   minimum  age,  18  years,   prescribed   for employment,  under the Mines Act, 1952.  The learned  single Judge  allowed the writ petition and directed the  appellant to  correct the date of birth of the respondent as  9.2.1946 and  ordered that he was to superannuate from service in the year  2006 holding, inter alia, that the genuineness of  the certificates  in  which the date of birth of the  respondent was  entered  as  9.2.1946  could not  be  questioned.   The appellant  filed  an  appeal assailing the judgment  of  the single Judge.  The Division Bench of the High Court modified the  judgment  of  the single Judge to the effect  that  the respondent  is  to superannuate in the year 2004 instead  of 2006.   The reason as stated in the judgment of the Division Bench is as follows:

   "It  is  ordered that the order made by the Trial  Court and  dated  the twenty fifth day of September, one  thousand nine  hundred  and  ninety six be and the same  is  hear  by modified  to the extent that since the petitioner joined  in the  year 1960, he was at that time only 14 (fourteen) years of  age and the statutory age limit being 16 (sixteen) years and  he should not be allowed to continue up to Two thousand six  but  he should continue up to Two thousand four and  it

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shall  be  treated  as  if he has joined at the  age  of  16 (sixteen)  years.   And  it is further ordered that  in  all other  respects  the  order made by the  trial  court  shall remain operative."

The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal.

   The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the dispute  raised by the respondent having been determined  by the Company following the procedure laid down in the service regulations  and  his  date of  superannuation  having  been calculated  on the basis of the report of the medical board, the High Court erred in interfering with the order passed by the employer.  The learned counsel for the respondent on the other  hand contended that the judgment of the single  Judge does not suffer from any illegality inasmuch as he based his decision   on   the  Gas   Testing  and  Mining   Sirdarship Certificate which was issued in favour of the employee under the  provisions  of  the  Mines Act.   It  was  his  further contention  that the Division Bench should not have modified the  judgment  of the single Judge.  He also contended  that the  respondent has filed a cross objection challenging  the modification  made by the Division Bench of the judgment  of the  single  Judge which, in the submission of  the  learned counsel, should be allowed by this Court.

   The  first question that arises for consideration in the case   is  whether  the  High   Court,  in  the  facts   and circumstances of the case, was right in interfering with the date  of birth recorded in the service records maintained by the  employer,  in the proceeding under Article 226  of  the Constitution?   From the facts of the case discussed in  the foregoing  paragraphs the position that emerges is that  the respondent  was an employee of a private colliery (Chirkunda Coal  Company)  before being absorbed in the service of  the appellant  on  nationalisation  of the  colliery  under  the Nationalisation  Act.   It was specifically asserted by  the appellant  that  the  service   records  received  from  the previous  employer showed ’1932’ as the year of birth of the respondent.   Our  attention  has  not  been  drawn  to  any pleading  in  which  the  respondent  denied  aforementioned assertion  nor is any contemporaneous material placed before us  to show that the factual position was otherwise.   After about  20  years  of service under the former  employer  and under the appellant company, the respondent raised the claim that  his  date  of birth was 9.2.1946 and  not  1932.   The appellant,  following the procedure for determination of the date  of  birth/age of an employee in such a case,  referred the  matter  to  the  Medical   Board  and  instructed   the respondent  to  appear before the Board.  The Medical  Board after  examining  the  respondent determined his age  as  52 years  in 1988.  Accepting the report of the Medical  Board, the  appellant  held the year of birth of the respondent  as 1936.   Thus  the  respondent  was   given  the  benefit  of superannuation  in 1996 instead of 1992.  Being dissatisfied with  the  decision of the appellant the respondent  carried the  matter to the High Court in the writ petition.  At  the first  instance, the High Court disposed of the case with  a direction  to  the appellant to consider the  representation which  the  respondent would make.  The  representation  was considered by the authority concerned and was rejected.  The respondent again approached the High Court by filing another writ  petition reiterating his claim that his year of  birth is  1946  and  not 1936 which was dealt with in  the  manner

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noted earlier.

   Before  entering  into  the  question  of  validity  and sustainability  of  the judgment passed by the single  Judge and  the  Division Bench of the High Court in this  case  we would  like to make the observation that in a case where the controversy  over the date of birth of an employee has  been raised  long  after joining the service and the  matter  has engaged  the  attention of the authority concerned  and  has been  determined by following the procedure prescribed under Service Rules or General Instructions issued by the employer and  it is not the case of the employee that there has  been any  arithmetical  mistake or typographical error patent  on the  face  of the record, the High Court in exercise of  its extraordinary   jurisdiction  under  Article   226  of   the Constitution  should not interfere with the decision of  the employer.   In the present case the core question is whether the two certificates subsequently obtained by the respondent on 9.6.1973 and on 3.11.1983 should be accepted and the date of  the birth entered therein should be taken as conclusive. This  question is essentially one of fact.  Determination of the question requires detailed enquiry into relevant factual matters.   Without intending to be exhaustive it can be said that some of the relevant aspects to be considered in such a matter  is  whether the certificates have been issued by  an authority  competent to issue the same under any statute  or statutory   rules;   whether  the   authority  issuing   the certificate  is  required  under  the statute  or  rules  to inquire  into  the question of date of birth of  the  person before  issuing  the  certificate and on  such  inquiry  the authority  has  found the date of birth to be as entered  in the  certificate  or the entry has been made merely  on  the disclosure  made  by the holder of the certificate.  In  the former  case  some  sanctity may be attached  to  the  entry regarding  date of birth in the certificate though it is not conclusive,  in the latter case the entry having been  based on  a  declaration/disclosure  made  by the  holder  of  the certificate  himself without any enquiry on the part of  the authority  concerned  is  of  little avail  when  a  dispute regarding the date of birth arises for determination.  It is relevant  to note here that one of the objections raised  on behalf of the appellant against the certificates in question is  that the certificates were not issued by the Manager  of the  colliery who was the competent authority in the matter. If  the  respondent was basing his case on  these  documents then  it was incumbent upon him to place evidence on  record materials  from  which a conclusion can be reasonably  drawn that  the date of birth as entered in the certificate is the correct one.  Similar is the position regarding the document purportedly  issued  by  the Head Master  of  Adarsh  Madhya Vidyalaya  in  which  the  respondent  is  alleged  to  have studied.   This  document is stated to be a  School  Leaving Certificate in which 1946 is entered as the year of birth of the respondent.  There is no material on record to show that when  this  document was issued to the respondent;   he  had produced  a copy of the same when he entered service in  the private  colliery (Chirkunda Coal Company) in support of his age and if so why was the document not sent with the service records when the service of the respondent was taken over by the   appellant.    These   are   some  of   the   questions consideration  of which will depend on the evidence,  either oral  or documentary to be placed by the parties.  The  High Court  in writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum for undertaking  such  enquiry into disputed questions of  fact. At  this  stage  it  is  relevant   to  state  that  if  the

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respondent’s  date of birth is taken to be 9.2.1946 then  he would  have  been 14 years of age when he joined service  in 1960.   No  material  is  available   on  record  that   the industrial  undertaking  in  which   the  respondent  joined service  was  legally permitted to employ a  minor.   Indeed this  fact  has been taken note of by the Division Bench  of the  High  Court  in  its judgment and  on  that  basis  the Division  Bench modified the judgment of the learned  single Judge and held that the respondent’s date of birth should be so  determined  as  to  fit it with the  position  that  the respondent  was  16  years  of age at the  time  of  joining service.   Unfortunately, the judgment of the Division Bench does  not  discuss  any material on the basis of  which  the court  took such a view.  Where from the court got 16  years as  the  minimum prescribed age for joining service  is  not indicated in the judgment.

   The  date of birth of an employee is not only  important@@     IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII for  employee  but for the employer also.  On the length  of@@ III service  put  in  by  the employee depends  the  quantum  of retiral  benefits he would be entitled to.  Therefore, while determining  the dispute in such matters courts should  bear in  mind  that  a  change of the date of  birth  long  after joining  service,  particularly when the employee is due  to retire  shortly  which will upset the date recorded  in  the service  records maintained in due course of  administration should not generally be accepted.  In such a case the burden is  heavy  on the employee who comes to the court  with  the case that the date of birth in the service record maintained by  the employer is untrue and incorrect.  The burden can be discharged  only  by  producing  acceptable  evidence  of  a clinching   nature.   We  are   constrained  to  make   this observation  as  we  find that in a large  number  of  cases employees who are on the verge of retirement raise a dispute regarding  correctness  of the date of birth entered in  the service  record  and  the  courts are inclined  to  pass  an interim  order  for continuance of such employee beyond  the date  of superannuation on the basis of the entry of date of birth  in  the service record.  Such a situation  cannot  be commended  for the reason that the court in passing such  an interim  order  grants a relief to the employee even  before determining  the issue regarding correctness of the date  of birth  entered  in the service record.  Such interim  orders create various complications.  Anticipated vacancy for which the  employee  next  in the line has been waiting  does  not materialise,  on  account  of  which the  junior  is  denied promotion  which he has all along been lead to believe  will be his due on the retirement of the senior.

   At  this stage we may take note of certain  instructions which were issued by the appellant laying down the procedure for determination/modification of date of birth of employee. The  document  is  styled as:   "Implementation  Instruction No.76" "Procedure for Determination" "Verification of Age of Employees".   Its  authenticity  is   not  disputed  by  the parties.   Indeed  the  respondent employee has  filed  this document  as Annexure R-7 to the counter affidavit filed  in this court.  Under paragraph ’A’ the manner of determination of  age  at  the time of appointment is  laid  down.   Under paragraph ’B’ are laid down the procedures to be followed in cases  of  determination  of  date of birth  in  respect  of existing  employees.   Under sub-paragraph (i) of  Paragraph ’B’ the case of the existing employee having a Matriculation

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Certificate  or  Higher Secondary Certificate issued by  the recognised  University  or Board or Middle Form  Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of Public Instruction  should be treated as the correct date of  birth provided  the  documents are issued by the  University/Board prior  to  the date of the employment.  Under  sub-paragraph (i)(b) of paragraph B it is provided that mining sirdarship, wind  up engine or similar other statutory certificate where the Manager had to certify the date of birth will be treated as authentic.

   Provided  that  where  both the documents  mentioned  in (i)(a)  and (i)(b) above are available the date of birth  in (i)(a) will be treated as authentic.  In clause (ii) of para B  it  is  specifically stated that where ever there  is  no variation in records such cases will not be re-opened unless there  is a very glaring and apparent wrong entry brought to the  notice of the Management.  The Management, after  being satisfied  on  the merit of the case will  take  appropriate steps   for  corrections  through   the  Age   Determination Committee/Medical Board.  In ’C’, ’D’ and ’E’ the procedures to  be  followed by the Age Determination  Committee/Medical Board for determination of age of an employee are laid down. The provisions read as follows:

   "C)Age  Determination  Committee/Medical Board  for  the above will be constituted by the Management.  In the case of employees  whose  date  of  birth cannot  be  determined  in accordance  with  the  procedure mentioned in  (B)(i)(a)  or (B)(i)(b)  above, the date of birth recorded in the  records of  the  company, namely, form B register, CMPF  Record  and Identify  Cards  (untempered)  will  be  treated  as  final, provided  that  where  there  is a  nomination  in  the  age recorded  in the records mentioned above, the matter will be referred  to  the Age Determination Committee/Medical  Board constituted by the Management for determination of Age.

   D) Age determination of the age, Committee/Medical Board referred to above may consider their evidence available with the colliery management and/or

   E)  Medical  Board constituted for determination of  Age will  be  required to manage the age in accordance with  the requirement  of Medical Jurisprudence and the Medical  Board will  as far as possible indicate the accurate age  assessed and not approximately."

   From  the  provisions  in the instructions  referred  to above,  it is clear that in case of dispute over the date of birth   of   an  existing  employee   who  has   neither   a Matriculation Certificate/Secondary School Certificate nor a statutory certificate in which the Manager has certified the entry  regarding  the  date  of birth to  be  authentic  the employer  is  to  refer  the matter to  the  Medical  Board. Therefore,  no  fault can be found with the action taken  by the appellant to refer the case of the respondent to Medical Board.   The Medical Board as laid down in the  Instructions is to consider the matter on the evidence available with the colliery  management and in accordance with the  requirement of  medical jurisprudence.  As noted earlier, in the present case  the Medical Board determined the age of the respondent to be 52 years in 1988 and the employer (appellant) accepted such  determination.  In the circumstances there was  hardly any  scope for the High Court to interfere with the date  of

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birth  as determined by the employer (appellant herein)  and issue  a  writ of Mandamus that the date as claimed  by  the employee (the respondent herein) should be accepted.  In the case  of Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department &  Ors. vs.   R.Kirubakaran,  1994  Supp.(1)  SCC  155,  this  Court indicated  the  approach to be made by the Tribunal  or  the High  Court in a dispute regarding correction of age/date of birth, made the following observations:

   "An  application  for  correction of the date  of  birth should  not be dealt with by the tribunal or the High  Court keeping  in view only the public servant concerned.  It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the  date  of  birth of the public servant concerned  has  a chain  reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him  for  their respective promotions are affected  in  this process.   Some  are  likely to suffer  irreparable  injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the  officer  concerned, continues in office, in some  cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in  seniority  waiting for their promotion, may  lose  their promotions  for  ever.  Cases are not unknown when a  person accepts  appointment keeping in view the date of  retirement of  his  immediate  senior.   According to us,  this  is  an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or  the  tribunal while examining the grievance of a  public servant  in respect of correction of his date of birth.   As such,  unless a clear case, on the basis of materials  which can  be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by  the respondent,  the  court or the tribunal should not  issue  a direction,  on the basis of materials which make such  claim only  plausible.   Before any such direction is  issued  the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been  real  injustice to the person concerned and his  claim for  correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with  the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any  rule or order.  If no rule or order has been framed  or made,  prescribing the period within which such  application has  to be filed, then such application must be filed within the time, which can be held to be reasonable.  The applicant has  to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may  amount  to  irrefutable proof relating to his  date  of birth.   Whenever  any such question arises, the onus is  on the  applicant, to prove the wrong recording of his date  of birth,  in his service book.  In many cases it is a part  of the strategy on the part of such public servants to approach the  court  or the tribunal on the eve of their  retirement, questioning  the  correctness of the entries in  respect  of their dates of birth in the service books.  By this process, it  has come to the notice of this Court that in many cases, even  if  ultimately  their applications are  dismissed,  by virtue  of  interim orders, they continue for months,  after the date of superannuation.  The court or the tribunal must, therefore,  be  slow  in  granting  an  interim  relief  for continuation  in  service,  unless prima facie  evidence  of unimpeachable  character  is produced because if the  public servant  succeeds,  he can always be compensated, but if  he fails,  he would have enjoyed undeserved benefit of extended service  and  merely  caused   injustice  to  his  immediate junior."

  [para 7]

   In  the  case  of  Burn Standard Co.Ltd.   &  Ors.   vs. Dinabandhu  Majumdar  & Anr., (1995) 4 SCC 172,  this  Court

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sounded  a caution regarding entertaining writ petitions  by High  Courts  for correction of date of births.  This  Court observed:

   "Entertaining  by High Courts of writ applications  made by  employees of the Government or its instrumentalities  at the  fag  end  of their services and when they are  due  for retirement from their services, in our view, is unwarranted. It  would be so for the reason that no employee can claim  a right  to correction of birth date and entertainment of such writ  applications for correction of dates of birth of  some employees  of  Government or its instrumentalities will  mar the chances of promotion of their juniors and prove to be an undue  encouragement to the other employees to make  similar applications  at  the fag end of their service careers  with the  sole  object of preventing their retirements when  due. Extraordinary  nature of the jurisdiction vested in the High Courts  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution,  in  our considered  view,  is  not  meant   to  make  employees   of Government  or its instrumentalities to continue in  service beyond the period of their entitlement according to dates of birth  accepted by their employers, placing reliance on  the so-  called newly-found material.  The fact that an employee of Government or its instrumentality who has been in service for  over decades, with no objection whatsoever raised as to his  date of birth accepted by the employer as correct, when all  of  a sudden comes forward towards the fag end  of  his service career with a writ application before the High Court seeking  correction  of  his date of birth  in  his  Service Record,  the very conduct of non-raising of an objection  in the  matter  by  the  employee, in our  view,  should  be  a sufficient  reason for the High Court, not to entertain such applicants  on  grounds  of acquiescence,  undue  delay  and laches.   Moreover,  discretionary jurisdiction of the  High Court  can  never  be  said  to  have  been  reasonably  and judicially exercised if it entertains such writ application, for  no employee, who had grievance as to his date of  birth in  his  "Service  and Leave Record"  could  have  genuinely waited  till  the  fag end of his service career to  get  it corrected by availing of the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High  Court.  Therefore, we have not hesitation, in holding, that ordinarily High Courts should not, in exercise of their discretionary   writ   jurisdiction,    entertain   a   writ application/petition  filed by an employee of the Government or  its instrumentality, towards the fag end of his service, seeking  correction  of  his date of birth  entered  in  his "Service  and  Leave  Record" or Service Register  with  the avowed  object  of continuing in service beyond  the  normal period of his retirement.  [para 10] Prudence on the part of every  High  Court should, however, in our considered  view,@@                            JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ prevent  it  from granting interim relief in a petition  for@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ correction  of the date of birth filed under Article 226  of the  Constitution  by  an  employee   in  relation  to   his employment,  because  of  the  well-settled  legal  position governing  such correction of date of birth, which precisely stated,  is  the following:  [para 11] When a  person  seeks employment,   he  impliedly  agrees   with  the  terms   and conditions  on which employment is offered.  For every  post in   the   service   of  the   Government   or   any   other instrumentality there is the minimum age of entry prescribed depending  on  the functional requirements of the post.   In order  to verify that the person concerned is not below that prescribed age he is required to disclose his date of birth.

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The  date of birth is verified and if found to be correct is entered  in  the service record.  It is ordinarily  presumed that  the birth date disclosed by the incumbent is accurate. The  situation then is that the incumbent gives the date  of birth  and  the  employer accepts it as  true  and  accurate before  it is entered in the service record.  This entry  in the  service  record  made on the basis  of  the  employee’s statement  cannot be changed unilaterally at the sweet  will of  the  employee except in the manner permitted by  service conditions or the relevant rules.  Here again considerations for  a  change in the date of birth may be diverse  and  the employer  would  be entitled to view it not merely from  the angle  of  there being a genuine mistake but also  from  the point of its impact on the service in the establishment.  It is common knowledge that every establishment has its own set of  service  conditions  governed by rules.  It  is  equally known  that  practically  every establishment  prescribes  a minimum  age  for entry into service at different levels  in the  establishment.  The first thing to consider is  whether on  the  date of entry into service would the employee  have been  eligible for entry into service on the revised date of birth.   Secondly, would revision of his date of birth after a long lapse of time upset the promotional chances of others in  the establishment who may have joined on the basis  that the  incumbent  would  retire  on a given  date  opening  up promotional  avenues  for  others.   If that be  so  and  if permitting  a change in the date of birth is likely to cause frustration  down  the line resulting in causing an  adverse effect on efficiency in functioning, the employer may refuse to  permit  correction in the date at a belated  stage.   It must be remembered that such a sudden and belated change may upset  the  legitimate  expectation of others who  may  have joined  service hoping that on the retirement of the  senior on  the  due date there would be an upward movement  in  the hierarchy.  In any case in such cases interim injunction for continuance  in  service should not be granted as it  visits the  juniors with irreparable injury, in that, they would be denied  promotions, a damage which cannot be repaired if the claim  is ultimately found to be unacceptable.  On the other hand,  if  no interim relief for continuance in  service  is granted  and  ultimately his claim for correction  of  birth date  is found to be acceptable, the damage can be  repaired by  granting him all those monetary benefits which he  would have  received  had  he  continued   in  service.   We  are, therefore,  of  the opinion that in such cases it  would  be imprudent to grant interim relief."

   In  the case of Union of India vs.  C.Ramaswamy &  Ors., (1997)  4  SCC 647, interpreting Rule 16-A of the All  India Services  (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958,  this Court held that the date of birth as recorded in the service book  and  the  date  as  declared  by  an  officer  in  the application for recruitment has to be accepted as correct by the  Central  Govt.  and this can be altered only  if  under sub-rule  (4)  it is established that a bona  fide  clerical mistake  had  been committed in accepting the date of  birth (See para 21).

   On  the  analysis and the discussions in  the  foregoing paragraphs,  we  have  no hesitation to hold that  the  High Court erred in interfering with the date of birth/age of the respondent as determined by the appellant.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.  The judgment of the single Judge in writ petition  No.2717  of 1994 and the judgment of the  Division Bench,  confirming  the judgment of the single Judge with  a

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modification,   are  set  aside.    Writ   petition   stands dismissed.   Consequentially  the  respondent shall  not  be entitled  to any service benefit on the basis of the service beyond  the date/year of superannuation as determined by the appellant,  except the salary/wage already received by  him. No costs.