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PETITIONER: G B KASHIRSAGAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: L A NARODE

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       25/09/1996

BENCH: M.M. PUNCHHI, K.VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      The view  of the  High Court in rendering the appellant helpless in retaining his tenancy over a small piece of land admeasuring 1 acre and 38 guntas is put to challenge in this appeal.      It transpires  that the  appellant was  in  cultivating possession of  4 acres  and 38  guntas  of  land  under  the respondent-landlord. On an application moved by the landlord under Section  31 of  the Bombay  Tenancy  and  Agricultural Lands Act.  1948 [the  Act],  the  Tenancy  Awal,    Karkun. Kopargaon passed  an order  on 3.5.1954  on the  basis of  a compromise effected  between the parties whereunder 3  acres of land was surrendered to the landlord and the balance land was left  to be retained by the tenant. It is beyond dispute that had  the application  been decided  on merit, the worst that could  have happened  to the  tenant was  that he would have been  made to  vacate half  the tenanted  land.  As  is obvious, the  tenant was worse off by the compromise and was left to retain less than half of the land to the extent of 1 are, 38  quntas only.  Be that  as  it  may,  the  situation continued as  such, when  a second  attempt was  made by the landlord to  evict the  tenant under  the same  provision of ection  31  of  the  Act.  This  time,  there  again  was  a compromise. The  land was  conceded to  be  sugarcane  land. Undentably, different    provisions  of  the  Act  apply  to sugarcane lands,  details of  which  we  are  not  presently concerned with:  except to  say  that  the  tenants  of  the sugarcane lands  were  then  not  evictable.  Later  came  a notification  which   permitted  eviction   of  tenants   of sugarcane lands  as well, provided such an endeavour did not come to  clash with the provisions of Section 31C and 31d of the act.  Section 31C  provides that the tenancy of any land left with  the tenant  after the  termination of the tenancy under  Section 31 shall not at any time arterwards be liable to termination  again on  the ground  that the landlord bona fide required  that land  for personal  cultivation. Section 31D provides  that if,  in consequence of the termination of the tenancy  under Section 31 any part of the land leased is left with  the tenant,  the rent shall be apportioned in the prescribed manner in proportion to the area of the land left

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with the  tenant. The  notification prompted the landlord to move again,  seeking the  land left with the tenant for bona fide personal  cultivation. He  naturally was  confronted by the tenant  with the  bar under  Section 31C of the Act. Two courts in the revenue hierarchy employed the bar and decided in favour  of the  tenant-appellant but the Land Tribunal in revision at the instance of the landlord, upset those orders and the  High Court  in a writ petition, has come to confirm the same.      The ground  on which  the Land  Tribunal and  the  High Court   have demolished the defence available in Section 31C is that  the earlier  order under Section 31, dated 3.5.1954 was, strictly  speaking, not  an order  under Section 31 but merely a  consent order  or a compromise order: not an order of the kind envisaged under Section 31C so as to erect abar. It is  to examine  that view  that the parties’ counsel have been heard and the relevant provisions gone into.      It is  noticeable that  Section  31  provides  for  the procedure  for   termination   of   tenancy   for   personal cultivation and  for non-agricultural  use,  for  which  the landlord has  been vested with a right. If his claim is bona fide and  is based  on the rights conferred in the provision then read  with Section  31C, the  said  provision  patently appears to  be a one-time measure. The matter in hang can be viewed in this manner that proceedings under Section 31 were resorted to by the landlord and a decision was made thereon. if not  on contest  with consent of the Parties to which the Authority hearing  the matter  put. its seal of approval. No one can  say that  the  said  order  was  not  an  order  in purported exercise  of  the  powers  and  functions  of  the Authority under Section 31. Having had a larger share of the cake, it  did not  lie in  the month  of the  landlord to be complaining that  those proceedings  were no  proceedings at all, in  terms of  Section 31.  Merely because the Authority did not  record an  order after contest, can be no ground to denude the  power exercised by the Authority in that behalf. If this is so then Section 31C is an Obvious bar to a second attempt to end the tenancy. Merely because the landlord bona fide requires  that land  for personal  cultivation  on  the suggested premise  that his family members have increased is of no  consequence. Thus,  in our view, the High Court, with due  respect,  was  in  error  in  rendering  the  appellant defenceless, denying  him the  benefit of Section 31C of the Act. We hold accordingly.      For the  foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and  order of  the High  Court is set aside as also that of  the Land  Tribunal; restoring  the  orders  of  the Authorities under  the Act passed at the two stages: initial as well as secondary. No costs.