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PETITIONER: FAGU SHAW, ETC., ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1973

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN RAY, A.N. (CJ) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BHAGWATI, P.N.

CITATION:  1974 AIR  613            1974 SCR  (2) 832  1974 SCC  (4) 152  CITATOR INFO :  R          1974 SC 917  (12)  F          1974 SC1739  (3)  RF         1974 SC2151  (14)  RF         1974 SC2154  (27)  F          1975 SC 863  (5)  R          1975 SC1005  (4)  R          1982 SC 149  (241)

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950- Art. 22(4)(a)(b);  (7)(a)  and (b)-Whether  Parliament was bound to prescribe  the  maximum period of detention. Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act,  1971-S.  13-Whether period fixed in s.  13 is maximum period.

HEADNOTE: Art. 22(4)(a) of the Constitution says that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of  a person  for  a  period longer than three  months  unless  an Advisory  Board  has  reported before the  expiry  of  three months  that  there is in its opinion sufficient  cause  for such  detention.  The proviso to the Article  provides  that nothing  in sub-clause (a) shall authorise the detention  of any person "beyond the maximum period prescribed by any  law made  by Parliament under sub-cl. (b) of cl. (7) "  of  Art. 22.   By reason of Art. 22 (4) (b) a person can be  detained for a longer period than three months without the  necessity of consulting an Advisory Board if "such person is  detained in  accordance  with  the  provisions of  any  law  made  by Parliament  under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of cl. (7)"  of  Art. 22.  And Art. 22(7) says "(7) Parliament may by law prescribe (a)  the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of  cases  in which, a person may be detained for  a  period longer  than  three  months  under  any  law  providing  for preventive  detention  without obtaining the opinion  of  an Advisory  Board  in accordance with the provisions  of  sub- clause (a) of clause (4); (b)  the  maximum  period for which any person  may  in  any

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class  or  classes  of  cases  be  detained  under  any  law providing for preventive detention; and (c)  the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4)." Section 13 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 as  amended  by s. 6(d) of the Defence of  India  Act,  1971 enacts that the "maximum period for which any person may  be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has  been confirmed  under s. 12 shall be twelve months from the  date of  detention  or until the expiry of the Defence  of  India Act,  1971,  whichever is later." Pursuant to  an  order  of detention  passed  by  the Government  of  West  Bengal  the petitioners were detained under s. 13 of the Maintenance  of Internal Security Act, 1971.  In a petition under Art. 32 of the  Constitution it was contended (i) that  the  Parliament was bound to prescribe the maximum period of detention under Art.  22(7)  (b)  of  the Constitution  in  order  that  the provision  of Art. 22 (4) (a) might operate and is s. 13  of the Act, as amended, did not prescribe the maximum period of detention, the confirmation of detention orders in terms  of sec.   13  of  the  Act  was  bad;  (ii)  that   since   the determination of the period of detention, namely. the expiry of  the  Defence of India Act, 1971 is  depending  upon  the requirement  of  the proclamation of emergency,  the  period fixed  in Sec. 13 is Dot "the maximum period" as  visualised by  Art.  22(7)(b);  and  (iii)  that  the  Parliament   has abdicated  its power and duty to fix the maximum  period  to the  executive as the determination of the operation of  the proclamation of emergency is a matter within the  discretion of  the  President and he is, therefore,  the  authority  to determine the retirement age of the Defence of India Act. HELD  :  (Per Ray C. J., Mathew and Chandrachud, JJ  :)  (1) There  is  no  provision in the  Constitution  which  either expressly or by necessary implication compels Parliament  to prescribe the maximum period of detention under Art. 22  (7) (b).   The  proviso  does  not  proprio  vigore  compel  the Parliament to fix the 833 maximum period.  Nor does Art. 22(7) (b).  On the other hand it expressly says otherwise. [841 B] The  language of Art. 22 (4) (b) is in marked contrast  with that  of  Art.  22  (4) (a) read  with  the  proviso.   Art. 22(4)(b) makes it obligatory upon Parliament, if it wants to pass a law for detaining a person for a period of more  than three  months,  without making a provision in that  law  for obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board.  L841 DE] Under  entry  3 of List III of the  Seventh  Schedule,  both Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary power to pass laws  for  preventive  detention as  respects  the  subjects mentioned  therein.   A power to pass a  law  for  detention carries  with  it the incidental power to  provide  for  the period  of such detention.  Therefore, both  Parliament  and State Legislatures have power under the entry to provide for detention of a person for a specified period without  fixing a specified period.  The purpose of Art. 22(4) (a) is to put a  curb on that power.  What the proviso means is that  even if the Advisory Board has reported before the expiration  of three  months that there is sufficient cause for  detention, the period of detention beyond three months shall not exceed the  maximum period that might be fixed by any law  made  by Parliament  under  Art. 22(7)(b).  The proviso  cannot  mean that  even  if  Parliament does not pass a  law  fixing  the maximum period tinder Art. 22(7) (b), the State legislatures cannot  pass a law which provides for detention of a  person beyond  three months.  The period of such  detention,  viz.,

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detention beyond the period of three months, would then be a matter  within  the  plenary power of  Parliament  or  State legislatures,  as  the  case  may be, as  such  a  power  is incidental  to the power to pass a law with respect  to  the topics covered by entry 3 of List III. [839 H; 840 A-D] Therefore,  but, for the proviso to cl. (4)(a) of  Art.  22, the  Act  as  it provides for the opinion  of  the  Advisory Board,  can authorise detention of a person for any  period, by virtue of the plenary character of the legislative  power conferred by the entry.  The proviso says in effect that  if Parliament  fixed the maximum period under Art.  22(7)  (b), the  power of Parliament and State legislatures to  fix  the period of detention in a law passed under the entry would be curtailed to that, extent. [840 E-F] Gopalan v. The State of.  Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, Krishnan v. The State of Madras. [1951] S.C.R. 621 and State of  West Bengal  v.  Ashok  Dey  and Others,  [1972]  1  S.C.C.  199, referred to. (2)  (a)  The meaning of the word ’maximum’ is "the  highest attainable magnitude or quantity (of something); a  superior limit,"  The  meaning of the word ’period’ is "a  course  or extent  of  time;  time of duration,"  Therefore  the  words ’maximum period’ mean the highest or the greatest course  or extent or stretch of time, which may be measured in terms of years, months or days as well as in terms of the  occurrence of an event or the continuance of the state of affairs. [842 G] (b)  It  is  not necessary that the Parliament  should  have fixed  a period in terms of years, months or days  in  order that  it  might be the "maximum period" for the  purpose  of Art. 22(7)(b).  As the object of preventive detention is  to prevent  persons from acting in a manner prejudicial to  the maintenance of internal security or public order or supplies or  services  essential to the community  or  other  objects specified  by  Entry 9 List 1, the power to detain  must  be adequate in point of duration to achieve the object.  If the maximum  period can be fixed only in terms of years,  months or days, certainly it would have been open to Parliament  to fix  a long period in s. 13 and justify it as  "the  maximum period". [843 D-E] (3)  It is not correct to say that the Parliament in  fixing the  duration  of  the  maximum  period  of  detention  with reference  to an event like the cessation of the  period  of emergency,  has in any way, abdicated its power or  function to fix the maximum period or delegated it to the  President. There  can be no doubt that it is Parliament that has  fixed the  maximum  period  in s. 13 of the  Act.   It  cannot  be presumed  that  the  President  will  act  unreasonably  and continue  the  Proclamation  of  Emergency  even  after  the Emergency  has  ceased to exist.  Seeing  that  the  maximum period  of  detention has been fixed by s. 13 and  that  the discretion  to fix the period of detention in  a  particular case has to be exercised after taking 834 into account a number of imponderable circumstances three is no substance in the argument that the power of Government to determine  the  period  of  detention  is  discretionary  or arbitrary. [844 DE; F] Suna  Ullah  v.  State of J. & K.  A.I.R.  1972  S.C.  2431, referred to Per  Alagiriswami, J : (a) An analysis of the provisions  of cls. 4 and 7 of Art. 22 clearly shows that a maximum  period of detention should be laid down by Parliament whether it is a  case  of  detention after obtaining  the  opinion  of  an Advisory  Board  or  without obtaining  the  opinion  of  an

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Advisory Board. it is clear from the provisions of cls.  (4) and  (7) that a law providing for preventive  detention  can authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three  months  only if an Advisory Board has  reported  that there is sufficient cause for such detention, that even with the advice of an Advisory Board the detention cannot  exceed the  maximum  period prescribed by law  made  by  Parliament under  sub-cl.  (b)  of  cl. (7) and that  if  a  person  is detained  in accordance with the provisions of any law  made by  Parliament  under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of  cl.  (7)  the detention  can  be for a period longer  than  three  months. Therefore,   the  parliamentary  statute  can  provide   for preventive  detention  without obtaining the opinion  of  an Advisory Board by laying down the circumstances under which, the  class or classes of cases in which it can be done.   In that  case  the  maximum period for which a  person  can  be detained should also be specified by the parliamentary  law, that is, a person cannot be detained for a period  exceeding three  months without obtaining the opinion of  an  Advisory Board  unless the concerned provision of law  also  provides for  the  maximum period for which such a person  is  to  be detained. [851 E; 849FG] (b)  The word "may" ’in Art. 22(7) amounts to "shall".   The power  to dispense with the opinion of an Advisory Board  is given  only to Parliament.  When it makes a law  under  cls. (7)  (a) and (b) of Art. 22 that also would bind  the  State Legislatures  in so far as they enact any  legislation  with regard   to   preventive  detention.    Though   the   State Legislatures  have  the  power  with  regard  to  preventive detention,  they  do  not have the power  to  prescribe  the circumstances under which and the class or classes of  cases in  which a person may be detained for a period longer  than three  months without obtaining the opinion of  an  Advisory Board.  That power is completely that of Parliament and  any State legislation will also be subject to the maximum period prescribed by Parliament under a legislation made under Art. 22(7) (a) and (b). [849 H; 850 AB] A.   K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, S. Krishnan  v.  The State of Madras.  [1951] S.C.R.  621,  and State-  of  West Bengal v. Ashok Dey, [1972] 1  S.C.C.  199. distinguished. (2)  (a)  The power to prescribe a maximum period  given  to Parliament  (referred to in this proviso) is to prevent  the State  Legislatures  making laws with regard  to  preventive detention  without  any  maximum  limit.   The  Constitution makers  apparently  did not want the State  Legislatures  to have an unfettered power with regard to preventive detention even in the field allotted to them under Entry 3 of List III of Seventh Schedule. [850 D-E] (b)  An harmonious construction of the whole of Arts.  22(4) and  (7)  would  thus  necessitate  that  Parliament  should provide a maximum period of detention not merely in  respect of  laws  relating  to preventive detention  made  by  State Legislatures  but  also its own  laws  regarding  preventive detention.   If  the  proviso to  sub-cl.  (a)  contemplates Parliament making a law providing for the maximum period  of detention  which  cannot  be  exceeded  by  any  State   law regarding  preventive detention the reasonable  construction would  be  to hold that it is obligatory  on  Parliament  to legislate  under  sub-cl.  (b) fettering the  hands  in  the matter  of legislating with regard to the maximum period  of detention.  If the Parliament can fix the maximum period  it can  also  alter  it.  If legislation  with  regard  to  the provisions of a maximum period is merely optional there  was no  need for the proviso at all.  The concept of  a  maximum

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period of detention runs through the whole of Art. 22(4) and (7).   This  is because while Parliament  and  State  Legis- latures  make laws it is the executive that makes orders  of detention and if no maximum period of detention is specified by law it would be open to the executive to keep persons  in detention indefinitely. [850 H; 851 A-C] 835 Per Bhagwati,  J : (1) (a) Parliament is under no obligation to  make a law under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (7).  It is only  if the  requirement  of obtaining the opinion of  the  Advisory Board  is intended to be dispensed with that the  Parliament must  make  a  law under sub-cl. (a) of  cl.  (7).   If  the Parliament  does not make such a law, cl. (4) (b)  will  not come  into operation and detention for a period longer  than three months whether under Parliamentary law or under  State law, would be impermissible without obtaining the opinion of the  Advisory  Board.  The language of cl.  (4)  (b)  posits clearly  and  in no uncertain terms that there must  be  law both under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of cl. (7) in order that cl. (4)  (b) may operate.  If there is a law only under  sub-cl. (a)  of cl. (7) and no law under sub-cl. (b) of cl.  (7),  a person  cannot be detained longer than three months  without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board as  contemplated under  cl. (4) (b).  The making of a law by  the  Parliament under  sub-cl. (a) of cl. (7) is, therefore,  obligatory  if the detention is to be for a longer period than three months without the intercession of the Advisory Board. [824 E-H] (b)  It  is clear on a combined reading of the  proviso  and the  main  provision in cl. (4) (a) that the proviso  is  an integral part of the main provision.  It is intended to  cut down the large amplitude of the power of detention conferred under  the  main provision.  The scope and boundary  of  the power  of  detention under cl. (4) (a)  can,  therefore,  be defined  only by reading the proviso and the main  provision as  one single enactment.  If the proviso does  not  operate the main provision also would not, for the main provision is intended to operate only with the limitation imposed by  the proviso.  The proviso is not used in its traditional  ortho- dox sense.  It is intended to enact a substantive  provision laying down as outside limit to the period of detention.  If there is no outside limit by reason of Parliament not having prescribed  the  maximum  period  under  cl.  (7)  (b),  the provision enacted in cl. (4) (a) cannot operate and in  that event  detention  cannot be continued beyond  three  months, even  though  the  opinion  of the  Advisory  Board  may  be obtained.  The proviso clearly posits the existence of a law made  by  Parliament  under  cl. (7) (b)  and  makes  it  an essential element in the operation of cl. (4) (a). [859 B-E] A.   K.  Gopalan  v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R.  88,  S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras, [1951] S.C.R. 621 and State of  West  Bengal  v.  Ashok  Dey,  [1972]  1  S.C.C.,   199, distinguished. (c)  Parliament is free to prescribe or not to prescribe the maximum period under cl. (7) (b).  But if no maximum  period is  prescribed neither Parliament nor the State  Legislature can authorise detention for a long period than three  months either under sub-cl. (a) or sub-cl. (b) of cl. (4).  If  the Parliament  or  the State Legislature  wishes  to  authorise detention  for  a period longer than three  months  it  must conform  to the provisions of either sub-cl. (a) or  (b)  of cl.  (4) and that requires that the maximum period  must  be prescribed by Parliament by law made under cl. (7) (b). [860 H] (2)  The  highest or the greatest extent or stretch of  time may  be determined by means of a fixed date or In  terms  of

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years,  months or days or by reference to the occurrence  of an  event.   But whatever be the mode of  determination  the maximum period must be a definite period.  What is necessary is  that the point of time at which the event  would  happen must be definite. [863 E] In  the instant case since it cannot be predicated with  any definiteness  as to when the emergency would come to an  end the period prescribed by s. 13 of the Act cannot be said  to be  the "maximum period" within the meaning of cl. (7)  (b). Parliament   has  not  prescribed  the  maximum  period   of detention as contemplated under cl. (7) (b) and so no person can be detained under the provisions of the Act for a period longer than three months. [866 C]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 41, 106 etc. etc. of 1973. Under Art. 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. R.   K. Maheshwari, for the petitioner (in W.P. 41). 836 A.   K. Gupta, for the petitioner (in W.P. Nos. 106 & 113). M.   S. Gupta, for the petitioner (in W.P. Nos. 441 & 214). T.   S. Arora, for the petitioner (in W.P. 621). Niren De, Attorney General of India and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent (in W.P. 106). Dilip Sinha, for the respondents (in W.P. Nos. 113, & 441). M.   M. Kshatriya, for the respondents (in W.P. 214). P.   K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the  respondent (in W.P. 41). Nire  De, Attorney General of India and R. N. Sachthey,  for Attorney General of India. Ramamurthy, for intervener No. 1 and for intervener No. 2. The  Judgment  of  Ray  CJ, Mathew  &  Chandrachud  JJ.  was delivered  by  Mathew J. Alagiriswami, J. and  Bhagwati,  J. gave partly dissenting Opinions. MATHEW, J. In these writ petitions filed under article 32 of the  Constitution, the petitioners question the legality  of their  detente and pray for issue of writs in the nature  of habeas    corpus.    These   petitions   raise   a    common constitutional question, namely, whether Parliament is bound to  prescribe the maximum period of detention under  article 22(7)(b)  of the Constitution in order that the  proviso  to article  22(4)(e) might operate, and, whether, by s.  13  of the  Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act  26  of 1971),  hereinafter  referred to as the Act,  after  it  was amended  by s. 6(d) of the Defence of India Act,  1971,  the Parliament has prescribed the "maximum period". The  orders  passed by the Government of West  Bengal  under s.12 (1) of the Act in these cases provide that the Governor is-pleased  to  confirm  the  orders  of  detention  and  to continue  the detention of the detenues till the  expiration of 12 months from the dates of their detention of until  the expiry  of  the  Defence of India Act,  1971,  whichever  is later. The material part of s. 13 of the Act as it originally stood ran as follows :               "The  maximum period for which any person  may               be  detained  in pursuance  of  any  detention               order  which  has been confirmed under  s.  12               shall  be  twelve  months  from  the  date  of               detention."               After it was amended by s. 6(d) of the Defence

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             of India Act, 1971, the material part of s. 13               of the Act reads               "The  maximum period for which any person  may               be  detained  it% pursuance of  any  detention               order  which  has been confirmed under  s.  12               shall be twelve months from the date               837               of  detention  or  until  the  expiry  of  the               Defence  of  India  Act,  1971,  whichever  is               later." The Defence of India Act, 1971, came into force on  December 4,  1971.   Section 1(3) of that Act provides that  the  Act shall  come  into force at once and shall  remain  in  force during  the  period  of operation  of  the  Proclamation  of Emergency  and  for  a  period  of  six  months  thereafter. Section 2(g) of that Act defines "Proclamation of Emergency" as  the proclamation issued under clause (1) of article  352 of  the Constitution on the 3rd day of December, 1971.   The President issued the Proclamation of Emergency under article 352 of the Constitution on December 3, 1971. Article  22(4)(a)  of  the Constitution  says  that  no  law providing  for  preventive  detention  shall  authorise  the detention of a person for a period longer then three  months unless  an Advisory Board has reported before the expiry  of three  months that there is in its opinion sufficient  cause for  such  detention.  The proviso to the  article  provides that   nothing  in  sub-clause  (a)  shall  authorize,   the detention   of  any  person  "beyond  the   maximum   period prescribed  by any law made by Parliament  under  sub-clause (b)  of clause (7)" of article 22.  By reason of article  22 (4)  (b), a person can be detained for a longer period  than three months without the necessity of consulting an Advisory Board  if  "such person is detained in accordance  with  the provisions  of any law made by Parliament under  sub-clauses (a) and (b)    of  clause (7)" of article 22.  And,  article 22(7) says               "(7) Parliament may by law prescribe-               (a)   the  circumstances under which, and  the               class  or classes of cases in which, a  person               may be detained for a period longer than three               months under any law providing for  preventive               detention without obtaining the opinion of  an               Advisory   Board   in  accordance   with   the               provisions of subclause (a) of clause (4);               (b)   the maximum period for which any  person               may  in  any  class or  classes  of  cases  be               detained   under   any   law   providing   for               preventive detention; and               (c)the procedure to be followed by an Advisory               Board  in an inquiry under sub-clause  (a)  of               clause (4)." The contentions of the petitioners were that the  Parliament was bound to prescribe the maximum period of detention under article  22 (7) (b) of the Constitution in order  that  the, proviso to article 22(4) (a) might operate and, as S. 13  of the Act as amended did not prescribe "the maximum period" of detention, the confirmation of the detention orders in terms of s. 13 of the Act was bad. The   learned  Attorney  General,  who  appeared   for   the respondent  in these petitions, submitted that in s.  13  of the  Act the parliament has prescribed "the maximum  period" of detention.  And in the alter- 838 native,  he  said  that the Parliament  was  not.  bound  to prescribe the maximum period of detention for the proviso to

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article 22(4)(a) to operate. in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(1) Kania, C. J. said that   article  22(7)  (b)  is  permissive,  it  being   not obligatory on Parliament to prescribe the maximum period and that  if this construction resulted in a  Parliamentary  law enabling the detention of a person for an indefinite  period without trial, that unfortunate consequence is the result of the  words of article 22(7) itself and that the Court  could do nothing about it. In  Krishnan  v.  The  State of  Madras(2),  s.  11  of  the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, was impugned  as violative of article 22 (4) (a) on the ground that S. 11 did not fix a maximum period of detention, but on the  contrary, empowered the Government in express terms to order that  the detenu  was to continue in detention for such period  as  it thought  fit.  The Court, by a majority, held that s.11  was not  invalid on the ground that it did not fix  the  maximum period  of detention inasmuch as the Act was to be in  force only  for a period of one year and no detention  under  that Act  could  be  continued  after  the  expiry  of  the  Act. Mahajan, J. pointed out that the point was concluded by  the decision in Gopalan’s case(1) where Kania, C.J. had observed that  it was not obligatory on Parliament to’ prescribe  any maximum  period.   On the other hand, Bose, J. who  wrote  a dissenting judgment, held that though it was not  obligatory on  Parliament to fix the maximum period of detention  under article  22(7)(b),  if it wanted to detain a  person  for  a period  longer  than three months, it could only  do  so  by providing in the Act the maximum period of detention. In  the State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey and Others(3)  the central  issue was whether a State Legislature has power  to pass  a law providing for preventive detention of  a  person for  a period longer than three months even after  obtaining the  opinion of an Advisory Board that there was  sufficient cause  for detention, unless the Parliament  has  prescribed the  maximum period of detention under article 22  (7)  (b). The contention was that there was no such power.  The  Court negatived  the  contention and said that  article  22(7)  is couched  in,  a  permissive  way,  that  there  is   nothing mandatory  about  it  and  that  the  majority  decision  in Krishnan’s case(2) following the observation of Kania,  C.J. in  Gopalan’s case(3) was binding on the, Court.  The  Court also  said  that under entry 3 of list III  of  the  Seventh Schedule,  both  Parliament  and  State  legislatures   have concurrent  power  to make laws in  respect  of  "preventive detention  for  reasons  connected with the  security  of  a State,  the maintenance of public order, or the  maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; persons subject   to  such  detention",  and  that  as   the   State legislatures  have plenary power to make- law providing  for preventive, detention within the limitations imposed by  the Constitution, the power must necessarily extend to all (1) [1950] S.C.R.  88,               (2) [1951] S.C.R. 621 (3)  [1972] 1 S.C.C. 199. 839 matters  incidental to preventive detention as  contemplated by  this  entry subject only to the condition that  the  law made  by the State should not come into conflict with a  law made  by  Parliament with respect to the same  matter.   The Court came to the conclusion that there was no limitation on the power of a State legislature to make a law providing for detention  for a period beyond three months for  the  reason that  Parliament has not made a law prescribing the  maximum period of detention under article 22 (7) (b). Great  reliance  was  placed  by  the  petitioners  on   the

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reasoning  contained in the dissenting judgment of Bose,  J. in  Krishnan’s  case (supra) for the  proposition  that  the fixation  by  law  of the maximum  period  of  detention  is obligatory  upon  Parliament in order that  the  proviso  to article 22 (4) (a) may operate. According  to Bose, J., a law providing for detention  of  a person  beyond a period of three months must satisfy  either clause (4) (a) or clause (4) (b) of article 22.  The learned judge  was not, however, prepared to read the word ’may’  in clause  (7)  of article 22 as meaning must’  as  that  would change  the usual meaning of the word.  He was of  the  view that Parliament is free to prescribe or not to prescribe the maximum  period  of detention under article 22 (7)  (b)  and that  neither  Parliament  nor  State  legislature  can   be compelled  to  pass a law authorising  preventive  detention beyond  three months but, if, however, either wishes  to  do so, then it is bound to conform to the provisions of  either sub-clause (a) or (b) of article 22(4) or both, and that, in the  case, of sub-clause (a), the proviso is as much a  part of the sub-clause as its main provision.  The learned  judge then said that if no maximum limit is prescribed under  sub- clause  (b) of article 22(7), the proviso to article 22  (4) (a)  cannot operate, and, if it cannot operate, no  legisla- tive action can be taken under clause (4) (a), and  resorted to  reasoning from analogies to fortify his conclusion.   He observed : "’If A is told by B that he may go to a bank  and withdraw  a sum of money not exceeding such limit as may  be fixed  by C, it is evident that until C fixes the  limit  no money  can be withdrawn.  Equally, if A is told that he  may withdraw  money not exceeding a limit which he  himself  may fix,  there  can, in my opinion, be no right  of  withdrawal until  he  fixes the limit".  He concluded his  judgment  by saying   that   the  majority  judgment  amounted   to   the Constitution  telling all persons resident in the land  that "though we authorise Parliament to prescribe a maximum limit of detention if it so chooses, we place no compulsion on  it to do so and we authorise it to pass legislation which  will empower any person or authority Parliament chooses to  name, right down to, a police constable, to arrest you and  detain you as long as he pleases, for the duration of your life  if he  wants, so that you may linger and rot in jail. till  you die, as did men in the Bastille". We  think the analogies which the learned judge referred  to are,  In fact, misleading and his seasonings from  them  not convincing. Under  entry  3 of List III of the  Seventh  Schedule,  both Parliament and State legislatures have plenary power to pass laws  for  preventive  detention as  respects  the  subjects mentioned therein.  As ancillary to 840 that  power, or, as an inseparable part of  it.   Parliament and  State  legislatures  have power to fix  the  period  of detention  also.  One cannot imagine a power to pass  a  law for  detention  unless  that  power  carries  with  it   the incidental   power  to  provide  for  the  period  of   such detention.     Therefore,   both   Parliament   and    State legislatures  have  power  under the entry  to  provide  for detention of a person for a specified period. the purpose of article 22 (4) (a) is to put a curb on that power by provid- ing  that no law shall authorize the detention,of  a  person for a period exceeding three months unless an Advisory board has reported within the period of three months that there is sufficient cause for detention.  And, what the proviso means is  that even if the Advisory Board has reported before  the expiration  of three months that there is  sufficient  cause

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for  detention, the period of detention beyond three  months shall  not exceed the maximum period that might be fixed  by any  law  made by Parliament under article 22(7)  (b).   The proviso cannot mean that even if Parliament does not pass  a law fixing the maximum period under article 22 (7) (b),  the State  legislatures,  for example, cannot pass a  law  which provides for detention of a person beyond three months.  The period of such detention,, viz., detention beyond the period of  three months, would then be a matter within the  plenary power  of Parliament or State legislatures, as the case  may be, as such a power is incidental to the power to pass a law with respect to the topics covered by entry 3 of List III. It  is therefore clear that, but for the proviso  to  clause (4)  (a)  of  article 22, the Act, as it  provides  for  the opinion of the Advisory Board, can authorize detention of  a person for any period, by virtue of the plenary character of the legislative power conferred by the entry.  Whether  such a  law  is liable to be struck down on the  ground  that  it imposes  unreasonable  restrictions  upon  the   fundamental rights under article 19 is an altogether different question. The  proviso  says in effect that if  Parliament  fixes  the maximum  period  under  article  22(7)  (b),  the  power  of Parliament  and  State  legislatures to fix  the  period  of detention in a law passed under the entry would be curtailed to that extent. Seeing,  therefore, that the power to pass a  law  providing for detention of a person after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory  Board  includes the power to  fix  any  reasonable period  beyond  three  months  by  virtue  of  the   plenary character  of the legislative power conferred by the  entry, the proper analogy would be : A has authority from B to draw any  amount  from a bank but he is told that if  C  fixes  a limit  upon that authority then be can only draw the  amount as fixed by C, in such a case. if C does not fix the  amount the power of A to draw is plenary.  Or, if A is told that he may  withdraw money not exceeding a limit which  he  himself may  fix.   A has power to draw any amount, nay,  the  whole amount  in  the  Bank, if only he fixes the  limit  at  that amount.   The condition-precedent, namely. the  fixation  of the  amount by A in such a case, would be  wholly  illusory, for  whatever be chooses to draw would be the limit  of  his authority.   To put it differently, as Parliament and  State legislatures  have  power  under the entry  to  pass  a  law enabling the detention of a person for a period longer  than three 841 months  in  case  the law provides for the  opinion  of  the Advisory  Board,  there could be no limit  to  that  period, except in the context of its reasonableness, as the power to fix  the  period of detention is incidental to  the  plenary power  to  legislate on the topic of  preventive  detention. The proviso merely enables Parliament to put a curb on  that power  by prescribing the maximum period of detention  under article  22 (7) (b).  The proviso does not, proprio  vigore, compel  the Parliament to fix the maximum period.  Nor  does article  22(7).   On  the  other  hand,  it  expressly  says otherwise.  Whence then arises the obligation of  Parliament to fix the maximum period under article 22 (7) (b) ? We  see no   provision  which  either  expressly  or  by   necessary implication  compels Parliament to do so.  Personal  liberty is  a  cherished freedom, more cherished  perhaps  than  all other freedoms, and we are deeply concerned that no man  may linger  and  rot  in detention.  As  judges  and  citizens., personal  liberty is as dear to us as to anyone else and  we may  respectfully  venture to make the  same  assumption  in

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regard to those judges who were parties to the decisions  in Gopalan’s  case(1),  Krishnan’s  case(2)  and  Ashok   Dey’s case(3).   But  the  problem here is  one  of  dispassionate interpretation  of  the article in question  and  we  cannot import   an  obligation  that  Parliament  "shall"  by   law prescribe   the  maximum  period  of  detention.   Such   an obligation  could  only arise from an  invisible,  radiation proceeding from a vague and speculative concept of  personal liberty.   The  language’ of article 22(4(b)  is  in  marked contrast  with  that  of article 22 (4) (a)  read  with  the proviso.   Article  22(4)  (b)  makes  it  obligatory   upon Parliament, if it wants to pass a law for detaining a person for  a  period of more than three months  without  making  a provision  in  that  law for obtaining  the  opinion  of  an Advisory  Board  within three months. to  comply  with  sub- clauses (a) and (b) of article 22(7).  We, therefore, see no sufficient  reason for departing from the view taken in  the decisions  of this Court referred to earlier as regards  the power of Parliament under article 22(7) (b). The  question  whether, when Parliament passes a  law  under article 22(7) (b) fixing the maximum period of detention  in any class of cases, it is exercising an independent power of fixing  the maximum period of detention derived from  clause (7) of article 22 or a power traceable to the entries on the subject   of  preventive  detention,  does  not  arise   for consideration  here.   If the exercise of  the  power  under article  22(7) is independent of the power conferred by  the entries  relating  to  preventive  detention,  the  question whether a law passed by virtue of any of the entries  fixing a period of detention in excess of the maximum period  fixed by a law passed under article 22 (7) (b) would, sub-silentio repeal the provision in regard to the maximum period in  the law  passed under article 22(7), and make that  period  "the maximum  period" for the purpose of article, 22(7) (b)  does not also strictly arise for consideration.  But this much we think  is  certain,  namely,  that  the  prescription  of  a ’maximum  period’ by a law made under article 22(7) (b)  has no particular sanctity so far as Parliament is concerned, as it could pass a law for detention the (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.       (2) [1951] S.C.R. 621. (3)  [1972] 1 S.C.C. 199. 842 next day providing for a higher ’maximum period’ and justify that  law  as  a law passed both under  the  relevant  entry relating  ’to preventive detention and under article 22  (7) (b).  To put it differently, the, view that the prescription of the maximum period under article 22(7)(b) is a  guarantee that  the Parliament cannot pass a law providing for  longer period  of  detention than the maximum  period  fixed  under article   22(7)(b)  has no solid foundation, as the  law  of detention fixing    the  longer  period would  sub  silentio repeal the law under article  22(7)(b)  fixing the  ’maximum period’.  As Parliament has power  to  repeal a  law  fixing the maximum period under article 22(7)(b), the longer period fixed  under  the later law of detention  would  become  the maximum period. Detention  without  trial is a serious matter.  It  is  only natural  that  it should conjure up lurid  pictures  of  men pining in Bastille.  But malignant diseases call for drastic remedies.   And  it  was  this  realization  that  made  the Constitution-makers-all   lovers  of  liberty-to   reconcile themselves to the idea of detention without trial. Even  if it is granted that Parliament is bound to  fix  the maximum  period  of detention, as we said, such  a  fixation cannot  be  immutable. what then is the great  guarantee  of

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personal  liberty in the fixation of the maximum  period  of detention by Parliament, if that fixation can fluctuate with the mood of Parliament ? The  learned Attorney General contended in  the  alternative that  if S. 13 as amended is regarded as fixing the  maximum period  of  detention under article 22(7) (b), it  does  not suffer from any infirmity on the score that the period fixed is indefinite as contended by the petitioners. The  petitioners  bad  contended that  the  expression  "the maximum  period" occurring in article 22(7) (b)  connotes  a definite  period reckoned in terms of years, months or  days and that no period can be said to be a maximum period unless it  is possible to predicate its beginning and end in  terms of years, months or days.  In other words, the argument  was that  since  the determination of the period  of  detention, namely, the expiry of the Defence of India Act, 1971, is de- pendent   upon  the  revocation  of  the   Proclamation   of Emergency,  the  period fixed in S. 13 is not  "the  maximum period" as visualized by article 22 (7) (b). The   meaning  of  the  word  ’maximum’  is,  "the   highest attainable magnitude or quantity (of some thing), a superior limit"  (Shorter  Oxford Dictionary, p.  1221,  (1953),  3rd ed.).  The  meaning of the word ’period’ is "  A  course  or extent   of   time;  Time  of  duration"   (Shorter   Oxford Dictionary, p. 1474).  Therefore, the words "maximum period" mean the highest or greatest course or extent or stretch  of time.   The highest or greatest course or extent or  stretch of  time may be measured in terms of years, months or  days, as  well  as in terms of the occurrence of an event  or  the continuous of a state of affairs. In Juggilal Kamlapat v. Collector, Bombay(1), the High Court of  Bombay  was  concerned  with  the  question  whether   a requisition (1) A.I.R. 1946 Bombay 280. 843 der  which  stated  that the requisition  of  the  immovable property  in question was to continue during the  period  of "the,  present  war and x months thereafter" was  vague  and indefinite.  Bhagwati, J. said               "The   period  of  the  present  war   through               indefinite in duration was definite in  itself               in so far as the petitioners were given in  as               clear  terms as it could be an  indication  of               the period for which their property was sought               to be requisitioned by respondent 1 viz.,  the               duration of the present war.  The user of this               term  was as definite as the user of  the  ex-               pression  "the life time of A" which  is  used               when  settling or bequeathing a  remainder  in               favour of B. B could not be heard to say  that               the  life  time  of A  which  was  the  period               prescribed as the one which was to come to  an               end   before  the  remainder  would  vest   in               possession in his favour was a term which  was               vague  or  indefinite.  It was  as  clear  and               definite as it could be, having regard to  the               fact  that the period of the life time  of  an               individual is indeterminate, though that  life               is  of necessity going to come to an end  some               time or other". We  do  not think it necessary that Parliament  should  have fixed  a period in terms of years, months or days  in  order that  it  might be "the maximum period" for the  purpose  of article  2Z(7)  (b).  Seeing that the object of the  law  of preventive detention is to prevent persons from acting in  a

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manner prejudicial to the maintenance of internal  security, or of public order, or of supplies and services essential to the community or other objects specified in entry 9 of  List I  of  the  Seventh  Schedule, we see  great  force  in  the contention of the learned Attorney General that "the maximum period" in article 22(7) (b) can be fixed with reference  to the duration of an emergency.  In other words, as the object of preventive detention is to prevent persons from acting in a   manner  prejudicial  to  the  maintenance  of   internal security, public order or supplies or services essential  to the community or other objects specified in entry 9 of  List I, the power to detain must be adequate in point of duration to  achieve the object.  And, how can the power be  adequate in point of duration, if it is insufficient to cope with  an emergency  created by war or public disorder or shortage  of supplies  essential to the community, the duration of  which might  be  incapable of being predicted in terms  of  years, months  or  days even by those gifted with  great  prophetic vision ?  If ’the maximum period" can be fixed only in terms of years, months or days, certainly it would have been  open to  Parliament to fix a long period in S. 13 and justify  it as "the maximum period".  It would be straining the gnat and swallowing  the camel if anybody is shocked by the  fixation of  the  maximum period of detention with reference  to  the duration of an emergency but could stomach with  complacency the  fixation of maximum period, say, at fifteen  or  twenty years.  Whether the fixation of a "maximum period" in  terms of years or in terms of events is reasonable in a particular circumstance, is a totally different matter. it  was  argued on behalf of one of the interveners  on  the basis  of the decision of this Court in B. Shama Rao v.  The Union Territory 844 of  Pondicherry(1)  that the Parliament  has  abdicated  its power al. duty to fix maximum period to the executive as the determination  the  duration  of  the  Proclamation  of  the Emergency  is a matter with the discretion of the  President and  he  is,  therefore,  the  authority  to  determine  the retirement age of the Defence of India Act. We do not think that the Parliament, in fixing the  duration of  the  maximum period of detention with  reference  to  an event like the cessation of the period of emergency, has, in any way, abdicated its power or function to fix the  maximum period  or delegated it to the President.  There can  be  no doubt  that  it  is Parliament that has  fixed  the  maximum period  in S. 13 of the Act.  The only question is  whether, because  the  duration of the period is dependent  upon  the volition  of  the President, it ceases to  be  "the  maximum period".   We  cannot presume that the  President  will  act unreasonably and continue the Proclamation of Emergency even after the emergency has ceased to exist. The petitioners argued that s. 13 of the Act is bad for  the reason that it is violative of their fundamental right under article 19 of the Constitution.  This challenge is not  open to them as it is precluded by the Proclamation of Emergency. Although it was argued that s. 13 of the Act is violative of article  14 of the Constitution for the reason that  it  has conferred unlimited discretion on the detaining authority to fix  the period of detention, we do not think that there  is any  substance  in  that contention.   The  authority  which passes the initial order of detention is not expected to fix the  period of detention [see Krishnan’s case(supra)],  nay, it  may  be  illegal  if  it were to  do  so.   Nor  is  the Government  bound, when confirming the order  of  detention, under  s. 12(1) of the Act, to fix the period  of  detention

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[see  Suna Ullah v. State of J N K(2).  Even if a period  is fixed in confirming the detention order under S. 12(1),  the period can be revoked or modified (see s. 13).  The  maximum period  of  detention  has  been fixed  by  s.  13  and  the discretion  to fix the duration within the maximum has  been given  to the Government after considering all the  relevant circumstances.  Seeing that the maximum period of  detention has  been fixed by S. 13 and that the discretion to fix  the period of detention in a particular case has to be exercised after   taking  into  account  a  number   of   imponderable circumstances,  we do not think that there is any  substance in  the argument that the power of Government  to  determine the period of detention is discriminatory or arbitrary. In the result, we overrule the contention of the petitioners and direct the writ petitions to be listed for disposal. ALAGIRISWAMI,  J.  I have read the judgment of  our  learned brother Mathew, J. and with respect I differ from him on the question  whether it is obligatory on Parliament to fix  the maximum  period of detention.  I shall analyse the  relevant provisions later but I shall first deal with three decisions which have dealt with this question. (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 650. (2) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2431. 845 In  A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(1) the six  learned Judges  comprising the Bench delivered  separate  judgments. Kania C. J. was the only Judge who dealt with this point  in these words :               "It was argued that this gives the  Parliament               a  right  to  allow a person  to  be  detained               indefinitely.    If   that   construction   is               correct,  it springs out of the words of  sub-               clause (7) itself and the Court cannot help in               the matter."               It   would  be  noticed  that  there   is   no               discussion  at  all  here as  to  whether  the               learned  Chief Justice came to the  conclusion               that the contention was correct or not or  how               it  springs out of the words of subclause  (7)               that  it was not obligatory on  Parliament  to               prescribe any maximum period.               In  the next case of S. Krishnan v. The  State               of  Madras(2) Patanjali Sastri, J.  with  whom               Kania,  C.J.  agreed, did not deal  with  this               question at all.  Mahajan, J., with whom S. R.               Das,  J. agreed substantially on  the  grounds               stated  by  Mahajan, J. did, of  course,  deal               with this question in these words :               "The  next point canvassed before us was  that               the  Constitution does not envisage  detention               for  an  indefinite  period  and  that  it  is               obligatory on Parliament to provide a  maximum               period  for detention of a person under a  law               of preventive detention.  In my opinion,  this               argument  again  is not sound.   Emphasis  was               laid on the proviso to article 22(4) (a) which               enacts  that nothing in the  sub-clause  shall               authorize  the detention of any person  beyond               the maximum period prescribed by any law  made               by  Parliament  under  sub-clause(b)of  clause               (7)and  it was urged that the, word  "may"  in               article  22(7)  must be read in the  sense  of               "must"  and  as  having  a  compulsory   force               inasmuch  as the enactment authorizes  Parlia-               ment to prescribe by law a maximum period  for

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             detention, for the advancement of justice  and               for public good, or for the benefit of persons               subjected to preventive detention.   Reference               was made to Maxwell on "Interpretation of  the               Statutes"  (9th  End., page 246)  and  to  the               well-known   case  of  Julius  v.  Bishop   of               Oxford(3) Lord Cairns in that case observed as               follows :-               "Where  a  power is deposited  with  a  public               officer for the purpose of being used for  the               benefit  of  persons that power  ought  to  be               exercised."               In  my opinion, clause (7) of article  22,  as               already pointed out, in its true concept to  a               certain degree restricts the   measure of  the               fundamental right contained in clause (4)  (a)               and  in this context the rule referred  to  by               Maxwell has     no    application    whatever.               Moreover, the provision in the Constitution is               merely an enabling one and it is well settled               (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.       (2) [1951]  S.C.R.               621.               (3)   5 App. cas. 214.               846               that in an enabling Act words of a  permissive               nature  cannot be given a compulsory  meaning.               (Vide Caries on Statute Law, p. 254).  Be that               as  it may, the point is no longer open as  it               has been concluded by the majority decision in               Gopalan’s case.  The learned Chief Justice  at               p. 119 of the report observed as follows :-               "Sub-clause  (b)  is permissive.   It  is  not               obligatory on the Parliament to prescribe  any               maximum period.  It was argued that this gives               the Parliament a right to allow a person to be               detained  indefinitely.  If that  construction               is  correct,  it springs out of the  words  of               subclause (7) itself and the court cannot help               in the matter."               Nothing  said by Mr. Nambiar is sufficient  to               persuade  me to take a different view  of  the               matter  than was taken in Gopalan’s case.   It               may  be pointed out that Parliament  may  well               have  thought that it was unnecessary  to  fix               any maximum period of detention in the statute               which was of a temporary nature and whose  own               tenure of life was limited to one, year.  Such               temporary  statutes cease to have  any  effect               after they expire, they automatically come  to               an  end at the expiry of the period for  which               they have been enacted and nothing further can               be  done  under them.  The  detention  of  the               petitioners  therefore is bound to come to  an               end automatically with the life of the statute               and in these circumstances Parliament may well               have   thought   that  it  would   be   wholly               unnecessary to legislate and provide a maximum               period of detention for those detained  tinder               this law."               It would be noticed that while he did  discuss               this  question he thought that the  point  was               concluded  by the decision in Gopalan’s  case.               As  I have pointed out earlier that was not  a               majority   decision   but   only   a   passing               observation  by Kania, C.J. Both  these  cases

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             mainly  proceed  on  the basis  that  the  Act               itself  being a temporary Act to be  in  force               for a year the question of maximum period  did               not arise for serious consideration.  Bose, J.               however was of the view that it was obligatory               on  Parliament  to fix the maximum  period  of               detention.               In the latest case of State of West Bengal  v.               Ashok  Dey(1),  which was a judgment  by  four               learned Judges, Dua, J. speaking for the Court               said :               "Now,  the argument raised in the  High  Court               and  accepted by it and repeated before us  by               Shri   S.  N.  Chatterji  on  behalf  of   the               respondents is that clause (7) (b) of  Article               22  makes it obligatory for the Parliament  to               prescribe by law the maximum period for  which               a person may be detained as also the procedure               to  be  followed  by  the  Advisory  Board  in               holding  the enquiry under clause (4)  (a)  of               this Article.  According to the submission, in               the  absence  of such a law by  Parliament  no               order of detention can authorise detention  of               any  person  for a period  longer  than  three               months and at the               (1)   [1972] (1) S.C.C. 199.               847               expiry  of three months all  persons  detained               under the Act must be released.               We  are unable to accept this construction  of               clause  (7) of Article 22.  It  is  noteworthy               that  Shri Chatterji, learned counsel for  the               respondents, expressly conceded before us that               Article  22(7)  is  only  an  enabling  or   a               permissive provision and it does not impose  a               mandatory obligation on the Parliament to make               a  law  prescribing  the  circumstances  under               which  a person may be detained for more  than               three months as stated therein.  But according               to him sub-clause (b) and (c) of clause (7) do               contain  a mandate to the Parliament which  is               obligatory.   In our view, clause (7) of  this               Article on its plain reading merely authorises               or  enables  the  Parliament  to  make  a  law               prescribing (i) the circumstances under  which               a  person may be detained for a period  longer               than three months, (ii) the maximum period for               which a person may in any class or classes  of               cases be detained under any law providing  for               preventive detention, and (iii) the  procedure               to  be  followed by the Advisory Board  in  an               enquiry under clause (4) (a) of this  Article.               The respondents’ contention that "may" in  the               opening  part of this Article must be read  as               "shall" in respect of sub-clauses (b) and  (c)               though   it  retains  its  normal   permissive               character   in  so  far  as  clause   (a)   is               concerned,   in   the   absence   of   special               compelling reasons can be supported neither on               principle  nor  by precedent of which  we  are               aware.  On the other hand this Court has in S.               Krishnan v. State of Madras agreeing with  the               observations  of  Kania, C.J.  in  Gopalan  v.               State of Madras held sub-clause (b) of  clause               (7)  to  be permissive.  This opinion  is  not

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             only  binding  on  us  but  we  are  also   in               respectful agreement with it." This  decision does directly deal with the point but not  by detailed  analysis  of the relevant provisions  as  done  by Mathew, J. and Bhagwati, J. and as I have tried to do  later on.   The decision, however, war. mainly concerned with  the power of the State Legislature to make a law with regard  to preventive  detention and the whole approach is coloured  by this  consideration  rather than the  question  whether  the prescription of the maximum is obligatory. The  power  of  Parliament  to  legislate  with  regard   to preventive  detention  arises under Entry 9, List 1  of  the Seventh  Schedule as well as Entry 3, List 3 of the  Seventh Schedule.  The State Legislature has the power to  legislate with regard to preventive detention under Entry 3 in List  3 of the Seventh Schedule.  This, of course, is subject to the provisions  of Article 254(2) of the Constitution.   Article 22  is  found  in Part III  of  the  Constitution  regarding fundamental rights.  According to Article 1 3 (2) the  State shall  not  make any law which takes away or  abridges  the, rights conferred by that Part.  Therefore, Article 22 is  an article  restricting  the  powers of  Parliament  and  State Legislatures in regard to preventive detention in the manner laid  down  therein.  Of the learned Judges who  dealt  with Gopalan’s case.  Kania, C.J., Patanjali Sastri and Dass  JJ. took the view that Article 22 does not 4-L748SuP.  CI/74 848 form  a complete code of constitutional safeguards  relating to preventive detention.  While Mahajan, J, thought that  it contains a self contained code of constitutional  safeguards relating  to  preventive  detention, Das,  J.  thought  that Article  22  lays down the minimum rules of  procedure  that even the Parliament cannot abrogate or overlook.  Mukherjea, J. proceeded to state his conclusions on the assumption that Art. 22 is not a self-contained code relating to  preventive detention.  Fazl Ali, J. took the view that Art. 22 does not form  an exhaustive code by its,-If relating  to  preventive detention.   All  this  goes to show that  all  the  learned Judges  more  or less took the view that  Art.  22  obtained certain  constitutional safeguards regarding the  preventive detention.               Now let us took at Article 22 in so far as  it               is necessary for purpose of this discussion :               "Art.  22(4) No law providing  for  preventive               detention  shall authorise the detention of  a               person  for a longer period than three  months               unless--               (a)   an Advisory Board consisting of  persons               who are, or have been, or are qualified to  be               appointed  as,  Judges of a  High  Court,  has               reported  before  the expiration of  the  said               period  of three months that there is  in  its               opinion sufficient cause for such detention               Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall               authorise  the detention of any person  beyond               the maximum period prescribed by any law  made               by  Parliament under sub-clause (b) of  clause               (7); or               (b)   such  person is detained  in  accordance               with  the  provisions  of  any  law  made   by               Parliament  under  subclauses (a) and  (b)  of               clause (7).               (7)   Parliament may by law prescribe-               a)    the  circumstances under which, and  the

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             class  or classes of cases in which, a  person               may be detained for a period longer than three               months under any law providing for  preventive               detention without obtaining the opinion of  an               Advisory   Board   in  accordance   with   the               provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);               (b)   the maximum period for which any  person               may  in  any  class or  classes  of  cases  be               detained   under   any   law   providing   for               preventive detention; and               (c)..................................               I  shall  now place the various parts  of  the               above  provisions  separately so  as  to  make               matters clear :               1.    No   law   providing   for    preventive               detention  shall authorise the detention of  a               person  for a longer period than three  months               unless  the  Advisory  Board,  consisting   of               persons   who  are,  or  have  been,  or   are               qualified to be the               849               appointed  as  Judges of the High  Court,  has               reported  before  the expiration of  the  said               period  of three months that there is  in  its               opinion sufficient cause for such detention.  This does not authorise the detention of  any               person beyond the maximum period prescribed by               any  law made by Parliament  under  sub-clause               (b) of clause               3.    No   law   providing   for    preventive               detention  shall authorise the detention of  a               person  for a period longer than three  months               unless  such person is detained in  accordance               with the provisions of any law made by Parlia-               ment prescribing               (a)   the  circumstances under which, and  the               class  or classes of cases in which, a  person               may  be  detained for a  _period  longer  than               three  months  under  any  law  providing  for               preventive  detention  without  obtaining  the               opinion  of  an Advisory Board  in  accordance               with  the  provisions  of  sub-clause  (a)  of               clause (4); (and)               (b)   the maximum period for which any  person               may  in  any  class or  classes  of  cases  be               detained   under   any   law   providing   for               preventive detention. The   1st  proposition  means  that  a  law  providing   for preventive detention can authorise the detention of a person for  a longer period than three months only if  an  Advisory Board  has reported that there is sufficient cause for  such detention. Proposition  (2)  means  that even with  the  advice  of  an Advisory  Board  the  detention cannot  exceed  the  maximum period prescribed by law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b)  of clause (7).  I shall deal with the question  whether it  is obligatory on Parliament to make such a law a  little later. Proposition  (3)  means  that if a  person  is  detained  in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a)    and (b) of clause (7) the detention can be for a period longer than three   months.   It  should be noticed that the law contemplated under this   proposition is  one  made under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of  clause  (7). Therefore a Parliamentary statute can provide for preventive

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detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board by  laying down the circumstances under which and  class  or classes of cases on which it can be done.  In that case  the maximum  period  for which a person can be  detained  should also  be  specified by the parliamentary law i.e.  a  person cannot  be  detained  for a period  exceeding  three  months without  obtaining the opinion of an Advisory  Board  unless tile  concerned  provision  of law  also  provides  for  the maximum  period for which such a person is to  be  detained. The  Constitution  makers  have  Contemplated  that  if  the Advisory  Board’s  opinion  is to  be  dispensed  with,  the maximum  period  of  detention should be laid  down.  it  is obvious,  therefore,  that  the word  "may"  in  Art.  22(7) amounts  to ‘shall".  It is also obvious that the  power  to dispense with the opinion 850 of  an Advisory Board is given only to Parliament.  When  it makes a law under clause (7) (a) & (b) of Art. 22 that  also would  bind the State Legislatures in so far as  they  enact any  legislation with regard to preventive detention.   This is  not, of course, to say that State Legislatures  have  no power with regard to preventive detention.  But they do  not have  the power to prescribe the circumstances  under  which and  the class or classes of cases in which a person may  be detained for a period longer than 3 months without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board.  That power is  completely that  of Parliament and any State legislation will  also  be subject to the maximum period prescribed by Parliament under a legislation made under Art. 22(7) (a) and (b).  The  only  question that now remains to  be  considered  is whether  if  an  Advisory Board is provided  for  in  a  law providing  for  preventive detention under Article  22(4)  a maximum period of detention should be prescribed or not.  In considering this question one thing would be obvious :  that if   Parliament  does  prescribe  a  maximum  period   under proposition  (2)  i.e. the proviso to Art. 22(4)  (a),  that would  apply  to all laws relating to  preventive  detention whether  made  by  Parliament or  by  a  State  Legislature. Apparently the power to prescribe, a maximum period given to Parliament  (referred to in this proviso) is to prevent  the State  Legislatures  making laws with regard  to  preventive detention  without  any  maximum  limit.   This  is  another limitation  on  the  powers  of  the  State  Legislature  to legislate   with  regard  to  preventive   detention.    The Constitution  makers  apparently  did  not  want  the  State Legislatures  to  have an unfettered power  with  regard  to preventive  detention  even in the field  allotted  to  them under Entry 3 of List 3 of Seventh Schedule.  This provision can  be usefully compared with the provision of  Art.  31(3) which  provides for a legislation made under the  provisions of  clause, (2) of Art. 31 being reserved for  consideration of  the President and receiving his assent in order that  it may  have effect.  This was intended to act as a  fetter  on the  power of the State Legislatures to legislate under  the provisions of Art. 31(2).  The only difference between  Art. 31(3)  and the proviso to Art. 22(4) (a) is that in the  one case  the power is given to the President and in  the  other case  the  power is given to the Parliament.  Now  if  under subclauses  (a)  and  (b)  of  clause  (7),  read  together, Parliament has to prescribe the maximum period of detention, does  the fact that the proviso to Art. 22(4)  (a)  mentions only  sub-clause (b) of clause (7) but not  also  sub-clause (a),  makes any difference ? If, as I have  already  pointed out, this proviso at least contemplates Parliament making  a law  providing  for the maximum period  of  detention  which

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cannot  be  exceeded by any State law  regarding  preventive detention the reasonable construction would be to hold  that it is obligatory on Parliament to legislate under sub-clause (b)  fettering the hands of the State Legislature in  regard to the maximum period of detention.  It is true that Parlia- ment  cannot  fetter  its  own  hands  in  the  matters   of legislating with regard to the maximum period of  detention. If  the  Parliament can fix the maximum period it  can  also alter   it.   But  if  the  maximum  period  so   fixed   is unreasonably long Art. 19(1) would be attracted.  An  harmo- nious construction of the whole of Articles 22(4) and  22(7) would  thus  necessitate that Parliament  should  provide  a maximum  period of detention not merely in respect  of  laws relating to preventive detention 851 made  by State Legislatures but also its own laws  regarding preventive  detention.   If legislation with regard  to  the provision  of a maximum period is merely optional there  was no  need  for the proviso at all.  The fact that  only  sub- clause  (b)  of clause (7) is mentioned in  the  proviso  to Article  22(4)  (a)  does not make  any  difference  to  the obligatory   character  of  having  a  maximum  period   for preventive  detention  because,  as we  have  already  seen, fixing  of maximum period of detention is  obligatory  under Article  22(7) (a) and (b).  It can also be said that  where Parliament  has prescribed the maximum period  of  detention under  sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7) such a  maximum would  be  automatically  attracted  to  the  proviso  under Article  22(4) (a).  Furthermore, sub-clause (a)  of  clause (7)  is not mentioned in the, proviso to sub-clause (4)  (a) because  Article 22(4) does not deal with detention  without the  opinion of an Advisory Board.  That is why  clause  (b) alone is mentioned.  It is clear that the concept of a maxi- mum  period of detention runs through the whole  of  Article 22(4)  and (7).  This is because while Parliament and  State Legislatures make laws it is the executive that makes orders of  detention  and  if no maximum  period  of  detention  is specified  by law it would be open to the executive to  keep persons in detention indefinitely.  It is not reason-able to hold that the Constitution makers while providing that if  a person is to be detained without the opinion of an  Advisory Board  being  taken  there should be  a  maximum  period  of detention, thought that no maximum period of detention  need be  fixed  if  the Advisory Board’s opinion  is  taken.   It should be noticed that the opinion of the Advisory Board  is only as regards the sufficiency of the cause for such deten- tion and not as regards the period for which such  detention can  be  made.   Therefore,  taking  an  overall  view   and analysing  the provisions of clauses (4) and (7) of  Article 22 it is clear that a maximum period of detention should  be laid  down by Parliament whether it is a case  of  detention after obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board or  without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board.  I am  fortified in  this view by the debates in the Constituent Assembly  to which Bhagwati J. has referred. I  agree,  however,  with  Mathew  J.  that  the  law  under consideration   has  prescribed  the  maximum   period   and therefore  the  contention  of  the  petitioners  should  be overruled and the writ petitions be listed for disposal. BHAGWATI,  J.  The question which arises in these  petitions is  of the highest importance.  It affects personal  liberty which is one of our most cherished freedoms.  How far  shall we permit it to be abridged by judicial construction ? Shall we  by interpretation vest large and unlimited power in  the legislature  to detain a person without trial as long as  it

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pleases  or shall we read constitutional limitations on  the exercise  of that power ? That is the real issue before  the Court. The law is now well-settled by the decision of this Court in A.  K, Gopalan v. State of Madras(1) that  the,  legislative power  to enact a law providing for preventive detention  is derived  from Entry 9, List I and Entry 3, List III  of  the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.  The (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 88. 852 Parliament  alone has the power to make law  for  preventive detention for reasons connected with the subjects enumerated in  entry  9  List 1, while the  Parliament  and  the  State Legislature  both can make law for preventive detention  for reasons  connected with the subjects specified in  entry  3, List  Ill.  The legislative power of the Parliament and  the State  Legislature  to  make law  for  preventive  detention within  their  allotted fields is plenary, subject  only  to constitutional  limitations,  and  this  legislative   power necessarily carries with it as incidental or ancillary to it the  power  to  fix the period for which  a  person  may  be detained under such law.  Now, if there were no  limitations on  the exercise of this power, the Parliament or the  State Legislature, particularly the latter,. could fix any  period of  detention  it  liked and indefinitely  detain  a  person without trial.  That would be a large and fearful power des- tructive  of personal liberty and Art. 21 would  not  afford any  protection against it, because the only guarantee  that article provides is that no person shall be deprived of  his personal  liberty except according to procedure  established by law.  The constitution-makers, therefore, introduced Art. 22  with  a  view to placing limitations  on  the  Dower  of Parliament  and  the  State  Legislature  to  make  law  for preventive detention, so is to safeguard personal liberty of the  individual  against excessive  inroads  by  legislative incursions  in the area of personal liberty.  Clause 3 to  7 of Art. 22 impose these limitations.  We are concerned  only with cls. 4 to 7 which run as follows               "(4) No law providing for preventive detention               shall authorise the detention of a person  for               a longer period than three months unless-               (a)   an Advisory Board consisting of  persons               who  are or have been, or are qualified to  be               appointed  as,  Judges  of a  High  Court  has               reported  before  the expiration of  the  said               period  of three months that there is  in  its               opinion sufficient cause for such detention :               Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall               authorise  the detention of any person  beyond               the maximum period prescribed by any law  made               by  parliament under sub-clause (b) of  clause               (7); or               (b) such person is detained in accordance with               the  provisions of any law made by  Parliament               under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).               (5)When any person is detained in pursuance of               an  order  made under any  law  providing  for               preventive detention, the authority making the               order shall as soon as may be, communicate  to               such person the grounds on which the order his               been  made and shall afford him  the  earliest               opportunity of making a representation against               the order.                (6) Nothing in clause (5) ’shall require  the               authority making any such order as is referred

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             to in that clause to disclose facts which such               authority  considers to be against the  public               interest to     disclose.               853               (7)   Parliament may by law prescribe-               (a)   the  circumstances under which, and  the               class  or classes of cases in which, a  person               may be detained for a period longer than three               months under any law providing for  preventive               detention without obtaining the opinion of  an               Advisory   Board   in  accordance   with   the               provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);               (b)   the maximum period for which any  person               may  in  any  class of  classes  of  cases  be               detained   under   any   law   providing   for               preventive detention; and               (C)   the  procedure  to  be  followed  by  an               Advisory Board in an inquiry under  sub-clause               (a) of clause (4)." It  is clear on a combined reading of cls. (4) and (7)  that if  a  law  made  by Parliament  or  the  State  Legislature authorises  the  detention  of a person  for  a  period  not exceeding  three  months, it does not have  to  satisfy  any other  constitutional  requirement except that it  must  be, within  the legislative competence of the Parliament or  the State  legislature,  as the case may be.   The  Constitution permits the Parliament and the State Legislature to make law providing  for  detention  upto a  period  of  three  months without  any  limitation, presumably because  detention  for such  a relatively short period of time without any  further safeguard may be justifiable on practical and administrative grounds.   But when the law seeks to provide  for  detention for  a longer period than three months, it must comply  with certain constitutional safeguards.  These safeguards are  to be found in sub-cls. (a) and (b) of cl. (4).  Sub-cl. (a) of cl.  (4) lays down that no law shall provide  for  detention for  a  period longer than three months unless  an  Advisory Board  consisting of persons with the  qualifications  there mentioned  has reported before the expiration of the  period of  three  months that there is in  its  opinion  sufficient cause for such detention.  The law must, therefore,  provide for  reference to an Advisory Board and its report within  a period  of three months, if the detention is to last  longer than three months.  If the Advisory Board opines that  there is  no sufficient cause for detention, the person  concerned cannot  be detained beyond a period of three months.  It  is only  if the opinion of the Advisory Board is in  favour  of detention  that the person concerned can be detained  for  a longer  period  than three months, but in such a  case  what shall  be the period of detention is entirely a  matter  for the detaining authority to decide.  Vide Puranlal  Lakhanpal v. Union of India.(1) There is, however, an outside limit to the period of detention laid down by the proviso which  says that  nothing in sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) shall authorise  the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by  any law made by Parliament under cl. (7),  sub-cl.  (b). It will, therefore, be seen that under cl. (4), sub-cl.  (a) there  is a double safeguard.  One is that there can  be  no detention  beyond  the period of three  months  without  the intercession  of  the Advisory Board and the other  is  that even  where the Advisory Board is of the opinion that  there is sufficient cause for the detention, the person  concerned cannot be detained beyond the, maximum period prescribed  by Parliamentary law made under cl. (7), (1)  [1958] S.C.R. 460.

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854 sub-cl.   (b).   Clause  (4),  sub-cl.  (b)  lays  down   an alternative  situation where a person may be detained for  a period  longer  than  three  months  without  obtaining  the opinion  of  the  Advisory  Board  and  that  is  where  the detention  is in accordance, with the provisions of any  law made  by Parliament under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of  cl.  (7). Sub-cl. (a) of cl. (7) empowers the Parliament to make a law prescribing  the circumstances under which and the class  or classes  of  cases in which a person may be detained  for  a period  longer  than  three  months  without  obtaining  the opinion  of  the Advisory Board and sub-cl. (b) of  el.  (7) provides  that Parliament may by law prescribe  the  maximum period  for which any person may in any class or classes  of cases  be  detained under any law of  preventive  detention. When  the Parliament has made a law under sub-cls.  (a)  and (b) of cl. (7), a person can be detained in accordance  with such  law for a period longer than three months without  the intercession  of  the  Advisory  Board.   Now  we  are   not concerned in these petitions with the question as to what is the scope and ambit of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (7) and what  kind of  law  is contemplated by this  constitutional  provision. That question arose for decision before this Court in Sambhu Nath  Sarkar  v.  State of West Bengal(1) and  there  is  an authorative  pronouncement of seven judges of this Court  on that  point.  But that need not detain me.  Our  concern  is with  sub-cl.  (b)  of cl. (7).  The question  that  we  are called  upon to consider is whether it is obligatory on  the Parliament  to  prescribe the maximum  period  of  detention under cl. (7), sub-cl. (b), if the, detention is to be  made for  a longer period than three months under sub-cl. (a)  of cl. (4). Now  one  thing  is clear that the Parliament  is  under  no obligation to make a law under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (7). it is only  if  the requirement of obtaining the  opinion  of  the Advisory  Board  is intended to be dispensed with  that  the Parliament must make a law under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (7).  If the  Parliament does not make such a law, cl.  (4),  sub-cl. (b) will not come into operation and detention for a  period longer than three months, whether under Parliamentary law or under  State law, would be impermissible  without  obtaining the  opinion of the Advisory Board.  It was not disputed  on behalf of the respondents  law a enacts Parliament the where that  be  not could it indeed and under sub-cl, (a)  of  cl. (7), it must be accompanied by a law made by the  Parliament under sub-cl. (b) of cl. (7).  Mere enactment of a law under sub-cl.  (a) of cl. (7) would be futile without a law  under sub-cl. (b) of cl. (7), because what sub-cl. (b) of cl.  (4) requires  is that the detention must be in  accordance  with the law made by Parliament under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of cl. (7).   The language, of cl. (4), sub-cl. (b) posits  clearly and in no uncertain terms that there must be law both  under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of cl. (7) in order that cl. (4),  sub- cl.  (b) may operate.  If there is a law only under  sub-cl. (a)  of cl. (7) and no law under sub-cl. (b) of cl.  (7),  a person  cannot be detained longer than three months  without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board as  contemplated under  cl.  (4), sub-cl. (a).  The making of a  law  by  the Parliament  under  sub-cl.  (b)  of  cl.  (7)  is  therefore obligatory if the detention, is to be (1) [1973] 1 S.C.C. 856. 855 for   a  longer  period  than  three  months   without   the intercession  of  the  Advisory Board.  The  object  of  the constitution makers in insisting on this requirement clearly

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was   that   though  in   "exceptional   circumstances   and exceptional  classes  of cases" the Parliament  may  by  law authorise  detention  for a period more  than  three  months without  reference  to the Advisory  Board,  such  detention should  be,  a maximum period specified  by  the  Parliament beyond  which  it  should not extend.  There  should  be  an outside  limit to the detention by the specification of  the maximum  period by the Parliament.  This was  the  safeguard provided  by  the  constitution  makers  in  protection   of personal  liberty.   The  maximum period  specified  by  the Parliament  must  obviously  be a  reasonable  one,  because otherwise  the Parliamentary law would be bad  as  offending cls. (a) and (d) of Art. 19(1).  So much is clear and beyond dispute.  But the question is : does the same requirement of specification  of the maximum period by the Parliament  also apply where the detention is sought to be made for a  longer period than three months under sub-cl. (a) of el. (4) ?  The answer  to this question depends on the true  interpretation of the Proviso to sub-cl. (a) of el. (4) read in the context of el. (4), sub-cl. (b) and el. (7), sub-cls. (a) and (b). Since the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the real meaning  of a constitutional provision, it is  evident  that nothing that is logically relevant to this process should be excluded  from  consideration.  It was at one  time  thought that  the  speeches made by the members of  the  Constituent Assembly  in  the  course  of  the  debates  on  the   Draft Constitution were wholly inadmissible as extraneous aids  to the  interpretation  of a constitutional provision,  but  of late  there has been a shift in this position and  following the recent trends in juristic thought in some of the Western countries  and  the  United States, the  rule  of  exclusion rigidly  followed in Anglo-American jurisprudence  has  been considerably  diluted.   Crawford in his book  on  Statutory Construction   points out at page 388 :               "The   judicial  opinion  on  this  point   is               certainly  not  quite uniform  and  there  are               American  decisions  to the  effect  that  the               general  history of a statute and the  various               steps  leading  up to an  enactment  including               amendments  or modifications of  the  original               bill and reports of Legislative Committees can               be looked at for ascertaining the intention of               the legislature where it is in doubt, but they               hold  definitely that the legislative  history               is inadmissible when there is no obscurity  in               the meaning of the statute." This  Court,  speaking through Krishna Iyer,  J.,  has  also noted  this change in the methodology of interpretation  and recognized its validity in State of Mysore v. R. V. Bidan(1) where,  after  referring to the rule laid  down  in  earlier decisions excluding reference to legislative proceedings for the purpose of interpretation, the learned Judge said :               "This rule of exclusion has been criticised by               jurists as artificial.  The trend of  academic               opinion and the Practice               (1)   C.A. No. 992 of 1972, dec. on 3-9-1973.               856               in   the   European   system   suggest    that               interpretation of a statute being an  exercise               in  the ascertainment of  meaning,  everything               which   is   logically  relevant   should   be               admissible.  Re  Recently,  an  ambit   Indian               Jurist  has  reviewed the legal  position  and               expressed his agreement with Julius Stone  and               Justice   Frankfurter.   Of   course,   nobody

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             suggests that such extrinsic materials  should               be  decisive  but  they  must  be  admissible.               Authorship  and interpretation  must  mutually               illuminance and interact.  There is  authority               for the proposition that resort may be had  to               these sources with great caution and only when               incongruities  and ambiguities are to  be  re-               solved.   There  is strong case  for  wattling               down  the  rule of Exclusion followed  in  the               British   courts  and  for  less   sapologitic               reference to legislative proceedings and  like               materials to read the meaning of the words  of                             a  statute.  Where it is plain,  the language               prevails, but where there is obscurity or lack               of harmony with other provisions and in  other               special circumstances, it may be legitimate to               take external assistance such as the object of               the  provisions,  the mischief  sought  to  be               remedied, the social context, the words of the               authors and other allied matters." We  may,  therefore, legitimately refer to  the  Constituent Assembly  debates for are purpose of ascertaining  what  was the  object  which the constitution makers had in  view  and what  was  the purpose which they intended to  achieve  when they  enacted cls. (4) and (7) in their present form.   When cl.  (15) of the Draft Constitution, corresponding  to  Art. 21,  was  adopted by the Constituent Assembly,there  was  no clause in the Draft Constitution corresponding to Art. 22. A large  section  of the Constituent Assembly,  including  Dr. Ambedkar, was greatly dissatisfied with the wordings of  cl. (16) and it    was felt that cl. (15) as adopted gave to the legislature  a carte blanche to provide for the arrest,  and detention of any person under any circumstances and for  any period it deemed fit.  Dr. Ambedkar, therefore, introduced a new cl. 15A providing certain safeguards, but in the  course of  a long and spirited debate which followed, it was  found that  these  safeguards were not  adequate. In view  of  the discussion which took place, Dr. Ambedkar amended cl. 15A so as  ’Lo incorporate some of the suggestions and the  amended cl. 15A was then further revised by the Drafting  Committee. In the course of revision, the Drafting Committee renumbered cls. 15 and 15A as Arts. 21 and 22 respectively.  Thereafter when   the   revised   Draft  Constitution   came   up   for consideration before the Constituent Assembly, on behalf  of the  Drafting Committee itself Mr. Krishnamchari  moved  two amendments  which sought further to redraft clauses (4)  and (7) so as to indicate clearly that there would be a  maximum period  laid down by Parliament for which any person or  any class  or  classes of persons could be detained by  any  law providing  for  such  detention; even  in  cases  where  the Advisory Board approved of detention beyond three months. no authority  in  India could in any  circumstances  order  the detention of a person beyond the maximum limit 857 so laid down by Parliament.  Certain apprehensions as to the truer effect of these amendments were voiced by some members but  Dr.Ambedkar while replying to the debate clarified  the position  and explained the scope of the amended article  as follows               "First,  every case of  preventive-  detention               must  be authorised by law.  It cannot be  ;it               the will of the executive.               Secondly,  every case of preventive  detention               for a period longer than three months must  be

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             placed  before a judicial board, unless it  is               one of those cases in which Parliament, acting               under  clause (7), sub-clause (a), has by  law               prescribed that it need not be placed before a               judicial board for authority to detain  beyond               three months.               Thirdly,  in every case, whether it is a  case               which  is  required to be  placed  before  the               judicial   board  or  not,  Parliament   shall               prescribe the maximum period of detention  so,               that  no person who is detained under any  law               relating   to  preventive  detention  can   be               detained indefinitely.  There               shall always be a maximum period of  detention               which  Parliament is required to prescribe  by               law.               Fourthly,  in  cases  which  are  required  by               article  22 to go before the  judicial  board,               the  procedure  to be followed  by  the  Board               shall be laid down by Parliament." The amendments were then adopted by the Constituent Assembly and  Art.  22  emerged  in its  present  form.   There  can, therefore,  be no doubt that according to  the  constitution makers,  it was clearly intended that if detention is to  be for  a longer period than three months,, whether under  sub- cl. (a) or under sub-cl. (b) of cl. (4), the Parliament must prescribe  the  maximum period of detention and to  use  the words  of  Dr. Ambedkar, "there shall always  be  a  maximum period.  of  detention  which  Parliament  is  required   to prescribe by law".  The problem before us therefore resolves itself  into  a  very narrow one, namely, are  we  going  to accept an interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the constitution makers, or are we going to defeat  their intention by a highly literal interpretation ?  Are we going to  preserve the safeguard which the constitution makers  in their  overweening  anxiety  to  protect  personal   liberty intended  to  fashion  or are we going to  dilute  it  by  a process of construction ? Fortunately  the language of the Proviso to sub-cl. (a)’  of cl. (4) is not so intractable that it cannot be  interpreted so as to effectuate the intention of the constitution makers a  id  protect  the citizen  from  indefinite  incarceration without trial.  I shall presently examine the language,  but before  that.  let me once again look at the object  of  the provision  in  cl. (7), sub-cl. (b).  This provision,  as  I have  pointed  out in relation to cl. (4)  sub-cl.  (b),  is Intended  to  provide  a  safeguard  or  insulation  against indefinite  detention in cases where detention for a  longer period than three months without reference, to the  Advisory Board is authorised by Parliamentary legislation under  sub- cl. (a) of cl. (7).- Now, if this protection or safeguard is necessary 858 where  the detention may be for a longer period  than  three months  under a law made by Parliament under sub-cl. (a)  of cl.  (7), a fortiorari it should equally be necessary  where the detention is under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) because  under that  provision  too the detention would be.  for  a  period longer  than three months.  It can hardly be  supposed  that the constitution-makers should have thought that in one case detention  for an indefinite period should be  impermissible as grave encroachment of personal liberty while in the other it should be allowed without any inhibition.  The  provision for reference, to the Advisory Board would certainly  ensure that  there is sufficient cause for the detention,  but,  as

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held  by  this  Court in Puranlal Lakhan  pal  v.  Union  of India(1) the Advisory Board would have no say in the  matter of determination of the period of detention and how long  to detain  would  be solely within the power of  the  detaining authority.   There would thus be no check or control of  the Advisory  Board  so  far  as  the  period  of  detention  is concerned.   The power of the detaining authority in  regard to the period of detention would, therefore, be as large and unlimited in a case falling under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4)  as it  would  be  in  a  case falling  within  a  law  made  by Parliament  under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (7).  Equally  in  both cases,  this power could lend itself to abuse  by  detention for indefinite duration and render the guarantee of personal freedom  illusory and meaningless.  It was  to  co-,interact this menace and safeguard personal liberty from  attenuation by  excessive inroads that the  constitution-makers  enacted sub-cl.  (b)  of cl. (7) providing for fixation  of  maximum period  by  the  Parliament beyond which no  person  can  be detained whether under parliamentary law or under State law. The  compelling reasons which necessitated the enactment  of the  safeguard  in  sub-cl. (b) of  cl.  (7)  apply  equally whether the detention for a period longer than three  months is authorised under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) or sub-cl. (a) of cl.  (7).   It  therefore stands to reason  that  where  the detention  is  to be for a longer period than  three  months under  sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4), the safeguard of the  maximum period   to be prescribed by Parliament under cl.  (7), sub- cl. (b) must be there so that there can be no detention  for indefinite   duration.   If  there  is  no  maximum   period prescribed  by  Parliament  under  cl.  (7),  sub-cl.   (b), detention  cannot  be authorised for a  period  longer  than three  months  under  sub-cl. (a) of cl.  (4).   To  take  a different  view would mean that where the Parliament  itself authorises  detention for a longer period than three  months under  cl. (7), sub-cl. (a), the Parliament is  required  to prescribe  a maximum period but where the State  Legislature authorises  detention for a period longer than three  months under  sub-cl.  (a) of cl. (4), no maximum  period  need  be prescribed  and once the Advisory Board gives  a  favourable opinion,  the State Legislature can authorise detention  for an  indefinite  period.  ‘hat  would  indeed  be  a   highly regrettable  result.   It would free the  State  Legislature from  any  restraint  as  to the period  for  which  it  may authorise,  detention under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) and  open the  flood gates for "cessive invasion of personal  liberty. I  do  not think such is the meaning of  the  constitutional provision. (1)  [1958] S.C.R. 460. 859 The  Proviso  to sub-cl. (a) of el. (4) says that  though  a person  may  be  detained for a longer  period  than  three, months after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory.   Board, such  detention shall not extend "beyond the maximum  period prescribed  by any law made by Parliament under sub-cl.  (b) of  el.  (7)".   It is clear on a combined  reading  of  the Proviso  and  the main provision in sub-cl. (a) of  el.  (4) that the Proviso is an integral part of the main  provision. It is intended to cut down the large amplitude of the  power of detention conferred under the main provision.  The  scope and  boundary of the power of detention under el. (4),  sub- Cl.  (a)  can,  therefore, be defined only  by  reading  the Proviso  and  the main provision as  one  single  enactment. Both  together  represent  the  will  of  the   constitution makers..  One cannot be disjoined from the other  and  given effect to though the other is not operative.  If the Proviso

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does not operate, the main provision also would not, for the main  provision  is  intended  to  operate  only  with   the limitation  imposed  by  the Proviso.  It  is  difficult  to believe,   for   reasons   already   discussed,   that   the constitution, makers should have intended that the power  to detain  for  a  longer period than three  months  should  be exercisable,  even if the limitation imposed by the  Proviso were non-existent.  The Proviso and the main provision  form part of one integral scheme and either both operate together or  none.  Here the Proviso is not used in  its  traditional orthodox  sense.   It  is intended to  enact  a  substantive provision  laying  down an outside limit to  the  period  of detention.   If  there  is no outside  limit  by  reason  of Parliament  not having prescribed the maximum  period  under sub-cl.  (b) of el. (7), the provision enacted in  el.  (4), sub-cl.  (a)  cannot  operate and in  that  event  detention cannot  be  continued beyond three months, even  though  the opinion of the Advisory Board may be obtained.  The  Proviso clearly  posits  the existence of a law made  by  Parliament under  sub-cl.  (b)  of cl. (7) and makes  it  an  essential element  in  the operation of el. (4),  sub-cl.  (,a).   The constitution  makers  have, by enacting the Proviso  in  el. (4), sub-cl. (a), achieved the same legislative end as  they have  in el. (4), sub-cl. (b) by u sing the words "and  sub- cl. (b)".  The legislative device has been different because of  the  differing structural arrangements of the  two  sub- clauses.  This is in my, opinion the correct construction of el. (4), sub-cl. (a) read with el. (7), sub-cl. (b).  In any event, it is highly possible construction and if it  carries out  the intention of the constitution makers  and  inhibits the  power  of the legislature to  authorise  detention  for indefinite  duration, there is no reason why we  should  not prefer  it.  We must remember that it is a  constitution  we are  expounding a constitution which gives us  a  democratic republican form of government and which recognize the  right of  personal  liberty as the most prized  possession  of  an individual.  Shall we not then lean in favour of freedom and liberty  when  we  find  that it can  be  done  without  any violence  to the language of the constitutional provision  ? Shall we not respond freely and fearlessly to the  intention of  the  founding father and  interpret  the  Constitutional provision  in  the broad and liberal spirit  in  which  they conceived  it, instead of adopting a rather  mechanical  and literal construction which defeats their intention ? 860 It  may be argued : what is the vale of this safeguard,  how does  it strengthen the guarantee of personal liberty,  when the fixation of the maximum period is not immutable, but can fluctuate according to the pleasure of the Parliament.  I do not  think  this argument is valid.  It fails to  take  into account  two important considerations.  In the first  place, cl.  (4),  sub-cl. (b) clearly shows that  even  though  the fixation  of  maximum  period is within  the  discretion  of Parliament,  the  constitution  makers  regarded  it  as   a valuable  safeguard,  for  otherwise  they  would  not  have insisted upon prescription of maximum period as a  condition of  detention for a period longer than three months under  a law  made by Parliament under cl.. (7), sub-cl.  (a).   Even where  Parliament itself makes a law under cl. (7),  sub-cl. (a)  authorising  detention for a period longer  than  three months,  the Constitution says that in order that  such  law may operate, Parliament should prescribe the maximum period. That shows the great importance attached by the constitution makers to this safeguard, even though the maximum period  is to   be   fixed  by  the  Parliament   and   a   fortiorari,

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theoretically  at least, it may be varied from time to  time according  to  the pleasure of the Parliament.  Now  if  the prescription   of   maximum  period  is  regarded   by   the Constitution makers as a valuable safeguard necessary to  be complied  with even where Parliament makes a law  under  cl. (7),  sub-cl. (a) authorising detention for a longer  period than  three months, how much more necessary and valuable  it would  be where instead of a parliamentary law, a State  law authorises  detention for a period longer than three  months under cl. (4), sub-cl. (a).  Secondly, if the maximum period is  required to be prescribed, Parliament would  necessarily have to apply its mind to the question and when it does  so, it  can safely be presumed that, being a highly  responsible body  that  it is, it would fix a maximum  period  which  is reasonable and that would provide a check against indefinite detention by the Government.  It is true that  theoretically it  may be possible to say that the fixation of the  maximum period can be varied by Parliament arbitrarily according  to its sweet-will, but in practice such an eventuality would be highly  remote having regard to the pressure  of  democratic forces  and sanction of ’public opinion.  Moreover,  if  the maximum  period  fixed  is unreasonable, it  can  always  be struck  down by the court as violative of cls. (a) and  (d). of Art. 19.  It would not, therefore, be correct to say that the  prescription  of  maximum period by  Parliament  is  an illusory  safeguard.  At least the constitution  makers  did not think it to be-so. These reasons compel me to differ from the view taken in the leading  judgment  of my learned brother Mathew,  J.  In  my opinion Parliament is free to prescribe or not to  prescribe have maximum period under cl. (7), sub-cl. (b).  It is under no  obligation  to  do  so’ But ’if  no  maximum  period  is prescribed,   neither   the  Parliament   nor’   the   State Legislature can authorise detention for a longer period than three months either under sub cl. (a) or sub-cl. (b) of  cl. (4).   If the Parliament or the State Legislature wishes  to authorise  detention for a period longer than three  months, it must conform to the, provisions of either sub-cl. (a)  or sub-cl. (b) of cl. (4) and that requires 861 that maximum period must be prescribed by Parliament by  law made under cl. (7), sub-cl. (b).  There would thus always be a maximum period of detention : either the initial period of three months or the maximum period prescribed by  Parliament under cl. (7), sub-cl. (b).  There can be no detention for a period longer than three months unless the maximum period of detention is prescribed by Parliament under cl. (7), sub-cl. (b).   I  know  it is not customary  to  refer  to  opinions expressed  in the text book of a living author but I  cannot help   mentioning   that  Mr.  Seervai  in   his   book   on Constitutional  Law  also echoes the same line  of  thought. (Constitutional Law of India, p.   450, para 12.52). This  is  the view which I am taking on construction  but  I must  consider  whether  there is anything  in  the  earlier decisions  of this Court which precludes me from  doing  so. Three decisions were cited before us and I must now refer to them.  The first is Gopalan’s case(supra) Where six  learned judges comprising the constitution bench delivered  separate judgments in regard to the validity of certain provisions of the  Preventive, Detention Act, 1950.  None of  the  learned judges, except Kania, C.J., dealt with the present point  or expressed  any  opinion  upon it.  Kania,  C.J.,  alone  had something  to  say  and he observed  :  "Sub-clause  (b)  is permissive.   It  is  not obligatory on  the  Parliament  to prescribe any maximum period.  It was argued that this gives

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the  Parliament  a right to allow a person  to  be  detained indefinitely.   If that construction is correct, it  springs out  of  the words of sub-clause (7) itself  and  the  court cannot  help  in the matter." It will be  seen  that  these, observations  merely express the inse dixit of  the  learned Chief  Justice.  There is no discussion of the point and  no reasons are given in support of it.  That cannot bind us. The  next decision is that of the constitution Bench  is  S. Krishnan v.    The  State  of Madras(1).  There  were  three main  judgments  in this case.  The first was  by  Patanjali Sastri, J., (as he then was), with whom Kania, C.J., agreed. (Patanjali  Sastri, J., did not deal with this  question  at all  and his judgment does not throw any light on  it.   The second  judgment was by Mahajan, J., (as he then was),  with whom  S. R. Das, J. (as he then was)  substantially  agreed. Mahajan,  J., certainly dealt with this question but  it  is evident   from  the  relevant  portion  from  his   judgment extracted by brother Alagiriswami, J., that the question was not  raised  before the Court in that case in  the  form  in which  it has been presented before us.  The argument  which was advanced in that case was that the word ’may’ in cl. (7) of Art. 22 must be read in the sense of ’must’ and it  must, therefore-,  be  held  to  be  obligatory  on  the  part  of Parliament to make a law under sub-cl. (b)   of  cl. (7)  of Art.  22.   This argument was rejected by Mahajan,  J.  That does  not  help us because the argument before us  is  quite different.   Moreover, Mahajan, J., regarded this  point  as concluded by the majority decision in Gopalan’s case (supra) and relied on the observations of Kania, C.J., which I  have quoted   above.    But  this  was   obviously   under   some misapprehension  because,  as pointed out Above.  the  other learned Judges did not express themselves on this point and (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 621. 862 the  observations  of  Kania, C.J., did  not  represent  the majority  decision.  in any event,  this  view.expressed  by Mahajan,  J. was shared only by S. R. Das, J. and Bose,  J,. emphatically dissented from the, view.  Bose J., in a strong and powerful judgment held that though it is not  obligatory on  Parliament to fix a ’maximum period of  detention  under sub-cl. (b) of el. (7) of Art. 22, if a person is to be  de- tained  for  a period longer than three  months,  a  maximum period  must be prescribed by Parliament.  This is the  same view  which has found favour With me This decision does  not therefore compel me to hold otherwise. The last decision to which I must refer is that in State  of West Bengal v. Ashok Dev(1).  It cannot be disputed that the question  in the form in which it has been presented  before us  was  raised before the Court in that case.  But,  if  we look  at  the  judgment of Du a, J.,  and  particularly  the portion  extracted in the judgment of brother  Alagiriswami, J., it will, be clear that the argument advanced before  the Court  in that case Was the same as that in Krishnan’s  case (supra),  namely, "that may in the opening part of" el.  (7) of  Art.  22."must  be read is ’Shall’ in  respect  of  sub- clauses  (b) and (c)though it retains its normal  permissive character in so far as clause this argument which was (a)  is concerned.  and it was this argument which was  rejected  by precedent". the     Court  by saying that in the absence  of special  compelling  reason it can be supported  neither  on principle   nor  by precedent". The argument here  is  quite different:  it  is not contended that may must  be  read  as shall.  it  is  an  argument  from  a  different  angle  and approach  and that does not appear  to have  been  canvassed before  the Court nor has it  been discussed. Moreover  this

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decision is by a Bench of four judges.  It cannot  therefore deflect me from the view  I am taking. Now in the present case s. 13 of the Maintenance of internal Security Ac 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as  it originally stood, provided that the maximum period for Which any  person  may be detained in pursuance of  any  detention which any person may under s. 12 shall be twelve months from the  date  of detention.  It was common ground  between  the parties  that the period of twelve months prescribed by  the unamended  s.13  as the maximum period for  which  a  person could be detained under the provisions of the ACt was "maxi- mum period." as contemplated under sub-cl. (b) of cl.(7)  of Art.22.  But  by s.6(d) of the Defence of India  Act,  1971, which  came  into  force on 4th  December,  1971,  s.13  was amended  so  as  to  provided that  the  maximum  period  of detention shall be twelve months from the date of  detention or  until  the  expiry of the Defence  of  India  Act,  1971 whichever  is  latter".  Sec 1(3) of the  Defence  of  India Act,  1971 laid down the duration of that ACt and said  that Act  shall remain in force  for the duration  of  the proclamation   of  emergency  and a  period   of  six months  thereafter.  SEc 13 as amended thus  provided   that the   maximum  period of detention under the Act   shall  be twelve  months  from teh date detention or until the  expiry of a period of six-months (10 [1972] (10 S.C.C. 199). 863 after  the  cessation  of  the  proclamation  of   emergency whichever  is latter.  The question is whether  this  period prescribed by the amended s. 13 could be said to be "maximum period"  within  the meaning of that expression as  used  in sub-cl.  (b)  of cl. (7) of Art. 22.  The  argument  of  the petitioners was that the period specified in the amended  s. 13 was indefinite inasmuch as it could not be predicated  as LO  When the proclamation of emergency would come to an  end and  it could not therefore be regarded as "maximum  period" so  as to satisfy the mandate of sub-cl. (b) of cl.  (7)  of Art.  22.  The. petitioners contended that since no  maximum period was prescribed by Parliament the amended S. 13  being inadequate  for that purpose-the petitioners could  ’not  be detained  beyond  a  period of three months  and  they  were therefore  entitled  to be freed.   This  argument  requires serious consideration. The  question  is  what is the  meaning  of  the  expression ’maximum  period’ in sub-cl. (b) of cl. (7) ? When a  period is fixed with reference to the happening of an event,  which is  bound  to happen, but of which it cannot  be  predicated with  any definiteness as to when it’ would happen,  as  for example,  cessation of emergency or death of an  individual, can  it  be said that the period fixed  is  ’maximum  period within  the  meaning of sub-cl. (b) of cl. (7)  ?  The  word ‘maximum  according to the Shorter Oxford  Dictionary  means "highest attainable magnitude or quantity (of something);  a superior  limit"  and the word ‘period’ means "a  course  of extent of time; time of duration"’.  Therefore, as a  matter of  plain  grammatical English, the words  ’maximum  period’ mean the highest or greatest extent or stretch of time Which fixes an outside limit.  Now this highest or greatest-extent or  stretch of time may’ be determined by means of  a  fixed date or in terms of years, months or days or by reference to the  occurrence  of  an event But whatever be  the  mode  of determination,  ’maximum period, must be a definite  period. Ile measure of the period must not be un certain.The outside limit  must  be definite and known.  The period  fixing  the outside  limit may be prescribed by reference to  art  event

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but  the  date  of  occurrence of  the  event  must  not  be uncertain.   It  should be possible to  predicate  that  the event  Will happen at a definite ascertained point of  time. It is not enough to say that the event is certain and  bound to  happen.  What is necessary is that the point of time  at which the event would happen must be definite.  Then only it can be said to fix the ’maximum period, of detention.  It Is indeed difficult to see how ’maximum period, can be Said  to be  prescribed, when no one knows how long it will  be.   It may  be  five years, or ten years or more.   That  would  be uncertain.   How can such a period be regarded  as  ’maximum period’  fixed by law?  The very notion of ’maximum  period’ carries  with  it  a sense of  definiteness.   When  maximum period  is prescribed, there must be definite  qualification of  the length or duration of the period. if the  length  of duration  is  uncertain  in  that  it  depends  on  when   a particular  event would happen, the prescription of  such  a period  would  hardly  act as  a  check  against  indefinite detention,  for  there  would  be  no  guarantee  that   the detention  would not continue beyond a determinate point  of time.  The period of detention which could be authorised  by the 15 748SCI/74 864 Legislature  would in such a case be indefinite, because  it would  be  uncertain as to when the event, by  reference  to which  the, period is to  be measured, would  happen.   That would  fail  to  effectuate the object and  purpose  of  the requirement  of  prescription of maximum period  enacted  in sub-cl. (b) of cl. (7). I  may at this stage pause, to consider what would  be  the, consequences  if  a  construction contrary to  that  I  have discussed  above  were  accepted.   It  is  true  that   the consequences  of a suggested construction do not  alter  the meaning  of  a statute but they certainly help  to  fix  its meaning.   If I accept the construction that maximum  period can  be prescribed with reference to an event,  even  though the  event  is  such  that  though  certain,  it  cannot  be predicated  of it with any definiteness as to when it  would occur-and it is only on the, basis of this construction that the fixation of maximum period with reference to theduration of an emergency can be upheld and not otherwise logically it would  mean  that  ’maximum  period’  can  be,  fixed   with reference  to  the life of the person detained and  if  such maximum period is fixed, it would be open to the legislature to  authorise detention of a person for the duration of  his life.  That would be a most starting and devastating result. It is impossible to believe that the constitution makers who had  themselves suffered long periods of in  carceration  at the  hands  of  the British rulers  should  have  become  so obvious of the need to safe guard personal liberty that they ,  should  have  given carte blanche to  the  Parliament  to permit  detention of a person for life without  trial.   The power  to  detail without trial is itself  a  drastic  power justified only in the interest of public security and order. It is tolerated in a free society as a necessary evil.   But the  power  to  detain a person for life  without  trail  is something unthinkable in a democracy governed by the rule It is  a draconic power subversive of freedom and  liberty  and can  have  no. place in our constitutional  arrangements  To grant,.such  a power would be to destroy the democratic  way of life, to annihilate one of the most cherished. values  of a ’free society and to vest in the State authoritarian power which  is the anti thesis of the rule of law.  It would  rob the fundamental guarantee of personal liberty of all meaning

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and  content and reduce it to a mere husk.  It would  amount to  the Constitution felling all persons residents  in  ,the land, in the words of Bose J.               "Here is th full extent of your liberty so far               as  the length of detention is concerned.   We               guarantee that you will not be detained beyond               three   months  unless  Parliament   otherwise               directs,   either   generally   of   in   your               particular  class  of  case;  but  we  empower               Parliament  to smash the guarantee  absolutely               if it so chooses without  let  or hindrance  ,               with  out  restriction.  Though  we  authorise               Parliament  to prescribe  a maximum  limit  of               detention  if  it  so  chooses,  we  place  no               compulsion on it to do so and we authorise  it               to  pass  legislation which will  empower  any               person or authority Parliament chooses to name               right  down to a police constable,  to  arrest               you and detain you as long he pleases for the 865 duration  of your life if he wants, so that you  may  linger and rot in jail till you die, as did men in the Bastille." 1.shedder  to  accept  such a construction.   I  think  the, maximum period, jurist be prescribed either by reference  to a  fixed  date or in terms of years, months or  days  or  by reference  to some event of which it can be predicated  with certainty  that  it would happen at a determinate  point  of time,  so that there is complete ascertainment of  what  the period is meant to be and it is not indefinite.  Of  course, the   maximum  period  which,  is  so  prescribed  must   be reasonable, for otherwise it would be violative of cls.  (a) and (d) of Art. 19, This construction ensures two safeguards against  detention for a longer period than  three’  months. one  under cl. (7), sub-cl. (b) of Art. 22 and  ’the’  other under cls. (a) and (d) of Art. 19. I  am  conscious that the power to detain a  person  without trial is a necessary power for preservation of the State and maintenance of public security and order and therefore  when there is an emergency, it may be thought expedient that  the State should have the power to detain a person without trial for the duration of the emergency and the conferment of such a  power  may  not be regarded as  unreasonable.   But  this consideration cannot persuade me to accept a meaning of  the words  ’maximum period’ which would render  the  fundamental guarantee  of  personal  liberty  precarious.   It  must  be remembered  that  the Constitution is meant to  provide  not only  for times of emergency but also for normal times,  and it   would   not,   therefore.-be  right   to   construe   a constitutional provision such as sub-cl. (b) of cl. (7),  as if  it were an emergency provision.  The law  of  preventive detention is not necessarily a product of emergency.  Indeed it  has  been there in our country-in one  form  or  another since  the coming into force of the  Constitution.   Sub-cl. (b)  of  cl.  (7)  ;should  not,  therefore  be  interpreted according  to the cannon of construction which is  sometimes adopted  in interpreting war time or emergency  legislation. It must be construed like any other constitutional provision having  regard to its object and intentment.  The fact  that we  are living today in an emergency should not  colour  our interpretation   of  the  constitutional   provision.    The constitutional provision must speak the same voice,  whether it be in times of emergency or in normal times.  We must not forget  what Mr. Justice Brande is said in Whitney case  (1) "Those  who  won  our independence by  revolution  were  not cowards.  They did not fear political change.  They did  not

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exalt  older at the cost of liberty.  We   may  also  recall the words of Mr. Justice Murphy in Bridges case(2) where  he said "The strength of this nation is weakened more by  those who  suppress  the  freedom of others  than  those  who  are allowed  freely  to  think  and  act  as  their  consciences dictate." Moreover, I may point out that the  interpretation which  I am  accepting does not in any way whittle  down  or affect  the  power  of the State to detain with  a  view  to meeting   a   situation  arising  out  of   the   emergency. Parliament  can always prescribe a, suitable maximum  period as interpreted by me and authorise detention for the (1) 274 U.S.  380 (2) 326 U.S. 376 866 duration  of such ’maximum period’.  If at the end  of  such ’maximum period’ when the person detained is released, it is found that, having regard to the relevant circumstances then existing,  it  ’is  still  necessary  to  detain  him,   the detaining authority can once again place him under detention provided of course-and that would be an important safeguard- that  if  the case falls within. cl. (4)  sub-cl.  (a),  the Advisory  Board  gives an opinion that there  is  sufficient cause for such further. detention. I  am,  therefore,  of  the view that  since  it  cannot  be predicated, with any, definiteness in the present case as to when  the  emergency  would  come  to  an  end,  the  period prescribed by s. 13 of the Act cannot be said to be ’maximum period within the meaning of sub-cl. (b) of cl. (7)    The result is that the Parliament has not prescribed the maximum period,  of detention as contemplated under sub-cl.  (b)  of cl. (7), and   if  that  be so, no person  can  be  detained under  the  provisions of the Act for a period  longer  than three months. I  would  accordingly allow these petitions  and  order  the petitioners to be set at liberty forthwith since a period of three months has already elapsed in the care of each of them since the date of his detention. ORDER In  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the  majority,   the contentions of petitioners are over-ruled.  The petitions be listed before the approach Bench for disposal. 867