REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5292 OF 2004

 FULJIT KAUR   …. Appellant

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.   …. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This is a unique case which reveals that an influential  

person can have allotment of a residential plot in discretionary  

quota within 48 hours of submission of application and then  

assert  in  Court  that  she  has  a  right  to  have  a  land  on  a  

throwaway price and not to deposit the sale price for quarter of  

a century.   

2. This appeal has been preferred against a Judgment and  

Order dated 21.12.1999 in Writ Petition No. 4763 of 1992 of  

the  High  Court  of  Punjab  &  Haryana  at  Chandigarh,

dismissing  the  petition  against  the  Demand  Notice  of  

additional price for residential plot.   

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that  

the appellant made an application on 23.02.1987 for allotment  

of a residential plot in Urban Estates, SAS Nagar, Punjab.  The  

Administration,  vide  letter  dated  25.02.1987,  issued  the  

allotment letter in favour of the appellant in respect of plot No.  

702, measuring 400 sq. yards in Sector 70 Urban Estate SAS  

Nagar, making it clear that as the proper calculation could not  

be  made  and tentative  price  had not  been determined,  the  

allottee has to deposit provisional price of Rs. 93000/- in four  

installments upto 15.10.1989.  Subsequently, vide letter dated  

25.03.1992, additional demand of Rs. 2,19,000/- was made,  

however,  instead  of  depositing  the  said  amount,  appellant  

challenged the said Demand Notice by filing Writ Petition No.  

4763  of  1992  before  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  &  Haryana  

contending  that  the  additional  demand  was  arbitrary  and  

unreasonable.   A  large  number  of  similar  cases  were  also  

pending  before  the  High  Court  and  some  had  earlier  been  

disposed of.  However, the Writ Petition filed by the appellant

has  been  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  vide  impugned  

Judgment and Order dated 21.12.1999 upholding the demand  

dated 25.03.1992.  Hence this appeal.  

4. Sh. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the appellant, has submitted that the High Court committed  

an error in dismissing the said Writ Petition relying upon the  

Judgment of this Court in Preeta Singh & Ors. Vs. Haryana  

Urban Development Authority & Ors. (1996) 8 SCC 756.  In  

D.S. Laungia & Anr. Vs.  The State of Punjab & Ors. AIR  

1993 Pub.&Har. 54, such unreasonable and arbitrary demand  

had  been  quashed  by  the  High  Court  and  the  State  

Government was issued direction to re-determine the amount  

taking into consideration the provisions of the Punjab Urban  

Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called as, “the  

Rules”) and provisions of Punjab Urban Estates (Development  

and Regulation)  Act,  1964 (hereinafter  called  as,  “the  Act”).  

The  said  Judgment  has  attained  finality  as  the  State  had  

preferred Special Leave Petition against the said Judgment &  

Order before this Court but later on, it was withdrawn.  After  

re-determining  the  additional  price,  no  recovery  has  been

made from Sh. D.S. Laungia till date.  Therefore, the appeal  

deserves to be allowed.     

5.  On  the  other  hand,  Ms.  Rachna  Joshi  Issar,  learned  

counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposed the  

appeal contending that the High Court has rightly relied upon  

the  Judgment  in  Preeta  Singh (supra).   In  D.S.  Laungia  

(supra),  the  State  Government,  being  aggrieved,  had  

challenged the said Judgment and Order before this Court by  

filing  the  Special  Leave  Petition  but  it  was  withdrawn  for  

certain  reasons.   Therefore,  it  cannot  be  held  that  the  

Judgment  in  D.S.  Laungia (supra)  stood  approved  by  this  

Court.   Calculations  had been made  strictly  in  consonance  

with  the  Statutory  provisions  of  the  Act  and  the  Rules,  

particularly taking note of Rule 2(aa) and 2(e) of the Rules and  

it is to be recovered from D.S. Laungia also.  The High Court  

was fully  satisfied regarding determination of  the  additional  

price  and  therefore,  no  fault  can  be  found  with  impugned  

Judgment  and  Order.   Hence,  the  appeal  is  liable  to  be  

dismissed.

6. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  

learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.   

7. The questions do arise as to whether such an order of  

withdrawal  passed  by  this  Court  amounts  to  

confirmation/approval of  the judgment and order of the High  

Court and as to whether appellant could be treated differently.  

8. There is no dispute to the settled proposition of law that  

dismissal of the Special Leave Petition in limine by this Court  

does not mean that the reasoning of the judgment of the High  

Court against which the Special Leave Petition has been filed  

before this Court stands affirmed or the judgment and order  

impugned merges with such order of this Court on dismissal  

of  the  petition.  It  simply  means  that  this   Court  did  not  

consider the case worth examining for the reason, which may  

be other than merit  of  the case.  Nor  such an order  of  this  

Court operates as res judicata. An order rejecting the Special  

Leave  Petition  at  the  threshold  without  detailed  reasons  

therefore  does  not  constitute  any  declaration  of  law  or  a  

binding precedent. [Vide The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust

Vs. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust & Anr.  

AIR  1978  SC  1283; Ahmedabad  Manufacturing  &  Calico  

Printing Co.  Ltd.  Vs.  The Workmen & Anr. AIR 1981 SC  

960;  Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.  

AIR  1986  SC  1780; Supreme  Court  Employees’  Welfare  

Association Vs.  Union of  India & Ors.  AIR 1990 SC 334;  

Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury & Ors. Vs. Union of India &  

Ors. AIR  1996  SC 751;  Union of  India  & Anr.  Vs.  Sher  

Singh & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1796;  V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. (P)  

Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 2000 SC 1623;   

Saurashtra  Oil  Mills  Assn.,  Gujrat  Vs.  State  of  Gujrat  &  

Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1130; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal  

Singh (2004)  1 SCC 121;  and  Y. Satyanarayan Reddy Vs.  

Mandal  Revenue  Officer,  Andhra  Pradesh (2009)  9  SCC  

447].

9. In  State  of  Maharashtra  Vs.  Digambar AIR  1995  SC  

1991,  this  Court  considered  a  case  wherein  against  the  

judgment and order of the High Court, special leave petition  

was not filed but when other matters were disposed of by the  

High Court  in terms of its earlier judgment,  the Authorities

approached  this  Court  challenging  the  correctness  of  the  

same.   It  was  submitted  in  that  case  that  if  the  State  

Authorities had accepted the earlier judgment and given effect  

to it, it was not permissible for the Authority to challenge the  

subsequent judgments/orders passed in terms of the earlier  

judgment which had attained finality.  This Court repealed the  

contention observing that the circumstances for non-filing the  

appeals in some other or similar matters or rejection of the  

SLP against such Judgment in limine by this Court, in some  

other similar matters by itself, would not preclude the State  

Authorities to challenge the other orders for the reason that  

non-filing  of  such  SLP  and  pursuing  them  may  seriously  

jeopardize the interest of the State or public interest.

 10. In Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. AIR  

2000 SC 2587, this Court reconsidered the issue and some of  

the above referred judgments and came to the conclusion that  

dismissal of special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking  

order may not be a bar for further reconsideration of the case  

for the reason that this Court might not have been  inclined to  

exercise its discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 where  

the matter has been decided on merit by a speaking judgment  

as in that case doctrine of merger would come into play.  This  

Court laid down the following principles:-      

“(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against   an  order  passed  by a court,  tribunal  or  any  other   authority  before  superior  forum and  such  superior  forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put  in  issue  before it,  the  decision  by  the  subordinate   forum merges in the decision by the superior forum  and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative   and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii)  The jurisdiction  conferred  by  Article  136 of  the  Constitution  is  divisible  into  two  stages.  The  first  stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave  to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and  when the leave to appeal is granted and the special  leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or   unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of   jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the   content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable   of  being  laid  shall  be  determinative  of  the  applicability  of  merger.  The  superior  jurisdiction  should  be  capable  of  reversing,  modifying  or  affirming  the  order  put  in  issue  before  it.  Under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  the  Supreme  Court  may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or  order appealed against while exercising its appellate   jurisdiction  and  not  while  exercising  the   discretionary  jurisdiction  disposing  of  petition  for  special  leave to appeal.  The doctrine of merger can  therefore  be  applied  to  the  former  and  not  to  the   latter.

(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be  a  non-speaking  order  or  a  speaking  one.  In  either   case  it  does not  attract  the  doctrine  of  merger.  An  order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand   substituted in place of the order under challenge. All   that  it  means is that the Court was not inclined to   exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being  filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking   order,  i.e.,  gives  reasons  for  refusing  the  grant  of   leave,  then the  order  has  two  implications.  Firstly,   the  statement  of  law  contained  in  the  order  is  a  declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the  meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly,   other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated   in  the  order  are  the  findings  recorded  by  the   Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto   and  also  the  court,  tribunal  or  authority  in  any  proceedings  subsequent  thereto  by  way  of  judicial   discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of   the country. But, this does not amount to saying that   the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has  stood  merged  in  the  order  of  the  Supreme  Court  rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of  the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res  judicata  in  subsequent  proceedings  between  the  parties.”

11. The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter  

has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party  

may  approach  the  Court  for  reconsideration  of  the  case  in  

exceptional circumstances.

12. In view of the above, in the fact-situation of the case in  

D.S.  Laungia (supra),  question of  application  of  doctrine  of  

merger did not arise and even by no stretch of imagination it  

can be held that this Court has approved the judgment in D.S.  

Laungia (supra),  rather  a  different  view  is  required  to  be  

taken in view of the fact that this Court had expressed doubts  

about the correctness of the impugned Judgment by making  

the following observations :-    

“In  the  instant  matter  as  also  in  the  matters   enumerated in the letter of Mr. G.K. Bansal, Advocate   for the petitioners dated January 25, 1994, seeking  withdrawal of all these matters, we are constrained  to remark that no reasons have been assigned as to   why  the  State  of  Punjab  is  submitting  to  the  impugned orders of the High Court which prima  facie  appear  to  us  to  be  unsustainable.   The  direct  result  of  the  withdrawal  would  not  only  be  compounding  to  an  illegality  but  would  otherwise   cause tremendous loss to the State exchequer.  We,  therefore, direct that the reasons which impelled the   State to seek withdrawal of these matters be placed  before  us  in  the  form of  an affidavit  by  the  Chief   Secretary, Punjab or the Secretary of the Department   concerned  justifying  the  step  for  seeking  withdrawal.” (Emphasis added)   

13. The respondent cannot claim parity with  D.S. Laungia  

(supra) in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of  

the  Constitution  of  India  does  not  envisage  for  negative

equality.  Article  14  is  not  meant  to  perpetuate  illegality  or  

fraud.  Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept.  

Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and  

therefore,  cannot  be  enforced  by  a  citizen  or  court  in  a  

negative  manner.   If  an  illegality  and irregularity  has  been  

committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals  

or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial Forum, others  

cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court  

for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality  

or for passing wrong order.  A wrong order/decision in favour  

of  any  particular  party  does  not  entitle  any  other  party  to  

claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision.  Even  

otherwise Art.14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it would  

make  function  of  the  administration  impossible.  [vide  

Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR  

1984 SC 1772;  Panchi Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.  

(2009) 2 SCC 589; and Shanti Sports Club & Anr. Vs. Union  

of India & Ors. (2009) 15 SCC 705].    

14. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have  

been granted some benefit  inadvertently or  by mistake,  such

order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the  

same relief. (Vide Chandigarh Administration & Anr Vs. Jagjit  

Singh & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 705; Smt Sneh Prabha Vs. State  

of U.P. & Ors.,  AIR 1996 SC 540;  Jalandhar Improvement  

Trust Vs. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1347; State of Bihar  

& Ors. Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr.,  AIR 2000 SC  

2306; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2001 SC  

1877; Yogesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Government of NCT Delhi &  

Ors.,  AIR  2003  SC  1241;  Union  of  India  &  Anr.  Vs.  

International Trading Company & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 3983;  

M/s Anand Button Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR  

2005 SC 565; K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2006  

SC  898;  and  Maharaj  Krishan  Bhatt  &  Anr.  Vs.  State  of  

Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 24).

15. In  view  of  the  above,  the  submissions  made  by  Shri  

Hansaria, Amicus Curiae in this regard are preposterous and  

not worth consideration.  

16. In  the  instant  case,  the  High  Court  has  taken  into  

consideration all  statutory provisions and calculations made

by  the  respondents  as  under  what  circumstances  the  

“tentative- price” had been fixed and reached the conclusion  

that the demand was justified.  The Court also rejected the  

submissions made on behalf of the allottees that judgment in  

D.S. Laungia (supra) was an authority on the issue.   

17. Rules 2(aa), 2(e),  4 and 5 of the Rules which have direct  

bearing on the questions raised in this appeal read as under:

“2(aa)-  ‘Additional  Price’  means  such  sum  of  money  as  may  be  determined  by  the  State   Government,  in  respect  of  the  sale  of  a  site  by  allotment,  having  regard  to  the  amount  of   compensation by which the compensation awarded  by the Collector  for the land acquired by the State   Government of  which the site  sold forms a part,  is   enhanced by the Court on a reference made under   Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the   amount of cost incurred by the State Government in  respect of such reference.  

2(e)- ‘tentative price’ means such sum of money as  may  be determined  by the  State  Government  from  time  to  time,  in  respect  of  the  sale  of  a  site  by   allotment, having regard among other matters, to the  amount  of  compensation  awarded  by the  Collector  under  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  for  the  land  acquired by the State Government of which the site   sold forms a part.  

4. Sale Price:-  In  the  case  of  sale  of  a  site  by  allotment the sale price shall be:

(a) where such site forms part of the land acquired  by  the  State  Government  under  the  Land  Acquisition Act, 1894; and  

(i) no reference under Section 18 thereof is made   against  the  award  of  the  Collector  of  such  reference  having  been  made  has  failed,  the   tentative price.

(ii) On a reference made under Section 18 thereof   the compensation awarded by the Collector is   enhanced  by the  Court.  The aggregate  of  the   tentative price and the additional price;

(b) in  any  other  case,  such final  price  as  may  be  determined by the State Government from time to  time.

(2) In case of sale of site by auction the sale price  shall  be  such  reserve  price  as  may  be  recommended by the State Government from time   to time or any higher price determined as a result   of bidding in an open auction.  

5-A: Liability to pay additional price.

(1) In  the  case  of  sale  of  site  by  allotment  the  transferee  shall  be  liable  to  pay  to  the  State   Government  in  addition  to  the  tentative  price,  the   additional price, if any determined in respect thereto   under these rules.

(2) The additional  price  shall  be payable  by the  transferee within a period of thirty days of the date   of demand made in this behalf by the Estate Officer.

Provided that the Chief Administrator may in a  particular  case,  and  for reasons  to  be  recorded in   writing allow the applicant to make payment of the  

said  amount  within  a further period not  exceeding  thirty days.”

18. A  perusal  of  the  above  quoted  rules  shows  that  the  

“tentative  price”  means  the  price  determined  by  the  State  

Government from time to time in respect of a sale of site by  

allotment and while doing so, the Government has to take into  

consideration  various  factors  including  the  amount  paid  as  

compensation.

19. The  phrase  ‘additional  price’  has  been  defined  as  the  

price determined by the State Government having regard to  

the  enhanced  compensation  payable  to  the  land  owners  in  

pursuance of the award passed by the court on a reference  

made under Section 18 or further appeal under the Act 1894.  

The sale price is the price payable in respect of an allotment of  

site.  If the site sold by the competent authority forms part of  

the  land  acquired  by  the  State  Government  under  the  Act  

1894  and  no  reference  under  Section  18  thereof  is  made  

against the award of the Collector or such reference having  

been made has failed, the sale price is the tentative price as  

defined  in  Rule  2(e)  of  the  Rules  but  if  the  compensation

awarded  by  the  Collector  is  enhanced  by  the  court  on  a  

reference made under Section 18 of the Act 1894, then the  

sale price means the aggregate of the tentative price and the  

additional price. If the site allotted by the competent authority  

does  not  form  part  of  the  land  acquired  by  the  State  

Government under the Act 1894,  then the sale price would  

mean  such  final  price  as  may  be  determined  by  the  State  

Government. However, there is nothing in the scheme of  the  

Act  1964 and the rules  from which it  can be  inferred  that  

tentative price is synonymous with the provisional price, and  

that  a  person,  to  whom  the  plot  has  been  allotted  on  

provisional price, cannot be asked to pay the tentative price  

determined by the government. There is a difference between  

the  “provisional  price”  and the  “tentative  price”  and it  may  

take a long time for the State to determine the tentative price.

20. In the instant case, the calculations had been furnished  

by the respondents as on what basis tentative price had been  

determined.

A. Cost of land  

1. Cost of land per acre of Sector 70 SAS

Nagar Rs.90,000/-

2. Solatium charges @30% Rs.27,000/-

3. Interest charges from the date of  Notification till the date of Award @12% from 1980 to 1984 for 4 Years Rs.43,000/-

4. Interest charges 15% from 1984 to 1990 for 6 years on the cost of land       Rs.1,44,180/-

     ______________

     Rs.3,04,380/-

B. Cost of Internal and External Development

1. Water Supply @ Rs.1.35 lacs. Rs.1,35,000/- 2. Sewerage @ Rs.59,000/- Rs.   59,000/- 3. Sterm Water @ Rs.1,32,000/- Rs. 1,32,000/- 4. Roads @ Rs.55,000/- per acre Rs.    55,000/- 5. Bridges & Others @Rs.11,000/-per acre   Rs.    11,000/- 6. Horticulture @ Rs.36,000/- per acre         Rs.    36,000/- 7. Street lightening @Rs.15,000/-per acre     Rs.    15,000/- 8. Electrification @Rs.15,000/-per acre          Rs.    15,000/- 9. Conservancy charges @Rs.9,000/-per acre Rs.     9,000/-

      10.    Utility services @Rs.20,000/-per acre         Rs.    20,000/- 11. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads

for 5 years @ Rs.63,000/- per acre   Rs.    63,000/- 12. Maintenance of Public Health service  

@ Rs.39,000/- per acre    Rs.    39,000/- 13. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads

Beyond 5 years @Rs.45,000/- per acre    Rs.    45,000/- 14. Division of H.T. Line@ Rs.7,000/- per acre   Rs.      7,000/- 15. Earth Filling @Rs.10,000/- per acre     Rs.   10,000/-

 _______________      Rs.6,51,000/-

C.(Establishment charges@14% + 3% on the cost of land.              Rs.  51,745/-   (ii) Interest charges @1% for plotable area(55%)Rs.    2,662/-

(iii) Interest charges for 3 years @10% each Year on development charges         Rs.1,51,200/-

  (iv) Unforeseen charges as well as escalation Charges @10%         Rs.1,16,098/-

__________________ Total expenditure per acre       Rs.12,77,064/-

Total Expenditure of 306.59 acres of land Acquired for Sector 70 SAS Nagar  Rs.39,15,34,824/- Saleable area 6,74,233 Sq.yds. Rate per sq.yd. 39,15,34,824    =  Rs.580/-  

   6,74,233

21. The plots measuring 100 sq.yds. were to be allotted at  

tentative price calculated at subsidized rate of 10% less than  

the  reserve  price  while  plots  measuring  150,  200  and  250  

sq.yds.  were  to  be  allotted  at  tentative  price  equal  to  the  

reserve price. The plots measuring 300 and 400 sq.yds. area  

are to be allotted at tentative price equal to 1-1/2 times of the  

reserve  price  and  plots  measuring  500  sq.yds.  were  to  be  

allotted at tentative  price equal  to double  the reserve price.  

Taking the overall position into account, the Government fixed  

the  reserve  price  at  Rs.520/-  per  sq.yd.  for  calculating  the  

tentative  prices,  in  the  above  manner,  for  plots  of  various  

sizes.  

22.  There   is   nothing  on  record  to   show  that   the  

tentative  price    determined   by    the   State   could    be  

unreasonable or arbitrary  and  it  is  not  the case of  the  

allottee  that  the  market  value  of  the  land  has  not  been  

enhanced  while  deciding  the  reference under  the  Act  1894.  

While deciding this case, the High Court  placed heavy reliance  

upon  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Preeta  Singh (supra)  

wherein  after  taking  note  of  various  statutory  provisions  of  

Act  1964 and Rules  1965,  particularly,  Rule  2(aa)  and sale  

price as determined in Rule 4, this Court came to the following  

conclusion:

“7.  A  conjoint  reading  of  the  above  Rules  would  clearly indicate that the allottee is liable to pay a  sale  price  including  the  additional  price  and  the  cost incurred and also the cost of improvement of  the  sites.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  respondent  HUDA  is  only  a  statutory  body  for  catering to the housing requirement of the persons  eligible  to  claim  for  allotment.  They  acquire  the  land,  develop it  and construct buildings and allot  the  buildings  or  the  sites,  as  the  case  may  be.  Under these circumstances, the entire expenditure  incurred in connection with the acquisition of the  land  and  development  thereon  is  required  to  be  borne  by  the  allottees  when  the  sites  or  the  buildings sold after the development are offered on  the  date  of  the  sale  in  accordance  with  the  regulations and also conditions of  sale.  It  is  seen  that in the notice dated 9-8-1990, the total area, net

area, the payable amount for the gross acreage, the  acreage left for the developmental purpose, balance  recoverable  from  the  plot-holders,  plot-table  area  have been given for each of the areas and recovery  rate also has been mentioned under the said notice.  Under these circumstances,  there is no ambiguity  left in the calculations. If, at all, the appellants had  got  any  doubt,  they  would  have  approached  the  authority and sought for further information. It is  not the case that they had sought the information  and  the  same  was  withheld.  Under  these  circumstances, we do not find any illegality in the  action taken by the respondents. The High Court,  therefore, was right in refusing to interfere with the  order.”

23. In  Bangalore  Development  Authority  Vs.  Syndicate  

Bank  (2007)  6  SCC  711,  this  Court,  while  considering  a  

similar issue, laid down large number of principles including  

the following : -    

“Where the plot/flat/house has been allotted at   a tentative  or  provisional  price,  subject  to  final  determination  of  price  on  completion  of  the  project  (that  is  acquisition  proceedings  and  development  activities),  the  development  authority will be entitled to revise or increase the  price.  But where the allotment is at a fixed price,   and a higher price or extra payments are illegally   or  unjustifiably  demanded  and  collected,  the   allottee will be entitled to refund of such excess  with  such interest,  as may be determined with   reference to the facts of the case.”

24. In  Tamil  Nadu Housing Board & Ors.  Vs.  Sea Shore  

Apartments Owners’ Welfare Association (2008) 3 SCC 21,  

while deciding the similar issue, this Court held as under :-

“So far as price is concerned, in 1991, when the   names  of  applicants  were  registered,  it  was   clarified that  the  price indicated  was  'tentative   price'  and  it  was  subject  to  'final  price'  being   fixed by the Board. In any case when the scheme  was  altered  from seven  types  to  fifteen  types  flats, it was stated that the amount shown was   merely  tentative  selling  price.  The  intending   purchasers,  therefore,  were  aware  of  the  fact  that the final price was to be fixed by the Board.   In fact an agreement to that effect was executed  by all prospective allottees wherein they agreed  that they would pay the amount which would be   finally  fixed  by  the  Board…………….In  the   circumstances,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  allottees were not aware of the above condition   and they were compelled to make payment and  thus  were  treated  unfairly  or  unreasonably  by  the Board.”  

25. The  instant  case  is  squarely  covered  by  the  aforesaid  

Judgments  of  this  Court  and  particularly,  Preeta  Singh  

(supra)  and  in  view  thereof,  the  appeal  is  liable  to  be  

dismissed.   

26. Before  parting  with  the  case,  it  may  be  pertinent  to  

mention  here  that  the  allotment  had  been  made  to  the

appellant  within  48  hours  of  submission  of  her  application  

though in ordinary cases, it takes about a year.  Appellant had  

further been favoured to pay the aforesaid provisional price of  

Rs. 93,000/- in four installments in two years, as is evident  

from the letter dated 8.4.1987.  Making the allotment in such  

a hasty manner itself is arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit  

by Article 14 of the Constitution.  This Court has consistently  

held  that  “when  a  thing  is  done  in  a  post-haste  manner,   

malafide would be presumed.”  Anything done in undue haste  

can also be termed as “arbitrary and cannot be condoned in  

law.” [vide Dr. S.P. Kapoor Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh &  

Ors. AIR 1981 SC 2181; Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas  

Nigam Ltd. Vs. Devendra Kumar Jain & Ors.  (1995) 1 SCC  

638;  Bahadursinh  Lakhubhai  Gohil  Vs.  Jagdishbhai  M.  

Kamalia & Ors.  AIR 2004 SC 1159; and Zenit Mataplast P.  

LTd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2009)10 SCC 388].   

Thus,  such an  allotment  in  favour  of  the  appellant  is  

liable  to  be  declared  to  have  been  made  in  arbitrary  and  

unreasonable manner.  However, we are not inclined to take  

such drastic  steps as the  appellant  has developed the land  

subsequent to allotment.

27. We further find no force in submission made by Sh. Vijay  

Hansaria, Sr. Advocate, that in spite of making recalculation  

in view of the directions issued by the High Court in the case  

of  D.S. Laungia (supra),  State could not make any recovery  

from Sh. Laungia.  This Court, vide order dated 20.05.2010,  

asked  the  respondents  to  explain  this  aspect  and  file  an  

affidavit  of  the Administrator  of  the Authority.   In response  

thereto, an Affidavit had been filed by the Chief Administrator,  

Greater Mohali  Development Authority, explaining the entire  

position  in  respect  of  the  allotment  and  recovery  of  dues  

furnishing  all  details  and  according  to  this  Affidavit,  the  

money is  being  recovered from all  defaulters  including  Shri  

D.S. Laungia along with interest.   

28. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeal, it  

lacks  merit  and is,  accordingly,  dismissed.   No order  as  to  

costs.   

        …… …………………………...J.

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

………………………………...J. (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi, June 3, 2010.   

REPORTABLE  

      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3546 OF 2007   STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. …. Appellants

VERSUS

COL. KULDEEP SINGH    …. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

We have heard Ms. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned counsel  

appearing for the appellant.  In spite of notice, respondent did  

not  enter  appearance.   We  requested  Sh.  Vijay  Hansaria,  

learned senior counsel for the respondent, to assist the Court  

as Amicus Curiae.

For  the  reasons  recorded  in  Civil  Appeal  No.  5292  of  

2004 (Smt. Fuljit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.) decided  

on this date, the appeal stands allowed.  Judgment and Order  

of  the  High  Court  dated  06.12.2006  is  set  aside  and  the

Demand Notice is upheld.  The appellant is entitled to make  

recovery in accordance with law.          

        ………………………………...J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

………………………………...J. (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi, June 3, 2010.

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   3392 OF 2007

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. …. Appellants

VERSUS

G.S. RANDHAWA    …. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

We  have  heard  Ms.  Rachna  Joshi  Issar,  learned  counsel  

appearing for the appellant.  In spite of notice, respondent did not  

enter appearance.  We requested Sh. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior  

counsel for the respondent, to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae.

For the reasons recorded in Civil  Appeal No. 5292 of 2004  

(Smt. Fuljit  Kaur Vs.  State of Punjab & Ors.)  decided on this  

date, the appeal stands allowed.  Judgment and Order of the High  

Court  dated  06.12.2006 is  set  aside  and  the  Demand Notice  is

upheld.  The appellant is entitled to make recovery in accordance  

with law.          

        ………………………………...J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

………………………………...J. (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi, June 3, 2010.

2