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PETITIONER: G. M. ARUMUGAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S. RAJGOPAL & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/12/1975

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1976 AIR  939            1976 SCR  (3)  82  1976 SCC  (1) 863  CITATOR INFO :  R          1976 SC1904  (5,6)  E          1984 SC  41  (8)  R          1984 SC 600  (5,6,17,19,21)

ACT:      Constitution (Scheduled  Castes) order,  1950, Paras  2 and 3 Adi Dravida, converted to Christianity and reconverted to Hinduism-If and when could be treated as Adi Dravida.      When conversion affects caste.      Code of  Civil Procedure  (Act 5  of  1908)  s.  11-Res judicata-Decision about caste of‘a candidate in one election petition if  res-judicata when  question arises  in  another later election.

HEADNOTE:      In the 1967 election to the State Legislative Assembly, the appellant  and the  1st respondent  claiming to  be  Adi Dravidas, stood  as  candidates  for  a  seat  reserved  for Scheduled Castes.  The respondent  was declared elected. The appellant‘s election  petition challenging  the election was allowed  by   the  High  Court.  This  Court  dismissed  the respondent’s appeal  holding, (1)  that the  respondent  was converted  to   Christianity  in  1949,  (2)  that  on  such conversion he   ceased to be an Adi Dravida, (3) that he was reconverted to Hinduism but 4) assuming that membership of a caste can  be acquired  on  conversion  or  reconversion  to Hinduism, the  respondent had  failed to  establish that  he became a member of the Adi Dravida caste after reconversion.      In the  1972 elections,  the appellant  and  respondent again filed  their nominations  as Adi Dravidas for the seat reserved  for   Scheduled  Castes.   On  objection   by  the appellant, the  Returning officer rejected the nomination of the  respondent   on  the   view  that   on  conversion   to Christianity, he  ceased to  be an  Adi Dravida  and that on reconversion,  he   could  not  claim  the  benefit  of  the Constitution (Scheduled  Castes) order,  1950. The appellant was declared elected. The respondent challenged the election and the  High Court  held that  the question (a) whether the respondent embraced  Christianity in  1949, (b)  whether  on such conversion  be ceased  to be  an Adi  Dravida, and  (c) whether he  was reconverted  to Hinduism,  were concluded by

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the decision of this Court in the earlier case. In fact, the respondent so  conceded on  the first  two aspects. The High Court, however,  held that  the respondent  had  established twelve cir  circumstances, which  happened subsequent to the earlier election  showing that  he was  accepted into  their fold by  the members  of the Adi Dravida caste, that he was, therefore, at  the material  time, an Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion  as required  by paragraphs  2 and  3 of  the Constitution (Scheduled  Castes) order,  and that therefore, his nomination was improperly rejected.      Dismissing the appeal to this Court, ^      HELD: (1) The question whether the respondent abandoned Hinduism and  embraced Christianity in 1949 is essentially a question of  fact. The respondent having conceded before the High Court,  that in  view of  the decision of this Court in the  earlier   case,  the   question  did  not  survive  for consideration and  the High  Court,  having  acted  on  that concession, the  respondent could  not be permitted to raise an argument  that the  evidence did  not establish  that  he embraced Christianity in 1949. [89 D-F]      (2) Similarly.  the question whether the respondent was reconverted to  Hinduism stands concluded by the decision of this Court  in the  earlier case  and it  must be  held that since prior  to January 1967, the respondent was reconverted to Hinduism,  he was,  at the  material time, professing the Hindu religion so as to satisfy the requirement of para 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) order                                                      [94C-D] 83      (3) The  High Court  was right  in  the  view  that  on reconversion to  Hinduism, A the respondent could once again reconvert to  his original  Adi  Deavida  caste  if  he  was accepted, as  such, by  the other members of that caste; and that, in  fact, the  respondent after  his  reconversion  to Hinduism, was recognised and accepted as a member of the Adi Dravida caste by the other members of that community                                                 [97A-B, 98G]      (a) Since  a caste  is a  social combination  of person governed by  its rules and regulations, it may, if its rules and regulations so provide, admit a new B. member just as it may expel  an existing  member. The rules and regulations of the caste may not have been formalised they may not exist in black and  white: they  may consist  only of  practices  and usages. If, according to the practice and usage of the caste any particular  ceremonies are  required to be performed for readmission to the caste, a reconvert to Hinduism would have to perform  those ceremonies  if he seeks readmission to the caste. But,  if no  rites or  ceremonies are  required to be performed for  readmission of a person as a    member of the caste, the  only thing  necessary would be the acceptance of the  person concerned by the other members of the caste. [95 C-F] C      (b) The  consistent view  taken by  the Courts from the time of  the decision  in Administrator General of Madras v. Anandachari (ILR  9 Mad. 466), that is, since 1886, has been that on  reconversion to  Hinduism, a  person can once again become a  member of  the caste  in which  he was born and to which he  belonged before  conversion to another religion if the members of the caste accept him as a member. If a person who has  embraced another  religion can  be  reconverted  to Hinduism, there  is no  rational principle why he should not be able  to come  back to his caste, if the other members of the caste  are prepared  to re-admit  him as  a  member.  It stands to  reason that he should be able to come back to the

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fold to  which he  once belonged,  provided the community is willing to take him within the fold. [96 C-R]      Nathu v.  Keshwaji I.L.R.  26 Bom. 174. Guruswami Nadar v. Irulappa  Konar A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 630 and Durgaprasada Rao v. Sudarsanaswami, AIR 1940 Mad. 513, referred to.      (c) It  is the  orthodox Hindu Society, still dominated to  a   large  extent,   particularly  in  rural  areas,  by medievalistic outlook  and  status-oriented  approach  which attaches  social  and  economic  disabilities  to  a  person belonging to  a Scheduled  Caste and  that is  why,  certain favoured treatment is given to him by the Constitution. Once such a  person ceases  to be a Hindu and becomes a Christian the social  and economic  disabilities  arising  because  of Hindu religion cease and hence, it is no longer necessary to give him  protection; and  for this reason, he is deemed not to belong  to a Scheduled Caste. But, when he is reconverted to Hinduism. the social and economic disabilities once again revive and  become  attached  to  him,  because,  these  are disabilities inflicted  by Hinduism.  Therefore, the  object and purpose  of the  Constitution (Scheduled  Castes)  order would be  advanced rather  than retarded  by taking the view that on  reconversion to  Hinduism, a  person can once again become a  member of the Scheduled Caste to which he belonged prior to his conversion. [96 F-97 A]      (d) out  of the  12 circumstances relied on by the High Court, 5  are not  of A  importance, namely,  (1)  that  the respondent celebrated  tho marriages of his younger brothers in the  Adi Dravida  manner; (ii)  that the  respondent  was looked upon as a peace-maker among the Adi Dravida Hindus of the locality;  (iii) that  the  funeral  ceremonies  of  the respondent’s father  were performed  " according  to the Adi Dravida Hindu  rites; (iv) that he participated in the first annual death ceremonies of another Adi Dravida; and (v) that the respondent participated in an All India Scheduled Castes Conference.  The   other   seven   circumstances,   however, establish that  the respondent was accepted and treated as a member of the Adi Dravida community, namely, (1) that he was invited to  lay the foundation stone for the construction of the wall of an Adi Dravida temple: (ii) that he was asked to take part  in the celebrations connected with an Adi Dravida temple. (iii)  that he  was asked  to preside  at a festival connected with  an Adi  Dravida temple;  (iv) that  he was a member of  the Executive  Committee of  the Scheduled  Caste Cell in the organisation of the Ruling 84 Congress; (v) that his children were registered in school as Adi Dravidas  and  that  even  the  appellant  had  given  a certificate that  the respondent’s  son was  an Adi Dravida. (vi) that  he was  treated as  a member  of the  Adi Dravida caste and  was never  disowned by  the members of the caste; and (vii)  that a Scheduled Caste Conference was held in the locality with the object of re-admitting the respondent into the fold  of Adi  Dravida Caste  and that  not only  was the purificatory ceremony  performed on  him at  the  Conference with a  view to clearing  the doubt   which had been cast on his membership  of the  Adi Dravida  caste  by  the  earlier decision of this Court, but also an address was presented to him felicitating him on the occasion. [97 C-98 F]      (4)(a)  The   question   whether   on   conversion   to Christianity the respondent ceased to be a member of the Adi Dravida caste  is a  mixed question  of law  and fact  and a concession made  by him  in the  High Court on that question does not  preclude him  from re-agitating  it in  the appeal before this Court. r[89 G-H]      (b) Further,  the decision  given in  the earlier  case

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relating to  the 1967 elections on the basis of the evidence led in  that case,  cannot operate  as res  judicata ill the present case  which relates  to the  1972-election and where fresh evidence has been adduced by the parties and moreover, when all the parties in the present case are not the same as those in the earlier case. [89 H-90 B]      (c) When  a ’caste’ is referred to in modern times, the reference is  not to  the  4  primary  castes.  but  to  the innumerable castes  and sub-castes  that  prevail  in  Hindu society. The  general rule is that conversion operates as an expulsion from  the caste, that is, a convert ceases to have any caste,  because, caste  is pre-dominantly  a feature  of Hindu Society  and ordinarily  a person,  who ceases to be a Hindu, would  not be  regarded by  the other  members of the caste  as  belonging  to  their  fold.  But  it  is  not  an invariable rule  that whenever  a person  renounces Hinduism and  embraces  another  religious  faith,  he  automatically ceases to  be a member of the caste in which he was born and to which  he be  longed prior to his conversion. Ultimately, it must  depend on  the structure of the caste and its rules and regulations  whether a  person would  cease to belong to the caste  on his abjuring Hinduism. If the structure of the caste is  such that  its members, must necessarily belong to Hindu religion, a member, who Ceases to be a Hindu, would go out of  the caste, because, no non-Hindu can be in the caste according to  its rules and regulations. Where, on the other hand, having regard to its structure, as it has evolved over the  years,   a  caste  may  consist  not  only  of  persons professing Hinduism  but also  persons professing some other religion as  well, conversion  from Hinduism  to that  other religion may  not  involve  loss  of  caste,  because,  even persons professing  that other religion ca be members of the caste. This might happen where caste is based on economic or occupational characteristics  and not on religious identity, or the  cohesion of the caste as a social group is so strong that conversion  into another  religion does  not operate to snap the bond between the convert and the social group. This is indeed  not an  infrequent  phenomenon  in  South  India, where, in  some of  the castes,  even  after  conversion  to Christianity, a   person  is   regarded  as   continuing  to belong  to  the  caste.  What  is,  therefore,  material  to consider  is   how  the  caste  looks  at  the  question  of conversion. Does it outcaste or excommunicate the convert or does it  still treat  him  as  continuing  within  its  fold despite his  conversion. If  the convert desires and intends to continue  as a  member of  the caste  and the  caste also continues to  treat him  as  a  member  notwithstanding  his conversion, he  would continue  to be a member of the caste, and the  views of  the new faith hardly matter. Paragraphs 2 and 3  of the  Constitution (Scheduled  Castes) order.  read together. also recognise THAT there may be  castes specified as Scheduled  Castes which  comprise persons  belonging to a religion different  from Hindu  or Sikh  religion.  In  such castes, conversion of a person from Hinduism cannot have the effect of putting him out of the caste, though. by reason of para 37  he would  be deemed  not to  be  a  member  of  the Scheduled Caste. [90 F; 91 B-G; 93 C-E, F-H]      Cooppoosami Chetty  v. Duraisami Chetty, I.L.R. 33 Mad. 67; Muthusami  v. Masilamani, I.L.R. 33 Mad. 342. G. Michael v. S.  Venkateswaran. AIR  1952       Mad.  474.  Kothapalli Narasayya v.  Jammana Jogi,  30  E.L.R.  199;  K.  Narasimha Reddy v.  G. Bhupathi,  31 E.L.R.  211; Gangat  v. Returning Officer, [1975 85 1. S.C.C. 589 and Chatturbhuj Vithaldas  Jasani v. Moreshwar

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Prasahram, [1954] A S.C.R. 817, referred to.      [It  would   therefore,  prima   facie,  seem  that  on conversion  to   Christianity,  the   respondent   did   not automatically cease  to belong to the Adi Dravida caste; but in  view  of  the  decision  that  on  reconversion  he  was readmitted to  the Adi  Dravida faith,  no final opinion was expressed on this point.] [94 B-C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1171 of 1973. B      From the  judgment and  order dated the 19th July, 1973 of the  Mysore High  Court at Bangalore in Election Petition No. 3 of 1972.      M. N.  Phadke, M/s.  N. M.  Ghatate and S. Balakrishnan for the appellant.      A. K.  Sen, G.  L. Sanghi,  M/s. M.  Veerappa and Altaf Ahmed for the respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BHAGWATI,  J.-This   appeal  under   s.  116-A  of  the Representation of  People Act,  1951 is  directed against an order made  by the  High Court  of Mysore  setting aside the election of  the appellant on the ground that the nomination paper of  the 1st  respondent was improperly rejected by the Returning  officer.   This  litigation  does  not  stand  in isolation. It  has a  history and  that is  necessary to  be noticed in order to appreciate the arguments which have been advanced on behalf of both parties in the appeal.      The  appellant   and  the   1st  respondent  have  been opponents in  the electoral  battle since  a long  time. The constituency  from   which  they   have  been   standing  as candidates is 68 KGF Constituency for election to the Mysore Legislative Assembly.  They opposed each other as candidates from this  constituency in  1967  General  Election  to  the Mysore  Legislative   Assembly.  Now,  the  seat  from  this constituency was  a seat  reserved for Scheduled Castes and, therefore, only  members of  Scheduled Castes could stand as candidates from this constituency. The expression "Scheduled Castes" has  a technical  meaning given  to it by cl.(24) of Art. 366  of the  Constitution and  it means  "such  castes, races or  tribes or parts Of or groups within such castes or tribes as  are deemed  under Art. 341 to be Scheduled Castes for the  purpose of  the Constitution".  The  President,  in exercise of  the power  conferred upon  him under  Art.  341 issued the  Constitution  (Scheduled  Castes)  order,  1950. Paragraphs 2  and 3  of. this  order are material and, since the amendment  made by  Central Act  63 of 1956, they are in the following terms:           "2. Subject  to the  provisions of this order, the      castes, races  or tribes  or parts of, or groups within      castes or  tribes specified  in Part  I to  XIII of the      Schedule to this order shall, in relation to the States      to which  those parts  respectively   relate, be deemed      to be  scheduled  castes  so  far  as  regards  members      thereof  resident   in  the   localities  specified  in      relation to them in those Parts of that Schedule. 86           3. Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph      2, no  person who  professes a  religion different from      the Hindu  or the Sikh religion shall be deemed to be a      member of a  Scheduled Castes." The Schedule  to this  order in  Part  VIII  sets  out  "the castes, races  or tribes or parts of or groups within castes

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or tribes"  which shall  in the different areas of the State of Mysore be deemed to be Scheduled Castes. We are concerned with cl. (1) of Part VIII as the area of 68 KGF Constituency is covered by that clause. One of the castes specified there is Adi  Dravida and  that caste  must,  therefore,  for  the purpose of  election from  68 KGF Constituency, be deemed to be a  Scheduled Caste.  The appellant was admittedly, at the date when  he  Filed  his  nomination  paper  for  the  1967 election from 68 KGF Constituency, an Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion  and was consequently qualified to stand as a candidate for  the reserved seat from this constituency. The 1st respondent  also claimed to be an Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion  and on this basis, filed his nomination from the same  constituency. The appellant and the 1st respondent were thus  rival candidates-in  fact they  were the only two contesting candidates-r-and  in a  straight contest, the 1st respondent defeated the appellant and was declared elected.      The appellant  thereupon filed  election petition No. 4 of 1967 in the Mysore High Court challenging the election of the 1st respondent on the ground that the 1st respondent was not an  Adi Dravida  professing Hindu  religion at  the date when he  filed  his  nomination  and  u-as,  therefore,  not qualified to stand as a candidate for the reserved seat from 68 KGF  Constituency. The  Mysore High  Court, by  an  order dated 30th  August, 1967,  held that  the 1st respondent was converted to Christianity in 1949 and on such conversion, he ceased to  be an Adi Dravida and, therefore, at the material date, he  could not  be said  to be  a member of a Scheduled Caste,  nor  did  he  profess  Hindu  religion  and  he  was consequently not  eligible for  being chosen  as a candidate for  election   from  a   reserved  constituency.   The  1st respondent being  aggrieved by  the order  setting aside his election, preferred  C.A. No.  1553 of  1967 to  this  Court under s.  116A of  the Representation  of People  Act, 1951. This Court addressed itself to four question, namely, first, whether  the   1st  respondent   had  become  a  convert  to Christianity in 1949; secondly, whether, on such conversion, he ceased  to be  a member  of Adi  Dravida caste;  thirdly, whether he  had reverted  to Hinduism and started professing Hindu religion  at the  date of  filing his  nomination, and lastly, whether  on again professing  the Hindu religion, he once again  became a  member of Adi Dravida caste. So far as the  first   question  was   concerned,  this  Court,  on  a consideration of  the evidence, held that the 1st respondent was converted  to Christianity  in 1949 and in regard to the second question,  this Court  observed that  it must be held that when  the 1st respondent embraced Christianity in 1949, he ceased  to belong  to Adi  Dravida caste. This Court then proceeded to  consider the  third  question  and  held  that having regard  to the  seven circumstances enumerated in the judgment, it  was clear  that at  the relevant time in 1967. that is  in January-February   1967,  the 1st respondent was professing 87 Hindu religion.  That led  to a  consideration of  the  last question as  to  the  effect  of  reconversion  of  the  1st respondent to  Hinduism. This  Court referred to a number of decisions  of  various  High  Courts  which  laid  down  the principle that    reconversion  to  Hinduism,  a person  can become a  member of  the same caste in which he was born and to which he belonged before having been converted to another religion" ,  and pointed  out that  the main  basis on which these decisions  proceeded was  that "if  the members of the caste accept  the reconversion     of a person as a member,‘ it should  be held  that he  does become  a member  of  that

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caste, even though he may have lost membership of that caste on conversion  to   another religion".  This Court, however, did not  consider it necessary to express any opinion on the correctness of these-decisions, as it found that even if the principle enunciated  in these  decisions was valid, the 1st respondent  did   not  give   evidence  to   t  satisfy  the requirements laid  down by  this principle  and  "failed  to establish that  he became  a member of the Adi Dravida Hindu caste after  he started professing the Hindu religion". This Court observed  that "whether  the membership of a caste can be acquired by con version to Hinduism or after reconversion to Hinduism  is a  question on  which we have refrained from expressing our  opinion, because  on the  assumption that it can be acquired, we have arrived at the conclusion  that the appellant"; that  is, the  1st respondent  in the  present , case must  fail in  this  appeal".  This  Court  accordingly upheld the  decision of  the High  Court and  dismissed  the appeal.(1)      This decision  was given  by a  Bench consisting of two judges on   3rd  May, 1968.  In the three or four years that followed certain   events happened to which we shall refer a little later.  Suffice it  to state  for the  present  that, according to  the 1st  respondent, these  events showed that the members  of the  Adi Dravida  caste accepted  him  as  a member and regarded him as belonging to their fold. The next General Election  to the  Mysore Legislative  Assembly  took place in  1972. There  was  again  a  contest  from  68  KGF Constituency  which     was  reserved  for  candidates  from Scheduled Castes.  The appellant  filed his  nomination as a candidate  from   this  constituency  and  so  did  the  1st respondent.  The  nomination  of  the  1st  respondent  was, however, objected  by the  appellant on  the ground that the 1st respondent   was  not an  Adi Dravida  professing  Hindu religion at  the   date of filing his nomination and he was, therefore, not  qualified to  stand as  a candidate  for the reserved seat  from this  constituency. The  1st  respondent rejoined  by   saying  that   he  was   never  converted  to Christianity and that in any event, even if it was held that he had  be" come a Christian, he was reconverted to Hinduism since long  and was  accepted    by  the members  of the Adi Dravida caste as belonging to their fold and was, therefore, an Adi  Dravida professing  Hindu religion   at the material date and  hence qualified  to  stand  as  a  candidate.  The Returning officer,  by an  order dated 9th February, 1972 up held the  objection of  the appellant  and taking  the  view that, on  con version  to Christianity,  the 1st  respondent ceased to  be an Adi Dravida and thereafter on reconversion, he could  not claim  the benefit  of the        Constitution (Scheduled Castes) order, 1950, the Returning officer      (1) S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Arumugam, [1959] 1 S.C.R. 254. 7-L390 SCI/76 88 rejected the  nomination of the 1st respondent. The election thereafter took  place  without  the  1st  respondent  as  a candidate and  the appeliant,  having obtained  the  highest number of votes, was declared elected.      The 1st  respondent filed  Election Petition  No. 3  of 1972 in the High Court of Mysore challenging the election of the appellant  on     the  ground that the nomination of the 1st respondent  was improperly  rejected. This  was a ground under s.  100(1)(c) of the Act and if well founded, it would be sufficient, without more, to invalidate the election. The point which  was, therefore,  seriously debated  before  the High Court  was whether the nomination of the 1st respondent was    improperly. rejected and that in its turn depended on

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the answer to the question whether the 1st respondent was an Adi Dravida  professing Hindu religion at the date of filing his nomination.  There were  four aspects  bearing  on  this question which arose for consideration and they were broadly the same  as in  the earlier  case (supra)., namely, whether the 1st respondent embraced Christianity in 1949, whether on his conversion  to Christianity  he ceased  to belong to Adi Dravida caste,  whether he  was reconverted  to Hinduism and whether on such reconversion, he was accepted by the members of the  Adi Dravida caste as belonging to their fold. So far as the  first three  aspects were  concerned, the High Court took the view that they must be taken to be concluded by the decision of  this Court  in the earlier case (supra) and the discussion of  the question  must, therefore, proceed on the established premise  that the Ist respondent was born an Adi Dravida Hindu,  he was converted to Christianity in 1949 and on such  conversion he  lost his  capacity as an Adi Dravida Hindu and  at least   by  the   year 1967, he had once again started  professing  Hindu  religion.  Visa-vis  the  fourth aspect, the  High Court  observed: "It  is settled  law that reconversion  to   Hinduism  does  not  require  any  formal ceremony      or rituals  or expiratory  ceremonies, that  a reconvert to Hinduism can revert to his original Hindu caste on acceptance  by the  members of  that caste  and that  the quantum and  degree of  proof of  acceptance depends  on the facts and  circumstances of  each  case,  according  to  the established  customs  prevalent  in  a  particular  locality amongst the  caste there",  and on this view of the law, the High Court  proceeded to  examine the evidence led on behalf of  the   parties  and   pointed  out   that  this  evidence established twelve  important  circumstances  subsequent  to January-February 1967  which clearly  showed  that  the  1st respondent was  accepted into  their fold  by the members of the Adi Dravida caste and he was, therefore, at the material time, an  Adi  Dravida professing Hindu religion as required by Paragraphs  2 and 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Caste) order, 1950.  The High  Court, in  this view,  held that the nomination of  the 1st respondent was improperly rejected by the Returning  officer and  that  invalidated  the  election under s.  100(1)(c) of  the Act.  The High Court accordingly set aside  the election  of the appellant and declared it to be void. This judgement of the High Court is impugned in the present appeal under s. 116A   of the Act.      Now before we deal with the contentions urged on behalf of the  appellant in  support of  the appeal,  it  would  be convenient first to 89 refer to  two grounds  which were  held by  the  High  Court against the  A 1st  respondent. The 1st respondent contended that these  two grounds were wrongly decided against him and even on these two grounds, he was entitled to claim that, at the material  time, he  was an  Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion. The  first ground  was that he was never converted to  Christianity   and  the   second  was,   that,  on  such conversion, he  did not  cease to  be an  Adi  Dravida.  The appellant disputed  the claim’  of  the  1st  respondent  to agitate these  two grounds  in the  appeal  before  us.  The reason given  was that  the 1st  respondent had  not pressed them in  the course  of the  arguments before the High Court and had conceded that, in view of the judgment of this Court in the earlier case, Issue No. 3, which raised the question: "Whether  the   petitioner  having  abandoned  Hinduism  and embraced  Christianity   in  the  year  1949  had  lost  the membership of  the Adi  Dravida Hindu caste and incurred the disqualification under  Paragraph      of  the  Constitution

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(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950" and "Is this issue concluded against the petitioner by virtue of the judgment of the High Court in  Civil Appeal  1553 of  1967", did  not survive for consideration. There  can be  no doubt  that so  far as  the first of  these two  grounds is concerned, there is force in the objection raised on behalf of the appellant.      The  question  whether  the  1st  respondent  abandoned Hinduism and  embraced Christianity in 1949 is essentially a question of  fact and  if, at  the stage  of  the  arguments before the  High Court, the 1st respondent conceded that, in view of the decision of this Court in the earlier case, this question did  not survive  for consideration  and  the  High Court, acting  on the  concession  of  the  1st  respondent, refrained  from   examining  the   question  on  merits  and proceeded on  the basis  that  it  stood  concluded  by  the decision of  this Court  in the  earlier case, how could the 1st respondent  be now  permitted to reagitate this question at the  hearing of  the appeal  before this  Court ? The 1st respondent must  be held bound by the concession made by him on a  question of  fact before  the High  Court. We  cannot, therefore, permit  the 1st  respondent to  raise an argument that the  evidence on  record does  not  establish  that  he embraced Christianity  in 1949. We must proceed on the basis that he was converted to Christianity in that year      The position is, however, different when we turn to the question whether,  on conversion  to Christianity,  the  1st respondent ceased  to be  a member of the Adi Dravida caste. That question  is a mixed question of law and fact and we do not think  that a  concession made  by the 1st respondent on such a  question at  the stage  of argument  before the High Court, can  preclude him  from reagitating  it in the appeal before this  Court, when  it formed the subject matter of an issue before  the High  Court and full and complete evidence in regard  to such issue was led by both parties. It is true that this  Court held in the earlier case that, on embracing Christianity in  1949, the  1st respondent  ceased to  be  a member of  the Adi Dravida caste, but this decision given in a case relating to 1967 General Election on the basis of the evidence led  in that  case, cannot  be res  judicata in the present case  which relates  to 1972  General  Election  and where fresh evidence 90 has been adduced on behalf of the parties, and more so, when all the  parties in  the present  case are  not the  same as those in the earlier case. It is, therefore, competent to us to consider  whether, on  the  evidence  on  record  in  the present case,  it can be said to have been established that, on conversion  to Christianity  in 1949, the 1st  respondent ceased to belong to Adi Dravida caste.      It is a matter of common knowledge that the institution of caste  is  a  peculiarly  Indian  institution.  There  is considerable controversy  amongst scholars  as  to  how  the caste system originated in this country. It is not necessary for the  purpose of  this appeal  to  go  into  this  highly debatable  question.   It  is   sufficient  to   state  that originally there  were only  four main castes, but gradually castes  and  sub-castes  multiplied  as  the  social  fabric expanded with  the absorption  of different groups of people belonging  to   various  cults   and  professing   different religious faiths.  The caste  system in its early stages was quite elastic  but in  course of  time it gradually hardened into a  rigid framework  based upon  heredity. Inevitably it gave rise  to graduation which resulted in social inequality and put  a premium  on snobbery.  The caste system tended to develop, as  it were, group snobbery, one caste looking down

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upon another.  Thus there  came into  being social hierarchy and stratification  resulting in  perpetration of social and economic injustice  by the  so-called higher  castes on  the lower castes.  It was  for this  reason that  it was thought necessary by  the Constitution  makers  to  accord  favoured treatment to  the lower castes who were at the bottom of the scale of  social values and who were afflicted by social and economic  disabilities   and  the   Constitution      makers accordingly provided  that the  President  may  specify  the castes and  these would  obviously be the lower castes which had suffered  centuries of oppression and exploitation-which shall be  deemed to  be Scheduled  Castes and  laid down the principle that  seats should  be reserved in the legislature for the  Scheduled Castes  as it  was believed  and rightly, that the  higher castes  would not  properly  represent  the interest of these lower castes.      But that  immediately raises  the question:  what is  a caste? When  we speak of a caste, we do not mean to refer in this  context   to  the  four  primary  castes  but  to  the multiplicity of  castes and  sub-castes which  disfigure the Indian social  scene. "A  caste", as pointed out by the High Court of  Madras in  Cooppoosami  Chetty v. Duraisami Chetty (1) "is  a voluntary  association  of  persons  for  certain purposes." It  is a  well defined  yet fluctuating  group of persons governed  by their     own rules and regulations for certain internal  purposes. Sir  H. Risley  has shown in his book on People of India how castes are formed based not only on  community   of  religion,   but  also  on  community  of functions. It  is also  pointed out by Sankaran Nair, J., in Muthusami v.  Masilamani(2): "a  change  in  the  occupation sometimes creates a new caste. A common occupation sometimes combines members  of different  castes into  a distinct body which becomes  a new caste. Migration to another place makes sometimes a new caste". A caste is more a social combination than a religious Group. But since, as      (1) I. L. R. 33 Mad. 67.      (2) l. L. R. 33 Mad. 342. 91 pointed out  by  Rajamannar,  C.J.,  in  C.  Michael  v.  S. Venkateswaran   (1), ethics provides the standard for social life and  it is  founded ultimately on religious beliefs and doctrines, religion  is  inevitably  mixed  up  with  social conduct and that is why caste has become an integral feature of Hindu  society. But  from that  it does  not  necessarily follow  as   an  invariable  rule  that  whenever  a  person renounces Hinduism  and embraces another religious faith, he automatically ceases to be a member of the caste in which he was born  and to  which he belonged prior to his conversion. It is no doubt true; and there we agree with the Madras High Court in  C. Michael’s case (supra) that the general rule is that conversion  operates as an expulsion from the caste or, in other  words, the  convert  ceases  to  have  any  caste, because caste  is predominantly  a feature  of Hindu society and ordinarily  a person  who ceases to be a Hindu would not be regarded  by the  other members of the caste as belonging to  their  fold.  But  ultimately  it  must  depend  on  the structure  of  the  caste  and  its  rules  and  regulations whether a  person would  cease to belong to the caste on his abjuring Hinduism.  If the  structure of  the caste  is such that its  members must necessarily belong to Hindu religion, a member,  who ceases  to be  a Hindu,  would go  out of the caste, because no non-Hindu can be in the caste according to its rules  and regulations. Where, on the other hand, having regard to its structure, as it has evolved over the years, a caste may  consist not  only  of  persons  professing  Hindu religion but  also persons professing some other religion as

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well, conversion  from Hinduism  to that  other religion may not involve  loss of  caste, because even persons professing such other  religion can be members of the caste. This might happen where  caste is  based on  economic  or  occupational characteristics  and   not  on  religious  identity  or  the cohesion of  the caste  as a  social group is so strong that conversion into  another religion  does not  operate to snap the bond  between the  convert and the social group. This is indeed not an infrequent phenomenon in South India where, in some of the castes, even after conversion to Christianity, a person is  regarded as  continuing to  belong to  the caste. When an  argument was  advanced before the Madras High Court in G.  Michael’s case (supra) "that there were several cases in which  a member  of one  of the lower castes who has been converted to Christianity has continued not only to consider himself as  still being  a member of the caste, but has also been considered so by other members of the caste who had not been converted,"  Rajamannar, C.J.,-who,  it can  safely  be presumed, was  familiar with  the  customs    and  practices prevalent  in  South  India,  accepted  the  position  "that instances can  be found  in which in spite of conversion the caste distinctions  might continue",  though he treated them as exceptions to the general rule.      The High  Court of  Andhra  Pradesh  also  affirmed  in Kothapalli    Narasayya     v.    Jammana    Jogi(2)    that "notwithstanding  conversions,   the  converts   whether  an individual or  family or  group of  converts, may like to be governed by  the law by which they were governed before they became converts-and the community to which they originally H      (1) A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 474. (2) 30 L. R. 1. 92 belonged may  also continue to accept them within their fold notwithstanding conversion", and proceeded to add:           "While tendency  to divide into sects and division      to form  new sects  with their own religious and social      observances is  a characteristic feature of Hinduism-it      should be        remembered that  sects were formed not      only on  community of   religions but also community of      functions. Casteism  which  has  taken  deep  roots  in      Hinduism for  some reason  or other  may not  therefore      cease its  existence even after conversion. May be that      the religion  or faith to which conversion takes place,      on grounds  of  policy  or  otherwise,  does  not  take      exception to this social order which does not interfere      with its spiritual   or theological aspect which is the      main object  of the  religion.  That  is  why  we  find      several  members   of   lower   castes   converted   to      Christianity in  Madras State-still  continue    to the      members of  their castes-Thus  a  conversion  does  not      necessarily  result  in  extinguishment  of  caste  and      notwithstanding conversion,  a convert  may  enjoy  the      privileges social and  political by virtue of his being      a member of the community with its acceptance." The elected  candidate in  this case was held to continue to belong to the Mala Andhra Caste which was a Scheduled Caste, despite  his   conversion  to  Christianity.  It  was  again reiterated  by  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  in  a subsequent decision  reported in  K. Narasimha  Reddy v.  G. Bhupathi(1) that  survival  of  caste  after  conversion  to Christianity is  not an  unfamiliar phenomenon in this  part of the  country  and  it  was  held  that,  even  after  his conversion  to  Christianity,  the  elected  candidate,  who belonged to  Bindla caste,  specified as  a Scheduled Caste, continued to  retain his  caste, since  he never abjured his caste nor  did his  caste people  ostracize or excommunicate

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him. The  caste system  is indeed so deeply ingrained in the Indian mind  that, as pointed out by this Court in Ganpat v. Returning Officer   ,(2)  "for a  person who has grown up in Indian society, it is very difficult to get out of the coils of the  caste system"  and, therefore,  even  conversion  to another religion  like Christianity,  has in  some cases  no impact on  the membership of the caste and the other members continue to  regard the  convert as  still being a member of the caste.  This Court  pointed out in Ganpat‘s case (supra) that "to  this day one sees matrimonial advertisements which want a  Vellala Christian   bride  or Nadar Christian bride" which shows  that Vellala and Nadar comprise both Hindus and Christians.      lt seems  that the  correct test  for determining  this question is the one pointed out by this Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas  Jasani   v.  Moreshwar  Prasahram.(J)  Bose,  J., speaking on  behalf of  the Court  in this  case pointed out that when  a question  arises whether conversion    operates as a break away from the caste "what we‘have to      (1) 31E.L.R.211.               (2) [1975] 1 S.C.C. 589.                    (3) [1954] S.C.R. 817. 93 determine are  the social and political consequences of such conversion h  that, we  feel, must  be decided  in a  common sense  practical   way  rather   than  on   theoretical  and theocratic grounds".  The learned  Judge then  proceeded  to add:           "Looked at  from the  secular point of view, there      are "  three factors  which have  to be considered: (1)      the   reactions of  the old body, (2) the intentions of      the individual  himself and  (3) the  rules of  the new      order. If  the old  order is  tolerant of the new faith      and sees  no reason  to outcaste  or ex-communicate the      convert and  the individual himself desires and intends      to retain his old social political ties, the conversion      is only  nominal for all practical purposes and when we      have to  consider the legal and political rights of the      old body, the views of the new faith hardly matter." What is,  therefore, material  to consider  is how the caste looks at the question of conversion. Does it outcaste or ex- communicate the  convert or  does  it  still  treat  him  as continuing within  its fold  despite his conversion ? If the convert desires  and intends  to continue as a member of the caste and the caste also continues to treat him as a member, notwithstanding his  conversion, he  would continue  to be a member of  the caste  and, as pointed out by this Court "the views  of  the  new  faith  hardly  matter".  This  was  the principle  on   which  it   was  decided  by  the  Court  in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas  Jasani’s case  (supra) that  Gangaram Thaware, whose nomination as a Scheduled Caste candidate was rejected by  the Returning  officer, continued to be a Mahar which was  specified  as  a  Scheduled  Caste,  despite  his conversion to  the Mahanubhav faith.      Paragraphs 2  and  3  of  the  Constitution  (Scheduled Castes) order,  1950 also  support the  view that even after conversion, a person may continue to belong to a caste which has been  specified in  the Schedule  to  that  order  as  a Scheduled  Caste.  Paragraph  2  provides  that  the  castes specified in  the Schedule  to the order shall be deemed  to be  Scheduled   Castes  but   Paragraph  3   declares  that, notwithstanding anything  contained in Paragraph 2, that is, notwithstanding that  a per son belongs to a caste specified as a  Scheduled Caste, he shall not be deemed to be a member of the  Scheduled Caste, if he profess a religion  different from Hindu  or  Sikh  religion.  Paragraphs  2  and  3  read

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together thus  clearly recognise  that there  may be  castes specified  as   Scheduled  Castes   which  comprise  persons belonging to  a religion  different    from  Hindu  or  Sikh religion and  if that be so, it must follow a fortiori, that in such  castes, conversion of a person from Hinduism cannot have the  effect of  putting him out of the caste. though by reason of  Paragraph 3 he would be deemed not to be a member of a  Scheduled Caste. It cannot, therefore, be laid down as an absolute  rule uniformly  applicable in  all  cases  that whenever a  member of  a caste is converted from Hinduism to Christianity, he  loses his  membership of  the caste. It is true that ordinarily on conversion to Christianity, he would cease to  a  member  of  the  caste,  but  that  is  not  an invariable rule. It 94 would depend on the structure of the caste and its rules and regulations. There  are castes, particularly in South India, where this consequence does not follow on conversion,  since such castes  com prise  both Hindus  and Christians. Whether Adi Dravida  is a  caste which falls within this category or not is  a question  which would have to be determined on the evidence in  this case.  There is  on the record evidence of Kakkan (PW  13) J. C. Adimoolam (RW 1) and K. P Arumugam (RW 8), the  last two  being witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant, which shows. that amongst Adi Dravidas, there are both Hindus  and Christians  and  there  are  intermarriages between them. It would, therefore, prima facie seem that, on conversion    to  Christianity, the  1st respondent  did not cease to belong to Adi Dravida caste. But in the view we are taking as  regards the  last contention,  we do not think it necessary to express any final opinion on this point.      The third  question in  controversy between the parties was whet her the 1st respondent was reconverted to Hinduism. This question stands concluded by the decision of this Court in the earlier case and it must be held, for the reasons set out in  that decision,  that at  any  rate  since  prior  to January-February 1967, the 1st respondent was reconverted to Hinduism and,  therefore,  at  the  material  time,  he  was professing  the   Hindu  religion,  so  as  to  satisfy  the requirement of  Paragraph 3  of the  Constitution (Scheduled Castes) order, 1950.      The last contention, which formed the subject matter of controversy between the parties, raised the issue whether on reconversion to  Hinduism, the  1st  respondent  could  once again become  a member  of the  Adi Dravida  caste, assuming that he ceased to be such on conversion to Christianity. The argument of  the appellant  was that once the 1st respondent renounced Hinduism  and embraced Christianity,  he could not go  back  to  the  Adi  Dravida  caste  on  reconversion  to Hinduism. He  undoubtedly became  a Hindu,  but he  could no longer claim  to be  a member of the Adi Dravida caste. This argument    is  not sound  on principle  and  it  also  runs counter to  a long  line of decided cases. Ganapathi Iyer, a distinguished scholar and jurist, pointed out as far back as 1915 in his well known treatise on ’Hindu Law’: -           "- caste is a social combination, the   members of      which are  enlisted by  birth  and  not  by  enrolment.      People do  not join castes or religious fraternities as      a matter  of choice  (in one  respect); they  belong to      them as a matter of necessity  ; they are born in their      respective castes or sects. lt cannot be said, however,      that membership  by caste is deter. mined only by birth      and not by anything else," (emphasis supplied) Chandravarkar, J.,  observed in Nathu v. Keshwaji(1): "It is within the  power of  a caste to admit into its fold men not

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born in  it as  it is  within the  power of  a club to admit anyone it  likes as  its member. To hold that the membership of a caste is determined by birth is to      (1) I. L. R. 26.Bom. 174. 95 hold that  the caste  cannot, if  it likes, mix with another caste and   form both into one caste. That would be striking at the very root of caste autonomy." Sankaran Nair, J., made observations to  the same effect in Muthusami‘s case (supra) and concluded  by saying:  "It is,  of  course,  open  to  a community to  admit any  person and  any marriage  performed between him and any member would in my " opinion, be valid". Ganapathi Iyer,  after referring  to  these  two  decisions, proceeded to add: Of course it is open to a person to change his caste  by entering  another caste  if such  latter caste will admit  him-in this  sense there is nothing to prevent a person from  giving up  his caste  or community  just as the caste may re-admit an expelled person or an outcasted person if he conforms to the caste observances." Since a caste is a social combination  of persons  governed   by its  rules and regulations,  it  may,  if  its  rules  and  regulations  so provide, admit a new member just as it may expel an existing member. The  rules and regulations of the caste may not have been formalised.:  they may  not exist  in black  and white: they may consist only of practices and usages. If, according to the  practices and  usages of  the caste  any  particular ceremonies are  required to be per formed for readmission to the caste,  a reconvert  to Hinduism  would have  to perform those ceremonies  if he seeks readmission to the caste. That is why  Parker, J., dealing with the possible readmission of a reconvert  to Brahmanism observed in Administrator-General of madras   v. Anandchari(1) :           "His conversion  to Christianity  according to the      Hindu law,  rendered him  an outcaste and degraded. But      according    to  that law,  the degradation  might have      been atoned  for, and  the convert  readmitted  to  his      status as a Brahmin, had he at any time during his life      renounced  Christianity  and  performed  the  rites  of      expiation enjoined by his caste." The rites of expiation were referred to by the learned Judge because they were enjoined by the Brahmin caste to which the reconvert wanted  to be  readmitted.  But  if  no  rites  or ceremonies are required to be performed for readmission of a person as  a member  of the  caste, the only thing necessary for eradication  would be  the acceptance    of  the  person concerned by  the other  members  of  the  caste.  This  was pointed out  by Varadachariar,  J.,  in  Gurusami  Nadar  v. Irulappa   Konar(2); where  after referring to the aforesaid passage from  Administrator-General of Madras  v. Anandchari (supra), the learned Judge said:           "The language  used in  9 Mad 466 merely refers to      the expiatory  ceremonies enjoined  by the  practice of      the community    in question; and with reference to the      class  of   people  we   are  now  concerned  with,  no      suggestion has  anywhere been made in the course of the      evidence that  any particular  expiatory ceremonies are      observed amongst  them. No  particular   ceremonies are      prescribed for  them by  the Smriti    writers nor have      they got  to perform  any Homas. One has therefore only      to look at the sense of the community and (1) I. L. R. 9 Mad. 466.        (2) A. I. R. 1934 Mad. 630 . 96      from  that   point  of   view  it   is  of   particular      significance that the community was prepared to receive      Vedanayaga and  defendant 5  as man  and wife and their

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    issue as legitimate." These observations  of Varadachariar,  J., were  approved by Mockett, J., in Durgaprasada Rao v. Sudarsanaswami(1) and he pointed out  that in  the case  before  him,  there  was  no evidence of  the existence  of any ceremonial in Vada Baligi fishermen community  of Gopalpur  for  readmission  to  that community. Krishnaswami  Ayyangar, J.,  also observed in the same case  that "in  matters affecting  the  well  being  or composition of  a caste,  the caste  itself is  the  supreme judge". (emphasis  supplied). The  same view  has also  been taken in  a number  of decisions  of the  Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Courts in election petitions arising out of 1967 General Election.  These decisions  have been set out in the judgment of  this Court  in Rajagopal  v. C.  R.    Arumugam (supra).      These cases show that the consistent view taken in this country from  the time  Administrator-General of  Madras  v. Anandachari (supra)  was decided,  that is,  since 1886  has been that  on    reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once again become  a member of The caste in which he was born and to which he belonged before con version to another religion, if the members of the caste accept him as a member. There is no reason  either on  principle or on authority which should compel us  to disregard  this view  which has  prevailed for almost a  century and  lay down  a  different  rule  on  the subject. If  a person  who has embraced another religion can be reconverted  to Hinduism,  there is no rational principle why he  should not be able to come back to his caste, if the other members of the caste are pre pared to readmit him as a member. It  stands to  reason that he should be able to come back to  the fold  to which  he once  belonged, provided  of course the community is willing to take him within the fold. It is  the orthodox Hindu society still dominated to a large extent,  particularly   in  rural  areas,  by  medievalistic outlook and  status oriented  approach which attaches social and  economic  disabilities  to  a  person  belonging  to  a Scheduled Caste  and that  is why certain favoured treatment is given  to him  by the  Constitution. Once  such a  person ceases to be a Hindu and becomes a Christian, the social and economic disabilities  arising  because  of  Hindu  religion cease and  hence it  is no  longer  necessary  to  give  him protection and for this reason he is deemed not to belong to a Scheduled  Caste. But  when he is reconverted to Hinduism, the social  and economic  disabilities once again revive and become  attached  to  him  because  these  are  disabilities inflicted by Hinduism. A Mahar or a Koli or a Mala would not be recognised  as anything  but a  Mahar or a Koli or a Mala after reconversion  to Hinduism and he would suffer from the same social and economic disabilities from which he suffered before he  was    converted  to  another  religion.  It  is, therefore, obvious  that  the  object  and  purpose  of  the Constitution  (Scheduled   Castes)  order,   1950  would  be advanced rather than retarded by taking the view that on      (1) A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 513. 97 reconversion to  Hinduism, a  person can once again become a member of  the Scheduled Caste to which he belonged prior to his conversion.  We accordingly agree with the view taken by the High  Court that  on reconversion  to Hinduism,  the 1st respondent could  once again  revert  to  his  original  Adi Dravida caste  if he  was accepted  as  such  by  the  other members of the caste.      That takes  us to  the question whether in fact the 1st respondent was accepted as a member of the Adi Dravida caste after his  reconversion  to  Hinduism.  This  Court  in  the

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earlier decision  between the  parties found  that  the  1st respondent had  not produced evidence to show that after his reconversion to  Hinduism, any  step had  been taken  by the members of  the Adi  Dravida caste  indicating that  he  was being  accepted   as  a   member  of  that  caste.  The  1st respondent, therefore, in the present case, led considerable oral as  well as documentary   evidence tending to show that subsequent to  January-February 1967, the 1st respondent had been accepted as a member of the Adi Dravida caste. The High Court referred  to twelve  circumstances appearing  from the evidence  and   held  on   the   basis   of   these   twelve circumstances, that  the Adi  Dravida caste had accepted the 1st respondent  as its member and he accordingly belonged to the Adi  Dravida caste  at the  material time.  Now, out  of these twelve  circumstances, we do not attach any importance to the  first circumstance  which refers to the celebrations of the  marriages of  his  younger  brother  Govindaraj  and Manickam by  the 1st  respondent in  the Adi Dravida manner, because it  is quite natural that if Govindaraj and Manickam were Adi Dravida Hindus, their marriages would be celebrated according to  Adi Dravida  rites and merely because the 1 st respondent,  as   their  elder   brother,  celebrated  their marriages, it  would not  follow that  he was  also  an  Adi Dravida  Hindu.   The  second   circumstance  that  the  1st respondent was  looked upon  as a  peacemaker among  the Adi Dravida Hindus  of K.G.F. cannot also be regarded as of much significance,  because,   if  the   Ist  respondent   was  a recognised leader, it is quite possible that the Adi Dravida Hindus of  K.G.F. might  go to  him for  resolution of their disputes, even though he himself might not be an Adi Dravida Hindu.  But   the  third,  fourth  and  fifth  circumstances are of  importance, because,  unless the  1st respondent was recognised and  accepted as  an Adi  Dravida Hindu, he would not have  been invited  to lay  the foundation stone for the construction of  the new  wall of the temple of Jambakullam, which was  essentially a  temple of  Adi Dravida Hindus, nor would he  have been requested to participate in the Maroazhi Thiruppavai celebration at the Kannabhiran Temple situate at III Line,  Kennedy Block,  K.G.F., which   was also a temple essentially  maintained   by  the  Adi  Dravida  Hindus  and equally, he  would not  have been  invited to preside at the Adi Krittikai festival at Mariamman Temple in I, Post office Block,  Marikuppam,   K.G.F.  where  the  devotees  are  Adi Dravidas or  to start  the procession  of the  Deity at such festival. These  three circumstances are strongly indicative of the fact that the 1st respondent was accepted and treated as a  member by  the Adi  Dravida community. So also    does the sixth  circumstance that the 1st respondent was a member of the  Executive Committee  of the  Scheduled Caste Cell in the organisation of the Ruling Congress indicate in the same direction. The 98 seventh and  eighth circumstances  are again  of  a  neutral character The funeral ceremonies and obsequies of the father of  the   1st  respondent    would  naturally  be  performed according to  the Adi  Dravida Hindu  rites if he was an Adi Dravida  Hindu   and  that  would  not  mean  that  the  1st respondent was  also an  Adi Dravida  Hindu. Similarly,  the fact that  the 1st  respondent  participated  in  the  first annual ceremonies  of the  late M.  A.  Vadivelu  would  not indicate that  the 1st  respondent was  also an  Adi Dravida Hindu like  late M.  A. Vadivelu. But the ninth circumstance is again very important. It is significant that the children of the  1st respondent  were registered in the school as Adi Dravida Hindus  and even  the  appellant  himself  issued  a

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certificate "  stating that  R. Kumar,  the son  of the  1st respondent, was  a Scheduled  Caste Adi  Dravida Hindu.  The tenth circumstance  that the   first respondent participated in the  All India  Scheduled Castes            Conference at New Delhi  on 30th and 31st August, 1968 may not be regarded as of  any particular  importance. It  would merely indicate his intention  and desire  to regard  himself as a member of the  Adi   Dravida  Caste.  The  eleventh  circumstance  is, however,  of   some  importance,   because  it   shows  that throughout the 1st respondent was treated as a member of the Adi Dravida  Caste and he was never  disowned by the members of that  caste. They  always regarded  him as an Adi Dravida belonging to their fold. But the most important of all these circumstance is  the twelfth,  namely, the  Scheduled  Caste Conference held  at Skating Rink, Nundydroog Mine, K.G.F. On 11th August. 1968. The High Court has discussed the evidence in regard  to  this  conference  in  some  detail.  We  have carefully gone through the evidence of the witnesses on this point, but we do not find anything wrong in the appreciation of their  evidence by  the High  Court. We  are particularly impressed by  the evidence  of Kakkan  (PW 13).  The  cross- examination  of  J.  C.  Adimoolam  (RW  1)  is  also  quite revealing. We  find ourselves  completely in  agreement with the view  taken by  the High  Court  that  this  conference, attended largely  by Adi  Dravida Hindus,  was held  on 11th August, 1968  inter alia with the object of re-admitting the 1st respondent  into the  fold of  Adi Dravida caste and not only was  a  purificatory  ceremony  performed  on  the  1st respondent at  this conference  with a  view to clearing the doubt which  had been  cast on  his membership  of  the  Adi Dravida caste  by the  decision of this Court in the earlier case but  an address  Ex. P-56 was also presented to the 1st respondent felicitating him on this occasion.      It is  clear from  these circumstances, which have been discussed   and accepted  by us, that after his reconversion to Hinduism,  the 1st respondent was recognised and accepted as a member of the Adi Dravida caste by the other members of that community.  The  High   Court  was, therefore, right in coming to  the conclusion  that at the material time the 1st respondent belonged  to the  Adi Dravida caste so as to fall within the category of Scheduled Castes under Paragraph 2 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) order, 1950.      In the  result the  appeal fails  and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S.                                     Appeal dismissed. 99