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PETITIONER: FOREST RANGE OFFICER AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P.MOHAMMED ALI AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1993

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:  1994 AIR  120            1993 SCR  (3) 497  1993 SCC  Supl.  (3) 627 JT 1993 (3)   222  1993 SCALE  (2)792

ACT: % The Kerala Forest Act, 1961: S.2  (f)--Forest  Produce-Wood oil-Sandalwood  oil-Held,  is wood oil and a forest produce. Ss.   52,54-Forest  offence-Accused-Manufacturing/found   in possession  of  sandalwood oil-Trial-Held, trial  court  has jurisdiction to proceed with trial. Interpretation   of statute: Doctrine of Purposive interpretation- Applied. Words and Phrases: "include  ",  "wood  oil"-S. 2 (f)  of  Kerala  forest  Act- Interpretation of.

HEADNOTE: The  Kerala  Forest  Act,  1961  regulates  preservation  of forests and forest produce.  Section 2(f) (i) defines forest produce which includes wood oil. The  respondents in Crl.  Appeals Nos. 420422 of  1993  were found   manufacturing/in  possession  of   sandalwood   oil. Proceedings  under  s.  52 (1) of  the  Act  were  initiated against  them.   They filed applications under s.  482,  Cr. P.C.  before the High Court challenging the jurisdiction  of the  trial court on the premise that sandalwood oil was  not wood oil as defined under s. 2(f) (i) of the Act The  High  Court  allowed the case of  the  respondents  and quashed  the  complaint*.   Subsequently  in  another   case involving the same controversy, a Division Bench of the High Court  held that sandalwood oil was a forest produce  within the meaning of s. 2(f) (i) of the Act. **The State and  tile accused  challenged the respective judgments in the  appeals by special leave. It  was contended on behalf of the accused  that  sandalwood oil  is  not  a  forest  produce  inasmuch  as  there  is  a distinction between wood oil and sandalwood oil--wood oil is a natural produce of forest directly derived as an exudation from living trees in the forest whereas sandalwood oil is  a bye product from sandalwood by industrial process  utilising the heart wood and 497 498 roots  of sandalwood trees removed from the forest as a  raw

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material. The  State contended that extraction of sandalwood oil  even by  mechanical process would nonetheless be a wood oil;  and that  since the word ’timber’ defined under s. 2 (k) of  the Act  includes ’sandalwood’ being a forest produce,  the  oil extracted therefrom would also he within the meaning of  the word ’wood oil’. On the question: whether sandalwood oil is a forest  produce within the meaning of s. 2(f) (i) of the Kerala Forest  Act, 1961. Allowing  the appeals of the State and dismissing the  other appeal, this Court, HELD:     1.1 Sandalwood oil is wood oil within the  meaning of s.2(f) (i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961.  Therefore, it is a forest produce. (507-G) *  Mohammed Ali v. Forest Range Officer: (1992) 2  KLT  502, overruled **Khushboo Enterprises v. Forest Range Officer. (1993) 1 KLT 91, approved. Kangundi  Industrial  Works.  Kuppam v. The  Govt.  of  A.P. (1987) 2 A.P.L.J. 458, disapproved. 1.2  Sandalwood is forest produce.  Even its roots are  also included  as forest produce.  They are  also  ’timber’within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Act. (504-D) 1.3  Forest  produce  as  defined in s.2  (f)  of  the  Act, whether found in or brought from a forest or not is a forest produce which include, that is to say, the enumerated  items in  clauses  (1)  and  (ii).   "Wood  oil"  is  one  of  the enumerated  items as are roots of sandalwood and rose  wood. (502-E) 2.1  The  word  "wood  oil" used in  the  Act  will  require purposive  interpretation drawing the context in  which  the words  are used and its meaning will have to  be  discovered having regard to the intention and object which  legislature seeks  to subserve.  The purposive interpretation would  aid conservation  of  sandal  wood, a  valuable  forest  wealth, prevent illicit felling and transportation of them and makes the manufacturers of sandalwood oil 499 accountable  to the possession of sandalwood trees or  chips or roots etc. (506C-D) Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Bombay  v.  Indian  Oil Corporation, AIR 1991 SC 686; State of Bombay & Ors. v.  The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors, [1960] 2 SCR 866 and State  of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V Narasimhan, 1197512 SCC, relied on. 2.2  The  Legislature does not intend to restrict  the  word ’wood oil’ nor are there any compelling circumstances in the Act  to give restricted meaning that only oil  derived  from Dipterocarpus   trees   would  be   wood   oil.The   literal interpretation  if given acceptance would lead  to  manifest frustration of the purpose of the Act. (506-D) Aditya  Mills  v. Union of India, [1988] 4SCC315,  and  Babu Manmohan  Das Shah & Ors. v. Bishun Das, [1967] 1  SCR  836, referred to. Rathi  Khandsari  Udyog  and Ors v. State  of  U.P.  &  Ors, [1985]2SCC 485, inapplicable. Craies  on  Statute  law.   Seventh  Edition,  referred  to. Stedman’s   Medical  Dictionan,  (23rd   Edition),   Concise Chemical   and   Technical  Dictionary   (Fourth   edition); ’Scientific   Treatises’  (Vol.  6)  by   Ernest   Guenther; ’Cyclopaedia  of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia’  by Edward   Balfour;  ’Materia  Medica  of  India   and   their Therapeutics’  by  R.N. Khori, Pharma- cographia  Indica  by William Dymock and ’Medical Plants of India and Pakistan’ by J.F. Dastru, referred to.

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2.3  The  expert  opinion  is only an  opinion  evidence  on either side and does not aid in interpretation. (506-E) 3.1  Forest  produce defined under s. 2(f) of the Act is  an inclusive  definition.   It  is settled law  that  the  word ’include’  is generally used as a word of  extension.   When used  in an interpretation clause, it seeks to  enlarge  the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. (504-D) 3.2  The  word  ’include’ in the definition  under  s.  2(f) would  show  that  it did not intend to  exclude  what.  was ordinarily and in common parlance to be spoken of wood  oil. The expression being technical and being part of an 500 inclusive  definition has to be construed in  its  technical sense  but in an exhaustive manner, it cannot be  restricted in  such a manner so as to defeat the principal  object  and purpose of the Act (505-H, 506-A) Kishan  Lal  v.  State of Rajasthan, AIR 1990  SC  2269  and South  Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Assn. &  Anr.  v. State of Gujarat and Anr., [1977] 1 SCR 878, referred to. Fatesang Gimba Vasava & Ors v. State of Gujarat & Ors.,  AIR 1987 Gujarat 9, distinguished. 4.   The  process  by  which the oil  is  extracted  is  not decisive  as  oil  may be extracted by  natural  process  of exudation  or it may be extracted by subjecting to  chemical or  mechanical  process.  The purpose for which the  oil  is used is also not decisive. (506-B) 5.   The  trial court has jurisdiction to proceed  with  the trial.   It  is  for the trial court  to  find  whether  the offence  as amputed to the accused has been made out at  the trial. (507-G)

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-22 of 1993. From  the Judgment and Order dated 31.8.1992 of  the  Kerala High  Court  in Crl.  R.P. Nos. 665/91 and 666/91  and  Crl. M.C. 832 of 1992.                             AND               Criminal Appeal No. 423 of 1993. From  the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.1992 of the  Kerala High Court in Crl.  M.C. No. 1192 of 1992. T.S. Krishna Murthy Iyer and M.T. George for the  Petitioner in  C.A. Nos. 420-22/93 and for the Respondents in C.A.  No. 423/93. G.   Ramaswamy, John Joseph, P.S. Nayar, K.V. Sree Kumar, K. Raghunath  and  T.G.N. Nair for the Appellant  in  C.A.  No. 423/93 and for the Respondents in C.A. Nos. 420-422/93. N.D. Garg for the Respondents, 501 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY.  J.: Special Leave granted. Untramelled by questions of fact the learned Senior  counsel on  both  sides  neatly presented question  of  law  whether "sandlewood  oil"  is forest produce within the  meaning  of Section  2 (f) (1) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 for  short the  Act’.  When proceedings were laid under section 51  (1) of the Act against the respondents in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 27-29 of 1992, they questioned the  jurisdiction of  the court in C.C. Nos. 145 and 148 of  1988.   Eschewing delineation  of  intermediary proceedings went on  from  the start  of  prosecution, the High Court in  exercise  of  its power  under section 482 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,

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1973  for short ’the Code’ by order dated August  31,  1992, reported  in Mohammed Aliv.  Forest Range Officer, (1992)  2 KLT  502 quashed the complaint holding that Sandal Wood  Oil is  not’wood oil’ as defined in s.2 (f) (i) of the Act.   So it  is not a forest produce.  Thus these appeals by  Special leave.  When same question subsequently arose, other learned Single Judge doubting the correctness of aforesaid  judgment referred  the  matter to the division bench which  by  order dated December 15, 1992, reported in Khushboo Enterprises v. Forest  Range officer, (1993) 1 KLT 91 held that  Sandalwool Oil is a forest produce within the meaning of S.2 (f) (1) of the Act.  Thus the appeal in the other case. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 aims to prevent  depleting forests, conservation thereof and protection of wild life in the country to maintain ecological balance.  The State, Acts regulate  preservation  of  forest  and  forest  produce  to supplement  the Central Act.  The Act  prescribes  procedure for  preservation of the forest and regulates possession  of the forest produce, failing of trees in the forest area  and removal  from the forest or reserved forest area by  transit permits  etc.   When  Sandalwood Oil  either  was  found  in transit or in possession of the manufacturers, it was seized in  the  respective  cases and  laid  the  complaints  under section 5 1 (1) (or contravention thereof.  As said  earlier the  jurisdictional question was raised on the premise  that Sandal  Wood Oil is not a wood oil as defined under  section 2(f) (1) of the Act. The question, therefore, emerges whether Sandalwood Oil is a wood oil.  S.2(f) defines forest produce thus: "Section 2(f) ’forest produce’ includes:- (i)the  following whether found in or brought from, a forest               or not 502 that is, to say- timber,  charcoal,  wood-oil, gum, resin,  natural  varnish, bark, lac, fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood; and (ii)the following  when  found in or brought  from  aforest,               that is to say- a)trees  and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other  parts or produce not here-in-before mentioned, of trees. b)plants  not being trees including grass,  creapers,  reeds and moss and all parts or produce of such plants; c)   silk cocoons, honey and wax, and d)   peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including lime- stone, laterite), mineral oils and all products of mines  or quarries". A  reading  thereof  do indicate  that  the  forest  produce whether  found  in  or ,brought from a forest or  not  is  a forest   produce  which  include,  that  is  to   say,   the ’enumerated  items in Clauses 1 and 11 "wood-oil" is one  of the  enumerate  items  as well as roots  of  sandalwood  and rosewood.   The contention of Sri G. Ramaswami, the  learned Senior   counsel   for  the  accused   is   that   technical Dictiontries,  Botanical Tax Books and expert opinion  would bring  out a demonstrable distinction between wood  oil  and sandalwood  oil.  The wood oil is a natural produce  of  the forest directly derived as an exudation from living trees in the  forest belonging to the family of the  Dipterocarpucoae trees while sandal wood oil is a bye product from sandalwood (Santalum  Album)  by  industrial  process.   Wood  oil   is produced  by making a hole on the trunk of the  living  tree commonly  known  as "oil trees" or "wood oil  trees".   This family  of trees are variously known in different  parts  of South  India  but they relate  to  Dipterocarpucoae  family. Wood  oil  is gathered by heating the hole in the  trunk  to

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induce  exudation  of  the  olec-resin  from  the  tree  and commercially  dealt  with  as  wood oil  which  is  a  cheap substance  in  the  commercial world  used  solely  for  the purpose  of  painting  planks  of  wood  or  wooden  vessels floating in the sea.  The physio-chemical properties of wood oil are distinct and different from other oil.  Sandal  wood oil would be produced only at factory level and that too  by mechanised  process  utilising the heart wood and  roots  of sandal wood trees removed from the forest as a raw material. Sandal wood oil is having very high commercial value and  it is mainly used in manufacturing perfumery and 503 cosmetic items of different types and grades.The  production of sandal wood oil is being carried out as industry,  either by licence by the individuals or the state government as its monopoly  like  Karnataka State, in a larger scale or  as  a small  scale  business.  It is further  contended  that  the meaning of the word "wood oil" defined in S. 2 (f) (1)  must receive  its colour from its context and connotation.   When the legislature used the word ’that is to say ’the wood  oil and  other natural growth referred to in the  definition  it would only mean natural bye-product directly drawn from  the trees.   The Learned Single Judge had rightly construed  the meaning of the word ’wood-oil’ and held that sandal wood-oil being  the  bye-product derived  commercially  manufacturing process  is  not  wood oil.  The  division  bench  committed manifest  error in its construction of the  word’wood-oil’to include  sandal  wood  oil.  Sri Krishna  Murthy  Iyer,  the learned  Senior  counsel for the respondents  on  the  other hand,   refuted  the  contention  arguing   that   inclusive definition of forest produce must receive extended  meaning. It must also be construed in the context in which it is used and  the  purpose the Act seeks to serve and the  family  to which  sandal wool oil belongs being an essential oil  would include wood oil.  The expression wood-oil being a technical and part of inclusive definition has to be construed in  its technical  sense and in an exhaustive manner.  It-cannot  be restricted  in  a narrow circumference as was  done  by  the learned Single Judge so as to defeat the object and  purpose of  the  Act.   Extraction  of  sandal  wood  oil  even   by mechanised process would nonetheless be a wood oil.  He laid emphasis on the word ’timber’ defined in section 2(k)  which include  ’Sandal  wood’,  being a  forest  produce  the  oil extracted therefrom would also be within the meaning of  the word  ‘wood-oil’.  The restricted meaning canvassed  by  the counsel would defeat the purpose of the Act and the  literal interpretation  giving narrow meaning to the word  wood-oil’ should be excluded. Ex-facie  the argument of Sri Ramaswami backed by  material, though  is  alluring, deeper probe  denied  its  acceptance. Undoubtedly, the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 incorporated  in its  definition of forest produce Sandalwood oil  after  the word  "wood oil" and the legislature in Andhra  Pradesh  and Tamilnadu,  like  the Act, do not  specifically  incorporate Sandalwood  oil in the definition of forest  produce.   From this   could   it   be  concluded,  if   it   be   otherwise interpretable,  that wood oil would not  include  Sandalwood oil as well.  Undoubtedly Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (23rd Edition) defined at page 1576, wood oil as gurjan balsam and gurjan balsam defined at p. 156 to mean wood  oil-oleo-resin from Dipterocarpus alatus (family Dipterocarpuceae),  a tree of  India  and  other regions  of  Southern  Asia.   Similar meaning   was  given  in  Concise  Chemical  and   Technical Dictionary  edited  by H. Bennett (Fourth Edition)  at  page 1217; Scientific Treatises on the subject by Ernest Guenther

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in  volume 6; Edward Balfour in his ’Cryclopaedia of  India’ and  of  Eastern  and  Southern Asia;  R.N.  Khori-  in  his ’Materia Medica of 504 India  and their Therapeutics’ and’ Pharmacographia  Indica’ by  Willim  Dymock defined wood oil in the  same  strain.All these  technical literatures were concerned in  finding  out physio-chemical  properties  contained in wood oil  and  the source  from  which  they are drawn for  use  in  industrial purposes.  The literal interpretation given therein if given acceptance would lead to manifest frustration of the purpose of  the Act.  In its interpretation we have to keep  at  the back  of our mind the purpose which the Act and  the  Parent Act (Forest Conservation Act) seek to subserve.  J.F. Dastru equally  in his ’Medical Plants of India and  Pakistan’tread into the same path and given construction to wood oil in the context  of  its exudation obtained from the  trunk  of  the trees  belonging  to the family of  Dipterocarpaceae  as  an oleoresin  or gurjan balsam.  There would be no  quarrel  on that  behalf.  It must be noted in this context  that  there are several types of essential oils in India, the  important being  Sandalwood  oil, agar-wood oil, deodar oil  and  pine oil,  apart  from  oleo-resin  and  wood  oil  derived  from exudation  from  living  trees in the  forest  area.   These essential  oils  are  obtained  from  any  of  forest  wood. Sandalwood as observed by the High Court is forest  produce. Even   its  roots  thereof  are  also  included  as   forest produce.They  are also timber within the meaning of  Section 2(k)  of  the Act.  The purpose of the Act  is  to  conserve forest  wealth  which  is  very  dear  for  preservation  to maintain ecology.  Forest produce defined under section 2(f) is an inclusive definition.  It is settled law that the word ’include’  is generally used as a word of  extension.   When used  in an interpretation clause, it seeks to  enlarge  the meaning of the words or pharases occuring in the body of the Statute.   Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition at  p.  64 stated the construction to be adopted to the meanings of the words   and  pharases  that  "The  cardinal  rule  for   the construction  of Acts of Parliament is that they  should  be construed  according to the intention expressed in the  Acts themselves.   If  the words of the  statute  are  themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary  than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural  sense. The  words themselves alone do in such a case  best  declare the  intention of the law giver",.  At p. 214 it  is  stated that an interpretation clause which extends the meaning of a word   does  not  take  away  its  ordinary   meaning.    An interpretation  clause  of the inclusive definition  is  not meant  to prevent the word receiving its  ordinary,  popular and natural sense whenever that word that would be  properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act,  when there is nothing in the context or the subject matter to the contrary, to be applied to some things to which it would not ordinarily  be applicable......... An interpretation  clause should  be used for the purpose of interpreting  word  which are  ambiguous  or equivocal, and not so as to  disturb  the meaning  of such as are plain.  At p. 216 it is stated  that another  important  rule  with regard to the  effect  of  an interpretation  clause is, that an interpretation clause  is not  to  be  taken  as substituting one  set  of  words  for another, or as strictly defining what the meaning 505 of  the term must be under all circumstances, but rather  as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so construed.

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This Court in Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Ors. v. Bishun Das  [ 1967]  1 SCR 836 adopting the ordinary rule of  construction stated  that "the provisions of a statute must be  construed in  accordance with the language used therein  unless  there are   compelling   reasons  such  as   where   the   literal construction  would reduce the Act to absurdity  or  prevent manifest  legislative purpose from being carried out".   The question  therein  was  the  interpretation  of  the  phrase "materially   altered   the  accommodation  or   is   likely substantially to diminish its value" in the construction  to a  shop.   In  that context this court  laid  that  cardinal principle of statutory construction referred to hereinbefore would   apply.   In  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  v.  M.   V. Narasimhan,  [1975]  2 SCC 377 the  definition  of  ’public, servant’  in S.21 I.P.C. was amended and clause  12  thereof was  brought on statute.  The Prevention of Corruption  Act, 1947  created  its own provisions as  specific  offences  of criminal  misconduct which is different from the offence  of bribery  defined  in the-Indian Penal  Code.   When  similar definition  was  not  given under the  P.C.  Act,  1947  the contention   was   raised   that   the   respondent   cannot be prosecuted not being a public servant under the P.C. Act. This  court while holding that definition of public  servant was  incorporated  in P.C. Act by necessary  implication  of public  servant  defined in Cl. 12 of S.21 I.P.C.  and  held that P.C. Act is supplemental to I.P.C. and that, therefore, both  would  deal with the same offence.   Accordingly,  the respondent  was held to be public servant coming within  the definition of P.C. Act.  This court adopted the doctrine  of purposive  interpretation  to prevent  corruption,  a  penal offence.   In  Municipal Corporation of  Greater  Bombay  v. Indian  Oil Corporation, AIR 1991 SC 686 this Court  adopted purposive  construction  in  the  definition  of  the   word ’building’ for the purpose of levy of property tax under the Bombay  Municipal  Corporation Act to include  oil  storage- tanks  to  be  "building" and held that the  language  of  a statutory  provision  is  not static vehicle  of  ideas  and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, as they are bound to  do in any country like-ours with the establishment of  a democratic  structure  based  on  agalitarian  values,   the meaning  and  content of the statutory provision  undergo  a change.  The law does not operate in a vaccum.  It cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and  political setting in which it is intended  to  operate. The Judge has to inject flesh and blood in the dry  skeleton provided  by  the legislature and invest it with  a  meaning which  will harmonise the law with the  prevailing  concepts and   values  and  make  it  an  effective  instrument   for delivering justice. The word include in the definition under section 2(f)  would show that it did 506 not  intened  to exclude what was ordinarily and  in  common parlance  be  spoken  of wood  oil.   The  expression  being technical  and being part of an inclusive definition has  to be  construed  in its technical sense but in  an  exhaustive manner,  it cannot be restricted in such a manner so  as  to defeat  the  principle object and purpose of the  Act.   The process by which the oil is extracted is not decisive as oil may  be extracted by natural process of exudation or it  may be extracted by subjecting to chemical or mechanical process and  Sandalwood (Santalum Album) are cut into  pieces.   Its heart  wood and roots of Sandalwood trees removed  from  the forest  are used as a raw material at a factory  level  that too  by mechanised process to extract sandalwood  oil.   The

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purpose  for  which  the  oil  is  used  is  not   decisive. Therefore,  the word wood oil used in the Act  will  require purposive  interpretation drawing the context in  which  the words  are used and its meaning will have to  be  discovered having regard to the intention and object which  legislature seeks to subserve.  The restricted meaning sought to put  up by  the accused would frustrate the object and  the  literal interpretation  would defeat the meaning.   The  Legislature does  not intend to restrict the word wood oil nor  we  find any compelling circumstances in the Act to olive  restricted meaning that only oil derived from Dipterocarpus trees to be wood  oil as contended for the accused and found  acceptance to  the learned single Judge.  The purposive  interpretation would  aid  conservation of sandle wood, a  valuable  forest wealth,  prevent illicit failing and transportation of  them and makes the manufacturers of sandlewood oil accountable to the  possession of sandlewood trees or chips or  roots  etc. Incorporation of sandlewood oil abundentecatela in Karnataka Act  and absence thereof in sister Acts operating  in  South India  does  not detract from giving its due  meaning.   The expert  opinion is only an opinion evidence on  either  side and does not aid us in interpretation.  This court in  Adity Mills v. Union of India, [1988] 4 SCC 315 did not adopt  the dictionary  meaning  as it may be to some  extent  delussive guide  to interpret entries in Central Excise and Salt  Act. In  Kishan  Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1990 SC  2269  to which  one  of us, Sahai, J, was member, this court  was  to consider   the   word  ’Sugar’   whether   under   Rajasthan Agricultrual  Produce  Marketing Act, 1961  an  agricultural produce.  It was contended that the Khandsari Sugar was  not an  agricultural produce.  Repelling that  contention,  this Court  held that the word agricultural produce  include  all produce   whether   agricultural,   horticultural,    animal husbandary  or otherwise as specified in the schedule.   The legislative  power to add or include and define a word  even artificially, apart, the definition which is not  exhaustive but inclusive neither exclude any item produced in mills  or factories  nor it confines its width to produce  from  soil. If  that  be  the  construction then  all  items  of  animal husbandry  shall stand excluded.  It further  overlooks  the expression  "or  otherwise as specified  in  the  Schedule". Accordingly   it  was  held  that  Khandsari  Sugar  is   an agricultural  produce under that Act.  In State of Bombay  & Ors.  v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. [1960] 2 SCR  866 this court adopted purposive approach 507 in  interpreting  the  word ’industry’ in  s.  2(j)  of  the Industrial  Disputes Act, and held that the  Legislature  in defining  the  word  ’industry’  in  s.2  (j)  of  the   Act deliberately  used term of wide import in its  first  clause and  referring to several other industries in the second  in an   inclusive  way  obviously  denoting   extention.    The conventional  meaning  attributed to trade or  business  was eschewed even in the absence of profit motive.  It was  held that  hospital was an industry.  Therefore, the  ratio,  far from  helping  the accused, is consistent with the  view  we have  expressed  above.   In  South  Gujarat  Roofing  Tiles Manufacturers  Association and Anr. v. State of Gujarat  and Anr.,  [1977]  1  SCR  878  the  inclusive  definition   was construed  in the context of the explanation given to  Entry 22.   It was held, therefore, that the word  ’pottery’  does not include tiles industry for the purpose of Minimum  Wages Act.   The  ratio therein renders little assistance  to  the accused.  In Rathi Khandsari Udyog and Ors. v. State of U.P. and  Ors., [1985] 2 SCC 485, this court held that the  words

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not  defined may be construed in the popular sense in  which it is being commonly used in commercial parlance.  The ratio is  not  apposite  to the  fact  situation.   Similarly  the construction  placing reliance on the passage at p.  164  of Craies  on Statute Law that the word is to be  construed  in the sense in which it is being understood in trade, business or  transaction known to the trade is also  inapplicable  to the  factual context.  In Fatesang Gimba Vasava and Ors.  v. State  of Gujarat and ors., AIR 1987 Gujarat 9 the  division bench  construed whether bamboo would include in  its  ambit cut pieces in the context and the purpose the Act sought  to serve the tribals in the forest area.  Privilege was granted to the tribals to remove certain forest produce from  forest area for sale to supplement their livelihood.  When  toplas, supdas  and palas made out of bamboo chips were being  taken out  for  sale, they were sought to be prosecuted.   It  was challenged  by  the tribals.  In that context  the  division bench  held  that  though bamboo is a  forest  produce,  the Bamboo chips of the specified description do not fall within the  definition  of  forest  produce.   Accordingly  it  was interpreted, from the context and purposive approach of  the word  ’forest produce’.  Accordingly the ratio therein  does not assist the accused. The  Andhra Pradesh High Court, relied for the accused,  had not  correctly  laid the law in Kangundi  Industrial  works, Kuppam   v.  The  Govt.  of  A.P.  (1987)  2  A.P.L.J.   458 Accordingly  we hold that Sandalwood oil is wood oil  within the meaning of s. 2 (f) (i) of the Act.  Therefore, it is  a forest  produce.   Necessary conclusion is  that  the  Trial Court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial.  It is for the  Trial Court to find whether the offence as  imputed  to the accused has been made out the trial.  We need express no opinion at this stage.  The appeals of the State are allowed and the appeal of the accused is dismissed. R.P.                  Appeals dismissed/allowed. 508