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PETITIONER: G.   K. KRISHNAN ETC.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/11/1974

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN RAY, A.N. (CJ) ALAGIRISWAMI, A.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  583            1975 SCR  (2) 715  1975 SCC  (1) 375  CITATOR INFO :  R          1975 SC 594  (4,8)  F          1975 SC1006  (2)  RF         1981 SC 711  (10)  D          1983 SC 634  (16,18,21)  OPN        1983 SC1005  (7)  R          1985 SC 660  (24)  R          1988 SC2062  (15)  R          1989 SC 100  (31)  F          1990 SC 913  (27)  R          1990 SC1637  (21)

ACT: Madras  Motor  Vehicles  Taxation Act  (3  of  1931)-Tax  on contract Carriages enhanced by notification-If violative  of Art.   301-Motive   for  enhancing   tax,   if   relevant-If discriminatory as compared to stage carriages and  violative of Art. 14.

HEADNOTE: The  enhancement of motor vehicles tax on omnibuses  imposed by the State Government, by notification dated September 20, 1971,  from Rs. 30/per seat per quarter to Rs. 100 per  seat per quarter was challenged on the following grounds :- (1)  The  notification was not a measure of taxation  but  a device  to eliminate the competition of omnibus" with  stage carriages run by the Government; (21  Since the tax operates as a restriction on the  freedom of  trade,  commerce and intercourse within  the  State,  it could  be  imposed  only by a law  which  had  obtained  the previous  sanction of the President under Art. 304.  and  as the  notification was issued by the government in the  exer- cise  of  its delegate power, it was not a law made  by  the legislature,   nor  could  the  previous  sanction  of   the President be obtained for it; and (3)The distinction made between contract carriages and stage carriages. in the matter of levy of vehicle tax offends Art. 14. Rejecting the contentions. HELD  :  1.  The tax was imposed by the  Government  in  the exercise  of  its  power  under S. 4  of  the  Madras  Motor Vehicles  Taxation Act, 1931.  As the State Legislature  was

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competent  to  pass  the  Act  and  as  the  Government   is authorised  under s. 4 to levy the tax, the question of  the motive with which the tax was imposed is immaterial.   There can  be no plea of a colourable exercise of power to tax  if the Government had power to impose the tax and the fact that the imposition of the tax was for the purpose of eliminating competition would not detract from its validity. [720A-B] 2.   (a)  Article  301 imposes a general limitation  on  all legislative  power in order to secure that  trade,  commerce and  intercourse throughout the territory of India shall  be free.   The word ’free’ does not mean freedom  from  regula- tion.  There is a distinction between laws interfering  with freedom  to carry out the activities constituting trade  and law  imposing  on  those engaged  therein  rules  of  proper conduct or other restraints directed to the due and  orderly manner of carrying out the activities.  This distinction  is described  as  regulation.  The true solution in  any  given case  could be found by distinguishing between  features  of the  transaction  or  activity in virtue of  which  it  fell within  the category of trade, commerce and intercourse  and those  features which, though invariably found to  occur  in some  form or another in the transaction or action  are  not essential  to  the  conception.  what  is  relevant  is  the contrast  between  the  essential attributes  of  trade  and commerce  and the incidents of the transaction which do  not give  it  necessarily the character of trade  and  commerce. Laws for government of such incidents, ,regulate’.  If a tax is  compensatory  or  regulatory, it  cannot  operate  as  a restriction  on  the  freedom  of  trade  or  commerce.    A compensatory  tax is based on the nature and the  extent  of the  use made of the roads. if the proceeds are  devoted  to the  repair, upkeep, maintenance of relevant roads  and  the collection   of   the  exaction  involves   no   substantial interference  with the movement.  What is essential for  the purpose  of securing freedom of movement by road is that  no pecuniary burden should be placed upon. it 716 which  goes beyond a proper recompense to the state for  the actual  use made of the physical facilities provided in  the shape  of a road.  Motor vehicles require, for  their  safe, efficient  and economical use, roads of considerable  width, hardness  and durability. and the maintenance of such  roads will  cost the government money.  But, because the users  of vehicles   generally  and  of  public  motor   vehicles   in particular,  stand in a special and direct relation to  such roads,  and  may  be said to derive  a  special  and  direct benefit  from them. it is not unreasonable that they  should be  called  upon  to make a special  contribution  to  their maintenance over and above their general contribution as tax payers of the State. [721C-H; 722B-F] (b)  In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the  State, the averment in that Government has incurred an  expenditure of  Rs. 19.51 crores in the year 1970-71 on the  maintenance and construction of roads while the receipts from out of the vehicle  tax  was only Rs. 16.38 crores.  It  would  not  be right  to  say that a tax is not  compensatory  because  the precise  or specific amount collected is not  actually  used for  providing  any  facilities,  and  a  working  test  for deciding whether a tax is compensatory or not is to  enquire whether  the  trades people are having the  use  of  certain facilities for the better conduct of their business and  not paying  patently  much  more  than  what  is  required   for providing  the facilities.  It would be impossible to  judge the  compensatory nature of a tax by a meticulous test  and, in the nature of things, it could not be done.  It is always

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difficult to evolve a formula which will in all cases ensure exact  compensation  for  the use of the  road  by  vehicles having  regard  to their type, weight  and  mileage.   Rough approximation, rather than mathematical accuracy is all that is required. [722G; 723A-D] Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of  Rajasthan [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491 followed. (c)  If  the  tax  is  attacked on the  ground  that  it  is excessive,  the burden ,of proof is upon the  one  attacking its  validity.  The amount of the charges and the method  of collection  are  primarily for determination  by  the  State itself, although they must be reasonable and fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical standard.  Although  any method  of  taxation  which has a  direct  bearing  upon  or connection with the use of the highways is apparently valid, a tax which has no such apparent bearing and is not shown to be  compensatory,  but is rather a tax on the  privilege  of engaging  in trade and commerce, is beyond the power of  the State.   It  is also not necessary that there  should  be  a separate  fund  or  expenses allocation  of  money  for  the maintenance of roads to prove the compensatory purpose  when such purpose is proved by alternative evidence. [723G-724B] (d)  It  could  not be said that vehicle tax can  be  levied only for the the of the road in existence and that the  levy is  not  compensatory because government, has  included  the cost  of the construction of new roads also in  their  ’road costs’ because. [724B-C] (i)  Even  if  the  cost of construction  of  new  roads  is excluded,  the receipts would not be sufficient to meet  the expenses   incurred  for  maintenance  of  old   roads   and therefore.  it  is  difficult to say that  in  actual  fact, capital expenditure for construction of new roads was  taken into account in the levy of vehicle tax. [724E-F] (ii) This  court approved in the Automobile case the  reason given by the High Court that the State was charging far  the cost incurred in maintaining and making roads. [724G-725A] (iii)     The  State may impose even upon motor vehicles  as compensation  ’for the use of the public highways a  charge) which  is a fair contribution to the cost  of  (constructing and  maintaining roads and "for regulating traffic  thereon. [725B-C] Artmstrong  and  Ors. v. The State of Victoria and  Ors.  99 Commonwealth  ’Law  Reports 28; Commonwealth  Freighters  P. Ltd.   v.  Sneeddon  102  Commonwealth  Law   Reports   280; Interstate Transit Inc. v. Lindsey 283 U.S. 183, at 185  and Capital Greyhound Lines v. Brice 339 U.S. 542 referred to. 717 Therefore,     the  tax  imposed  by  the  notification   is compensatory in character and could not therefore   restrict the freedom of trade and commerce. [726C-D] (e) There is no material to show that the tax is cofiscatory or excessive and operates     as an unreasonable restriction upon the appellants right to carry on the    trade.   A  tax which  is  compensatory cannot operate  as  an  unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental right of the appellants  to carry on the business, for, the very idea of a  compensatory tax  is  service  more or less  commensurate  with  the  tax levied.   No  citizen  has a right to  engage  in  trade  or business without paying for the special services he receives from  the  State.  because,  that is part  of  the  cost  of carrying on the business. [726E-F] 3.   (a)  The  reasons  for enhancing  the  vehicle  tax  on contract carriages are, (a)   that  contract  carriages  run more miles, (b) carry more load, and (c) stage carriages pay surcharge  on the fare collected; while owners  of  contract

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carriage are not liable to pay the surcharge.  It cannot  be said that a classification made on the basis of the capacity of the contract carriage to run more miles is  unreasonable, because,  these carriages will be using the road  more  than the stage carriages which have got time schedules. specified routes and maximum and minimum number of trips. [727D-728C] (b)  There is always a presumption that a classification  is valid,  especially  in  a taxing statute and  a  person  who challenges  a classification as unreasonable has the  burden of  proving  it.  Classification depends to a  great  extent upon an assessment of the local conditions under which these carriages  are  being  run  which  the  legislature  or  the administrative body alone is competent to make.  The Act  in its II Schedule classifies contract carriages     and  stage carriages separately for tax purposes.  Therefore, when  the Government,  in  the exercise of its power to  tax,  made  a classification  between stage carriages on the one hand  and contract carriage on the other hand and fixed a higher  rate of  tax  on the latter, the presumption is  that  Government made  that  classification on the basis of  its  information that  contract carriages are using the roads more  than  the stage  carriages  because they are running more  miles;  and this  Court has to assume, in the absence of  any  materials placed  by  the  owners  of  contract  carriages,  that  the classification  is  reasonable.   Hence,  the  levy  of   an enhanced  rate of vehicle tax on contract carriages  is  not hit by Art. 14. [730G-731E] State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills Ltd. [1974] 11 S.C.J.  211, at 231.  San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1 and  Carmichael  v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.  301  U.S.  495 referred to

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.  2415  of 1972 and 128 to 132 of 1973. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgments and Order  dated the  14th  February, 1972 of the Madras High Court  in  WPs. Nos. 3062/71 and 3069-3073 of 1971. S.   V.  Gupte (In CA No. 128/73), K. S. Ramamurthi  (In  CA No. 129 of 1973 and 2415 of 1972) and A. T. M. Sampath,  for the appellants (in CAs.  Nos. 2415/72 and 128-132/73). S.   Govind  Swaminathan,  Advocate Gen. for  the  State  of Tamil Nadu, N. S. Sivan, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for the respondent (in C.A. 2415/72 and 128-129/73). A.   T. M. Sampath, for the petitioners in WPs.  Nos.  1051- 54, 1120, 1463-65 and 488-495/73. E.   C. Agarwala, for the petitioners (in WPs.  No. 994  and 1312/73 K.   R. Nambiar, for the petitioners (in WP.  No,. 1850/73). 718 N.   Natesan  (In WP.  Nos. 253 and 394/73), A. K.  Sen  (In 395/73)   and  K.  Doraiswami  and  K.  Jayaram,   for   the petitioners (in all rest of petitions). S.   Govind  Swarninadhan, Advocate Gen. for State of  Tamil Nadu A.   V.  Rangam and A. Subhashini, for the  respondents (In all the petitions). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW,   J.-In  the  Civil  Appeals,  the   questions   for consideration are whether the enhancement of motor  vehicles tax  on omnibuses imposed by G.O. No. 2044-Home dated  20-9- 1971  by the Government of Tamil Nadu from Rs. 30  per  seat per   quarter  to  Rs.  100/-  per  seat  per   quarter   is constitutionally  valid  and whether  the  distinction  made

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between contract carriages and stage carriages in the matter of  levy  of vehicle tax offends Article 14 of  the  Consti- tution. The  writ  petitions assail the validity  of  the  aforesaid notification on the additional ground, namely, that the  tax levied  under the notification imposes restrictions  on  the freedom  of  trade, commerce and intercourse  guaranteed  by Article   301   of  the  Constitution  and  that,   as   the notification is not law passed after obtaining the  previous sanction of the President of India, the tax is invalid. We  take up for consideration Writ Petition No. 253 of  1973 and  the judgment therein will dispose of the Civil  Appeals and the Writ Petitions. The  petitioner  is  the owner of an  omnibus  which  has  a capacity to accommodate 54 passengers.  He obtained a permit on  16-5-1968 to operate it as a contract carriage  and  was paying  tax  at the rate of Rs. 30/- per  seat  per  quarter under  the  Madras  Motor Vehicles Taxation Act  3  of  1931 (hereinafter called the ’Act’).  This Act was passed with  a view  to abolish levy of tolls in the Presidency  of  Madras and  the, levy of taxes on motor vehicles by  local  bodies. The rate of tax which originally stood at Rs. 10/- per  seat per  quarter was increased to Rs. 30/- per seat per  quarter when  the  systems of issuing permits for omnibuses  by  the regional   transport  authorities  came  into  vogue.    The Government  of Tamil Nadu by G.O.M.S. 923-Home  dated  19-4- 1969  increased  the rate of tax with respect  to  omnibuses from ’Rs. 30/- to Rs. 50/- per seat per quarter with  effect from 1-7-1969.  It was announced that this measure was  with a view to avoid unhealthy competition between omnibuses  and regular  stage carriage buses and to put down the misuse  of omnibuses.  The owners of omnibuses questioned the  validity of the notification in Writ Petition No. 1412 of 1969,  etc. During the pendency of those writ petitions, the  government increased  the rate of tax from Rs.  SO/- to Rs.  100/-  per seat per quarter with effect from 1-9-1970 by G.O.M.S.  434- Home  dated  27-2-1970.  The avowed object of  this  measure also  was to avoid unhealthy competition of  omnibuses  with regular  stage carriages.  A number of writ petitions  were, filed challenging the validity of this 719 notification.   By  a common judgment dated  29-1-1971,  the High  Court  allowed  the writ  petitions  and  quashed  the aforesaid notifications holding that the notifications  were a  device to eliminate the operation of  contract  carriages and that the notifications were not made in the exercise  of the power of taxation.  The result was that the rate of  tax was restored to Rs. 30/- per seat per quarter. Appeals were preferred against this decision to this Court. Thereafter,  the  Government of Tamil Nadu  issued  G.O.M.S. 2544 Home dated 20-1-1971 enhancing the tax from Rs. 30/- to Rs. 100/per seat per quarter with effect from 1-7-1971.   It is  this  G.O. which the petitioner challenges in  the  writ petition. Counsel  for  the petitioner submitted,  firstly,  that  the notification   was not a measure of taxation but a device to eliminate the competition of omnibuses with stage  carriages run by Government and, therefore, the tax is bad.  Secondly, he  submitted  that  the tax  is  neither  compensatory  nor regulatory_  in  character  and, therefore,  the  tax  is  a restriction   on   the  freedom  of  trade,   commerce   and intercourse   guaranteed  under  Article  301  and  as   the notification is not a law passed with the previous  sanction of the President, it would not be saved by   Article 304(b). In  other  words,  the submission was  that  since  the  tax

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operates  as restriction on the freedom of  trade,  commerce and  intercourse within the State, it could be imposed  only by  a  law which had obtained the previous sanction  of  the President and as the notification in question was issued by- the  Government in the exercise of its delegated  power,  it was not a law made by the legislature nor could the previous sanction of the President be obtained for it. The tax was imposed by the Government in the exercise of its power under s. 4 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Taxation  Act, 1931.  That section provides :               "4(1)    The   State   Government   may,    by               notification  in  the official  gazette,  from               time to time direct that a tax shall be levied               on  every motor vehicle using any public  road               in the Presidency of Madras,               (2)   The   notification  issued  under   sub-               section (1) shall specify the rates at  which,               and  the quarter from which, the tax shall  be               levied :               Provided  that the rates shall not exceed  the               maxima specified in Schedule II.               (3)   A notification under sub-section (1) may               be issued so as to   have retrospective effect               from a date not earlier than the 1st     day               of July, 1962.               Provided that a notification under sub-section               (1) ill respect of the rates as amended by the               Madras  Motor  Vehicles  Taxation  (Amendment)               Act, 1967 shall not have retrospective  effect               from a date earlier than the 1st day of  July,               1967." 15-L319SupCI/75 720 As  the state legislature was competent to pass the Act  and as the Government is authorised under S. 4 to levy the  tax, the question of the motive with which the tax was imposed is immaterial.  To put it differently, there can be no plea  of a colourable exercise of power to tax if the Government  had power to impose the tax and the fact that the imposition  of the tax was for the purpose of eliminating competition would not detract from its validity. if an authority has power  to impose  a  tax,  the fact that it gave a  wrong  reason  for exercising the power would not derogate from the validity of the  tax.   Therefore, there is no substance  in  the  first contention. The  second  submission  raises the  point  whether  tax  in question is a restriction on the freedom of trade,  commerce and   intercourse   guaranteed  by  Article   301   of   the Constitution. In  Atiabari  Tea  Co. v.  State  of  Assam(1)  (hereinafter referred  to as ’Atiabari Case’), the appellants  challenged the  validity  of the Assam Taxation (on  Goods  carried  by Roads and Inland Waterways) Act, 1954, on the ground that it violated  Article 391 and was not saved by  Article  304(b). By a majority of 4 to 1, this Court upheld the challenge and declared  the  Act to be void.  The majority  said  that  it would  be reasonable and proper to hold  that  restrictions, freedom  from which is guaranteed by Article 301,  would  be such  restrictions as directly and immediately  restrict  or impede the free flow or movement of trade and that taxes may and do amount to restrictions, but it is only such taxes  as directly and immediately restrict trade hat would fall  with in  the purview of Article 301.  Sinha, C.J. dissented.   He held that taxation simpliciter, as opposed to discriminatory taxation,  was  not  within  Article  301.   Shah,  J.   who

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delivered   a  separate  judgment  said  that  Article   301 guaranteed  freedom  in its  widest  amplitude-freedom  from prohibition,  control,  burden or impediment  in  commercial intercourse. The direct and immediate restriction test had great  adverse effect upon the financial autonomy of states.  For instance, a  law passed by a state legislature under entry 56 in  List 11, namely "taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on  inland  waterways"  would  be  a  restriction  which  is immediate  and  direct  on the movement part  of  trade  and commerce and would be bad.  This means that Entry 56 in List 11 is rendered otiose. In  view of the grave impact of this judgment, when  appeals from  Rajasthan  High  Court came up  for  consideration  in Automobile   Transport   (Rajasthan)  Ltd.   v.   State   of Rajasthan(2)  (hereinafter  referred to as  the  ’Automobile Case’),  a  larger  Bench was  constituted  and  that  Bench considered the question once again.  The appellants in  that case  impugned  the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles  Taxation  Act, 1951,  inter alia as violating Article 301.  The High  Court dismissed the petitions ’and this Court, by a majority of  4 to 3 held that the Act was valid and dismissed the  appeals. The  case  practically overruled the  decision  in  Atiabari Case(17),  insofar  as it held that if a  state  legislature wanted to impose tax to raise moneys necessary in order to (1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 809. (2)  [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491. 721 maintain roads, that could only be done after obtaining  the sanction of the President as provided in Article 304(b).  In Khverbari  Tea co. Ltd. v. The State of,, Assam(1),  it  was said  that  the decision in Atiabar.; case was  affirmed  in Automobile   Case  with  a   clarification   that-regulatory measures  or measures imposing compensatory tax do not  come within  the purview of restrictions contemplated in  Article 301  and  that  such  measures  need  not  comply  with  the requirement  of  the  provisions  of  Article  304(b).    In whatever  way  one may choose to put it, the effect  of  the majority   decision  in  the  Automobile  Case  is  that   a compensatory tax is not a restriction upon the movement part of trade and commerce. Article 301 imposes a general limitation on all  legislative power   in  order  to  secure  that  trade,   commerce   and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. Article  302  gave  power to Parliament  to  impose  general restrictions upon that freedom.  But a restriction is put on this relaxation by Article 303(1) which prohibits Parliament from  giving  preference  to  one  State  over  another   or discriminating  between one State and another by  virtue  of the  entries relating to trade and commerce in Lists  I  and III of Seventh Schedule and a similar restriction is  placed on  the  states,  though  the reference  to  the  states  is inappropriate.  Each of the clauses of Article 304  operates as a proviso to Articles 301 and 303.  Article 304(a) places goods  imported  from sister-states on a  par  with  similar goods manufactured or produced inside the state in regard to state  taxation within the allocated filed.  Article  304(b) is  the  State analogous to Article 302, for  it  makes  the state’s  power  contained in Article 304(b)  expressly  free from  the prohibition contained in Article 303(1) by  reason of the opening words of Article 304.  Whereas in Article 302 the  restrictions  are  not subject to  the  requirement  of reasonableness, the restrictions under Article 304(b) are so subject.   The  word  ’free’ in Article 301  does  not  mean freedom  from  regulation.   There is  a  clear  distinction

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between  laws  interfering  with freedom to  carry  out  the activities  constituting  trade and laws imposing  on  those engaged therein rules of proper conduct or other  restraints directed  to the due and orderly manner of carrying out  the activities.   This distinction is described  as  regulation. The word ’regulation’ has no fixed connotation.  Its meaning differs according to the nature of the thing to which it  is ,applied.   The true solution, perhaps, in any  given  case, could  be  found by distinguishing between features  of  the transaction  or activity in virtue of which it  fell  within the  category of trade, commerce and intercourse  and  those features  which,  though invariably found to occur  in  some form  or  another  in  the transaction  or  action  are  not essential  to  the  conception.  What  is  relevant  is  the contrast  between  the  essential  attribute  of  trade  and commerce  and the incidents of the transaction which do  not give  it  necessarily the character of trade  and  commerce. Such  matters relating to hours, equipment,  weight/size  of load,  lights, which form the incidents  of  transportation, even  if  inseparable,  do  not  give  the  transaction  its essential   character  of  trade  or  commerce.   Laws   for government of such incidents ’regulate’(2). (1)  [1964] 5 S.C.R.975. (2)  See   Wynes,  "Legislative,  Executive   and   Judicial Powers", p. 270. 722 Regulations  like  rules of traffic  facilitate  freedom  of trade and commerce whereas restrictions impede that freedom. The collection of toll or tax for the use of roads, bridges, or aerodromes, etc., do not operate as barriers or hindrance to trade.  For a tax to become a prohibited tax, it has  to, be  a  direct  tax, the effect of which  is  to  hinder  the movement  part of-the trade.  If the tax is compensatory  or regulatory,  it  cannot  operate as  a  restriction  on  the freedom of trade or commerce. The  question  for consideration then  is, whether  the  tax here, is a compensatory tax. Strictly speaking, a compensatory tax is based on the nature and  the  extent  of  the use made of  the  roads,  as,  for example,  a mile-age or ton-mileage charge or the like,  and if   the  proceeds  are  devoted  to  the  repair,   upkeep, maintenance  and  depreciation  of relevant  roads  and  the collection   of   the  exaction  involves   no   substantial interference with the movement.  The expression  ’reasonable compensation’  is  convenient but vague.   The  standard  of reasonableness  can only lie in the severity with  which  it bears  on traffic and such evidence of extravagance  in  its assessment  as  come from general considerations.   What  is essential for the purpose of securing freedom of movement by road  is that no pecuniary burden should be placed  upon  it which  goes beyond a proper recompense to the state for  the actual  use made of the physical facilities provided in  the shape  of  a  road.   The difficulties  arc  very  great  in defining this conception.  But the conception appears to  be based  on  a real distinction between remuneration  for  the provision of a specific physical service of which particular use  is made and a burden placed upon transportation in  aid of  the general expenditure of the state.  It is clear  that the  motor vehicles require, for their safe,  efficient  and economical  use,, roads of considerable width, hardness  and durability;  the  maintenance of such roads  will  cost  the government  money.   But,  because  the  users  of  vehicles generally, and of public motor vehicles in particular, stand in  a special and direct relation to such roads, and may  be said  to derive a special and direct benefit from  them,  it

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seems  not unreasonable that they should be called  upon  to make  a special contribution to their maintenance  over  and above their general contribution as taxpayers of the  State. If,  however,  a charge is imposed, not for the  purpose  of obtaining  a  proper  contribution to  the  maintenance  and upkeep  of  the  road,  but for  the  purpose  of  adversely affecting trade or commerce, then it would be a  restriction on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse(1). In  the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State,  the averment  is that Government has incurred an expenditure  of Rs. 19.51 crores in the year 1970-71 on the maintenance  and construction of roads while the receipts from out of vehicle tax  is  only Rs. 16.38 crores.  It is also  stated  therein that  the  amount of Rs. 19.51 crores did  not  include  the grants made to local bodies like municipalities and  Pancha- yat  Unions for the repair and maintenance of  roads  within their jurisdiction: "Road    costs",   according   to    the affidavit, not only includes (1) see Freightlines & Construction Holding Ltd. v. State of New South Wales, (1) [1968] A.C. 625. 723 he  cost of construction and maintenance of roads, but  also the costs elating to the erection and maintenance of traffic control  devices,  safety  measures,  improvements  to   old layouts  and  the  increased  establishment  of  enforcement staff. In the Automobile Case (supra) this Court said that it would not  be right to say that a tax is not compensatory  because the  precise  or specific amount collected is  not  actually used  for providing any facilities and that a working,  test for  deciding  whether a tax is compensatory or  not  is  to enquire  whether  the trades people are having  the  use  of certain facilities for the better conduct of their  business and paving not patently much more than what is required from providing the facilities, and that it would be impossible to judge the compensatory nature of a tax by a meticulous  test and, in the nature of things, it could not be done. It   is  well  to  remember  the  practical   administrative difficulties  in imposing a tax at a rate per mile.   It  is always difficult to evolve a formula which will in all cases ensure  exact  compensation  for  the use  of  the  road  by vehicles  having regard to their type, weight  and  mileage. Rough  approximation, rather than mathematical accuracy,  is all  that is required.  In all such matters, it is  well  to remember  the profound truth of the sayings "it is the  mark of  an educated man to look for precision in each  class  of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits"(1). The Supreme Court of U.S.A. takes the view that the validity of  a  tax on vehicles must be determined not by  way  of  a formula but rather by the result, and in several cases,  the court  has upheld the validity of a flat fee not  geared  to weight,  mileage  or seating capacity, provided the  fee  is reasonable in amount and is not shown to be in excess of the compensation for the use of the roads (2). According to that Court, since the purpose of the tax imposed by the state  on motor  vehicle using its road is to obtain from them a  fair contributive   share  of  the  cost  of   constructing   and maintaining the public highways and facilities furnished and to   defray   the  expense  of  administering   the   police regulations enacted for the purpose of ensuring the,  public safety,  the method used by the state for imposing tax  does not  seem  to be of great significance; but  such  taxation, however,  can  only be for the purpose of  compensating  the state  for  the use of its roads and to defray the  cost  of

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construction  and  maintenance and  expenses  in  regulating motor traffic, and it must affirmatively appear that such is the  purpose of the legislation sought to be  upheld.   But, once  a proper purpose is established, the state has  consi- derable discretion in the method, measurement and amount  of the tax. It  has  been said that the amount of the  charges  and  the method of collection are primarily for determination by  the state  itself,  although they must be reasonable  and  fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical standard.   If the tax is attacked on the ground that it is excessive,  the burden of proof is upon the one, attacking its validity. (1)  see  Basic Works of Aristotle, Ed.  Richard McKson,  p. 936. (2)  see  Morf.  v.  Bingaman,  298  U.  S.  407;  and  Aero Mayflower  Transit Co. v Board of R. R. Commrs., 332  U.  S. 497. 724 Although  any method of taxation which has a direct  bearing upon  or  connection  with  the  use  of  the  highways   is apparently  valid, a tax which has no such apparent  bearing and is not shown to be compensatory, but is rather a tax  on the  privilege of engaging in trade or commerce,  is  beyond the  power  of the state.  Nor is it  necessary  that  there should be a separate fund or express allocation of money for the  maintenance of roads to prove the compensatory  purpose when such purpose is proved by alternative evidence. Mr.  Natesan  appearing  for some of  the  writ  petitioners submitted that the levy is not a compensatory tax,  because, the government has included the cost of the construction  of new  roads  also in their ’road costs’ and that  that  would derogate  from the compensatory character of the  tax.   His argument  was  that it is only for the use of  the  road  in existence  that vehicle tax can be levied and  that  capital expenditure  for construction of new roads cannot  be  taken into  account and included in the levy of vehicle  tax.   In Armstrong and Others v. The State of Victoria and Others(1), the  Court  said  that traffic is a constant  flow  and  the regularly recurring charges of maintaining a surface for  it to  run.  upon may be recoverable from the  flowing  traffic without  any derogation of the freedom of movement; but  any contribution to capital expenditure goes altogether  outside such a principle and the charge must be a genuine attempt to cover  or  recover  the costs of upkeep of  the  roads.   In Commonwealth Freighters Pvt.  Ltd. v. Sneddon(2), the  court observed  that  it  does not seem  logical  to  include  the capital cost of new highways or other capital expenditure in the  costs  taken as the basis of the  computation  of  road costs. It is clear from the counter--affidavit filed that Rs. 19.51 crores have been spent not only for the maintenance of roads but  also for construction of new ones and that the  receipt from the vehicle tax was only Rs. 16.38 crores.  However, it is   not   clear  whether  any   capital   expenditure   for construction  of  new roads really entered into  the  actual levy  of vehicle tax.  It might be that even if the cost  of construction  of new roads is excluded, the  receipts  would not  be  sufficient  to  meet  the  expenses  incurred   for maintenance of old roads and, therefore, it is difficult  to say  that in actual fact, capital expenditure for  construc- tion  of  new roads was taken into account in  the  levy  of vehicle tax. That part, in the Automobile Case (supra), this Court quoted with approval a passage from the judgment of the High Court. The passage is as follows

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             "...We find that in 1952-53 income from  motor               vehicles   taxation  under  the  Act  was   in               neighbourhood of 34 lakhs.  In that very year,               the  expenditure on new roads and  maintenance               of  old roads was in the neighbourhood  of               60  lakhs.  In 1954-55, the  estimated  income               from the tax was 35 lakhs, while the estimated               expenditure was over 65 lakhs.  It is  obvious               from these figures that the State is (1)  99 Commonwealth Law Reports 28. (2)  102 Commonwealth Law Reports 280. 725               charging  from  the users  of  motor  vehicles               something  in the neighbourhood of 50% of  the               cost it has to incur in maintaining and making               roads". The approach of this Court is supported by the decisions  of the  Supreme Court of U.S.A. In Interstate Transit, Inc.  v. Lindscy(1), it is observed that while a state may not lay  a tax  on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce  it may  impose even upon motor vehicles engaged exclusively  in interstate commerce a charge, as compensation for the use of the public highways which is a fair contribution to the cost of  constructing and maintaining them and of regulating  the traffic thereon.  In Capital Greyhound Lines v. Brice ( 2) , the  state tax was upheld even though the attorney  for  the state  had  conceded  that  the tax  was  allocated  to  the construction and maintenance of the state highways. Whether the restrictions visualized by Article 304(b)  would include the levy of a non-discriminatory tax is a matter  on which  there  is scope for difference of  opinion.   Article 304(a)  prohibits only imposition of a  discriminatory  tax. It is not clear from the article that a tax simpliciter  ran be  treated  as  a restriction on the  freedom  of  internal trade.  Article 304(a) is intended to prevent discrimination against  imported goods by imposing on them tax at a  higher rate  than  that borne by goods produced in  the  state.   A discriminatory  tax  against  outside goods  is  not  a  tax simpliciter but is a barrier to trade and commerce.  Article 304 itself makes a distinction between tax and  restriction. That  apart,  taxing  powers of the  Union  and  States  are separate and mutually exclusive.  It is rather strange  that power to tax   given  to  states, say  for  instance,  under Entry 54 of List II to  pass a law imposing  tax on sale  of goods should depend upon the goodwill of     the       Union executive.   It is said that a tax on sale does  not  impede the  movement  of  goods.   But Shah, J. said  in  State  v. Natarajan "that tax under Central sales  tax on  inter-state sale,  it  must be noticed, is in its essence  a  tax  which encumbers   movement  of  trade  and  commerce".    However, Bachawat, J. in his separate judgment in that case said that Article  301 makes no distinction between movement from  one part  of  the state to another part of the  same  state  and movement  from  one  state  to another, that  if  a  tax  on intrastate sale does not offend Article 301, equally, a  tax on  inter-state  sale cannot do so, and  that,  neither  tax operate directly or immediately on the free flow of trade or free movement as the tax is on the sale, the movement  being incidental  or consequential. What is guaranteed by  Article 301 is freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse.   Freedom of  movement  of goods from one place to another is  a  very important  facet of freedom of trade and commerce.  That  is perhaps  the  reason why the Court, in the  Automobile  Case (supra)  restricted  the  freedom  of  trade  and   commerce guaranteed  under  Article 301 to the movement part  of  it.

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Whether there is any warrant for restricting the concept  of freedom of trade and commerce to the movement part of it  is a  matter  upon  which we are not called upon  to  make  any pronouncement.  A tax on (1)283 U. S. 183, at 185. (3)  [1968] 3 S.C.R. 829. (2) 339 U. S. 5442. 726 sale of goods might encumber sale and purchase and, to  that extent,  restricts the freedom of trade and commerce.   That apart,  as Shah, J. said, if tax on inter-state sale  is  in essence  "a  tax  which  encumbers  movement  of  trade  and commerce",  a  tax  on intra-state,  sale,  if  it  Involves movement  from one part of the state to another part of  the same state, would encumber the movement part of it and is  a restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce.  Generally speaking, selling and buying involves delivery of the  goods sold  and  bought.   If  that be  so,  it  would  mean  that imposition  of sales tax by a state on intrastate  sale,  at any  rate, when the sale involves movement of goods will  be restriction  of  trade  and  commerce  and  unless  the  law imposing  it  has  received the  previous  sanction  of  the President, the law would be bad as a tax on sales is neither regulatory  nor  compensatory.   If the  President  were  to refuse his consent, the state will be bereft of that  source of  revenue which the Constitution has expressly,  given  to the State.  It is unnecessary to pursue the matter  further, as  we  think  the  tax  imposed  by  the  notification   is compensatory in character and could not, therefore, restrict the freedom of trade and commerce according to the  decision in Automobile Case (supra). In  the Civil Appeals, two points have been raised,  namely, (1)  that  the tax imposed is excessive  and  therefore,  it operates  as unreasonable restriction upon  the  fundamental right  of the appellants to carry on the business;  and  (2) that  the imposition of different rates of tax  on  contract and stage carriages is discriminatory and is, therefore, hit by Article 14. So far as the first contention is concerned, we do not think that any material has been placed before us to hold that the tax   is  confiscatory  and  operates  as  an   unreasonable restriction  upon  the  appellants’ right to  carry  on  the trade.  We have already held that the tax is compensatory in character.   If  that  is so, we do not think  that  it  can operate as an unreasonable restriction upon the  fundamental right of the appellants to carry on their business, for, the very  idea  of  compensatory tax is  service  more  or  less commensurate with the tax levied.  No citizen has a right to engage  in trade or business without paying for the  special services  he receives from the state.  That is part  of  the cost of carrying on the business. Mr.  Gupte contended that there was no reason  for  imposing vehicle  tax at a higher rate on contract carriages than  on stage  carriages.   He said that both  stage  carriages  and contract  carriages are similarly situated with  respect  to the purpose of vehicle taxation, namely, the use of the road and,  therefore, a higher vehicle tax on contract  carriages is manifestly discriminatory.  In other words, the  argument was  that  the  classification  of  the  vehicles  as  stage carriages and contract carriages for the purpose of a higher levy of vehicle tax on contract carriages has no  reasonable relation to the purpose of the Act. The  Act  contained  originally 3  schedules  out  of  which Schedule II was repealed in 1938 with the result that  there are  now  Schedules II and III only.  Schedule II  was  made

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under  s. 4(2) of the Act and Schedule III under s. 5  (1  ) (c) of the Act.  Section 17 of the Act gave 727 power  to  the  State, Government  to  make  rules  amending Schedule  11  or  Schedule  HI.  Sub-clause  (3)  of  S.  17 provided that any rule made under s. 17 shall be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly and the rule shall not  be made  unless the Assembly approves the draft either  without modification  cr.  addition and on such rule being  so  made shall  be  published  in the  official  gazette  and  shall, therefore,  have full force and effect.  Schedule  II  deals with various types of motor vehicles.  Entry 4(iii)  therein deals with vehicles permitted to ply as stage carriages  and to  carry more than 6 persons and not plying exclusively  in the City of Madras or Municipalities.  The maximum quarterly tax is indicated in respect of such vehicles under 2 heads : (1)  vehicles  fitted with pneumatic tyres;  and  (2)  other vehicles.   For  every  seated passenger  (.other  than  the driver and the conductor) which the vehicle is permitted  to carry,  the maximum quarterly tax for vehicles  fitted  with pneumatic  tyres  as also for other  vehicles  was  provided depending  upon  the distance covered by such  vehicles  per day.   Entry  4(iv)  deals with vehicles  permitted  to  ply solely  as contract carriages carrying more than  5  persons (other  than the driver).  For every person other  than  the driver, which the vehicle is permitted to carry, the maximum quarterly  tax for vehicles fitted with pneumatic tyres  and for other vehicles is also provided. The  reason  for  enhancing  the  vehicle  tax  on  contract carriages  is  stated in the counter-affidavit.   It  is  as follows.   Commercial vehicles consist of  public  transport passenger   buses,  namely  stage  carriages  and   contract carriages and goods vehicles namely, trucks of varying capa- city.   The  tax  on  lorries is  graduated,  based  on  the permitted  laden  weight, the higher the laden  weight,  the higher the amount of tax.  So far as the passenger buses are concerned, the stage carriages cannot do unlimited  mileage. But  contract carriages, depending upon  the  organisational efficiency,  can do much more distance of travel per day  as there  is flexibility of space and time for  its  operation. The  stage  carriages  have to operate only  on  fixed  time schedules  and on fixed routes and the number of miles  they can negotiate is limited by the rule to 250 miles.  Besides. they  can  operate  only  on roads  duly  certified  by  the concerned  authorities  as fit for such operation.   On  the other  hand,  in the-case of contract  carriages,  there  is neither  any  fixed time schedule nor any fixed  route;  the number  of miles they can run is also quite unlimited;  they are  free  to  operate  on any route  whether  the  road  is certified  as  fit  for  such traffic  or  not.   Hence  the contract  carriages  can run a larger number of  miles  than stage carriages and therefore the wear and tear of the  road caused  would be greater and in the case of roads which  are not  fit for such operation, the damage to the road  surface due  to  wear and tear is quite likely to  be  much  larger, involving higher cost of maintenance of such roads; in other words,  the contract carriage even with the  same  passenger seating capacity as a stage carriage can travel on any  road and on any type of surface at any time of the day or  night, and  thus can cause greater damage to roads,  especially  of the inferior type of road surfaces which it traverses.   The higher  speed of vehicle will induce correspondingly  higher impact  stresses on the pavement structure than the  vehicle of 728

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the same capacity at lower speeds.  These higher stresses in the  pavement layers affect the performance  characteristics ad durability of the, surface.  Also, higher speeds  require longer accelerating and decelerating, distances which brings in  the maximum value of the frictional coefficient  causing increased wear and tear of the road surfaces.  Moreover, the load  factor  of a stage carriage  including  the  passenger luggage may be comparatively low.  In the  counter-affidavit it  is  also stated that the rate ’of tax payable  on  stage carriage is Rs. 651- per seat per quarter and a surcharge of 10 paise per rupee on the fare collected, through there is a provision for compounding the tax collected at Rs. 25/-  per seat  per  quarter  under  the  Tamil  Nadu  Motor  Vehicles (Taxation  of  Passengers  and Goods)  Act,  1952,  is  also payable  by  their  owners  and  that  owners  of   contract carriages are not liable to pay the Surcharge. Section  2(3)  of  the Motor Vehicles  Act,  19,39,  defines "contract carriage" as follows :                " ’ contract carriage’ means a  motor vehicle               which  carries a passenger or  passengers  for               hire  or reward under a contract expressed  or               implied for the use of the vehicle as a  whole               at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum-               (i)   on  a  time basis whether  or  not  with               reference to any route or distance, or               (ii)  from one point to another, and in either               case without stopping to pick up,               or set down along the line of route passengers               not  included in the contract; and includes  a               motor cab notwithstanding that the  passengers               may pay separate fares."               "Stage carriage" has been defined in S.  2(29)               of that Act as under               "  stage  carriage’  means  a  motor   vehicle               carrying  or  adapted to carry more  than  six               persons excluding the driver  which  carries               passengers  for  hire or  reward  at               separate  fares  paid  by  or  for  individual               passengers,  either for the whole  journey  or               for stages of the journey".    Under  s.  46  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1939,   an application  for stage carriage permit must  contain,  among other  things, the route or routes or the area or  areas  to which  the  application  relates, the  minimum  and  maximum number of daily trips proposed to be provided in relation to each  route  or  area and the time table  of  normal  trips. Section 48 of that Act is clear that the regional  transport authority  may attach a condition that the vehicle shall  be used  only in a specified area or on a specified  route  and also  fix the minimum or maximum number of daily trips,  the number  of  passengers, the weight and nature  of  passenger luggages.   An  application for a contract  carriage  permit must contain, among other things, specification of the  area for  which  the  permit  is required (see  s.  49)  and  the regional transport 729 authority  may  attach  a  condition  that  the  vehicle  or vehicles  can be used only in a specified area  or  specific route or routes and that except in accordance with specified conditions,  no contract of hiring, other than an  extension or modification of a subsisting contract may be entered into outside  the specified area (see S. 51).  A  stage  carriage permit  may authorize the use of the vehicle as  a  contract carriage (sees. 42).  The State Government is authorised  by s.  43  to issue directions as to the fixing  of  fares  and

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freights including the maximum and minimum thereof for stage carriages and contract carriages.  The limit of the speed of any motor vehicle can be fixed by the State Government or an authority  authorized in that behalf and the  maximum  speed shall  in  no case exceed the maximum fixed  in  the  eighth schedule (sees. 71). It cannot be said that a classification made on the basis of the capacity of the contract carriages to run more miles  is unreasonable because those carriages will be using the  road more   than  the  stage’  carriages  which  have  got   time schedules,  specified routes and minimum and maximum  number of  trips.   A  person.who challenges  a  classification  as unreasonable has the burden of proving it.  There is  always a presumption that a classification is valid, especially  in a taxing statute.  The ancient proposition that a person who challenges  the  reasonableness  of  a  classification,  and therefore,  the  constitutionality  of the  law  making  the classification,  has to prove it by relevant materials,  has been reiterated by this Court recently.(1) In the context of commercial  regulation, Article 14 is offended only  if  the classification  rests  on grounds wholly irrelevant  to  the achievement  of the objective and this lenient  standard  is further  weighted in the State’s favour by the fact  that  a statutory  discrimination will not be set aside if a:  state of facts may reasonably be conceived by the Court to justify it.(2) .lm15 In  State  of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills Ltd. (3),  this  Court said : ". . . In the utilities, tax and economic  regulation cases,  there are good reasons for judicial  self-restraint, if  not  judicial deference to  legislative  judgment.   The legislature, after all, has the affirmative  responsibility. The   Courts  have  only  the  power  to  destroy,  not   to reconstruct.   When  these are added to  the  complexity  of economic  regulation,  the  uncertainty,  the  liability  to error,  the  bewildering conflict of the  experts,  and  the number  of times the judges have been overruled  by  events- self  limitation  can  be seen to be  the.path  of  judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability (see  Joseph Tussman  and Jacobus tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of  the Laws", 37 California Law Rev. 341.’  This  approach  is  consistent  with  the  latest  reported decision  of the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. in San  Antonio School District v. Bodrigues(4) where the majority  speaking through Justice Stewart said:               "Thus,  we  stand on familiar ground  when  we               continue  to acknowledge that the Justices  of               this Court lack both the ex- (1)  see Amalgamated Tea Estates v. State of Kerala.  (1974) 4  S.C.C. 415 & Murthy Match Works v. Asstt.   Collector  of Central Excise, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 428. (2) see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S., at 425-626. (3) [1974] 11 S.C.J. 211, at 231. (4) 411 U.S.I. 730               pertise   and  the  familiarity   with   local               problems  so necessary to the making  of  wise               decisions  with  respect to  the  raising  and               disposition  of public revenues.  Yet, we  are               urged  to  direct the States either  to  alter               drastically the present system or to throw out               the property tax altogether in favour of  some               other   form  of  taxation.   No   scheme   of               taxation,  whether  the  tax  is  imposed   on               property,  income, or purchases of  goods  and

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             services,  has yet been devised which is               free of all discriminatory impact.  In such  a               complex arena in which no perfect alternatives               exist,  the Court does well not to impose  too               rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local               fiscal  schemes become subjects  of  criticism               under the Equal Protection Clause."               Marshall, J. in his dissenting judgment  (with               which  Douglas, J. concurred), summed up,  his               conclusion as follows :               "In summary, it seems to me inescapably  clear               that this Court has consistently adjusted  the               care   with   which  it  will   review   state               discrimination in light of the  constitutional               significance of the interests affected and the               invidiousness      of      the      particular               classification.   In the context  of  economic               interests, we find that discriminatory,  state               action  is almost always sustained,  for  such               interests  are  generally  far  removed   from               constitutional  guarantees.   Moreover,   "the               extremes  to  which  the  Court  has  gone  in               dreaming   up   rational   bases   for   state               regulation in that area may in many  instances               be  ascribed to a healthy revulsion  from  the               Court’s   earlier   excesses  in   using   the               Constitution  to protect interests  that  have               more  than enough power to protect  themselves               in   the  legislative  halls"   Dandridge   v.               Williams, 397 US, at 520." Judicial  deference to legislature in instances of  economic regulation  is  sometimes  explained by  the  argument  that rationality  of  a  classification may  depend  upon  ’local conditions’ about which local legislative or  administrative body  would be better informed than a court.   Consequently, lacking  the  capacity  to inform  itself  fully  about  the peculiarities  of  a  particular local  situation,  a  court should  hesitate  to  dub  the  legislative   classification irrational  (see Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke  Co.(1). Tax  laws, for example, may respond closely to  local  needs and  court’s  familiarity with these needs is likely  to  be limited.   Therefore,  the Court must be aware  of  its  own remoteness and lack of familiarity with the local  problems. Classification  is dependent on peculiar needs and  specific difficulties   of   the  community.   The  needs   and   the difficulties of a community are constituted out of facts and information beyond the easy ken of the court.  It depends to a  great  extent upon an assessment of the  local  condition under  which  these  carriages  are  being  run  which   the legislature or the administrative body ;alone was  competent to make(2).  Therefore, when the Government, (1)301 U.S. 491 (2)  See  State  of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills Ltd.  [1974]  11 S.C.J.  211  Chiranjit lal v. Union of India  [1950]  S.C.R. 869; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952]  S.C.R. 284 at 303. 731 in  the exercise of its power to tax, made a  classification between  stage.  carriages  on the  one  hand  and  contract carriages on the other and fixed a higher rate of tax on the latter,  the  presumption is that the Government  made  that classification on the basis of its information that contract carriages are using the roads more than the stage  carriages because they are running more miles.  Therefore, this  Court has to assume, in the absence of any materials placed by the

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appellants  and  petitioners,  that  the  classification  is reasonable.    It  was  a  matter  exclusively  within   the knowledge  of the petitioners and the appellants as to,  how many miles the contract carriages would              run  on an average per day or month. When, in the  counter-affidavit the  allegation  was made that the owners  of  the  contract carriages  are free to run at any time throughout the  State without  restrictions, the inference which the State  wanted the  Court  to  draw was that the  owners  of  the  contract carriages were utilizing this freedom for running more miles than the stage      carriages. As to the number of miles run by the contract carriages, it was not possible for the state government to furnish any statistics.        They could only say that since there are no restrictions, they must have run more  miles  and  that  cannot  be  said  to  be  a   purely speculative   assessment.   If  the  petitioners   and   the appellants  had  a  case that contract  carriages  were  not running more miles on an average           than the    stage carriages,  it  would  have  been open  for  them  to  place relevant  materials  before the Court as the materials  were within  their exclusive knowledge and possession.  In  these circumstances,  we think there is the presumption  that  the classification is reasonable, especially in the light of the fact that the classification is based on local conditions of which   the  Government  was  fully  cognizant.  Since   the petitioners and     the  appellants have not discharged  the burden  of proving that the classification is  unreasonable, we hold that the levy of an enhanced rate of vehicle tax  on contract carriages was not hit by Article 14. We dismiss the writ petitions and appeals without any  order as to     costs. V.P.S.                                Petitions dismissed. 732