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PETITIONER: F.S. GANDHI (DEAD) BY LRS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, ALLAHABAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1990

BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1866            1990 SCR  (2) 886  1990 SCC  (3) 624        JT 1990 (3)   476  1990 SCALE  (1)89

ACT:     Wealth  Tax Act, 1957: Section 2(e) 2(iii)--Interest  in respect  of properties--Lease of lands on which   properties were  standing expired--Tenancy continued on month to  month basis for unstated period--Whether liable to tax. Words and Phrases--’Is’ and ’has been’--meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant-assessee  owned  certain  properties   on lease-hold  lands.  The  leases in respect  of  these  lands expired  in 1958 and 1963 and the  lessor--State  Government issued  notices to the assessee to hand over vacant  posses- sion of the leasehold lands. The properties were let out  to the  tenants  and the assessee was receiving  rental  income from the same.     In  the  Wealth  Tax Returns for  the  assessment  years 1971-72,  1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75, the assessee  valued the properties at ten times of the annual rental income.  In the  assessment  order  the Wealth Tax  Officer  valued  the properties at fifteen times of the annual rental income.  On appeal,  the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth  Tax valued the said properties at twelve and a half times of the annual rental income.     On  further  appeal, the Income Tax  Appellate  Tribunal valued  the  properties at ten times of  the  annual  rental income, but, at the request of the assessee, referred to the High Court for its opinion certain questions of law, includ- ing the questions whether the Tribunal was right in  holding that  the  properties  in respect of which  the  leases  had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been issued to hand over  the possession were assets within the meaning of  Sec- tion  2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and its value  was liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee  and that,  on correct interpretation of Section 2(e)(v)  of  the Wealth  Tax Act, and relevant provisions of the Transfer  of Property  Act, the interest of the appellant in  respect  of properties in dispute was for a period of over six years. 887     The High Court held that after the determination of  the earlier leases, the assessee was lessee of properties  under a  new contract of tenancy, and it was a tenancy from  month

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to  month  under Section 116 read with Section  106  of  the Transfer  of Property Act, and for an unstated  period,  and could not be said to be precarious in nature, that the  said tenancy  was an asset as defined in Section 2(e) of the  Act and  was not excluded under sub-clause (v) because the  said interest  had  been available to the assessee for  a  period exceeding six years from the date the new contract of tenan- cy  came into existence. It, however granted certificate  of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court. Allowing the appeals, this Court,     HELD:  1. The properties in respect of which leases  had expired  in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been  received  by the  assessee  to hand over the possession were  not  assets within the meaning of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Wealth Tax Act 1957 and the valuation of the same was not ’liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee. The Tribunal was not  right in holding that the interest of the  assessee  in respect  of the properties in dispute was for a period  over six  years  for the purpose of Section 2(e)(2)(iii)  of  the Act.[898F-H]     2.1 The word "available" in Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of  the Act  is  preceded by the word "is" and is  followed  by  the words "for a period not exceeding six years". The word ’is’, although  normally  referring to the present,  often  has  a future meaning. It may also have a past signification as  in the sense of ’has been’. In view of the words "for a  period not exceeding six years" which follow the word  "available", the word ’is’ must be construed as referring to the  present and the future. In that sense, it would mean that the inter- est is presently available and is to be available in  future for a period not exceeding six years. [896C-D]     The High Court has construed the word ’is’ to mean  ’has been’. As per the construction placed by the High Court in a case where an interest has been created for a period exceed- ing  six  years it would be included in the  assets  of  the assessee under Section 2(e) of the Act only after the expiry of  the  period  of six years even though  the  interest  is available  to the assessee for a period exceeding six  years from  the date the interest vests in the assessee. The  con- struction  placed by the High Court attaching importance  to the  enjoyment of the interest, instead of placing  emphasis on the nature of the interest is not correct. [894E-G] 2.3  The question as to whether the interest should  be  in- cluded or 888 excluded  from  the  assets of the  assessee  under  Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act has to be considered in the light of the nature of interest on the relevant date. Under the  said provision, the relevant date is the date on which the inter- est  vests in the assessee. Therefore, the matter has to  be considered  by examining the nature of the interest  on  the date the interests vests in the assessee. [894G-H]     Commissioner  of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthukrishna  Ammal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1, relied on.     In  the instant case, after the expiry of the leases  of the assessee in the years 1958 and 1963 the assessee contin- ued  in possession under a new contract of tenancy  and  the said  tenancy was a tenancy from month to month for  an  un- stated  period.  The said tenancy was precarious  in  nature because it could be terminated by the lessor, at any time by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property  Act. The  fact that such a notice was not given cannot mean  that the interest created by the said new tenancy was an interest available  to the assessee for a period exceeding six  years from  the date the interest vested in the assessee.  In  the

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circumstances,  in  view of Section  2(e)(2)(iii)  the  said interest  could not be treated as an asset of  the  assessee for the purpose of the Act. [897C-D]     [Section 2(e)(v), as amended in 1964, was substituted by the  Finance Act,1969 and the relevant provision  applicable to  the instant case was Section 2(e)(2)(iii).  However,  in the  reference to the High Court, the Tribunal  referred  to sub-clause (v) of clause (e) of Section 2, as it stood prior to the 1969 amendment and the High Court also did not notice it. This Court observed that since the provisions of Section 2(e)(v)  as amended in 1964, were identical with the  provi- sions  of  Section 2(e)(2)(iii) as substituted by  the  1969 amendment  the error was of no consequence and examined  the matter  in the light of the provisions contained in  Section 2(e) as substituted by the 1969 amendment.] [893G-H; 894A]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal  Nos.  3752- 3755 of 1982.     Appeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Order  dated 2.2.1982 of the Allahabad High Court in Wealth Tax Reference No. 179 of 1978.     S.C. Manchanda, Raja Ram Agarwal, Dr. Meera Agarwal  and R.C. Mishra for the Appellant. 889     Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, Manoj Arora and Ms. A.  Subhashini for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     S.C.  AGRAWAL, J. These appeals, by certificate  granted by the High Court under Section 29(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957,  (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’)  are  directed against  the judgment of the High Court of  Allahabad  dated February 2, 1982 in Wealth Tax Reference No. 179 of 1978.     The  appellant, F.S. Gandhi (hereinafter referred to  as ’the  assessee’), owns properties situate at Mahatma  Gandhi Marg and Sardar Patel Marg in Civil Lines area at Allahabad. The lands on which these buildings stand were leased out  to the assessee by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The  leases in respect of these properties, except the property  situate at 30-A, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, expired in 1958 and the  lease in  respect of the property situate at 30-A Mahatama  Gandhi Marg expired in 1963. The Government of Uttar Pradesh issued notices  to the assessee to hand over vacant  possession  of the  leasehold  lands.  The properties are let  out  to  the tenants  and the assessee was receiving rental  income  from the same. For the assessment years 197 1-72, 1972-73,  1973- 74 and 1974-75 the assessee submitted the Wealth Tax returns wherein he valued the properties at ten times of the  annual rental  income.  The Wealth Tax  Officer  passed  assessment orders wherein he valued the properties at fifteen times  of the annual rental income. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner  of Wealth Tax, valued the said  properties  at twelve  and  a half times of the annual  rental  income.  On further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinaf- ter referred to as ’the Tribunal’) valued the properties  at ten times of the annual rental income.     At the request of the assessee the Tribunal referred the following questions of law to the High Court:       "1.  Whether  on the facts and  circumstances  of  the case,  the Tribunal was fight in holding that properties  in respect  of  which leases had expired in 1958 and  1963  and notices  had been received to hand over the possession  were assets  within the meaning of Section 2(e)(v) of the  Wealth

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Tax  Act and its value was liable to be included in the  net wealth of the assessee? 890       2.  Whether  on  correct  interpretation  of   Section 2(e)(v) and relevant provisions of Transfer of Property Act, the  Tribunal was right in holding that the interest of  the appellant  in  respect of properties in dispute  was  for  a period over six years?       3. Whether there was any material before the  Tribunal to  hold  that on the relevant valuation date  the  property situated  at 30-A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg worth ten  times  of its  annual  was rental income while in previous  years  the value of the said property was shown and accepted at Rs.  1, 19,000?       4. Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that  the property at 30-A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg, was to be valued  on the basis .of its annual income along with other  properties notwithstanding  the  property in  question  was  commercial property while other properties were residential houses  and whether the multiple upheld by the Tribunal is justified  in law and on facts?       5. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the  case the  multiple  of ten times of rental income in  respect  of property at 30-A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg, is not excessive and wholly unjustified?"     By order dated February 2, 1982, the High Court answered the  said questions in the affirmative, i.e., in  favour  of the  Department  and against the  assessee.  Thereafter  the assessee moved an application under Section 29(1) of the Act for  grant  of  certificate of fitness for  appeal  to  this Court. By ’order dated July 8, 1982, the High Court  granted certificate of fitness on the view that the following  ques- tion is a question of law which is of general importance and as  such  this was a fit case in which an  appeal  could  be filed before this Court: "Whether  on  the facts and circumstances of  the  case  the Tribunal was fight in holding that the properties in respect to which leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been received to hand over the possession were assets within the meaning of Section 2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act and its valuation was liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee?" 891 This question was amongst the questions referred to the High Court.  While dealing with the said question the High  Court has held: "on  the  determination of a lease by efflux of time  or  by notice,  it  is  the duty of the lessee  to  deliver  vacant possession  of  the demised premises to the  lessor.  If  he continues in possession even after the determination of  the lease,  his  possession is secured inasmuch  as  the  lessor cannot evict him otherwise than in due course of law and  if he continues in possession without the assent or dissent  of the  landlord, he would be a tenant at sufferance. His  pos- session  would be wrongful but not unlawful. It is  wrongful because the erstwhile tenant continues in possession  beyond the  expiry  of  the period fixed in the lease.  It  is  not unlawful  because the landlord cannot take law into  in  his own hands and evict him. But in case the landlord  expresses his assent by acceptance of rent or otherwise to his contin- uing  in possession this wrongful possession would  be  con- verted  into  a  lawful one. The landlord’s  assent  may  be expresse or implied."     Taking into consideration the facts of the present  case the  High Court has found that the leases of the  properties

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expired  in 1958 and that of 30-A, Mahatama Gandhi  Marg  in 1963. The High Court has observed: "There  is  nothing on record to show that any  attempt  was made  whatsoever  by the State Government to  enforce  those notices given by it and the assessee had continued in peace- ful possession and enjoyment of these properties all  along. In our opinion, therefore, the assent of the landlord to the assessee’s continuing in possession of these properties  can be inferred and that being so that assessee would be treated to be a tenant of the same by holding over."     According  to the High Court after determination of  the earlier leases the assessee is lessee of properties under  a new  contract of tenancy and this tenancy is a tenancy  from month  to month under Section 116 read with Section  106  of the  Transfer  of Property Act. The High Court  has  further held  that  the present tenancy is a tenancy from  month  to month for an unstated period and it could not be said to  be precarious  in nature. The High Court was of the  view  that the said tenancy is an asset. as defined in Section 2(e)  of the Act and is not 892 excluded under sub-clause (v) because the said interest  has been  available to the assessee for a period  exceeding  six years  from the date the new contract of tenancy  came  into existence.    In  the Act, as originally enacted, Section 2(e)(v)  read as  under: "In .this Act, unless the context  otherwise  re- quires-- X              X             X              X              X X (e) "assets" includes property of every description, movable or immovable, but does not include-- X              X             X              X              X X (v) any interest in property where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years."     By the Wealth Tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 which came  into force  with effect from April 1, 1965, the words  "from  the date  the interest vests in the assessee" were  inserted  at the  end  of sub-clause (v) and thereafter,  sub-clause  (v) read as under: "any interest in property where the interest is available to an  assessee for a period not exceeding six years  from  the date the interest vests in the assessee."     By the Finance Act, 1969 clause (e) of Section 2 of  the Act was substituted by the following provision: "(e)--"assets"  includes  property  of  every   description, movable or immovable, but does not include-- (1) in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1969 or any earlier assessment year- (i)  agricultural land and growing crop, grass  or  standing trees on such land; (ii)  any building owned or occupied by a cultivator of,  or receiver of rent or revenue out of, agricultural land: Provided that the building is on or in the immediate 893 vicinity  of the land is a building which the cultivator  or the receiver of rent or revenue by reason of his  connection with the land requires as a dwelling house or a  store:house or an outhouse; (iii) animals; (iv) a right to any annuity in any case where the terms  and conditions relating thereto preclude the commutation of  any portion thereof into a lump-sum grant; (v) any interest in property where the interest is available

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to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee; (2) in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1970 or any subsequent assessment year-- (i) animals; (ii) a right to any annuity in any case where the terms  and conditions relating thereto preclude the commutation of  any portion thereof into a lump-sum grant; (iii) any interest in property where the interest is  avail- able  to  an assessee for a period not exceeding  six  years from the date the interest vests in the assessee." As  a result of the aforesaid amendment the provision  which is applicable in relation to the assessment year  commencing on  the  1st day of April, 1970  and  subsequent  assessment years  is sub-clause (2) of clause (e) of Section  2.  Since the  assessments  in  question relate  to  assessment  years 1971-72  to 1974-75 the matter has to be considered  in  the light of the provisions contained in clause (e) of Section 2 of  the Act as substituted by Finance Act, 1969. In  framing questions  Nos. 1 and 2 for reference to the High Court  the Tribunal has erroneously made a reference to sub-clause  (v) of  clause  (e) of Section 2 as it stood prior to  the  1969 amendment.  The High Court, while answering these  questions and  granting the certificate of fitness for appeal to  this Court, did not notice this error. The provisions of  Section 2(e)(v) as amended in 1964 are identical with the provisions of  Section 2(e)(2)(iii), as substituted by the 1969  amend- ment.  The  error is, therefore, of no consequence  and  the matter has been examined by us in the 894 ight of the provisions contained in clause (e) of Section 2, as substituted in 1969.     Shri  R.R. Agarwal, the learned counsel for  the  appel- lant,  has  not disputed the findings recorded by  the  High Court  that the assessee was n possession of  the  leasehold properties as a tenant holding over and hat the said tenancy was  a tenancy from month to month for an  restated  period. The  submission of Shri Agarwal is that the interest  of  he assessee under the said tenancy could not be regarded as  an ’asset’ ruder Section 2(e) of the Act and that it has to  be excluded  because he said interest cannot be regarded as  an interest  available to the assessee for a  period  exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee.     The aforesaid contention of Shri Agarwal involves inter- pretation  of the words "where the interest is available  to an  assessee for a period not exceeding six years  from  the date  the interest vests in the assessee" contained in  Sec- tion  2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act. The word "available" is  pre- ceded  by the word "is" and is followed by the words "for  a period  not  exceeding six years." The word  ’is’,  although normally  referring to :he present often has a future  mean- ing.  It may also have a past signification as in the  sense of ’has been’ (See Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edn. P.  745) We  are of the view that in view of the words "for a  period not  exceeding six years" which follow the word  "available" the  word is’ must be construed as referring to the  present and the future. In that sense it would mean that the  inter- est is presently available and is to be available in  future for  a  period not exceeding six years. The High  Court  has construed  the  word  ’is’ to mean ’has been’.  As  per  the construction  placed  by the High Court in a case  where  an interest  has been created for a period exceeding six  years it  would  be included in he assets of  the  assessee  under Section 2(e) of the Act only after the expiry of the  period of  six  years even though the interest is available  to  he

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assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date  the interest  tests in the assessee. The construction placed  by the High Court instead of placing emphasis on the nature  of the  interest  attaches importance to the enjoyment  of  the interest.  We are unable to subscribe to that view.  In  our opinion  the question as to whether the interest  should  be included  or excluded from the assets of the assessee  under Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act has to be considered in  the light  of he nature of interest on the relevant date.  Under the said provision he relevant date is the date on which the interest vests in the assessee. Therefore, the matter has to be considered by examining the nature of the interest on the date the interest vests in the assessee. 895     This  view  of ours finds support from the  decision  of this  Court  in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Madras  v.  Smt. Muthukrishna Ammal, [1969] 2 SCR 1 wherein the provisions of Section 2(e)(v). as it stood prior to the amendment of 1964, have  been considered. In that case the  respondent-assessee had  obtained  on lease from Government  certain  salt  pans under  two  agreement dated January 1, 1943 and  January  1, 1945,  and  each lease was to endure for 25  years  but  was liable  to  be determined by notice on either  side  at  the close  of  any  salt manufacturing season.  In  relation  to wealth tax assessment years 1959-60, a question arose as  to whether  the  assessee’s interest in the salt pans  for  the unexpired period of the two leases was liable to be included in  the computation of her net wealth. This Court held  that the  interest of the lessee under each lease was  precarious inasmuch  as it was liable to be determined by notie by  the Government  at  the expiry of any manufacturing  season  and that the leasehold interest in the salt pans was not  avail- able  to the assessee for a period exceeding six years  from the  valuation date. It was urged on behalf of  the  Revenue that  since  the assessee had enjoyed the rights  under  one lease  for 16 years and in the other lease for 14 years  and on the valuation date both the leases were outstanding,  the rights were "assets" within the meaning of the Act and  that the expression "is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years" in clause (v) of Section 2(e) means ’is and has been available to an assessee for the period of  six years before the date of valuation.’ It was also urged  that if interest in property though revocable has remained  unre- voked for more than six years before the valuation date, the interest  would  be an asset within the meaning  of  Section 2(e).  This Court rejected the said contention and  held  as under: "We are unable to agree with that contention. The expression used  by  Parliament is "is available to an assessee  for  a period  not exceeding six years", and it must mean that  the assessee though he has interest in property at the valuation date  the  interest will remain available for a  period  not exceeding  six years. If it is to remain available  for  six years or for a shorter period the interest will fall  within the  exception:  if it is to remain available for  a  period exceeding  six years it will fall within the  definition  of "assets" and its value will be liable to be included in  the net wealth of the assessee. ’ ’     In that case this Court has noticed the amendment intro- duced  in sub-clause (v) of Section 2(e) by the  Wealth  Tax (Amendment) Act, 896 1964  but  did  not consider it necessary to  deal  with  it because  the said matter related to the period prior to  the said amendment.

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   The  High Court has sought to distinguish this  decision on  the view that the position has changed after the  amend- ment introduced in 1964 and that the insertion of the  words ’from  the  date the interest vests in the  assessee’  means that if an interest has been available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest  vests in  the  assessee, it would be an asset while prior  to  its amendment  if the interest was not available to an  assessee for a period not exceeding six years it could not be treated as an asset. The High Court has observed that as a result of the amendment of 1964, Section 2(e)(v) can be interpreted to mean that if an interests has been available to an  assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the  interest vests  in the assessee, it would be asset. We are unable  to agree  with  the said view. While construing the  words  "is available  to  an assessee for a period  not  exceeding  six years"  this  Court in Commissioner of Wealth  Tax  v.  Smt. Muthukrishna  Ammal,  (Supra) has  rejected  the  contention urged  by the Revenue that the said words mean "is  and  has been  available to the assessee for a period of  six  years" and  this  Court has construed the said words to  mean  that "the interest will remain available for a period not exceed- ing  six  years" meaning thereby that the interest  must  be such that on the relevant date it is available presently and is available for a period not exceeding six years in future. The  only change which was brought about in Section  2(e)(v) as a result of the amendment introduced in 1964, whereby the words  "from  the date the interest vests in  the  assessee" were inserted in that sub-clause, was that prior to the said amendment  the relevant date was the valuation date and  the availability  of interest had to be seen with  reference  to that  date  and as a result of the amendment  of  1964,  the relevant date became the date on which the interest vests in the asseses and, therefore, the availability of the interest was  to  be  seen with reference to the date  on  which  the interest vests in the assessee. But the requirement that  on the relevant date the interest would be available in  future for  a period exceeding six years, as held by this Court  in Commissioner  of  Wealth  Tax v.  Smt.  Muthukrishna  Ammal, (Supra), remained unaltered.     In  this context, it may also be mentioned that  Commis- sioner of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra) was decided by this Court on September 6, 1968. The Finance Act, 1969, whereby clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act was substi- tuted,  was  enacted by Parliament on May 13, 1969.  In  the amended  provisions of clause (e), Parliament  has  repeated the same language, namely, "where the interest is avail- 897 able to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years" in item  (v) of sub-clause (1) and in item (iii) of  sub-clause (2). It must be assumed that while enacting the Finance Act, 1969,  Parliament  was aware of the construction  placed  by this  Court on these words in Commissioner of Wealth Tax  v. Smt.  Muthukrishna  Ammal, (Supra). In  repeating  the  said words  in  the amended clause (e) of Section  2,  Parliament must be taken to have used the said words to bear the  mean- ing  which has been put upon them by this Court  in  Commis- sioner of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra).     In  the instant case, it has been found that  after  the expiry  of the leases of the assessee in the years 1958  and 1963  the assessee continued in possession under a new  con- tract  of  tenancy and the said tenancy was a  tenancy  from month to month for an unstated period. The said tenancy  was precarious  in nature because it could be terminated by  the lessor,  viz., the Government of Uttar Pradesh, at any  time

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by  a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer  of  Property Act.  The fact that such a notice was not given cannot  mean that  the  interest created by the said new tenancy  was  an interest  available to the assessee for a  period  exceeding six years from the date the interest vested in the assessee. In  the  circumstances in view of Section  2(e)(2)(iii)  the said interest could not be treated as an asset of the asses- see for the purpose of the Act.     Our  attention has been invited to the decision  of  the Allahabad High Court in Purshottam Dass Tandon and Others v. State of U.P., Lucknow and Others, A.I.R. 1987 All. 56. From the said decision it appears that a number of petitions were filed  in the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of  the Constitution of India by lessees who had been granted leases of  nazul lands in Civil Lines area of Allahabad  and  whose leases  have expired and who were seeking renewal  of  those leases.  After  considering  the various  orders  that  were passed  by  the Government of Uttar Pradesh,  from  time  to time, the High Court, while disposing of the said petitions, has given the following to the opposit parties: (i)  grant fresh leases to all those who had  deposited  the premium  or at least one instalment on terms and  conditions mentioned in 1959 Order read with 1960 Order; (ii)  issue notices to all those lessees to whom  no  notice was  issued  and determine their premium etc. on  terms  and conditions mentioned in 1959-60 Orders expeditiously; 898 (iii) determine premium etc. of others to whom notices  were issued but it could not be finalised for one reason or other at an early date; (iv)  determine rate of premium etc. for premises which  are used as residential cum commercial purpose in light of  1965 Order; (v) determine rate of premium used for commercial purpose in light of various Orders issued till 1965; and (vi)  lessees  shall after grant of fresh  leases  file  the necessary forms etc. within one month before the  Prescribed Authority under Urban Ceiling Act, 1976 (Act 33 of 76) if it had  already not been filed who shall proceed to decide  the same as expeditiously as possible.     In view of the aforesaid directions that have been given by  the  High Court it can be said that the  assessee  whose leases expired in 1958 and 1963, can ask for grant of  fresh leases  on  the terms and conditions mentioned in  1959  and 1960  Orders issued by the Government of Uttar  Pradesh.  In other  words it can be said that in the relevant  assessment years the assessee had the right to obtain fresh leases  for the lands of the properties in question. But there is  noth- ing to show that in pursuance of the said right fresh leases have  been granted by the Government of U.P. in  respect  of those  lands and such leases were available to the  assessee during the assessment years in question.     For  the  reasons  aforesaid it must be  held  that  the properties  in respect of which leases had expired  in  1958 and  1963 and notices had been received by the  assessee  to hand over the possession were not assets within the  meaning of section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act and the valuation of  the same was not liable to be included in the net wealth of  the assessee.  Question  No. 1 referred by the Tribunal  to  the High Court must, therefore, be answered in the negative i.e. in  favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 referred  by  the Tribunal to the High Court is connected with Question No.  1 and  both  the questions were considered by the  High  Court together. Since Question No. 1 is answered in Favour of  the assessee, Question No. 2 must also be answered in the  nega-

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tive  i.e.,  in favour of the assessee and it must  be  held that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the interest of the assessee in respect of the properties in dispute  was for  a  period  over six years for the  purpose  of  Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act. 899     In  the result the appeals are allowed and the  judgment and  order  of  the High Court is set aside  insofar  as  it relates  to Questions Nos. 1 and 2. The said  questions  are answered in favour of the assessee and against the  Revenue. No order as to costs. N.P.V.                                      Appeals allowed. 900