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PETITIONER: FAZLUNBI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K. KHADER VALI AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/05/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1730            1980 SCR  (3)1127  1980 SCC  (4) 125  CITATOR INFO :  F          1985 SC 945  (4,29)

ACT:      Code of  Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 127 (3) (b), scheme and scope of-Whether by the payment of Mahar and Iddat dues, the provisions of s. 127(3)(b) of the Code would be complied  with or the vinculum juris created by the order under s.  125 continues  despite the  make-believe ritual of miniscule mahar  which merely  stultified section 127(3) (b) Cr.P.C.-Precedents and  binding nature  under Article 141 of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE:      Fazlunbi,  the  appellant,  married  Khader  Vali,  the respondent, in  1966, and  during their conjugal life, a son Khader Basha,  was born to them. The respondent, husband, an additional accountant  in the State Bank of India, drawing a salary of  Rs. 1000/-, discarded the wife and the child, and the tormented woman talaqed out of the conjugal home, sought shelter in  her parent’s  abode. Driven  by destitution, she prayed for  maintenance allowance  for herself  and her  son under section  125  Cr.  P.C.  and  the  Magistrate  granted payment of  a monthly  sum of  Rs. 250/- to the wife and Rs. 150/- to  the child.  The respondent  husband challenged the award in  the High  Court where  the unjustified neglect was upheld, but  the quantum  of maintenance  of the  child  was reduced to Rs. 100/- per mensem.      Thereafter, the  respondent  husband  resorted  to  the unilateral technique  of talaq  and tendered the magnificent sum of  Rs. 500/-  by way  of Mahar  and Rs.  750/-  towards maintenance for  the period  of iddat,  hopeful thereby,  of extricating himself  from the  obligation  to  maintain  the appellant. The Additional First Class Magistrate vacated the grant of maintenance already granted on the score of divorce coupled with  discharge of  mahar and Iddat dues. This order was unsuccessfully  challenged in  the Sessions  Court.  The desperate appellant  reached the  High Court and invoked its jurisdiction under section 482 Crl. P.C. A Division Bench of that High  Court, though the revision petitioner banked upon the decision  of the  Supreme Court  in  Bai  Tahira’s  case [1979] 2  SCR 75  in her favour, distinguished that case and

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dismissed the petition. Hence the appellant-wife’s appeal by special leave.      Allowing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD:  1.   The  conscience   of  social  justice,  the cornerstone of  our Constitution  will be  violated and  the soul of  the scheme  of Chapter  IX of  the Code,  a secular safeguard of  British India  vintage against  the outrage of jetsam women  and  flotsam  children,  will  be  defiled  if judicial  interpretation  sabotages  the  true  meaning  and reduces a benign protection into a damp squib. [1131 E-F]      2. Precedents  of the  Supreme Court are not to be left on the  shelves. Neither  could they be brushed aside saying that precedents  is an authority only "on its actual facts". Such devices  are not  permissible for  the High Courts when decisions of  the Supreme  Court are  cited before  them not merely because  of  the  jurisprudence  of  precedents,  but because of the imperatives of Article 141. [1134 D-E] 1128      No Judge in India, except a larger Bench of the Supreme Court, without  a departure  from  judicial  discipline  can whittle down,  wish away  or be  unbound by the ratio in Bai Tahira’s case,  in which  Section 127(3)(b) of Crl. P.C. was interpreted. The language used is unmistakable, the logic at play is  irresistible, the conclusion reached is inescapable the application  of the  law as  expanded there  is an  easy task. And  yet, the  Division Bench,  by  the  fine  art  of skirting the real reasoning laid down "unlaw" in the face of the law  in Bail Tahira which is hardly a service and surely a mischief, unintended by the Court may be, but embarrassing to the  subordinate judiciary.  There is no warrant whatever for the  High Court  to reduce  to a husk a decision of this Court by its doctrinal gloss. [1132 C-E]      (3) Crl.  P.C. (Sections  125-127) is  a  secular  code deliberately designed  to protect  destitute women,  who are victims of  neglect during marriage and after divorce. It is rooted in  the State’s responsibility for the welfare of the weaker sections of women and children and is not confined to members of  one religion  or region, but the whole community of womanhood. Secondly muslim law show its reverence for the wife in  the institution  of Mehar  (dower). It  is  neither dowry nor price for marriage. [1138 C-E]      4. The  quintessence of  mehar whether  it is prompt or deferred is  clearly not  a contemplated quantification of a sum of  money in  lieu of  maintenance upon divorce. Indeed, dower focusses  on marital  happiness and  is an incident of connubial joy.  Divorce is  farthest from the thought of the bride and  the bridegroom  when mehar is promised. Moreover, dower may  be prompt  and is  payable  during  marriage  and cannot, therefore,  be a  recompense for divorce too distant and unpleasant  for the  bride and bridegroom to envision on the nuptial bed. May be, some how the masculine obsession of jurisprudence  linked  up  this  promise  or  payment  as  a consolidated equivalent  of maintenance after divorce. [1140 D-F]      5. The  language of  Section  127(3)(b)  suggests  that payment of the sum and the divorce should be essential parts of the  same transaction so as to make one the consideration for the  other. The payment of money contemplated by section 127(3) (b) should be so linked with the divorce as to become payable  only   in  the  event  of  the  divorce.  Mehar  as understood in Mohammadan Law cannot, under any circumstances be considered as consideration for divorce or a payment made in lieu  of loss  of connubial relationship. Under s. 127(3) (b) of  the Cr.  P.C.,  an  order  for  maintenance  may  be

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cancelled if  the Magistrate is satisfied that the woman has been divorced  by her  husband and  that she  has  received, whether before or after the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties was  payable on  such divorce.  Therefore,  even  by harmonising payments  under personal and customary laws with the obligations  under ss.  125 to  127 of the Cr. P.C., the conclusion is clear that the liquidated sum paid at the time of divorce  must be  a reasonable and not an illusory amount and will  release the  quondam husband  from the  continuing liability, only  if the sum paid is realistically sufficient to maintain  the ex-wife  and salvage  her from  destitution which is the anathema of the law. This perspective of social justice alone does justice to the complex of provisions from s. 125  to s. 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [1140 F-H, 1141 A-C] 1129      Kunhi Moyin  v. Pathimma, 1976 KLT 87 at 96; Kamalakshi v. Sankaran,  AIR 1979  Kerala 116; Hajabean Sulaiman & Anr. v. Ibrahim  Gandhabai and Anr., Guj. L.R. Vol. XVIII 1977 p. 133 at 137-139, referred to.      6. (i)  Section 127(3)(b)  has a  setting, scheme and a purpose and no talaq of the purpose different from the sense is permissible in statutory construction. [1141 C-D]      (ii) The  payment of  an amount,  customary  or  other, contemplated  by  the  measure  must  inset  the  intent  of preventing destitution  and providing a sum which is more or less the present worth of the monthly maintenance allowances the divorce may need until death or remarriage overtake her. The policy  of the  law abhors neglected wives and destitute divorcees and  s.  127(3)(b)  takes  care  to  avoid  double payment one  under custom at the time of divorce and another under s. 125. [1141 D-E]      (iii) Whatever  the facts  of a  particular  case,  the Code, by enacting ss. 125 to 127, charges the court with the humane obligation  of  enforcing  maintenance  or  its  just equivalent to  ill-used wives and castaway ex-wives, only if the woman  has received  voluntarily a  sum, at  the time of divorce, sufficient  to keep  her  going  according  to  the circumstances of the parties. [1141 E-F]      (iv) Neither  personal law  nor other salvationary plea will hold  against the  policy of  public law  pervading  s. 127(3) (b)  as much  as it  does s. 125. So a farthing is no substitute for  a fortune  nor naive  consent equivalent  to intelligent acceptance. [1141 F-G]      (v) Here  the mahar  paid is  Rs. 500/  and the  income therefrom may  will be  Rs. 5/-  a month,  too ludicrous  to mention as  maintenance. The  amount earlier  awarded is the minimum. [1141 G-H]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1980.      Appeal by  certificate against  the Judgment  and Order dated the  21 Nov., 1979 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1351 of 1979.      A. Suba Rao for the Appellant.      G. Narasimhulu for Respondent No. 1.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J.-The last  judicial lap of the journey to gender  justice made  by Fazulnbi,  a married  woman just past 30  years and talaged into destitution, constitutes the compassionate core  of this  case. The saga of Fazlunbi, who

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had earlier  secured an  order for maintenance in her favour under s.  125 Cr.  P. C. which was cancelled under s. 127(3) (b) Cr.  P. C.,  by three  courts, tier  upon  tier  in  the vertical system,  by  concurrent  misinterpretation  of  the relevant provision,  constitutes the  kernel  of  her  legal grievance. If  her plea  has substance,  social justice  has been jettisoned  by judicial  process and  a just and lawful claim due to a woman in distress has been denied heartlessly and lawlessly. We say ’heartlessly’, because no sensitive 1130 judge with  empathy for  the weaker sex could have callously cancelled an  order for  a monthly allowance already made in her favour,  as has  been done  here.  We  say  ’lawlessly’, because no  disciplined judge  bound by the decision of this Court which  lays down the law for the nation under Art. 141 of the  Constitution could  have defied  the  crystal  clear ruling of  this Court  in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia  by  the  disingenuous  process  distinguishing  the decision. We  are surprised by this process of getting round the rule  in Bai  Tahira’s case (supra) by the artful art of concocting a  distinction without a difference. The Sessions Court  and   the  High   Court,  who  had  before  them  the pronouncement of  the Supreme  Court, chopped legal logic to circumvent it.  Reading their  ’reasoning’ we  are  left  to exclaim how the high Bench argued itself out of Bai Tahira’s case by discovering the strange difference.      "Twixt Tweeldedum  and Tweedledee",  the discipline  of law, the  due process of law and the rule of law become mere claptrap if judges bound to obey precedent choose to disobey on untenable  alibi. And, behind it all is the unheeded wail of Fazulnbi’s womanhood for the karuna and samata of the law and we  are conscientized  into reversing the judgment under appeal in  terms express,  explicit and  mandatory  so  that masculine injustice  may not  crucify the  weaker sex. Small wonder that many a divorcee, beguiled by Arts. 14 and 15 and the decision  in Bai  Tahira’s case,  may well exclaim, "How long, O Lord, how long!"      The brief  facts which have led to this appeal are that Fazlunbi, the appellant married Khader Vali, the respondent, in 1966  and during their conjugal life, a son, Kader Basha, was born  to them.  The husband, an Additional Accountant in the State  Bank of  India, apparently  drawing a salary well above Rs.  1000/-, discarded the wife and the child, and the tormented woman,  talaged out  of the  conjugal home, sought shelter in  her parents’  abode. Driven  by destitution, she prayed for  maintenance allowance  for herself  and her  son under s. 125 Cr. P. C. and the Magistrate granted payment of a monthly  sum of Rs. 250/- to the wife and Rs. 150/- to the child. The  husband challenged  the award  in the High Court where the  unjustified neglect was upheld but the quantum of maintenance of  the child  was  reduced  to  Rs.  100/-  per mensem.      The  respondent-husband   resorted  to  the  unilateral technique of  talaq, and tendered the magnificent sum of Rs. 500/- by  way of mahar and Rs. 750/- towards maintenance for the period of iddat, hopeful thereby, of extricating himself from the obligation to maintain 1131 the appellant. The Additional First Class Magistrate vacated the grant  of maintenance  on the  score of  divorce coupled with discharge  of mahar  and iddat  dues.  This  order  was unsuccessfully  challenged   in  the   Sessions  Court.  The desperate appellant  reached the  High Court and invoked its jurisdiction under  s. 482 Cr. P.C. A Division Bench of that Court, however, dismissed the revision petition and Fazlunbi

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has landed  up in  this Court and banks upon the application of the rule in Bai Tahirai’s case (supra).      The facts  are clear, the talaq has snapped the marital tie, the  flimsy mahar  has been  tendered together with the three months’ iddat dues and the divorcee remains neglected. The question  is whether s. 127 (3) (b) of the Code has been complied with  or the  vinculum juris  created by  the order under s.  125 continues  despite the  make-believe ritual of miniscule mahar  which merely  stultifies s. 127 (3) (b) Cr. P. C.  and hardly  fulfils it.  The matter  is no longer res integra. No  one in his senses can contend that the mahar of Rs. 500/-  will yield  income sufficient to maintain a woman even if  she were  to live  on city  pavements! What  is the intendment of s. 127(3)(b)? What is the scheme of relief for driftwood and  destitute wives  and divorcees  discarded  by heartless  husbands?   What  is  the  purpose  of  providing absolution from  the obligation to pay continued maintenance by lumpsum  liquidation? What,  in short  is  the  text  and texture of  the provision,  if read  in  the  light  of  the mischief to  be avoided,  the justice  to be  advanced?  The conscience  of   social  justice,  the  cornerstone  of  our Constitution will  be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX  of the  Code, a  secular  safeguard  of  British Indian vintage  against the  outrage  of  jetsam  women  and flotsam children, will be defiled if judicial interpretation sabotages the  true meaning  and reduces a benign protection into  a   damp  squib.   The  holistic   art  of   statutory construction has  not the  pettifogging craft of lexical and literal reading  of the  text  woefully  keeping  alive  the moribund mores  of a  bygone  age  but,  in  the  felicitous diction of  Cardozo, ’the  task of a translator, the reading of signs  and symbols given from without (by those) who have absorbed the  spirit, have  filled themselves with a love of the language  they must  read’. Lord Denning’s great tribute to the  task of  a judge  is never  barred  by  the  law  of limitation.           Many of  the Judges of England have said that they      do not  make law.  They only  interpret it.  This is an      illusion which  they have  fostered. But it is a notion      which is  now being  discarded  everywhere.  Every  new      decision-on every new situation-is a development on the      law. Law does not 1132      stand  still.   It  moves  continually.  Once  this  is      recognised, then  the task  of the  Judge is  put on  a      higher plane. He must consciously seek to mould the law      so as  to serve the needs of the time. He must not be a      mere mechanic,  a mere  working mason,  laying brick on      brick, without  thought to  the overall design. He must      be an  architect-thinking of  the structure as a whole-      building for  society a  system of law which is strong,      durable and  just. It  is on  his work  that  civilised      society itself depends.      We lay so much emphasis on the functional sensitization of a  judge lest  what is absurd may be fobbed as obvious by judicial semanticisation.      We need  not labour  the point  because this  Court has already interpreted  s. 127(3)(b) in Bai Tahira and no judge in India, except a larger bench of the Supreme Court without a departure  from judicial discipline can whittle down, wish away or  be unbound  by the ratio thereof. The language used is unmistakable,  the logic  at play  is  irresistible,  the conclusion reached  is inescapable,  the application  of the law as  expounded there  is  an  easy  task.  And  yet,  the Division Bench,  if we  may with respect say so, has, by the

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fine art of skirting the real reasoning laid down ’unlaw’ in the face  of the law in Bai Tahira which is hardly a service and surely  a mischief,  unintended by the Court may be, but embarrassing to the subordinate judiciary.      There is  no warrant  whatever for  the High  Court  to reduce to  a husk  a decision of this Court by its doctrinal gloss. The learned judges observe, to our bafflement-           "The  decision   in  Bai  Tahira  v.  Ali  Hussain      Fassalli (supra) is to be confined only to the facts of      that  case.  It  falls  to  be  distinguished  for  the      following reasons:  (i) the compromise of 1962 referred      to therein was construed as not affecting the rights of      a  Muslim   divorced  wife   in  seeking   to   recover      maintenance under  Sec. 125  Cr. P.C.,  (ii)  what  was      considered to  have been  paid to  the Muslim  divorced      wife was  only the Mahar amount and not the maintenance      amount payable  for the  Iddat period,  (iii) The Mahar      amount paid  revealed a  rate of  interest which  for a      person  residing  in  Bombay  was  held  to  be  wholly      inadequate to  do duty  for maintenance allowance, (iv)      there was  nothing in that case to show that the amount      of Rs. 130/- paid towards Iddat represented the payment      of a sufficient maintenance amount for the three months      period of  Iddat and  (v) the  husband in that case did      not raise any plea based on sec. 127(3)(b) Cr. P.C." 1133      Let us quote a few passages from this Court’s ruling in Bai Tahira (supra) to express the untenability of the excuse not to follow the binding ratio.           Nor can Section 127 rescue the respondent from his      obligation, payment  of mehar  money,  as  a  customary      discharge, is  within the cognizance of that provision.      But what was the amount of mehar ? Rs. 5000/-, interest      from which  could not keep the woman’s body and soul to      wether for  a day,  even in  that city where 40% of the      population are  reported to  live on  pavements, unless      she was  ready to  sell her  body and give up her soul!      The point must be clearly understood that the scheme of      the complex  of provisions  in Chapter  IX has a social      purpose. III-used  wives and  desperate divorcees shall      not be  driven to  mate rial  and moral  dereliction to      seek sanctuary  in the  streets. This  traumatic horror      animates the  amplitude  of  Section,  127.  Where  the      husband, by  customary payment  at the time of divorce,      has adequately  provided for  the divorce, a subsequent      series of  recurrent doles  is contra-indicated and the      husband   liberated.    This   is    the   teleological      interpretation, the  sociological decoding  of the text      of Sec. 127. The key-note though is adequacy of payment      which; will take reasonable care of her maintenance.           The  payment   of  illusory   amounts  by  way  of      customary  or   personal  law   requirement   will   be      considered in  the reduction  of maintenance  rate  but      cannot annihilate  the rate  unless it  is a reasonable      substitute.  The  legal  sanctity  of  the  payment  is      certified by  the fulfillment of the social obligation,      not  by   a  ritual   exercise  rooted  in  custom.  No      construction  which   leads  to   frustration  of   the      statutory project can secure validation if the court is      to pay  true homage  to the Constitution. The only just      construction of the section is that Parliament intended      divorcees should  not derive  a double  benefit. If the      payment by  any mehar  or  ordained  by  custom  has  a      reasonable relation  to the object and is a capitalised      substitute  for   the  order   under  Section   125-not

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    mathematically but  fairly-then Section 127(3) (b) sub-      serves the goal and relieves the obliger, not pro tanto      but wholly.  The purpose  of  the  payment  ’under  any      customary  or   personal  law’   must  be   to  obviate      destitution of  the divorcee  and to  provide her  with      wherewithal to maintain herself. The whole scheme 1134      of Section  127(3)(b) is  manifestly to  recognise  the      substitute maintenance  arrangement by lump sum so paid      and  is  potential  as  provision  for  maintenance  to      interpret other wise is to stultify the project. Law is      dynamic  and   its  meaning   cannot  be  pedantic  but      purposeful. The  proposition,  therefore,  is  that  no      husband can  claim under  Section 127(3) (b) absolution      from  his   obligation  under  Section  125  towards  a      divorced wife  except on  proof of  payment  of  a  sum      stipulated by  customary or  personal law whose quantum      is more  or less  sufficient to do duty for maintenance      allowance.      Granville Williams  in his  "Learning the Law" (pp. 77- 78)  gives   one  of   the  reasons   persuading  judges  to distinguish precedents  is "that  the  earlier  decision  is altogether unpalatable  to the  court in  the later case, so that the  latter court wishes to interpret it as narrowly as possible". The  same learned  author notes  that some judges may "in  extreme and  unusual circumstances, be apt to seize on almost  any factual difference between this previous case and the  case before  him in  order to arrive at a different decision. Some  precedents are continually left on the shelf in  this   way,  as   a  wag   observed,  they  become  very "distinguished". The  limit of the process is reached when a judge says  that the  precedent is an authority only "on its actual facts". We need hardly say that these devices are not permissible for  the  High  Courts  when  decisions  of  the Supreme Court  are cited  before them  not merely because of the  jurisprudence   of  precedents,   but  because  of  the imperatives of Art. 141.      We have  been painstakingly  drawn into many rulings of the High  Courts but  none  except  this  one  has  had  the advantage of  the pronouncement  in Bai  Tahira. A  Division Bench of  the  Kerala  High  Court-a  ruling  which  perhaps advances the purpose more than the Full Bench decision which overruled it-dwelt  on s. 127(3) (b) of the Code. Khalid, J. speaking for  the court  observed, and rightly if we may say so with respect,           This section  provides that  the Magistrate  shall      cancel the  order for  maintenance if any sum under any      customary or  personal law applicable to the parties is      paid on  divorce. This  section  may  be  pressed  into      service  by  some  ingenious  husbands  to  defeat  the      provisions contained  in section  125. We would like to      make it  clear that  section 127(3)  (b) refers  not to      maintenance during  the period  of iddat  or payment of      dower. Unfortunately., place of dower is 1135      now occupied by dowry, payable by the girl’s parents, A      which till  1-6-1961 was  paid in public and thereafter      in private;  thanks to the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.      It is  therefore not  a sum  of money  which under  the      personal law  is payable  on divorce  as  expressed  in      Section  127(3)   (b).  On  the  other  hand,  what  is      impliedly covered  by this clause is such sums of money      as alimony  or compensation made payable on dissolution      of  the   marriage  under  customary  or  personal  law      codified or  unconfined, or  such amount agreed upon at

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    the time of marriage to be paid at the time of divorce;      the wife agreeing not to claim maintenance or any other      amount.  We   thought  it  necessary  to  clarify  this      position lest there be any doubt regarding the scope of      s. 127(3) (b), for, at the first blush, it might appear      that, it  takes away  by one  hand what  is given under      s.125 by the other hand. This is not so.      While,  in   our  view,  the  Full  Bench  decision  in Kamalakshi v. Sankaran in so far as it does not insist on an adequate sum  1 which  will  yield  a  recurring  income  to maintain the divorcee in future, is bad law and the Division Bench, in  so far as it excuses the husband if he pays a sum which the  ignorant wife  at the time of marriage has agreed upon to  relinquish maintenance  after divorce,  does not go far enough.      A division  Bench of the Gujarat High Court has sought, even by  literal construction,  to reach the conclusion that unless the  divorcee voluntarily  accepts a  sum in  lieu of future maintenance she is still entitled to her claim and s. 127(3) (b)  will not  dissolve the liability of the husband. The Judges argue:           We are  concerned with  the interpretation of sub.      (3) of  sec. 127, more particularly clause (b) thereof.      Evidently, this  provision which  seeks to confer power      on the  court to  cancel an  order of monthly allowance      passe. by it in certain specified contingencies, has to      be confined strictly within the narrow limits laid down      by sub-sec.  (3). This  is because  the  provision  for      maintenance of  wives, whether married or divorced, who      are unable  to maintain  themselves is a social welfare      measure applicable to all people irrespective of caste,      creed, community or nationality. 1136           With the aforesaid background, we will now proceed      to examine  the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 127.      A bare  reading of  clauses (a),  (b) and  (c) of  that      provision shows  that three  fact situations  have been      contemplated by the Legislature in which the Magistrate      is given  the power  to cancel  the order  for  monthly      allowance. These fact situations are shown by the words      (1) has  remarried in  clause (a),  (2) has received in      clause (b)  and (c) and (3) had voluntarily surrendered      in  clause  (c).  Clauses  (a)  and  (c)  of  the  said      provision do  not postulate any difficulty because they      contemplate the  fact situations  brought  about  by  a      voluntary and  irrevocable  act  on  the  part  of  the      divorced wife. Thus, clause (a) contemplates the act of      the  wife   in  getting   remarried  and   clause   (c)      contemplates the  act of  the wife in obtaining divorce      from  her   husband  and  surrendering  her  rights  to      maintenance after divorce. Both these eventualities, as      observed earlier,  are brought about by a voluntary and      irrevocable act on the part of the wife. If this is the      obvious position  to be kept in mind with regard to the      scope and  content of  clauses (a)  and (c) of sub-sec.      (3) of sec. 127, we see no reason why we should adopt a      different  standard   in  ascertaining  the  scope  and      content of clause (b);                xx               xx                xx           ....it is  clear that  one  of  the  eventualities      conferring jurisdiction  on the Magistrate to cancel an      order of monthly allowance can come into existence only      on doing  of a  voluntary act  by the  wife of actually      accepting the  amount offered as contemplated by clause      (b). It  is to  be noted  that the  Legislature has not

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    used words  indicating mere offer by the husband of the      amount contemplated  by clause  (b)  as  sufficient  to      bring into existence the fact situation contemplated or      bring into existence the eventuality on which the power      of the Magistrate to cancel the order of maintenance is      based. It  appears that  the Legislature  has advisedly      used the  words "has received" in order to indicate and      at the  same time  restrict the power of cancelling the      order of monthly allowance to cases where the wife by a      voluntary act  on her  part  of  receiving  the  amount      contemplated by clause (b) brings about the eventuality      contemplated for  exercise  of  the  said  power..  We,      therefore,  hold   that  in  order  to  exercise  power      conferred by clause (b) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 127, it      has to be 1137      found as  a fact that the wife has done a voluntary act      of   receiving the who e sum contemplated to be payable      by clause  (b). If  the wife shows her unwillingness to      receive the  amount tendered,  the provisions of clause      (b) are not applicable.      Even the  literal  and  the  purposive  approaches  may sometimes concur,  once we  grasp  the  social  dynamics  of interpretation, will  serve the  cause of truth and justice. We are  reminded of Lord, Denning’s fascinating reference in his "The  Discipline of  the Law"  to Portia’s  plea for the pound of  flesh but  not a  drop of  blood; The  traditional English view  is yielding  to the  pressure  of  the  modern European view (which is also the American view) expressed by Denning in delightful diction as           "the  ’schematic   and  teleological’   method  of      interpretation. It  is not  really so  alarming  as  it      sounds. All  it means  is that  the judges do not go by      the literal  meaning of the words or by the grammatical      structure of  the sentence.  They go  by the  design of      purpose which  lies behind  it. When  they come  upon a      situation which is to their minds within the spirit-but      not the  letter-of  the  legislation,  they  solve  the      problem by  looking at  the design  and purpose  of the      legislature-at  the  effect  which  it  was  sought  to      achieve. They  then interpret  the legislation so as to      produce the  unashamedly, without  hesitation. They ask      simply: What  is the  sensible way of dealing with this      situation so  as to give effect to the presumed purpose      of the legislation ? They lay down the law accordingly.      If you  study the  decisions of the European Court, you      will see  that they  do it  every  day.  To  our  eyes-      shortsighted by  tradition-it is  legislation, pure and      simple. But,  to their  eyes, it is fulfilling the true      role of  the courts. They are giving effect to what the      legislature  intended,  or  may  be  presumed  to  have      intended.  I  see  nothing  wrong  in  this  Quite  the      contrary.      Another angle to the subject of Mahar and its impact on liability for  maintenance  after  divorce  may  be  briefly considered. Khalid, J. of the Kerala High Court in two cases has taken  the view  that  s.125  and  s.  127  Cr.P.C.  are conceptually unconnected  with payment  of mahar  and cannot bail out  a muslim  husband from  his  statutory  obligation under  s.125.   We  are  aware  of  the  criticism  of  this conceptual 1138 divorce between  mahar and  post-divorce maintenance  by Dr. Tahir Mahmood  in his  recent book  on the  ’Muslim  Law  of India’ (see  P. 133)  where the  learned author  prefers  to

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retain the ’nexus between mahar and maintenance but has this to say:           In a  recent case  the Supreme Court has held that      the sum  paid under  personal law-referred to in clause      (b) of  section 127(3)  of the  Code-should be "more or      less sufficient  to do duty for maintenance allowance";      if it  is not  so it can be considered by the court for      the  reduction  of  the  maintenance  rate  but  cannot      annihilate that rate. This, indeed, is a liberal ruling      and conforms  to the  spirit  of  Islamic  law  on  the      subject.      Aside   from    this   controversy,    we   may    look perspicaciously at  the legal connotation of ’dower’ and the impact of  its payment on divorcees’ claims for maintenance. We must  first remember  that Cr.P.  Code, (s. 125-127) is a secular code  deliberately  designed  to  protect  destitute women, who  are victims of neglect during marriage and after divorce. It  is rooted in the State’s responsibility for the welfare of  the weaker sections of women and children and is not confined  to members  of one religion or region, but the whole community  of womanhood. Secondly we must realise that Muslim  law   shows  its  reverence  for  the  wife  in  the institution of  Mahar (dower). It is neither dowry nor price for marriage.           As explained  in an  old judgment  by Justice Syed      Mahmood, mahar  is "not  the exchange  or consideration      given by  the man  to the  woman, but  an effect of the      contract imposed  by law  on the  husband as a token of      respect for  its subject:  the woman". Giving a correct      appraisal of  the concept  of mahar,  the Privy Council      once described  it as  "an essential  incident  to  the      status of  marriage". On  another occasion it explained      that mahar was a ’legal responsibility’ of the husband.      These  judicial   observations   evidence   a   correct      understanding of the Islamic legal concept of mahar      Baillie in his Digest of Mohammaden Law says:           "Dower is  not the exchange or consideration given      by the man to woman for entering into the contract; but      an effect  of the  contract, imposed  by the law on the      husband as  a token  in respect,  for its  respect  the      woman Dower being, as already mentioned, opposed to the      use- 1139      fruct of the woman’s person, the right to either is not      completed without  the other.  Hence on  the one  hand,      dower is  said to  be confirmed and made binding on the      husband by  consummation, or by its substitute, a valid      retirement, or  by  death,  which  by  terminating  the      marriage, puts an end to all the contingencies to which      it is  exposed; and on the other hand the woman becomes      entitled to it as he has surrendered her person."      Justice Mahmood  has described  the nature  of  Meharin Abdul Kadir  v. Salima  and anr.  (8 All.  149 at  157-158). According to him:           "Dower, under  the Muhammadan  law, is  the sum of      money or  other property  promised by the husband to be      paid or  delivered to  the wife in consideration of the      marriage, and even where no dower is expressly fixed or      mentioned at the marriage ceremony, the law confers the      right of  dower upon  the wife as a necessary effect of      marriage. To  use the  language  of  the  Hedaya,  ’the      payment of  dower is  enjoined by  the law  merely as a      token of respect for its subject (the woman), wherefore      the mention  of it  is not  absolutely essential to the      validity of  a marriage;  and, for  the same  reason, a

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    marriage is also valid, although the man were to engage      in the  con- tract  on the special condition that there      should be no dower".... (Hamilton’s Hedaya by Grady, p.      44). Even after the marriage the dower may be increased      by the  husband during  coverture........In this  sense      and in  no other  can dower under the Muhammadan law be      regarded  and   the  consideration  for  the  connubial      intercourse, and  if the  authors of  the Arabic  Text-      books of  Muhammadan law  have compared  it to price in      the contract  of sale, it is simply because marriage is      a civil  contract under  that  law...  Such  being  the      nature of  the dower,  the  rules  which  regulate  its      payment are  necessarily affected  by the position of a      married woman  under the Muhammadan law. Under that law      marriage does not make her property the property of the      husband, nor  does coverture impose any disability upon      her as to freedom of contract. The marriage contract is      easily dissoluble,  and the  freedom of divorce and the      rule of  polygamy place  a power  in the  hands of  the      husband which  the law-giver  intended to  restrain  by      rendering the  rules as  to payments of dower stringent      upon the  husband. No  limit as  to the amount of dower      has 1140      been imposed,  and it  may either  be prompt,  that is,      immediately payable  upon demand,  or deferred, that is      payable upon  the dissolution  of marriage,  whether by      death or  divorce. The  dower may also be partly prompt      and partly  deferred; but  when  at  the  time  of  the      marriage ceremony  no specification  in this respect is      made, the  whole dower is presumed to be prompt and due      on demand".      In Tyabji’s Muslim Law (4th Edn) it is stated:           "Mahar is  an essential  incident to the status of      marriage. Regarded  as a consideration for the marriage      it is  . in theory payable before consummation; but the      law allows  its division  in two parts, one of which is      called ’prompt’  payable before  the wife can be called      upon  to   enter  the   conjugal  domicile,  the  other      ’deferred’ payable  on the  dissolution of the contract      by the  death of  either of  the parties or by divorce.      When the  Kabin nama  does hot specify the portion that      is prompt  and that  which is deferred, evidence may be      given of the custom or usage of wife’s family".      The quintessence  of mahar  whether  it  is  prompt  or deferred is  clearly not  a contemplated  qualification of a sum of  money in  lieu of  maintenance upon divorce. Indeed, dower focusses  on marital  happiness and  is an incident of connubial joy.  Divorce is  farthest from the thought of the bride and  the bridegroom  when mehar is promised. Moreover, dower may  be prompt  and is  payable  during  marriage  and cannot, therefore,  be a  recompense for divorce too distant and unpleasant  for the  bride and bridegroom to envision on the nuptial  bed. Maybe, some how the masculine obsession of jurisprudence  linked  up  this  promise  or  payment  as  a consolidated equivalent of maintenance after divorce. Maybe, some legislatures might have taken it in that light, but the law is  to be  read as  the law  enacted. The language of 5. 127(3) (b)  appears to  suggest that  payment of the sum and the  divorce   should  be  essentially  parts  of  the  same transaction so  as to  make one  the consideration  tor  the other. Such  customary divorce  on payment of a sum of money among the  so called  lower castes  are not uncommon. At any rate the  payment of  money contemplated  by s.  127(3)  (b) should be  so linked  with the  divorce as to become payable

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only in  the event  of the  divorce Mahar  as understood  in Mohammadan Law  cannot under any circumstances be considered as consideration  for divorce  or a  payment made in lieu of loss of  connubial relationship.  Under s.  127(3)(b) of the Cr.P.C., an  order for maintenance may be can. called if the Magistrate is satisfied that the woman has been divorced 1141 by her  husband and that she has received, whether before or after the  said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or  personal law  applicable to  the  parties  was payable on such divorce.      We are,  therefore, inclined  to the  view that even by harmonising payments  under person  and customary  laws with the obligations  under ss.  125 to  127 of  the Cr.P.C., the conclusion is clear that the liquidated sum paid at the time of divorce  must be  a reasonable and not an illusory amount and will  release the  quondam husband  from the  continuing liability, only  if the sum paid is realistically sufficient to maintain  the ex-wife  and salvage  her from  destitution which is the anathema of the law. This perspective of social justice alone does justice to the complex of provisions from s. 125 to s. 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code      We may sum up and declare the law fool-proof fashion:      (1) Section  127(3)(b) has  a  setting,  scheme  and  a purpose and no talaq of the purpose different from the sense is permissible in statutory construction.      (2) The  payment of  an  amount,  customary  or  other, contemplated  by  the  measure  must  inset  the  intent  of preventing destitution  and providing a sum which is more or less the present worth of the monthly maintenance allowances the divorce may need until death or remarriage overtake her. The policy  of the  law abhors neglected wives and destitute divorcees and  s.  127(3)(b)  takes  care  to  avoid  double payment one under custom at the time of divorce and another’ under s. 125      (3) Whatever  the facts of a particular case, the Code, by enacting  ss. 125  to 127,  charges the  court  with  the humane obligation  of  enforcing  maintenance  or  its  just equivalent to  ill-used wives and castaway ex-wives, only if the woman  has received  voluntarily a  sum, at  the time of divorce, sufficient  to keep  her  going  according  to  the circumstances of-the parties.      (4) Neither  personal law  nor other  salvationary plea will hold  against the  policy of  public law  pervading  s. 127(3)(b) as  much as  it does  s. 125.  So a farthing is no substitute for  a fortune  nor naive  consent equivalent  to intelligent acceptance.      (5) Here  the mahar  paid is  Rs. 500/-  and the income therefrom may  well be  Rs. 5/-  a month,  too ludicrous  to mention as  maintenance. The  amount earlier  awarded is the minimum.      Before we  bid farewell  to Fazlunbi it is necessary to mention that  Chief Justice  Baharul Islam,  in an elaborate judgment replete 1142 with quotes  from the  Holy Quoran, has exposed the error of early English  authors and  judges who  dealt with  talaq in Muslim Law as good even if pronounced at whim or in tantrum, and argued  against the  diehard view  of Batchelor. (ILR 30 Bombay 539)  that this  view ’is  good in law, though bad in theology’.  Maybe,  when  the  point  directly  arises,  the question will  have to  be considered  by  this  court,  but enough unto  the day  the evil thereof and we do not express our opinion  oh this  question as  it does  not call  for  a decision in the present case.

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    We allow the appeal.                                              Appeal allowed. 1143