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PETITIONER: F.A. SAPA ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SINGORA AND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/05/1991

BENCH: AHMADI, A.M. (J) BENCH: AHMADI, A.M. (J) RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1557            1991 SCR  (2) 752  1991 SCC  (3) 375        JT 1991 (2)   503  1991 SCALE  (1)939

ACT:      The Representation of the People Act, 1951-Sections 80, 80A, 81, 82, 83, 86 read with Rules 94, 95-A and Form 25  of the Representation of the People’s Rules,  1951-Presentation of  Election Petition-Contents of-Trial Court’s duty to  see whether  complied  with  the  statutory  requirements-Proper attestation and verification-Necessity of.      The Representation of the People Act, 1951-Section  83- Safeguards   against   allegation  of   corrupt   practices- Legislative intention explained.      Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order VI, Rule, 15  read with  Section  83, the Representation of the  People’s  Act, 1951-Verification of election petition-Application of Code.      The  Representation  of People  Act,  1951-Chapter  II- Tittle-"Presentation  of  Election  Petitions  to   Election Commission"-Held requires amendment.

HEADNOTE:      The respondents, who lost the State Assembly  elections as candidates of the Mezo National Front(MNF) from different constituencies  of Mizoram, challenged the election  of  the Congress  (I) candidates on the ground of corrupt  practices in the High Court.      The  appellants-the returned candidates raised  certain preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of each petition.   On the basis  therefore two  preliminary  issues were  raised  for consideration.  The appellants  moved  for striking   off  the  pleadings.   Thereupon,  the   original petitioners-the  respondents applied for amendment of  their election  petitions  which  was  strongly  opposed  by   the appellants.   The preliminary objections,  the  applications for   striking   off  the  pleadings   and   the   amendment applications were heard together.      The  two preliminary issues raise were (i) whether  the election petitions were in conformity with the  requirements of Section 81 and 83                                                        753 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 and the Rules framed thereunder by the High Court and (ii) whether rule  1 and  the other related rules and notes thereto enabling  the

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filing  of the Election Petition before the  Stamp  Reporter assigned  to  the election court by the Chief  Justice  were ultra vires Article 329 of the Constitution and Section  169 read with Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the R.P. Act.      The  appellants contended that the  election  petitions being  photo  copies,  could  not  be  treated  as  election petitions  as  contemplated  by  law;  that  the  copies  of petitions served on them were not attested to be true copies of the original petitions as required by Section 81(3); that the  election petitions were not signed and verified in  the manner laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch  as the  source  of information had not been  disclosed  in  the verification  or in the affidavit in Form 25 as required  by rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (the Rules); that no schedule of material particulars of corrupt practice had  been  annexed to the affidavit purporting to  be  under Form 25, and that the presentation of the election petitions before the Stamp Reporter was inconsistent with Sections 80, 80A  and  81  of  the  R.P.  Act  and  Article  329  of  the Constitution.      The averments in each election petition were identical.      The High Court rejected the preliminary objections  and party   allowed  the  applications  for  striking  off   the averments  in  the election petitions and  partly  permitted certain amendments to the election petitions, against  which order  the  present appeals are filed in  this  Court  under Article 136 of the Constitution.      The  returned  candidate-the appellant  contended  that paragraph  3 of the election petition was the  most  crucial paragraph  inasmuch as it disclosed the names of  towns  and villages  as  well as the period during  which  the  alleged corrupt  practices  were committed  had  been  deliberatedly omitted from the verification clause and the affidavit; that failure  to mention paragraph 3 of the election petition  in both  the  verification  clause  of  the  petition  and  the affidavit was fatal and cannot be cured after the expiry  of the limitation period of 45 days; that the affidavit was not in  Form No. 25 prescribed under Rule 94A of the  Rules  and since Section 83 of the R.P. Act is mandatory and failure to adhere  to  Form  No.  25 was  fatal,  as  the  doctrine  of substantial compliance had no place in election law but even if that doctrine could be invoked, the respondent failed  to make  substantial  compliance; that the  election  petitions being photocopies could not be entertained as valid                                                        754 election  petitions; that copies of the  election  petitions served on the returned candidates were not attested as  true copies  of the original as required by Section  81(3);  that the  election petitions and the schedule and annexures  were not  signed  and verified as required by the Code;  that  an election  dispute  founded  on  the  allegation  of  corrupt practice  being  quasi-criminal in nature calls  for  strict adherence to the requirements of election law as was evident from Section 86(I) of R.P. Act which provided for  dismissal of  an  election petition which failed to  comply  with  the requirements  of Section 81, 82 or 117 of the  statute;  and that if the Code did not apply to Mizoram, it applied to  an election petition because section 83(I)(c) obligates that an election  petition  ‘shall be signed by the  petitioner  and verified  in  the  manner  laid down in  the  Code  for  the verification of pleadings’.      This Court partly allowing the appeals,      HELD: 1. Our election law being statutory in  character must be strictly complied with since an election petition is not guided by ever strictly complied with since an  election

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petition   is  not  guided  by  ever  changing  common   law principles   of  justice  and  notions  of  equity.    Being statutory in character it is essential that it must  conform to  the requirements of our election law.  But at  the  same time  the purity of election process must be  maintained  at all  costs  and those who violate the statutory  norms  must suffer  for  such violation.  If the returned  candidate  is shown to have secured his success at the election by corrupt means  he must suffer for his misdeeds. [772B-D]      2.  A charge of corrupt practice has a two  dimensional effect;  its  impact  on the returned candidate  has  to  be viewed  from  the point of view of  the  candidate’s  future political and public life and from the point of view of  the electorate  to  ensure the purity of the  election  process. There  can, therefore, be no doubt that such  an  allegation involving   corrupt practice must be viewed  very  seriously and  the  the High Court should ensure compliance  with  the requirements of Section 83 before  the parties go to  trial. [783D-E]      3.  What is essential is that the petitioner must  take the  responsibility  of the copy being a true  copy  of  the original  petition and sign in token thereof. No  particular form of attestation is prescribed; all that the  sub-section enjoins  is that the petitioner must attest the  copy  under his  own  signature to be a true copy of the  petition.   By certifying  the  same  as  true  copy  and  by  putting  his signature  at  the  foot thereof,  the  petitioner  of  each election  petition had clearly complied with the letter  and spirit of section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. [786A-B]                                                        755      4.  Section 86(I) mandates that the High Court  ‘shall’ dismiss an election petition which does not comply with  the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the R.P.  Act.   The  language  of  this  sub-section  is  quite imperative  and  commands the High Court,  in  no  uncertain terms, to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the requirements of section 81 of section 82. [773B-D]      5.  Election  of a returned candidate can  be  rendered void on proof of the alleged corrupt practice.  In  addition thereto  he would incur a subsequent disqualification  also. This  harshness  is  essential if  we  want  our  democratic process to be clean, free and fair.  Eradication of  corrupt practice from our democratic process is essential if we want it  to  thrive and remain healthy.  Our  democratic  process will collapse if unhealthy corrupt practices like appeals to voters  on basis of caste, creed, community religion,  race, language, etc., are allowed to go unchecked and  unpunished. Use  of corrupt practices in elections to secure short  term gains  at the cost of purity of our democratic process  must be frowned at by every right thinking citizen. [773D-F]      6. It is for that reason that the law has provided  for double jeopardy to deter candidates, their agents and others from indulging in such nefarious practices, their agents and others  from  indulging in such  nefarious  practices.   But while  there is sufficient justification for the law  to  be harsh  with  those who indulge in such practices,  there  is also the need to ensure that such allegations are made  with a sense of responsibility and concern and not merely to  vex the  returned candidate.  It is with this in view  that  the law envisages that the particulars of such allegations shall be   set  out  fully  disclosing  the  name  of  the   party responsible  for  the  same and the date and  place  of  its commission.    A   simple   verification   was    considered insufficient  and, therefore, the need for an affidavit   in the  prescribed  form.   These  procedural  precautions  are

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intended to ensure that the person making the allegation  of corrupt practice realises the seriousness thereof as such  a charge  would be akin to a criminal charge since  it  visits the  party  indulging  in  such  practice  with  a  two-fold penalty. [773E-H]      7.  If full particulars of an alleged corrupt  practice are  not  supplied, the proper course would be  to  give  an opportunity  to the petitioner to cure the defect and if  he fails  to  that opportunity that part of the charge  may  be struck down. [775F-G]      8.  Once the amendment sought falls within the  purview of  section  86(5),  the High Court  should  be  liberal  in allowing the same unless, in the facts and circumstances  of the case, the Court finds it unjust and                                                        756 prejudicial  to the opposite party to allow the same.   Such prejudice   must,  however,  be  distinguished   from   mere inconvenience. [775G-H]      9.  The  power  conferred by section  86(5)  cannot  be exercised to allow any amendment which will have the  effect of  introducing  a corrupt practice not  previously  alleged inthe petition.  If it is found that the proposed amendments are not in the nature of supplying particulars but raise new grounds, the same must be rejected but if the amendments are sought  for removing vagueness by confining the  allegations to the returned candidate only such an amendment would  fall within  the  parameters of section 86(5) of  the  R.P.  Act. [789B-D]      10.  Clause(c)  of  sub-section  83  provides  that  an election  petition  shall be signed by  the  petitioner  and verification  of  the pleadings.  Under  section  83(2)  any schedule  or  annexure  to the pleading  must  be  similarly verified.  Order 6 Rule 15 is the relevant provision in  the Code.   Sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  15  says  that  the  person verifying  shall  specify  with reference  to  the  numbered paragraphs  of  the pleading, what he verifies  on  his  own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.  The verification must be signed by the person making it and must state the date on and the place at which it was signed.  The defect in the verification can  be (i)  of  a formal nature and not very substantial  (ii)  one which substantially complies with the requirements and (iii) that which is material but capable of being cured. [776A-C]      11. The object of requiring verification of an election petition  is  clearly  to fix  the  responsibility  for  the averments  and  allegations in the petition  on  the  person signing  the verification and at the same time  discouraging wild  and  irresponsible allegations unsupported  by  facts. [776C-D]      12.  In cases where corrupt practice is alleged in  the petition,  the  petition  shall  also  be  supported  by  an affidavit   in  the  prescribed  form,  i.e.  Form  No.   25 prescribed by Rule 94A of the Rules. [776D-E]      13.   While  defective  verification  or  a   defective affidavit may not be fatal, the High Court should ensure its compliance before the parties go to trial so that the  party required to meet the charge is not taken by surprise at  the actual trial. [783E-F]      14.  The  charge of corrupt practice has to  be  proved beyond   reasonable  doubt  and  merely   preponderance   of probabilities.                                                        757 Allegation  of  corrupt  practice  being  quasi-criminal  in nature,  the  failure  to supply  full  particulars  at  the earliest  point  of  time  and to  disclose  the  source  of

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information  promptly  may have an adverse  bearing  on  the probative value to be attached to the evidence  tendered  in proof   thereof  at  the  trial.   Therefore,  even   though ordinarily  a  defective verification can be cured  and  the failure  to disclose the grounds or sources  of  information may  not  be  fatal, failure to place them  on  record  with promptitude may lead the court in a given case to doubt  the veracity of the evidence ultimately tendered.  If,  however, the affidavit of the schedule or annexure forms an  integral part  of  the election petition  itself,  strict  compliance would be insisted upon. [783G-784B]      15. The requirements of section 81(3) are mandatory and failure to comply with them would render the petition liable to  summary dismissal under section 86(I) of the  R.P.  Act. [784G]      16. If a document does not form an integral part of the election petition but is merely referred to in the  petition or filed in the proceedings as evidence of any fact, failure to  supply a copy thereof will not prove  fatal.   Therefore the  maintainability of an election petition will depend  on whether the schedule or annexure to the petition constitutes an  integral part of the election petition  or not.   If  it constitutes   an   integral  part  it   must   satisfy   the requirements  of  section 81(3) and failure in  that  behalf would  be fatal.  But if it does not constitute an  integral part  of the election petition, a copy thereof need  not  be served along with the petition to the opposite party. [787A- C]     17.  The High Court is directed to issue  directions  to the  election  petitioner  of each petition  to  remove  the defects within such time as it may allow and if they or  any of them fail to do so, pass appropriate consequential orders in accordance with law. [789A-B]     Gurumayam  S.  Sarma  v. K. Ongbi  Anisija  Devi,  Civil Appeal No. 659 of 1957 dated 9.2.1961; State of Nagaland  v. Rattan  Singh,  [1966]  3  SCR  830;  V.L.Rohlus  v.  Deputy Commissioner,  Aizawal,  [1970]  2 SCC 908;  Raj  Narain  v. Indira  Gandhi, AIR 1972 SC 1302 at 1307: [1972] 3 SCR  841; Manphul  Singh v. Surinder Singh, [1973] 2 SCC 599  at  608; K.M.  Mani v. P.J. Antony, [1979] 1 SCR 701; Samant N.  Bal- Krishna  v. George Fernandez, [1969] 3 SCR 603; D.P.  Mishra v.  Kamal  Narayan Sharma, [1971] 1 SCR 8; Balwan  Singh  v. Lakshmi  Narain, [1969] 22 ELR 273; Murarka Radhey Shyam  v. Roop  Singh  Rathore, [1964] 3 SCR 573; State of  Bombay  v. Purushottam  Jog Naik, [1952] SCR 674; The Barjum  Chemicals Ltd. The Company Law                                                        758 Board, [1966] Supp. SCR 311; K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India, [1970]  3 SCR 121 at 125; Jadav Gilua v. Suraj  Narain  Jha, AIR  1974  Patna  207; M/s Sunder Industries  Ltd.  v.  G.E. Works,   AIR  1982  Delhi  220;  K.K.  Somanathan  v.   K.K. Ramachandran,  AIR  1988; Kerala 259; Kamalam  v.  Dr.  Syed Mohammad, [1978] 3 SCR 446; M/s. Sukhwinder Pal v. State  of Punjab, [1982] 1 SCC 31; Z.B. Bukhari v. Brij Mohan,  [1975] Suppl. SCR 281; Prabhu Narayan v. K.K. Srivastava, [1975]  3 SCR  552;  Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram, [1974] 4 SCC  237;  M. Karunanidhi  v. Dr. H.V. Hande, [1983] 2 SCC  473;  Mithlesh Kumar Pandey v. Baidyanath Yadav, [1984] 2 SCR 278; Rajender Singh v. Usha Rani, [1984] 3 SCC 339; U.S. Sasidharan v.  K. Karunakaran,  [1989] 4 SCC 482 and Ch. Subba Rao v.  Member, E.T. Hyderabad, [1969] 6 SCR 213 Referred to.     18.  When  by  the  same  statute  the  words  ‘Election Commissioner’  were  substituted  by  the  expression  ‘High Court’  with effect from December 14, 1966. Even  though  by the  said Amendment Act jurisdiction was conferred  on  High

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Court in place of the Election Commission,  surprisingly the title  of  chapter  II continues to  read  ‘Presentation  of election petitions to Election Commission’. Parliament  will well  to correct this slip by substituting the  words  ‘High Court’ for the expression ‘Election Commission’ to bring  it in conformity with the changes introduced by Act 47 of 1966. [768E-F]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  179-189 of 1991 etc. etc.     From  the  Judgment  and Order  dated  3.9.1990  of  the Gauhati High Court in Election Petition No. 7 of 1989.     A.M.  Mazumdar, Dr. L.M. Singhvi, S.K. Nandy, S.  Parekh and Ms. Lira Goswami for  the Appellants.     Dr.   B.L.  Wadehra  and  M.K.D.  Namboodiri   for   the Respondents.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     AHMADI, J. Special granted in all SLPs.     Mizoram  acquired Statehood on February 20, 1987. At the general  election held on January 21, 1989, the  respondents of  this  batch  of appeals  contested  the  State  Assembly elections  as  candidates of the Mizo National  Front  (MNF) from different constituencies. The                                                        759 results  of the election were declared on January 23,  1989. They  lost  to  candidates fielded by  the  Indian  National Congress (I). The unsuccessful MNF mainly on the ground that they  had indulged in and were guilty of corrupt  practices. As many as fifteen such election petitions came to be  filed in the  Gauhati High Court on one single day, March 9, 1989. Although  fifteen  petitions were filed,  one  Congress  (I) candidate  had  succeeded from two constituencies   and  one candidate  belonged to the Mizo National Front  (Democratic) Party.  On service of notice of the filing of  the  election petitions,  the returned candidates entered  appearance  and raised   certain   preliminary  objections   regarding   the maintainability  of each petition. On the basis thereof  two preliminary  issues  were  raised  for  consideration.   The returned  candidates moved for striking off  the  pleadings. Thereupon the original petitioners applied for amendment  of their election petitions which was strongly opposed  by  the returned   candidates.  The  preliminary   objections,   the applications   for  striking  off  the  pleadings  and   the amendment applications were heard together.     The  two preliminary issues raised by the learned  Judge hearing the election petitions were (i) whether the election petitions  were  in  conformity with   the  requirements  of Sections 81 and 83 of the Representation of the People  Act, 1951  (R.P.  Act), and the Rules framed  thereunder  by  the Gauhati  High  Court and (ii) whether rule 1 and  the  other related  rules and notes thereto enabling the filing of  the Election Petition before the Stamp Reporter assigned to  the election court by the learned Chief Justice were  ultravires Article  329 of the Constitution and Section 169  read  with Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the R.P. Act. so far as the first objection was concerned, the returned candidates   contended that the election petitions were photo-copies and could not, therefore, be treated as election petitions as  contemplated by  law,  the  copies of petitions served  on  the  returned candidates  were  not  attested to be  true  copies  of  the original petitions as required by Section 81(3), the  copies served  on them with the annexures were not true  copies  of

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the  original;  the election petitions were not  signed  and verified  in  the  manner laid down by  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure inasmuch as the source of information had not been disclosed in the verification or the affidavit in Form 25 as required by rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules,  1961 (the  Rule)  and  no schedule  of  material  particulars  of corrupt   practice  had  been  annexed  to   the   affidavit purporting  to  be under Form 25. In regard  to  the  second objection  the contention was that the presentation  of  the election   petitions   before   the   Stamp   Reporter   was inconsistent with Sections 80, 80A and 81 of                                                        760 the R.P. Act and Article 329 of the Constitution inasmuch as the  law  requires  that  an  election  petition  shall   be presented  to the High Court. The learned Judge in the  High Court overruled both the preliminary objections holding,  in the case of the first, that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the relevant provisions and on  the second point he ruled that the presentation of the  election petition to the Stamp Reporter appointed or authorised under the Rules was presentation in accordance with the Rules  and the  same  did  not  conflict with  Article  329(b)  of  the Constitution.  Thus  both the preliminary  objections  stood rejected.     The returned candidates had applied under Order VII Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (the Code), for  striking out  certain  averments  from  the  memo  of  the   election petitions  on the ground of failure to disclose a  cause  of action.  A  prayer  was  also  made  for  dismissal  of  the petitions  on  that ground. The learned Judge  in  the  High Court  rejected  this contention observing  that  under  the election law the High Court is empowered to permit amendment of  the  election  petition with a view  to  amplifying  the averments bearing on the question of corrupt practice  which it  considers  necessary for ensuring a fair  and  effective trial  of the election dispute. In this view of  the  matter the  learned Judge examined the averments of each  paragraph in  detail  and  directed the deletion  or  modification  of certain  paragraphs,  the averments wherein  were  vague  of benefit   of   necessary  particulars.  He   directed   that paragraphs  6,  9,  12, 13, 21, 22, 38 and  40  shall  stand deleted  whereas paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 8, 14 to 20, 25 to  27, 30  to 37, 39 and 45 of the petition giving rise to  CA  No. 179  of 1991 shall stand modified. All  allegations  against the   election  agent  or  other  agents  of  the   returned candidates were ordered to be struck off. In other words  he directed  that the allegations of corrupt practice shall  be confined  to  the returned candidates only.  Similar  orders were  passed in the other election petitions subject to  the variation  in number of paragraphs, etc. For convenience  we will take the pleadings of C.A. No. 179/91 as representative since  we  are  told that the  averments  in  each  election petition  are identical except for some variations here  and there.  Thus  the  learned Judge  rejected  the  preliminary objections  and partly allowed the application for  striking off  the  averments  in the election  petitions  and  partly permitted  certain amendments to the election petitions.  It is against the said order that the returned candidates  have approached this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.     At the time of admission of these appeals two  questions were   formulated  for  examination  and  we  will   confine ourselves to them in                                                        761 the  course  of this Judgment. These two  questions  are  as under:

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        (1)‘‘The  Election  Petitions  are  liable  to   be          dismissed  in  limine  under  Section  83  of   the          Representation  of  the  People Act,  1951  as  the          affidavit filed by the Election Petitioner in  each          case  is not strictly in conformity with  Form  25,          inasmuch   as  the  verification  as  regards   the          averments  based  on knowledge  and  the  averments          based  on information has not been made  separately          as required by the said Form prescribed under  Rule          95-A  of  the Representation of the  People  Rules,          1951; and              (II)  The  copies  of  the  Election  petitions          served  on the petitioners herein (the  respondents          in the Election Petitions) not being true copies of          the  Election  Petitions , the  Election  Petitions          were  not  maintainable  and  were  liable  to   be          dismissed in limine in view of Section 81 read with          Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act,          1951.’’     The  appellants  herein  are  the  returned  candidates. Election Petitions were filed against them challenging their election  on  more  or less  identical  grounds.  Since  the Election  Petitions  are  stated to be  based  on  a  single master copy, we would refer to the averments  of E.P. No.  7 of 1989 filed against the appellant F. Sapa of Civil  Appeal No. 179 of 1991.     On  a  perusal  of the cause title of  the  petition  it becomes  evident that the name of the constituency  and  the particulars  of the petitioner and the respondents are  left blank  and  filled  in hand. The petition is  stated  to  be under  Sections  80  and 81 of the  R.P.  Act.  Paragraph  1 furnishes  the dates concerning the election  programme  and the particulars regarding the petitioner. In paragraph 2 the particulars regarding the total votes, votes pulled by  each candidate, etc., have been set out. While the various  heads are  typed, the figures are hand written. The various  typed heads  would  show that particulars  upto  five  respondents figure. That is why the columns regarding three  respondents have  been  filled in while serial Nos. 6 and  7  meant  for respondents 4  and 5 have been left blank. This supports the appellant’s  say  that  one  master  copy  of  the  election petition were prepared and thereafter particulars in respect of each petitioner were filled in hand. In paragraph 3 it is averred  that  the  M.P.C.C. (I) had with  the  consent  and knowledge of the returned candidate conceived and                                                        762 executed  the  entire  election campaign   of  the  returned candidate between December 31, 1988 and January 19, 1989. So also the returned candidate had on his own and with the help of M.P.C.C. (I), its functionaries and workers organised and addressed  public  meetings  and  undertook  door  to   door canvassing  to promote his chances for  success.  Thereafter the list of towns and villages where he held such  meetings, etc.,  are written in hand in the blank space left for  that purpose. This is also indicative of that fact that a  master copy was prepared to challenge all the fifteen elections. In paragraphs  4  and  5 the  details  regarding  the  campaign literature  or  material,  such  as   stickers,   hand-bill, pamphlets,  press  publications etc., have  been  furnished. These have been produced with their English translations  at Annexures  I  to  VI(a). It is averred  that  this  campaign literature was widely distributed throughout the length  and breadth  of the entire constituency between the  aforestated dates and was also air dropped by helicopter on January  20, 1989  throughout the constituency. These were also read  out

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and  explained to the voters in the constituency during  the aforesaid period. After making this averment in paragraph 6, the  petitioner proceeds to add in paragraph 7 as under:          ‘‘That   by   publishing   printing,   circulating,          distributing  and by reading out and explaining  to          the  audiences  including the  electors  and  their          family members throughout the length and breadth of          the constituency as indicated above, Respondent No.          1  (returned candidate) has been guilty of  corrupt          practices under Section 123.............’’ The  details  in  regard  to  the  M.P.C.C.  (I)’s  Election Manifesto  produced  at  Annexure  I  (English  translation- Annexure  1A) have been set out in paragraphs 8 to 22  along with  comments, inferences, etc. In paragraph 23 there is  a mention of Annexure II which is merely a repeat of  Annexure I  dealt  with  in  the aforesaid paragraphs  8  to  22.  In paragraph  24 reference is to Annexure III which  is  merely the  summary  of the Election Manifesto dealt  with  in  the preceding  paragraphs.  Paragraphs  25 to 29  refer  to  the leaflet-Operation Josna-Annexure IV-and submission  thereon. The next two paragraphs 30 and 31 contain reference is to  a sticker-Annexure    V-which   appeals   to   the   religious sentiments  of  those  following  the  Christian  faith  and states:  ‘‘Let  us vote Mizoram Congress(i)  for  Mizos  and Christians’’-  which, it is contended,  constitutes  corrupt practice.  Then come paragraphs 32 to 40 which relate  to  a leaflet-Annexure  VI-entitled  ‘‘what our  vote  will  bring about’’  and then proceeds to add  ‘‘Christian  Government’’ and ‘‘promise of visit of the holy land (Israel)’’. Then,                                                        763 after referring to the activities aforestated, it is alleged in  paragraph  41  that this  has  materially  affected  the election prospects of the other contesting candidates  also. Paragraphs  42,  43 and 44 refer to  Press  publications  in ‘India   Today’,  ‘Statesman  and  the  Assam  Tribune   and Sentinals’. Paragraph 45 enumerates the grounds on which the election  of  the  returned candidate is liable  to  be  set aside. Paragraphs 45A to 47 deal with sundry items. This  in brief  is the nature of the Election Petition. The  petition is verified as under:          ‘‘I. SANGURA the petitioner herein verify that  the          facts  mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 18,  19,          28,  35, 30, 33, 36, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44,  45,  45A,          46  &  47  are  true  to  my  knowledge  and  facts          mentioned  in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,  12,  13,          14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 3          35,  37, 40 & 41 are based on information  received          and  believed to be true. Grounds A, B & C and  the          legal  submissions  are  based  on  legal   advice.          Verified at Guwahati on 7th March, 1989.’’ The verification is typed but the petitioner’s name and  the paragraph  numbers at both the places are hand  written.  It will  be  seen  from  the  above  verification  clause  that paragraphs 3, 16, 17, 25, 31 & 39 have not been verified  at all  either  as true to knowledge or on  information  and/or belief whereas paragraph 41 is mentioned at both the places. It  may  also be noted at this stage that in regard  to  the second  part  of  the  verification  based  on  ‘information received’  and  believed  to be true’ it  is  not  clarified which of the paragraphs are based on ‘information  received’ (nor  is the source of information disclosed) and which  are founded on ‘believed to be true’.     Appended  to  the  petition is  the  petitioner’s  typed affidavit,  which runs into six paragraphs. The name of  the petitioner, his age and address appear to be filled in on  a

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typewriter.  In  paragraph 2 of the affidavit it  is  stated that  the  petitioner (unsuccessful candidate)  has  alleged several corrupt practices on the part of the Respondent  No. 1  (the  returned candidate), his election agent  and  other agents  and  virtually  the  same  phrase  is  repeated   in paragraph  3. The in paragraph 4 it is stated: ‘for  brevity the  details  of the corrupt practices alleged by  me  which have  been given in the Election Petition and are not  being repeated  in this affidavit and the same may be treated  and read  as  part  of this affidavit’  and  then  the  deponent proceeds to add ‘The said particulars and details of corrupt practices  and contained in paragraphs 4 to 40 of  the  said election petition’. The word and figures ‘4 to 40’ are                                                        764 written  in hand after scoring out the words and figures  ‘7 to 47’. Then comes paragraph 5 which may be reproduced:          ‘‘That  I solemnly state and affirm  that all  that          has been stated in the election petition by way  of          corrupt  practices as  a correct to the best of  my          knowledge and to the information received by me and          believed by me to be true’’. It  will  be  seen  from the above  that  according  to  the election  petitioner  the  particulars and  details  of  the corrupt practices are contained in paragraphs 4 to 40  which also  omits paragraph 3 which is, according to the  returned candidate/appellant  crucial. Then in paragraph 5  extracted above  the election petitioner states that all that  he  has stated  in  regard  to corrupt  practices  in  his  election petition  (which according to paragraph 4 are  contained  in paragraphs 4 to 40) is ‘correct to the best of my  knowledge and to the information received by me and believed by me  be true’.  It is not stated which of the particulars  contained in  paragraphs 4 to 40 are true to his knowledge, which  are based  on  information received (apart  from  disclosure  of source of information) and which he believes to be true. The affidavit is totally silent in regard to paragraphs 1 to  3, and 41 to 47 of the election petition.     The returned candidate/the appellant herein,  therefore, contends  that  paragraph  3  which  is  the  most   crucial paragraph  in  the entire election petition inasmuch  as  it discloses  the  names of towns and villages as well  as  the period  during  which  the alleged  corrupt  practices  were committed has been carefully, deliberately and  scrupulously omitted both from the verification clause and the  affidavit referred  to  hereinabove  for reasons  best  known  to  the election  petitioner and, contends the appellant, once  this paragraph  3  is  kept out of  consideration,  the  Election Petition  is,  rendered  ‘a  theoretical  and  unimaginative essay’  on  corrupt practice of appeal to religion.  It  is, therefore, contended that failure to mention paragraph 3  of the  election  petition in both the verification  clause  of the  petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof  is fatal  and cannot be cured particularly after the expiry  of the limitation period of 45 days.     The appellant further contends that the affidavit is not in  Form No. 25 prescribed under Rule 94A  of the Rules  and hence   the affidavit is no affidavit at all. Since  Section 83  of  the  R.P. Act is  mandatory  and  strict  compliance thereof  is  expected of an election petitioner  failure  to adhere  to  Form  No.  25  is  fatal  as  the  doctrine   of substantial compliance has no place in election law but even if that doctrine could be                                                        765 invoked  to  rescue the  election  petitioner  out  of   the situation in which he was placed himself, it was  absolutely

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essential  for him to clearly state in his  affidavit  which paragraphs  of  the  Election  Petition  are  based  on  his knowledge,  which  are  based on  information  received  and which are based on his belief. Since even this is missing it is  difficult  to say that there is  substantial  compliance assuming  the  doctrine  has application.  Counsel  for  the appellant  fairly  stated  that  if  the  averments  in  the election  petition had been sworn to in the above manner  it could perhaps be argued that failure to strictly follow Form 25   could  be  excused  on  the  doctrine  of   substantial compliance  and the procedural defect could be cured  by  an appropriate  amendment.  But, argued counsel,  the  doctrine could never be pressed into service where the petitioner has failed  to disclose which part of the allegations  regarding corrupt   practice   are  based  on  knowledge,   which   on information  received  and which on belief. Where  there  is failure  to  comply with even the basic requirements  of  an affidavit,   there  can  be  no  question  of    substantial compliance; this being a case of non compliance, whatsoever. Where  several  paragraphs of the election  petition  remain unaffirmed  under  the verification clause as  well  as  the affidavit,   the  unsworn  allegation  can  have  no   legal existence  and  the election court  cannot  take  cognizance thereof.  The  further  allegation  was  that  the  election petitions  being  photocopies could not  be  entertained  as valid  election  petitions;  that  copies  of  the  election petitions  served  on  the  returned  candidates  were   not attested  as  true  copies of the original  as  required  by Section  81(3)  and  that the  election  petitions  and  the schedule  and  annexures  were not signed  and  verified  as required  by  the Code. An election dispute founded  on  the allegation  of  corrupt  practice  being  quasi-criminal  in nature  calls  for strict adherence to the  requirements  of election  law as is evident from Section 86(1) of  R.P.  Act which  provides for dismissal of an election petition  which fails to comply with the requirements of Sections 81, 82  or 117 on the said statute.     Before we set out of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act,  reference may be made to Order VI Rule 15 of the  Code which  deals  with verification of pleadings. This  rule  is divided  into three parts: the first part begins with  ‘save as  otherwise  provided  by any law for the  time  being  in force’ and then proceeds to add that every pleading shall be verified  by the party  or by one of the parties or by  some other  person  acquainted with the facts of  the  case;  the second part posits that every person verifying shall specify what  he verifies of his own knowledge and what he  verifies upon  information  received  or  believed  to  be  true   by reference  to  paragraph numbers and the third  part  states that the                                                        766 verification shall be signed by the party making it. It  was however,  pointed out that by virtue of sub-section  (3)  of Section 1, the Code extends to the whole of India except (a) the State of Jammu and Kashmir and (b) the State of Nagaland and the tribal areas. The explanation defines the expression ‘tribal  areas’  as territories  which,  immediately  before January 21, 1972 were included in the tribal areas of  Assam as referred to in paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to  the Constitution. Paragraph 20 says that the areas specified  in Parts   I,II  and  III  of  the  table  shown  below   shall respectively be the tribal areas within the State of  Assam, the State of Meghalaya, and the Union Territory of  Mizoram. Part III which is relevant for our purpose comprises (1) the Chakma  District  (2) the Lakher District and (3)  the  Pawi

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District.  During  the British period the area  was  divided into North Lushai Hills and South Lushai Hills but was later amalgamated  into a single District of Lushai Hills and  was made  part of Assam and was placed under the  administrative charge  of a Superintendent. On our attaining  independence, the Superintendent was replaced by a Deputy Commissioner but the District of Lushai Hills continued to be part of  Assam. The  Lushai Hill District was renamed Mizo District in  1954 by  an  Act of Parliament and was placed  under  a  District council. After a spell of disturbances on the implementation of  the  North Eastern Reorganisation Act,  1971,  the  Mizo District was upgraded into a Union Territory and was renamed Mizoram.  It was divided into three districts,  namely,  (i) Aizawal  ( i) Lunglei and (iii) Chhimtuipui. The  Mizo  Hill District  was replaced by Chakma, Lakher and Pawi  Districts which  find a mention in Part III of the Table to  paragraph 20  of  the  Sixth Schedule to  the  Constitution.  It  was, therefore,  argued that the provisions of the Code  did  not and  do  not apply to the State of Mizoram. In   support  of this  contention  reliance is placed on three  decisions  of this Court namely (1) Gurumayam S. Sarma V.K. Ongbi  Anisija Devi,  Civil Appeal No. 659 of 1957 dated February  9,  1961 (2) State of Nagaland V. Rattan Singh, [1966] 3 SCR 830  and (iii) V.L. Rohlus V. Deputy Commissioner, Aizawal, [1970]  2 SCC  908.  It is unnecessary to notice  these  decisions  in detail because Dr. Singhvi does not seriously question  this proposition. But, contends Dr. Singhvi, if the Code did  not apply  to  Mizaoram in view of the above, it applied  to  an election  petition because Section 83(1)(c)  obligates  that an election petition ‘shall be signed by the petitioner  and verified  in  the  manner  laid down in  the  Code  for  the verification  of  pleadings’.  Therefore,  even  though  the provisions  do  not extend to Mizoram by virtue  of  Section 1(3)  of the Code, counsel submitted they are applicable  by incorporation to election petitions by the thrust of Section 83(1)(c) of the R.P. Act to the extent indicated therein.                                                        767     And  now to the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act  and the   Rules  framed  thereunder.  The  expression   ‘corrupt practice’ defined in Section 1(c) means any of the practices specified  in  Section 123. The  various  corrupt  practices enumerated  in  Section  123  are  (1)  bribery,  (2)  undue influence,  (3) an appeal by a candidate or his agent or  by another  other person with the consent of the  candidate  or his  election agent to vote or refrain from voting  for  any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or  language or the use of, or appeal to religious  symbols, etc., (3A) the promotion of, or attempt to promote, feelings of  enmity  or  hatred  between  different  classes  of  the citizens  of  India  on grounds of  religion,  race,  caste, community, or language, (4) the publication of any statement of  fact which is false and which he either believes  to  be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to another candidate,  (5) the  hiring or procuring of any  vehicle  or vessel  or  the use of such vehicle or vessel for  the  free conveyance  of any elector to or from any  polling  station, (6)   the  incurring  or  authorising  of   expenditure   in contravention of Section 77, (7) the obtaining or  procuring of  any assistance from any Government servant of the  class specified  and  (8) booth capturing. Sections 8 and  8A  lay down  that any person convicted for practising  any  corrupt practice by an order made by the High Court under Section 99 shall be disqualified for a period of six years in the  case of  the former in addition to being punished  on  conviction and for a period not exceeding six years in the case of  the

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latter. Counsel for the appellant, therefore, contended that proof  of  allegations of corrupt practice would  visit  the returned  candidate  with certain serious  consequences  and must,  therefore, be viewed seriously. Being  quasi-criminal in  nature  courts  have and must always  insist  on  strict compliance  with  the provisions of law in that  behalf  and failure  to do so must prove fatal. Laying this  background, counsel for the appellants invited our attention to Sections 80 to 86 of the R.P. Act.     The   R.P.  Act  is  divided  into  XI  parts.  We   are essentially  concerned  with  Part  VI  entitled   ‘Disputes Regarding  Elections’  which  is divided  into  V  chapters. Chapter I  is a single section chapter comprising section 79 which  defines certain expressions used in Part VI and  Part VII  dealing with corrupt practices and electoral  offences. Chapter  II entitled ‘Presentation of election petitions  to Election  Commission’  comprises Sections 80  to  85  having since  been repealed. Section 80 says no election  shall  be called in question except by an election petition  presented in  accordance with the provisions contained in  that  part. Section   80A,   inserted  by  Act  47  of   1966,   confers jurisdiction on the High Court to try an election  petition. Section 81                                                        768 deals  with  the presentation of such  petitions.  It  reads under:          ‘‘81.  Presentation of petitions.-(1)  An  election          petition  calling in question any election  may  be          presented  on one or more of the grounds  specified          in  sub-section (1) of section 100 and section  101          to  the  High  Court  by  any  candidate   at  such          election  or  any elector  within  forty-five  days          from, but not earlier than, the date of election of          the  returned candidate, or if there are more  than          one  returned  candidate at the  election  and  the          dates   of their election are different, the  later          of those two dates.             Explanation.-In   this  sub-section,   ‘elector’          means  a  person who was entitled to  vote  at  the          election  to which the election  petition  relates,          whether he has voted at such election or not.             (3) Every election petition shall be accompanied          by as many copies thereof as there are  respondents          mentioned  in  the petition, and  every  such  copy          shall  be attested by the petitioner under his  own          signature to be a true copy of the petition.’’ Sub-section  (2)  of this section was omitted by Act  47  of 1966   when  by  the  same  statute  the   words   ‘Election Commission’ were substituted by the expression ‘High  Court’ with effect from December 14, 1966. Even though by the  said Amendment Act jurisdiction was conferred  on the High  Court in place of the Election Commission, surprisingly the  title of  Chapter II continues to read ‘Presentation  of  election petitions  to Election Commission’. Parliament will do  well to correct this slip by substituting the words ‘High  Court’ for  the  expression ‘Election Commission’ to  bring  it  in conformity   with the changes introduced by Act 47 of  1966. Section   82   indicates  the  parties  to  be   joined   as respondents. Then comes Section 83 which reads thus:          ‘‘83.   Contents  of  petition.-(1)   An   election          petition-          (a)  shall  contain  a  concise  statement  of  the          material facts on which the petitioner relies;          (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt          practice that the petitioner alleges, including  as

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        full  a statement as possible of the means  of  the          parties alleged to have com-                                                        769          mitted  such  corrupt  practice and  the  date  and          place of the commission of each such practice; and          (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and  verified          in  the  manner  laid down in  the  Code  of  Civil          Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of          pleadings:          Provided  that  where the  petitioner  alleges  any          corrupt  practice,  the  petition  shall  also   be          accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed  form          in  support  of  the  allegation  of  such  corrupt          practice and the particulars thereof.          (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition  shall          also  be signed by the petitioner and  verified  in          the same manner as the petition.’’ On a plain reading of this provision it is manifest that  it is   incumbent  on  the  petitioner  to  set   forth   ‘full particulars of any corrupt’ he alleges against the  returned candidate.  This  should  be  accompanied  by  ‘as  full   a statement  as  is possible’ of the names of those  who  have indulged in such corrupt practice and the date and place  of the  commission  thereof.  Clause  (c)  of  sub-section  (1) enjoins that the election petition shall not only be  signed but  also verified in the manner laid down in the Code.  The proviso  then  prescribes an additional safeguard  in  cases where  corrupt practice is alleged, as in the present  case, namely, that the election petition shall  be accompanied  by an  affidavit  in  the  prescribed form in  support  of  the allegation  of  such corrupt practice  and  the  particulars thereof.   This  provision  reflects  the  anxiety  of   the legislature  to ensure that allegations of corrupt  practice are not lightly made; not only that but it ensures that  the responsibility thereof is fixed on the petitioner himself by asking  him  to  swear  an  affidavit  in  support  thereof. ‘Prescribed’  says  Section 2(g) means prescribed  by  rules made  under  the  said  Act. Form 25  is  the  form  of  the affidavit  prescribed  by Rule 94A of the Rules.  Next  sub- section  (2) of this section provides that any  schedule  or annexure  to the petition shall also be signed and  verified in  the same manner as the petition itself. Section 84  sets out what relief the petitioner can claim in such an election petition.  That brings us to chapter III entitled ‘Trial  of election  petitions’.  Only two sections from  this  chapter require to be noticed. The first is section 86, the relevant part whereof reads:          ‘‘86.  Trial  of election petitions.-(1)  The  High          Court shall dismiss an election petition which does          not comply with the                                                        770          provisions  of section 81 or section 82 or  section          117.          Explanation.-An order of the High Court  dismissing          an  election petition under this sub-section  shall          be  deemed to be an order made under clause (a)  of          section 98.          (2)  As soon as may be after an  election  petition          has  been presented to the High Court. It shall  be          referred to the Judge or one of the Judges who  has          or have been assigned by the Chief Justice for  the          trial  of election petitions under sub-section  (2)          of section 80A.’’ The  rest  of  the  sub-sections  are  not  germane  to  the controversy before us. Section 87 outlines the procedure  to

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be  followed by the High Court in the trial of  an  election petition.  It says that it shall be tried ‘as nearly as  may be’,  in accordance with the procedure applicable under  the Code  to  the trial of suits. Since sub-section (1)  of  the Section  86 refers to Section 117 we may notice it  at  this stage.  It provides for a deposit of Rs. 2,000  as  security for  the  petition  with which we  are  now  concerned.  Dr. Singhvi,  therefore, emphasised that the law for  the  trial and  resolution of election disputes found in the  aforesaid provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder  offers a  self-contained  Code  and it is  not  necessary  to  look elsewhere  except  where  provisions of any  other  law  are incorporated  in  this  statute  by  reference.  He  further submitted that since some of the election disputes could  be quasi-criminal  in nature, e.g., where corrupt  practice  is alleged,  strict  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the statute  and  Rules is expected by the legislature  in  such cases and even if the provisions are treated as directory as held  by the learned Judge in the High Court, the degree  of non-compliance  which  the  Court will  tolerate  to  ensure substantial  compliance  will  not  be the  same  as  in  an ordinary civil proceeding. He submitted that tested on  this touchstone,  this  Court  should  hold  that  there  is   no substantial compliance for otherwise the election law  would loss  its  sanctity  and seriousness and  vague  charges  of corrupt  practice would be lightly made to vex the  returned candidates and when faced with an objection attempts to cure the  defects  through  applications  for  amendment  of  the pleadings  would  become  the  order  of  the  day   thereby defeating  the  very  object  of  expeditious  disposals  of election  petitions envisaged in Section 86(7) of  the  R.P. Act.     Dr. Singhvi took strong exception to the approach of the learned  Judge in the High Court when he ruled  that  strict compliance with the provisions of Sections 81 and 83 of R.P. Act was not necessary and                                                        771 that  the  procedural requirements thereunder  were  to   be treated  in  the  same  manner  as  a  suit  or  any   other proceedings  of  a  civil nature.  He  submitted  that  this approach   of  the  learned  Judge  betrays   an   erroneous understanding that election petitions are also to be treated on par with ordinary proceedings, notwithstanding the quasi- criminal  character  of  such proceedings, and  it  is  this approach  of the learned Judge which has led him to reach  a conclusion unknown to election law. In particular he invited our  attention to the following observations of the  learned Judge  which  according to counsel  betrays  his  fallacious approach:          ‘‘I  am not prepared to hold that simply because  a          petition before the court happens to be an election          petition,  the  procedural requirements  should  be          construed  in  a  mechanical  or  pedantic   manner          without  any  regard to the object  sought  to   be          achieved  thereby.  The law does  not  require  the          court, while dealing with an election petition,  to          construe  the pleadings in such a  hyper  technical          manner  and  to  make  a  microscopic   examination          thereof with a view to finding out a slip here or a          deviation  there which may be used as a ground  for          the rejection of the petition in limine in the name          of maintaining the democratic process or the purity          of   election.  In  any  opinion,  the   procedural          requirements  in  an election case also  should  be          construed in the same manner as in cases under  the

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        C.P.C.  The approach of the court should not be  to          reject  the election petition, in limine  on  every          possible pretext of non-compliance with one more of          the procedural requirements unless the law  itself,          in clear terms, mandates it to do so.’’ It is manifest from the above observations that the  learned Judge  took  the view that the procedural  requirements  are intended  to  serve the object of providing a  mechanism  to reach  the  ultimate  objective  of  dispensing  justice  in election  disputes. According to him these  provisions  were merely   adjectival  and  must,  therefore,   be   construed liberally  so as to advance the cause of justice and not  to stifle  it  at the threshold. In support of  this  line  of thought   the   learned  Judge  placed   reliance   on   the observations  of this Court in Raj Narain v. Indira  Gandhi, AIR 1973 SC 1302 at 1307 wherein this Court has observed  as under:          ‘‘Rules of pleadings are intended as aids for  fair          trial  and for reaching a just decision. An  action          at law should not be                                                        772          equated  to a game of chess. Provisions of law  are          not  mere  formulae  to  be  observed  as  rituals.          Beneath   the   words  of  a  provision   of   law,          generally   speaking,   there   lies   a    justice          principle. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain          that principle and implement it.’’ Let  us examine if the criticism of the  learned counsel  to the approach of the learned Judge is well founded.     It  is fairly well settled that our election  law  being statutory  in character must be strictly complied with since an  election petition is not guided by ever changing  common law  principles  of  justice and notions  of  equity.  Being statutory in character it is essential that it must  conform to  the  requirements of our election law. But at  the  same time  the purity of election process must be  maintained  at all  costs  and those who violate the statutory  norms  must suffer  for  such violation. If the  returned  candidate  is shown to have secured his success at the election by corrupt means he must suffer for his misdeeds.     The  mode  for  calling in question the  election  of  a returned candidate is by presenting an election petition ‘in accordance  with the provisions of this Part’ (Section  80). Such a petition has to be presented within 45 days from  the date of election of the returned candidate. Sub-section  (3) of  section 81 provides that such an election petition  must be  accompanied by as many copies thereof as there as  there are respondents and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of  the petition.  This  provision which explains how a copy  of  an election  petition shall be attested, emphasises  that  such attestation   will be under the petitioner’s own  signature. What  the  contents  of an election  petition  shall  be  is enumerated  in  Section  83.  It  must  contain  a   concise statement  of material facts on which the petitioner  relies but where a petition is founded on the allegation of corrupt practice, it shall set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice  alleged  by the petitioner, including  as  full  a statement as possible of the names of the parties  who  have indulged in such corrupt practice together with the date and place  of the commission thereof. Such an election  petition as well as every schedule or annexure thereto must be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner provided by the Code for the verification of pleadings. But, in cases  where the  petitioner  has alleged corrupt practice  that  is  not

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enough,  the  proviso  demands that the  petition  shall  be accompanied   by  an  affidavit  in  the   prescribed   from supporting  the allegation of such corrupt practice and  the particulars thereof. Therefore, an election                                                        773 petition  in which corrupt practice is alleged stands  on  a different  footing from an election petition which does  not carry such an allegation. The legislature has taken  special care to ensure that ordinary verification will not  suffice, it must be supported by an affidavit in the prescribed form. Form 25 has been prescribed for such an affidavit under rule 91A of the Rules. That rule says that the affidavit referred to in the proviso to Section 83(1) shall be in Form 25.  The form  of the affidavit requires the deponent to state  which of  the  paragraphs   of  the  election  petition  in  which allegations  of corrupt practice are made are based  on  his own  knowledge  and  which are based  on  this  information. Section  86(1)  then mandates that the  High  Court  ‘shall’ dismiss an election petition which does not comply with  the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the R.P.  Act.  The  language  of  this  sub-section  is   quite imperative   and  commands the High Court, in  no  uncertain terms, to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with  the  requirements  section  81  or  section  82.  This mandate  is, however, qualified by sub-section (5)  referred to earlier.     Election of a returned candidate can be rendered void on proof  of the alleged corrupt practice. In addition  thereto he  would  incur a subsequent  disqualification  also.  This harshness is essential if we want our democratic process  to be  clean,  free and fair. Eradication of  corrupt  practice from  our democratic process is essential if we  want it  to thrive  and  remain  healthy. Our  democratic  process  will collapse  if  unhealthy corrupt practices  like  appeals  to voters on basis of caste, creed, community, religion,  race, language, etc., are allowed to go unchecked and  unpunished. Use  of corrupt practices in elections to secure short  term gains  at the cost of purity of our democratic process  must be  frowned  at by every right thinking citizen. It  is  for that reason that the law has provided for double jeopardy to deter candidates, their agents and others from indulging  in such  nefarious  practices. But while  there  is  sufficient justification for the law to be harsh with those who indulge in  such  practices, there is also the need to  ensure  that such allegations are made with a sense of responsibility and concern and not merely to vex the returned candidate. It  is this in view that the law envisages that the particulars  of such allegations shall be set out fully disclosing the  name of the party responsible for the same and the date and place of  its  commission. A simple  verification  was  considered insufficient  and, therefore, the need for an  affidavit  in the  prescribed  form.  These  procedural  precautions   are intended to ensure that the person making the allegation  of corrupt practice realises the seriousness thereof as such  a charge  would be akin to a criminal charge since  it  visits the  party  indulging  in  such  practice  with  a  two-fold penalty. That                                                        774 is  why this Court described it as quasi-criminal in  nature in Manphul Singh v. Surinder Singh, [1973] 2 SCC 599 at  608 and reiterated the same in K.M. Mani v. P.J. Antony,  [1979] 1 SCR 701. Hence the insistence that each ingredient of  the charge  must  be satisfactorily proved before a  verdict  of guilt  is recorded by the Court. In Mani’s case  this  Court held  that  the  allegations  must  be  established   beyond

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reasonable  doubt  and  not merely  by  a  preponderance  of probability.  It is, therefore,  equally essential that  the particulars  of  the charge or allegation  are  clearly  and precisely stated in the  election petition to afford a  fair opportunity  to  the person against whom it  is  leveled  to effectively  counter the same.     The  law  in regard to the adjudication of  an  election dispute  has been set out, as stated earlier, in Part VI  of the  R.P.  Act, the provisions whereof  constitute  a  self- contained Code.  Therefore, an election petition calling  in question  the election of a returned candidate must be  made in  accordance  with  the provisions of  this  part  of  the statute.   Under  the provisions of this  part  an  election petition  calling  in question the election  of  a  returned candidate  must  be founded on one or more  of  the  grounds specified  in  Sections 100 and 101 for any of  the  reliefs specified  in  Section 84 thereof.   Section  100  specifies several  grounds, one of them being commission of a  corrupt practice  by  the  returned  candidate.   Section   83(1)(a) stipulates  that  every election petition  shall  contain  a concise  statement  of  the "material facts"  on  which  the petitioner  relies.  That means the entire bundle  of  facts which  would constitute a complete cause of action  must  be concisely stated in an election petition.  Section  83(1)(b) next  requires  an  election petitioner to  set  forth  full ’particulars’  of  any corrupt practice  alleged  against  a returned  candidate.   These  ’particulars’  are   obviously different from the ’material facts’ on which the petition is founded and are intended to afford to the returned candidate an  adequate  opportunity to effectively meet with  such  an allegation.   The underlying idea in requiring the  election petitioner  to set out in a concise manner all the  ’material facts’  as well as the ’full particulars’, where  commission of  corrupt practice is complained of, is to  delineate  the scope,  ambit and limits of the inquiry at the trial of  the election petition.      Before the amendment of the R.P. Act by Act 27 of 1956, section  83(3)  provided  for an amendment  of  an  election petition  insofar as ’particulars’ of corrupt practice  were concerned.   By  the  1956  amendment  this  provision   was replaced  by Section 90(5) which in turn came to be  deleted and  transferred  as sub-section (5) of section  86  by  the Amendment  Act  47 of 1966.  Section 86(5) as  it  presently stands                                                        775 empowers  the High Court to allow the ‘particulars’  of  any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to or amplified the amendment does not have the effect of widening the scope  of the  election petition by introducing particulars in  regard to  a  corrupt practice not previously  alleged  or  pleaded within  the period of limitation in the  election  petition. In other words the amendment or amplification must relate to particle already pleaded and must not be an effort to expand the   scope  of  the  inquiry  by  introducing   particulars regarding a different corrupt practice not earlier  pleaded. Only  the particulars of that corrupt practice of which  the germ  exists  in  the election petition can  be  amended  or amplified and there can be no question of introducing a  new corrupt  practice.  It is significant to note  that  section 86(5) permits ‘particulars’ of any corrupt practice ‘alleged in  the  petition’ to be amended or amplified  and  not  the ‘material facts’.  It is, therefore, clear from the  trinity of clauses (a) and (b) of 83 and section sub-section (5)  of section  86  that there is a distinction  between  ‘material facts’ referred to in clause (a) and ‘particulars’  referred

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to  in  clause  (b) and what Section 86(5)  permits  is  the amendment/amplification   of the latter and not the  former. Thus  the  power of amendment granted by  section  86(5)  is relatable to clause (b) of section 83(1) and is coupled with a  prohibition, namely, the amendment will not relate  to  a corrupt  practice  not  already  pleaded  in  the   election petition.   The  power  is not relatable to  clause  (a)  of section  83(1)  as  the  plain  language  of  section  86(5) confines  itself to the amendments of ‘particulars’  of  any corrupt practice alleged in the petition and does not extent to  ‘material  facts’.  This becomes crystal  clear  on  the plain  words  of the closely connected  trinity  of  Section 83(1)(a),  83(1)(b)  and  86(5) and  is  also  supported  by authority.   See Samant N. Balkrishna v.  George  Fernandez, [1969]  3 SCR 603 and D.P. Mishra v. Kamal  Narayan  Sharma, [1971] 1 SCR 8. In Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, [1969] 22 ELR  723  this  Court held that it full  particulars  of  an alleged corrupt practice are not supplied, the proper course would  be to give an opportunity to the petitioner  to  cure the defect and if he fails to avail of that opportunity that part  of  the charge may be struck down.  We  may,  however, hasten  to add that once the amendment sought  falls  within the  purview  of  section 86(5), the High  Court  should  be liberal  in  allowing  the same unless,  in  the  facts  and circumstances  of  the case, the Court finds it  unjust  and prejudicial  to the opposite party to allow the same.   Such prejudice   must,  however,  be  distinguished   from   mere inconvenience,  vide Raj Narain v. Indira Gandhi,  [1972]  3 SCR  841.  This much for the provisions of section  83(1)(a) and (b) and section 86(5) of the R.P. Act.                                                        776      The  brings  us  to clause (c) of  sub-section  (1)  of section  83, which provides that an election petition  shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner  laid down  by  the Code for the verification  of  the  pleadings. Under section 83(2) any schedule or annexure to the pleading must be similarly verified.  Order 6 Rule 15 is the relevant provision in the Code. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 says that the person  verifying  shall  specify  with  reference  to   the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies on his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.  The verification must be signed by the  person  making it and must state the date  on  and  the place   at  which  it  was  singed.   The  defect   in   the verification  can  be (i) of a formal natural and  not  very substantial  (ii) one which substantially complies with  the requirements and (iii) that which is material but capable of being  cured.   It  must be remembered that  the  object  of requiring verification of an election petition is clearly to fix the responsibility for the averments and allegations  in the  petition on the person signing the verification and  at the   same   time  discouraging   wild   and   irresponsible allegations  unsupported by facts.   Then comes the  proviso which  provides  that  in cases where  corrupt  practice  is alleged  in  the  petition,  the  petition  shall  also   be supported  by an affidavit in the prescribed form i.e.  From No.  25  prescribed by Rule 94A of the Rules.   Lastly  sub- section  (2)  of section 83 lays down that any  schedule  or annexure to the petition shall also be similarly signed  and verified.   Two question arise: (i) what is the  consequence of a a defective or incomplete verification and (ii) what is the consequence of a defective affidavit?  It was also  said that  the  verification  clause in regard  to  averments  or allegations  based  on  information ought  to  disclose  the source of information which had not been done in this case.

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    It  must at the outset be realised that  section  86(1) which  lays   down that the High court  ‘shall’  dismiss  an election petition which does not comply with the  provisions of section 81 or section 8 or section 117 does not in  terms refer  to section 83.   It would, therefore, seem  that  the legislature   did  not  view  the  non-compliance   of   the requirement  of section 83 with the same gravity as  in  the case  of  sections 81, 82 or 117.  But it was  said  that  a petition   which   does  not  strictly   comply   with   the requirements of section 83 cannot be said to be an  election petition  within the contemplation of section 81  and  hence section 86(1) was clearly attracted.  In Murrka Redhey Shyam v.  Roop Singh Rathore, [1964] 3 SCR 573 one of the  defects pointed out was that though the verification stated that the averments  made  in some of the paragraphs of  the  petition were  true to the personal knowledge of the  petitioner  and the averments in in some other paragraphs were verified                                                        777 to be true on advice and information received from legal and other sources, the petitioner did not in so may words  state that the advice and information received was believed by him to be true.  The Election Tribunal held that this defect was a  matter which came within section 83(1)(c) and the  defect could  be  cured in accordance with the  principles  of  the Code.  This Court upheld this view in the following words:          "It  seems  clear to us that reading  the  relevant          sections in Part VI of the Act, it is impossible to          accept the contention that a defect in verification          which is to be made in the manner laid down in  the          Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification          of  pleadings as required by cl. (c) of sub-s.  (1)          of  s.  83 is fatal to the maintainability  of  the          petition." It  is thus clear from this decision which is binding on  us that  mere  defect  in  the  verification  of  the  election petition is not fatal to the maintainability of the petition and the petition cannot be thrown out solely on that ground. As  observed  earlier since section 83 is not one  of  three provisions mentioned in section 86(1), ordinarily it  cannot be construed as mandatory unless it is shown to an  integral part of the petition under section 81.      The proviso to section 83(1) was inserted by section 18 of  Amendment  Act 40 of 1961.  It is  attracted  where  the petitioner  alleges any corrupt practice.  In that case  the election petition must be accompanied by an affidavit  inthe prescribed form i.e.  Form No. 25. The affidavit is intended to  support  the  allegation of  corrupt  practice  and  the particulars thereof pleaded in the election petition.  Order 19  Rule 3 of the  Code provides that affidavits  should  be confined  to such facts as the deponent is able on  his  own knowledge to prove.  Here again the submission was that  the affidavit to be sworn in Form No. 25 prescribed by Rule  94A must be sworn consistently with Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code. The  submission,  therefore,  was that  the  affidavit  must disclose the source of information for otherwise it will  be no affidavit at all.  In this connection reliance is  placed on  the  decision  of  this Court  in  State  of  Bombay  v. Purushottam  Jog  Naik, [1952] SCR 674 wherein at  page  681 this  Court  while  dealing with  the  verification  of  the affidavit  of  the  Home Secretary observed  that  when  the matter  deposed  to is not based on personal  knowledge  the source of information should be clearly disclosed.  Again in The Barium Chemicals Ltd. v.  The Company Law Board,  [1966] Supp.  SCR 311 Shelat, J. at page 352 reiterated that  where allegations  of  mala  fides are not  grounded  on  personal

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knowledge but only on ‘reason to believe’, the source of                                                        778 information must invariably be disclosed.  Same was the view expressed  in  the case of K.K. Nambiar v. Union  of  India, [1970] 3 SCR 121 at 125.  Based on the law laid down in  the aforesaid three cases the learned counsel for the appellants submitted  that  an affidavit which on its to  disclose  the source  of  information has no efficacy in law and  is   not worth  the  paper  on which it is written,  more  so  in  an election  petition alleging corrupt practice, for  otherwise it  will  fail to achieve the purpose, namely,  to  give  an opportunity  to  the  returned  candidate  to  counter   the allegation.  According to the learned counsel, the affidavit contemplated by the proviso to section 83(1) is intended  to be  an  integral part of the petition under section  81  and failure  to  comply with the requirement of  disclosing  the source of information renders the petition liable to summary dismissal under section 8(1) of the  R.P. Act. Reliance  was placed  on Jadav Gilua v. Suraj Narain Jha, AIR 1974   Patna 207;  M/s  Sunder Industries Ltd. v. G.E.  Works,  AIR  1982 Delhi  220; K.K. Ramachandran, AIR 1988 Kerala 259;  Kamalam v. Dr. syed Mohamad, [1978] 3 SCR 446 and M/s Sukhwinder Pal v.  State  of Punjab, [1982] 1 SCC 31,  which  support  this view.      In  the  case  of Murarka  Radhey  Shyam,  (supra)  two election  petitions were filed challenging his  election  to the  House  of the People.  In those two  petitions  certain preliminary   objections   were  raised  touching   on   the maintainability  of the petitions on the ground  that  there was failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the R.P.  Act.  One of the preliminary objections with which  we are  presently concerned was non-compliance with section  83 inasmuch  as the affidavit in respect of  corrupt  practices which accompanied the petition was neither properly made nor in the prescribed form.  The further submission was that  an election  petition  under section 81 must  comply  with  the requirements  of  section  83 for  otherwise  it  cannot  be rightly  described as an election petition under section  81 of the R.P. Act.  This Court referred to the observation  of the Election Tribunal, which  reads as under:          "The   verification   of  the  affidavit   of   the          petitioner is apparently not in the prescribed form          but reading as a whole the verification carries the          same  sense as intended by the words  mentioned  in          the  prescribed  form.  The mistake  of  the  Oaths          Commissioner in verifying the affidavit cannot be a          sufficient ground for dismissal of the petitioner’s          petition summarily, as the provisions of s. 83  are          not  necessarily  to be complied with in  order  to          make a petition valid and such                                                        779          affidavit  can  be allowed to be filed at  a  later          stage also." and  expressed its agreement therewith.  It also  held  that the defect in the time and place of verification cannot be a fatal defect and can be remedied.      In  Virendra  Kumar Saklecha v.  Jagjiwan  and  Others, [1972] SCR 955 Rule 7 of the M.P. High Court Rules  Provided that  every affidavit should cleraly express how much  is  a statement  and  declaration from knowledge and how  much  is based  on  information  or belief and must  also  state  the source  of information or belief.  This Court held that  the requirements  of  Form 25 were not consistent  with  Rule  7 which purported to give effect of Order 19 of the Code.   In that  case the affidavit accompanying the petition  did  not

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disclose  the  source of information in respect  of  certain speeches  alleged to have been made by the  appellant  which constituted  corrupt  practice nor were  the  notes  thereof allegedly  made  by certain persons therewith.   This  Court while  stating  that  it was not necessary  to  express  any opinion  on the question whether the non-disclosure  of  the source  or ground of information in the affidavit can  prove fatal, nevertheless observed that the grounds or sources  of information  are  required  to be stated  since  section  83 states  that an election petition shall be verified  in  the manner  laid down by the Code and affidavit was,  therefore, required to be modelled as required by Order 19 of the Code. This  decision is not an authority for the proposition  that failure  to  disclose the source or  ground  of  information would  result  in dismissal of the  petition  under  section 86(1) of the R.P. Act.      In  Krishan  Chand  v. Ram Lal, [1973] 2  SCC  759  the appellant,  a  voter questioned Ram Lal’s  election  on  the allegation that he, his election agent and some others  with his consent, had committed various acts of corrupt practices detailed  in  paragraphs  11 and 12 of  the  petition.   The petition  was verified by the appellant and was  accompanied by an affidavit wherein he stated that paragaphs 11 12  were based on information received and believed to be true.   The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the  petition was  liable  to  be dismissed for  non-compliance  with  the provisions of the R.P. Act read with the Code as the sources of  information  were  not disclosed.  In  support  of  this contention  reliance  was placed on the  decisions  rendered under  Order  6  Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 2  of  the  Code. Dealing  with  this  submission,  this  Court  observed   in paragraph 6 of the judgment as under:                                                        780          "At the outset it may be stated that the  provision          for  setting out the sources of  information  where          the  allegations have been verified as having  been          made on information and knowledge of the petitioner          is  not a requisite prescribed under Rule  94-A  of          the  Conduct  of Election Rules,  1961,  which  are          applicable  to the filing of an election  petition.          Under  sub-section  (1) of Section 83  an  election          petition has to contain a concise statement of  the          material  facts on which the petitioner relies;  it          has  to set forth full particulars of  any  corrupt          practice that the petitioner alleges, including  as          full  a statement as possible of the names  of  the          parties  alleged  to have  committed  such  corrupt          practice  and the date and place of the  commission          of  each such practice and shall be signed  by  the          petitioner  and  verified in the manner  laid  down          in  the  Code  of Civil Procedure,  1908,  for  the          verification of the pleadings, provided that  where          the  petitioner alleges any corrupt  practice,  the          petition shall also be accompanied by an  affidavit          in the prescribed form in support of the allegation          of  such  corrupt  practice  and  the   particulars          thereof." Setting  out Form 25 prescribed under Rule 94A,  this  Court proceeded to further observe:          "There  is nothing in this form which requires  the          petitioner to state under clause (b) of Form 25 the          source   or  sources  of  his   information.    The          appellant  has referred us to Order XI, Rule 13  of          the Supreme Court Rules as also to Rule 1(A) of the          Punjab   High  Court  Rules,  in  which  when   the

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        deponent  in the affidavit filed in support of  the          petition states that he has made the allegations in          the   paragraph   or   paragraphs   specified    on          information,  he is required also to  disclose  the          sources   of  information.   But  when  there   are          specific rules made under the Act which govern  the          election petitions, no other rules are  applicable.          Nor is the disclosure of the source of  information          a  requisite under Order VI, Rule 15(2) C.P.C.   On          this  ground alone the submission of the  appellant          can be rejected." Thus  this  Court came to the conclusion that  the  election petition under section 83(1)(b) must itself contain all  the necessary material facts and in the affidavit in support the petitioner  is required to say which of the allegations  are based on personal knowledge and which are based on                                                        781 information received and believed to be true.  If the source of  information has not been set out and the opposite  party finds  it  difficult  to answer  the  allegations  regarding corrupt   practice,   he  can  always   apply   for   better particulars.   In  other words the failure  to  disclose  or divulge  the source of information was not considered  fatal to the petition.  This Court, therefore, concluded that  the election  petition  did not suffer from any defect  on  that score.      Similar  was  the  view taken by this Court  in  Z.  B. Bukhari  v. Brij Mohan, [1975] Suppl. SCR 281 while  dealing with  the  contention that the affidavit in support  of  the election petition founded on allegations of corrupt practice falling  under sub-section (3) and (3A) of section  123  was not  in  proper form.  Repelling this contention  the  Court held that a petition can only be dismissed for a substantial defect.   In taking this view reliance was placed on  Prabhu Narayan  v. A.K. Srivastava, [1975] 3 SCR 552  wherein  this Court had negatived the contention that failure to  disclose the  sources  of  information  would  render  the  affidavit defective.      However,  strong  reliance was placed on  this  Court’s decision  in Kamalam v. Dr. Syed Mohamad, [1978] 3 SCR  446. In that case the respondent’s election to the Lok Sabha  was challenged alleging corrupt practice.  The election petition was  duly  signed  and verified by  the  appellant  and  was accompanied  by  the requisite affidavit in support  of  the allegations of corrupt practice and their particulars.   The election petition and the affidavit were tied together as on document.  The appellant’s signature appeared at the foot of the affidavit but there was no such signature at the foot of the  election  petition itself.  In this backdrop  of  facts this  Court  held that both the election  petition  and  the affidavit constituted one single document.  This Court after referring to section 81(3), 83 and 86(1) observed as under:          "The  context in which the proviso  occurs  clearly          suggests  that  the  affidavit is  intended  to  be          regarded   as  part  of  the   election   petition.          Otherwise,  it need not have been introduced  in  a          section  dealing  with  contents  of  an   election          petition nor figured as a proviso to a  sub-section          which  lays down what shall be the contents  of  an          election petition.  Sub-section (2) also by analogy          supports  this  inference.  It  provides  that  any          schedule or annexure to an election petition  shall          be  signed  by the petitioner and verified  in  the          same  manner  as an election petition.  It  is  now          established  by  the  decision  of  this  Court  in

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        Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram                                                        782          Singh Aharwar, [1968] 3 SCR 13 that sub-section (2)          applied only to a schedule or annexure which is  an          integral part of the election petition and not to a          schedule  or annexure which is merely  evidence  in          the  case  but  which is annexed  to  the  election          petition merely for the sake of adding strength  to          it." After  quoting  from the decision in  Sahodrabai’s  case  at pages 19-20, this Court proceeded to state:          "It would, therefore, be seen that if a schedule or          annexure  is  an  integral  part  of  the  election          petition,  it must be signed by the petitioner  and          verified,  since  it  forms part  of  the  election          petition.  The subject-matter of sub-section (2) is          thus  a  schedule or annexure forming part  of  the          election petition and hence it is placed in section          83  which  deals  with  contents  of  an   election          petition.  Similarly, and for the same reasons, the          affidavit referred to in the provisos to Section 83          sub-section  (1)  also forms part of  the  election          petition.   The election petition is in  truth  and          reality  reality  one document  consisting  of  two          parts,  one being the election petition proper  and          the  other being the affidavit referred to  in  the          proviso  to section 83, sub-section (1).  The  copy          of the election petition required to be filed under          the  first part of sub-section (3) of  section  81,          would,  therefore,  on  a  fair  reading  of   that          provision along with section 83, include a copy  of          the affidavit." The  above  observations have, however, to be  read  in  the context  on the controversy before the Court.   The  dispute between  the  parties was limited to the fulfilment  of  the last part of section 81(3), viz., the requirement that every such   copy of the election petition ‘shall be  attested  by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy  of the  petition’.   As pointed out earlier it was found  as  a fact  that  the signature was at the foot of  the  affidavit tied  to  the petition and not at the foot of  the  petition itself.   The Court, therefore, came to the conclusion  that since  the  affidavit constituted an integral  part  of  the election  petition,  the requirement of the latter  part  of section 81(3) was satisfied.  The decision clearly turned on the special facts of that case.      From  the text of the relevant provisions of  the  R.P. Act,  Rule  94A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule  15  and Order 19 Rule 3 of the                                                        783 Code  and  the  resume of the case law  discussed  above  it clearly  emerges  (i) a defect in the verification, if  any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the  verification clause  at  the  foot  of  the  petition  or  the  affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of  information  in regard to the averments  or  allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii)  if the  respondent desire better particulars in regard to  such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in  which case  the petitioner may be required to supply the same  and (iv)  the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form  25 can  be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral art  of the  petition, in which case the defect concerning  material facts  will  have to be dealt with, subject  to  limitation, under  section  81(3) as indicated earlier.   Similarly  the

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Court  would have to decide in each individual case  whether the  schedule  or  annexure referred  to  in  section  83(2) constitutes  an  integral part of the election  petition  or not; different considerations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter.      A  charge  of corrupt practice  has  a  two-dimensional effect;  its  impact  on the returned candidate  has  to  be viewed  from  the point of view of  the  candidate’s  future political and public life and from the point of view of  the electorate  to  ensure the purity of the  election  process. There  can, therefore, be no doubt that such  an  allegation involving corrupt practice must be viewed very seriously and the   High   Court  should  ensure   compliance   with   the requirements  of section 83 before the parties go to  trial. This  is quite clear from the observations of this Court  in the  case  of K.M. Mani v. P.J. Anthony, [1979] 1  SCR  701. While  defective verification or a defective  affidavit  may not  be fatal, the High Court should ensure  its  compliance before the parties go to trial so that the party required to meet  the  charge  is not taken by surprise  at  the  actual trial.   It  must also be realised that delay  in  complying with the requirements of section 83 read with the provisions of  the  Code  or the omission to disclose  the  grounds  or sources  of information, though not fatal, would  waken  the probative  value  of  the evidence ultimately  lead  at  the actual trial.  Therefore, an election petitioner can  afford to  overlook  the  requirements of section  83  on  pain  of weakening the evidence that he may ultimately tender at  the actual  trial of the election petition.  That is because  as held in Mani’s case the charge of corrupt practice has to be proved   beyond   reasonable  doubt  and   not   merely   by preponderance  of  probabilities.   Allegation  of   corrupt practice  being  quasi-criminal in nature,  the  failure  to supply full particulars at the earliest point of time and to disclose  the  source of information promptly  may  have  an adverse bearing on the probative value to be                                                        784 attached  to the evidence tendered in proof thereof  at  the trial.   Therefore,  even  though  ordinarily  a   defective verification  can be cured and the failure to  disclose  the grounds or sources of information may not be fatal,  failure to place them on record with promptitude may lead the  court in  a  given  case to doubt the  veracity  of  the  evidence ultimately  tendered.   If, however, the  affidavit  or  the schedule or annexure forms an integral part of the  election petition itself, strict compliance would be insisted upon.      The next objection is based on the language of  section 81 of the R.P. Act. This section deals with the presentation of an election petition.  Sub-section (1) thereof says  that an  election petition may be presented by any  candidate  at such  election or any elector within 45 days from,  but  not earlier  than,  the  date of the election  of  the  returned candidate  or if there are more than one returned  candidate at  the  election  and  the  dates  of  their  election  are different,  the  late  of  those  dates.   This  sub-section specifies  on  what ground or grounds the  election  of  the returned candidate can be challenged, who can challenge  the election and imposes a period of limitation for filing sucha petition.   Sub-section (2) of this section was  omitted  by Act 47 of 1966.  Then comes sub-section (3) which stipulates that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies  thereof  as there are respondents mentioned  in  the petition,  and  every  such copy shall be  attested  by  the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of  the petition.    This  sub-section enjoins (i)  supply  of  such

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number of copies of the petition as are respondents and (ii) every such copy must be attested by the petitioner under his own  signature to be a true copy of the petition.  There  is no  controversy regarding the first aspect, the  controversy centres round the second part.  It must the remembered  that non-compliance  with the requirement of sub-section  (1)  or (3)  of section 81 can prove fatal in view of section  86(1) of the R.P. Act. See Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram, [1974] 4 SCC 237;  M.  Karunanidhi v. Dr. H.V. Hande, [1983] 2  SCC  473; Mithilesh  Kumar  Pandey V. Baidyanath Yadav, [1984]  2  SCR 278; Rajender Singh v. Usha Rani, [1984] 3 SCC 339 and  U.S. Sasidharan v. K. Karunakaran, [1989] 4 SCC 482. It is  quite obvious  from  these  decisions  that  the  requirements  of section 81(3) are mandatory and failure to comply with  them would render the petition liable to summary dismissal  under section 86(1) of the R.P. Act.      The  objection raised in the context of section  81  is that the election petition in every case is a mere photocopy prepared  from  a  typed one and the copy  of  the  election petition served on the returned candi-                                                        785 date in each case was not duly attested to be a true copy of the  original  as required by section 81(3)  and  hence  the petition was liable to be  dismissed in limine under section 86(1)  of the R.P. Act. Section 81(1) does not  debar  photo copying but Rule 1 of the Rules says that is shall be "type- written  or  printed".  There is not dispute  that  a  model election  petition  was prepared and got  typed  and  prints thereof  were  taken  out by the  process  of  photocopying. These  prints were used both as original election  petitions as  well  as  copies.  The particulars  in  regard  to  each petition,  e.g.,  the  names  of  the  parties,  the  voting pattern,  the towns and villages where utterances  amounting to corrupt practice were made, etc., were filled in and  the court  fee  was fixed on one of them which  constituted  the original and photocopies thereof were filed before the Stamp Reporter  in  accordance  with  the  Rules.   The  photocopy bearing the court fee stamps was indisputably signed by  the election petitioner and was presented with sufficient copies to  the Stamp Reporter.  The original election petition  is, therefore, a photocopy of the typed model and the copies are also  photocopies  prepared  from  the  original   petition. Evidently the underlying idea in providing that the election petition shall be type-written or printed is to ensure  that the  document  is legible.  There is no complaint  that  the document  which is admitted as an election petition and  the copies  thereof  are  not  legible.  It that  be  so  it  is difficult  to  appreciate the objection that  the  photocopy should  not  be treated as an original petition even  if  it otherwise  complies with the requirement of law.   The  High Court was, therefore, justified in treating the same as  the original election petition.      The next objection raised by the appellants is that the copy  of  the  petition served on each one of  them  is  not attested  to  be  a true copy of the  original  petition  as required by section 81(3) of the R.P. Act and Rule 1 of  the Rules.   Each copy is attested as ‘certified true copy’  and the  petitioner  has put his  signature  thereunder.   This, contend  the appellants, is not in conformity  with  section 81(3)  and,  therefore,  it is obvious  that  the  mandatory requirement of section 81(3) read with section 86(1) is  not satisfied.   On a plain reading of section 81(3)  it  become clear  that  the requirement of that provision  is  (i)  the election  petition should be accompanied by as  many  copies thereof  as there are respondents mentioned in the  petition

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and (ii) every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under  his own signature to be a true copy of the  petition. There is no dispute in regard to the compliance of the first part.  So far as the second part is concerned, all that  the section requires is that the copy should be attested by  the petitioner  to be a true copy of the petition under his  own signature.  The requirement of this part of the provision is met by each copy having been signed at the                                                        786 foot thereof by the concerned petitioner.  What is essential is  that the petitioner must take the responsibility of  the copy being a true copy of the original petition and sign  in token  thereof.   No  particular  form  of  attestation   is prescribed;  all  that the sub-section enjoins is  that  the petitioner  must attest the copy under his own signature  to be  a true copy of the petition.  By certifying the same  as true copy and by putting his signature at the foot  thereof, the  petitioner  of  each  election  petition  had   clearly complied with the letter and spirit of section 81(3) of  the R.P.  Act.  In  fact  in  Ch.  Subba  Rao  v.  Member.  E.T. Hyderabad, [1969] 6 SCR 213 which was followed in  Kamalam’s case  (supra)  this Court had accepted  the  mere  signature without  the  words like true copy,  sufficient  attestation under  section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. We are, therefore,  in agreement  with the finding recorded in this behalf  by  the High Court.      The next grievance of the appellants is that they  were not  served  with  a  true copy  of  the  election  petition inasmuch  as  the annexures served therewith were  not  true copies  of the original.  Section 83(2) lays down  that  any schedule or annexure to the petition shall be signed by  the petitioner  and verified in the same manner as  a  petition. The  grievance  under  this head is not  that  there  is  no compliance  with section 83(2) but that the  annexure  which was an integral part of the election petition was not a true copy of the original, inasmuch as certain pages found in the annexure  produced with the petition were missing  from  the copies  supplied to the returned candidates/appellants.   It was strongly submitted that an annexure which is an integral part  of  the election petition is an  important  and  vital document  and failure to supply a true copy thereof  clearly violates  the  mandatory requirement of  section  81(3)  and renders  the  petition liable to be dismissed by  virtue  of section  86(1) of the R.P. Act. As held in Sahodrabai’  case (supra)  where  details  of averments  too  compendious  for inclusion  in  the petition are included inthe  schedule  or annexure,  the  schedule or annexure in that  case  must  be treated  as integrated with the election petition  and  must comply  with  the requirement of Section 83(2)  and  section 81(3)  failing  which the provision of section  86(1)  would stand  attracted.  But this does not apply to a schedule  or annexure which produces a document as evidence in support of the allegation in the election petition.  Such a schedule or annexure cannot be described as integrated with the election petition and defect in verification thereof would not  prove fatal.  In Sasidharan’s case (supra) the same principle  has been  reiterted.   In  the  case  the  election   petitioner referred  to  a  video  cassette  showing  progress  of  the constituency  which  also contained speeches  of  government servants. A copy                                                        787 of  the  document  was  not served  on  the  opposite  party alongwith the election petition.  It was held that the  said document formed part of the election petition and failure to supply  a copy thereof along with the election petition  was

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fatal.  If a document does not form an integral part of  the election petition but is merely referred to in the  petition of filed in the proceedings as evidence of any fact, failure to  supply a copy-thereof will not prove fatal.   Therefore, the maintainability of an election petition, in the  context of the point on hand will depend on whether the schedule  or annexure  to the petition constitutes an integral   part  of the election petition or not.  If it constitutes an integral part  it must satisfy the requirements of section 81(3)  and failure  in that behalf would be fatal.  But if it does  not constitute an integral part of the election petition, a copy thereof  need not be served along with the petition  to  the opposite  party.  Much would, therefore, depend  on  whether the  schedule  or  annexure  was an  integral  part  of  the election petition or not; if the former, failure to serve it along  with the petition to the returned candidate would  be fatal but not so in the latter case.  The appellants contend that it was an integral part of the election petition but the High Court didnt not go into this question; it solely relied on the Stamp Reporter’s report.  It then emphasised that  no defect  was noticed by the Stamp Reporter in  the  following words:          "The stamp reporter, in the instant case, found the          copies   in   order  and   made   his   endorsement          accordingly.  I do not find any reason not to  rely          upon the endorsement of the stamp reporter." Therefore, the criticism that the High Court which was  duty bound  to apply its mind and decide the question  judicially had  abdicated  in favour of the Stamp  Reporter’s  decision extracted  earlier.   We are afraid this  criticism  is  not wholly correct because the High Court has also observed that ‘no  specific  omission or deviation in the  copy  from  the original  was  pointed  out’  nor  was  it  shown  that  the respondents  were  misled  on that account.   We  have  also closely  scrutinised  the application made by  the  returned candidate  in  the  High  Court and  except  for  a  general allegation that the annexure served along with the  petition was  not  a  true copy, no  specific  allegation  is  found. However,  in the special leave petition filed in this  Court question  No.  (vi) states that certain pages  were  missing from  the  copy  of  the annexure  served  on  the  returned candidate.  Then in paragraph 11 it is averred that pages 15 and 16 of Annexure II were missing.  Since no such  specific allegation was made in the application filed by the returned candidate,  the High Court had no occasion to go  into  this allegation and to ascer-                                                        788 tain  if  the missing pages contained  material  forming  an integral  part of the election petition.  We would not  like to embark upon an inquiry in this behalf and would leave  it to  the appellants to agitate the question before  the  High Court.   We  would  request the High Court  to  examine  the contention  on  merits, if raised, and answer  the  same  in accordance with law.      Although we have come to the conclusion that the defect in  verification is not fatal and can be cured,  no  attempt has  been made by the election petitioners to cure the  same nor  has the High Court directed the petitioners to  do  so. By  way of a sample our attention was drawn to the  election petition No. 7 of 1989 which has given rise to Civil  Appeal No.  179  of  1991.  The said  petition  had  47  paragraphs besides  the prayer clause.  The verification  clause  shows that paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 18, 19, 28, 35, 30, 33, 36,  38, 41  to 47 of the election petition are on knowledge  whereas paragraphs  7 to 15, 20, to 24 , 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 37,  40

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and 41  are on information received and believed to be true. It will be seen from the above that paragraphs 3, 6, 16, 17, 25, 31 and 39 are not verified at all.  It was submitted  by counsel for the appellants that paragraph 3 contained  vital allegations  regarding  corrupt  practice  and  since   that paragraph  has  not been verified at all,  the  appellant is likely  to  be handicapped at the trial.  It  was  contended that  such was the position in as many as six  petitions  if not  more.   Further some of the paragraphs,  e.g.,  41  are verified  under  both  heads  of  the  verification  clause, thereby  causing  confusion.   In  the  affidavit  sworn  in compliance of the proviso to section 83(1) it is stated that particulars and details of corrupt practice are contained in paragraphs  4  to  40 of the election  petition.   Then  the petitioner  states   that  what he has  alleged  by  way  of corrupt practice in the election petition is correct ‘to the best  of my knowledge and to the information received  by  e and believed by me to be true’.  It is thus not clear  which allegation of corrupt practice is based on his knowledge and which information he believes to be true.  Besides when this affirmation  is compared with the verification clause of the election  petition,   the  confusion  is  worst  confounded. Similar is the case with the verification of the  annexures. There,  therefore, considerable force in the  submission  of the learned counsel for the appellants that even if the High Court concluded that the defect in  verification/affirmation was  not  fatal, the High Court ought to have  directed  the petitioners  to cure the defects within the time  stipulated by it so that the appellants would know the exact   position before  the  trial and would not be taken by  surprise.   We think  the High Court committed an error in failing to  give appropriate directions in the matter.  More or less  similar defects are                                                        789 also  found  in the verification/affirmation clause  in  the other  election petitions/affidavits. We  would,  therefore, request  the High Court to issue directions to the  election petitioner  of  each petition to remove the  defects  within such time as it may allow and if they or any of them fail to do  so, pass appropriate consequential orders in  accordance with law.      The  High  Court  has applied the  correct  test  while permitting  the  amendments.   The High  Court  has  rightly pointed out that the power conferred by section 86(5) cannot be  exercised  to allow and amendment which  will  have  the effect  of  introducing a corrupt  practice  not  previously alleged  in the petition.  If it is found that the  proposed amendments  are not in the nature of supplying   particulars but raise new grounds, the same must be rejected but if  the amendments  are sought for removing vagueness  by  confining the  allegations  to  the returned candidate  only  such  an amendment would fall within the parameters of section  86(5) of the R.P. Act. It was on this correct understanding of the legal position that the High Court scrutinised the amendment application.   It  was  not shown at the  hearing  of  these appeals that any particular averment introduced by way of an amendment  had  the  effect of  introducing  a  totally  new allegation of corrupt practice not previously pleaded in the election  petitions.  Yet, if the appellants can  point  out any inconsistency, the High Court will remove the same.      These were all the submissions made before us.  We have dealt  with  them in extenso and have  clarified  the  legal position.   We have suggested certain modifications  in  the impugned  orders and have indicated the course of action  to be adopted by the High Court.  We need not recapitulate  the

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modifications and the future course of action.  The impugned order of the High Court in each petition will stand modified to  the  extent it is inconsistent with the  legal  position explained hereinabove.  The High Court will pass appropriate orders  to  remove the inconsistencies.   The  appeals  will stand    allowed    only    to    the    extent    of    the modifications/directions made by this order with no order as to cost in each election petition. V.P.R.                                Appeals partly allowed.                                                        790