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PETITIONER: FIRM PANJUMAL DAULATRAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SAKHI GOPAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1977

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1977 AIR 2077            1977 SCR  (3) 767  1977 SCC  (3) 284

ACT:            Madhya   Pradesh  Accommodation  Control  Act,  1961   S.         12(1)(e) & (f)--Scope of---Bona fide  requirement---Require-         ment of the land-lord of  accommodation of both  residential         and non-residential part of the building,  if  proved  enti-         tled eviction of the tenant.

HEADNOTE:             Under sub clauses (e) and (f) of S. 12(1) of the  Madhya         Pradesh  Accommodation  Control Act, 1961,  a  landlord  can         evict  a tenant, if the residential and the  non-residential         accommodation respectively let out to the latter is required         bona  fide by him for occupation as a residence and for  the         purpose of continuing or starting his business.   Accommoda-         tion under the Act means any building or part of a building,         whether residential or non-residential.             The  appellant-tenant was inducted in by the  respondent         in  1955 for the dual purposes of residential and  non-resi-         dential purpose of running a cloth shop. The landlord,  bona         fide required the building for his residence and  also   for         starting his business of running a Chemist shop.  The  Evic-         tion  Suit filed  by him was dismissed by the  trial  court,         but  the  appellant and the  High  Court  ,,ranted  him  the         eviction decree.         Discussing the appeal by special leave, the Court.             HELD: The residential portion as well as a  non-residen-         tial portion are parts of the building and each is an accom-         modation  by definition.  The landlord is entitled to  evic-         tion  of  the "accommodation" if he makes out  a  bona  fide         residential and non-residential requirement of the portions.         In  the instant case the contract was integral but had  dual         purpose.   The landlord  has  put forward dual  requirements         which  neatly fit into S. 12(1)(e) and  (f)  of  the  Madhya         Pradesh  Accommodation Control Act, 1961.  The findings   of         the  appellate Court regarding the bona fide requirement  of         the  landlord, not having been challenged in the High  Court         and  in this Court in the memorandum  of Appeal, the  conse-         quence viz. eviction is inevitable. [769 E-G]         S. Sanyal v. Gianchand [1968] 1 S.C.R. 536, distinguished.             [The  Court, however granted time to the appellants  for         vacating the building till 1-1-1978, in terms of equity].

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JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 991/76.             (Appeal  by  Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated  the  21.1.1976 of the Madhya Pradesh  High  Court  in         Second Appeal No. 415 of 1971)             S.  Choudhury, D.N. Mishra, O.C. Mathur and Shri  Narain         for the appellant.             G.L. Sanghi, V.K. Sanghi, R.K. Sanghi and S.N.  Khanduja         for the respondent.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             KRISHNA IYER, J. A suit for eviction of an accommodation         from the tenant to whom it had been let for residential  and         non-residential         768         purposes resulted in dismissal by the trial Judge.   But  in         an  appeal, the final court of fact took the view  that  the         landlord (respondent) was entitled to eviction.   The tenant         challenged  the  appellate decree before the High  Court  in         Second Appeal without success and  has therefore come up  to         this Court with this appeal by special leave.             A  short  point has been raised which  deserves  only  a         short answer.   Since we agree with the High Court which  in         turn has agreed with the first appellate court, our judgment         can afford to be brief.             A  statement of necessary facts may now be given.    The         landlord  had  let  out the premises, which  is  a  storeyed         building, to be tenant as per Ex. P-1 of 1955.   The signif-         icant clause in the lease deed runs thus:                       "1  XXX                       2.  I take your house for my own use i.e.  for                       opening   a  cloth shop  and  for  residential                       purposes  and I will not sublet your house  to                       anybody.                       XXX                  XXX                   XXX                       XXX."                       The tenant has thus put the building to  busi-                       ness and residential purposes.   The landlord,                       who is an M. Sc., claimed the building back on                       the  score  that he wanted to  run  a  medical                       store  on the ground floor  a  non-residential                       purpose---and stay on the first floor with his                       wife--a residential purpose.  Thus the acommo-                       dation   was  let  out for dual purposes,  was                       being  used presumably for these  requirements                       and was being claimed back by the landlord for                       the twin purposes mentioned above.   The final                       court of fact has held that the landlord needs                       the  building for his chemist’s shop  and  for                       his  residential use.The High Court in  Second                       Appeal has upheld this finding and added that                       "the  finding as to his  bonafide  requirement                       was  rightly not challenged before me   ......                       The conclusion that the courts have reached is                       the  only conclusion possible on the  evidence                       on  record in the light of  the  circumstances                       appearing."                       This  statement  by the High  Court  that  the                       bonafide  requirement of the landlord was  not                       challenged  before it has not been  questioned                       in  the  memorandum of appeal to  this  Court.                       It must therefore  be taken that the  bonafide                       need of the landlord is validly made out.

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                         The  short  point that survives is  as  to                       whether  the composite purposes of  the  lease                       would  put  it out of the ground set  out  for                       eviction  under  s. 2 of the  Madhya   Pradesh                       Accommodation  Control  Act, 1961.   The  said                       Act defines ’accommodation’ thus:                        " ’accommodation’ means any building or  part                       of  a  building, whether residential  or  non-                       residential and includes,--                       XX                                         XXX                       XXX."                       769                       It follows that an accommodation can be  resi-                       dential,  non-residential or both. S. 12  bars                       an  action  of eviction of a tenant  from  any                       accommodation  except  on one or more  of  the                       grounds  set  out therein.  S. 12(1)  (e)  and                       (f),  bearing  on  the present  case,  may  be                       appropriately extracted here:                         "12. Restriction on eviction of tenents (1)                       (a) to (d)    x      x      x      x      x                       (e) that the accommodation let for residential                       purposes is required bona fide by the landlord                       for  occupation as a residence for himself  or                       for  any  member of his family, if he  is  the                       owner  thereof,  or for any person  for  whose                       benefit  the accommodation is held.  and  that                       the  landlord  or  such person  has  no  other                       reasonably   suitable  residential  accommoda-                       tion of his own in the occupation in the  city                       or town concerned;                             (f) that the accommodation let for  non-                       residential purposes is required bona fide  by                       the landlord for the purpose of continuing  or                       starting  his business or that of any  of  his                       major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the                       owner  thereof  or for any  person  for  whose                       benefit the accommodation is held and that the                       landlord or such person has no other  reasona-                       bly suitable non-residential  accommodation of                       his own in his occupation in the city or  town                       concerned;.                       XXX                                        XXX                       XXX."                       The  residential  portion  is a  part  of  the                       building  and is an accommodation  by  defini-                       tion.   The non-residential portion is also  a                       part  of the building  and is  an   accommoda-                       tion by definition.  The lease has been  given                       for  residential  as well  as  non-residential                       purposes.   The landlord is entitled to  evic-                       tion  of the residential portion if  he  makes                       out   a  bonafide   residential   requirement.                       Likewise  he  is entitled to eviction  of  the                       non-residential portion which is an accommoda-                       tion  if  he  makes  out  a    non-residential                       requirement.  We have already found  that  the                       final  court  of fact, affirmed  by  the  High                       Court,  has  found in favour  of the  landlord                       regarding  his  residential as  well  as  non-                       residential requirements.   Therefore, nothing                       more  can be done in defence of the tenant  in                       the light of the present law.                           Counsel  contended that in a  decision  of                       this  Court, viz, S. Sanyal v. Gian  Chand,(1)

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                     it  has been held that it is  not  permissible                       for  the  court to split up a contract  in  an                       eviction  proceeding.  We  agree. There is  no                       question  of splitting up of the  contract  in                       the  present case, as is abundantly plain from                       what  we:  have  stated.    The  contract  was                       integral but had dual purposes.   The landlord                       has put forward dual requirements which neatly                       fit  into s. 12(1)(e)   and (f).   The  conse-                       quence  is inevitable that the eviction  order                       has to   be upheld.            (1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 536.         770             It  is seep, that the tenant has been doing  a  thriving         cloth business, with goodwill attached to it, for well knigh         30  years.    It is therefore but fair that the.  tenant  is         given sometime to rehabilitate himself by securing an alter-         native  but  suitable accommodation.   In  our  towns  where         scarcity of accommodation is the rule it is not that easy to         secure alternative premises.  Taking due note of this reali-         ty, we direct that while dismissing the appeal the  eviction         order  shall not be put into execution before  1st  January,         1978.         Parties will bear their respective costs.         S.R.                                                  Appeal         dismissed.         771