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CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil)  59 of 2001

PETITIONER: Exp. Publications(Madurai)Ltd.& Anr.             

RESPONDENT: Union of India & Anr.    

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/03/2004

BENCH: Y.K. Sabharwal & D.M. Dharmadhikari      

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

Y.K. Sabharwal, J.

       In this petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenge  is to the constitutionality of paragraph 80(2) of the Employees’ Provident Fund  Scheme, 1952.  The effect of the impugned paragraph is that the employees of  newspaper industry, for the purposes of provident fund scheme, do not fall in the  category of excluded employees despite their pay being above prescribed amount  as notified by Government of India from time to time.   In order to appreciate the question involved, it is necessary to examine  certain provisions of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous  Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, ’the PF Act’).         The PF Act was passed by the Parliament in the year 1952 to, inter alia,  provide for the institution of provident fund for employees in factories and other  establishments.  Sub-section (3) of Section 1, inter alia, provides that the Act  applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified  in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are employed and to any other  establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishments  which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,  specify in this behalf.  The expression "basic wages" is defined in Section 2(b) and  the expression "scheme" in Section 2(l).  ’Scheme’ means the Employees’  Provident Fund Scheme framed under Section 5 of the PF Act.  The Central  Government has been empowered to add to Schedule-I any other industry in  respect of the employees whereof it is of opinion that a provident fund scheme  should be framed under the Act and thereupon the industry so added shall be  deemed to be an industry specified in Schedule I for the purposes of the Act.   Section 5, inter alia, provides that the Central Government may, by notification in  the Official Gazette, frame a Scheme to be called the Employees’ Provident Fund  Scheme for the establishment of provident funds under the Act for employees or  for any class of employees and specify the establishments or class of  establishments to which the said Scheme shall apply and there shall be established  as soon as may be after the framing of the Scheme, a Fund in accordance with the  provisions of the Act and the Scheme.         In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the PF Act, the Central  Government framed the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 (for short, ’the  Scheme’).  The employees to whom the provisions of the Scheme and the Act  would not apply are defined as "excluded employee" in paragraph 2(f) of the  Scheme.  The said paragraph to the extent relevant for present purposes reads as  under : "2(f) ’excluded employee’ means\027 (i)     ...  (ii)   an employee whose pay at the time he is  otherwise entitled to become a member of the  Fund, exceeds six thousand and five hundred  rupees per month;                 Explanation.\027’Pay’ includes basic wages with

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dearness allowance, retaining allowance (if any)  and cash value of food concessions admissible  thereon;

       The income ceiling mentioned in paragraph 2(f)(ii) has been substituted and  suitably increased from time to time by issue of notification by the Central  Government having regard to the fall in money value and increase in wages.  The  ceiling of Rs.6,500/- per month was fixed by notification dated 4th May, 2001  w.e.f. 1st June, 2001.  Earlier to 1st June, 2001, it was Rs.5,000/- per month.   Originally, an employee whose pay exceeded Rs.300/- per month was placed into  the category of an ’excluded employee’.  In 1957, the pay ceiling was increased to  Rs.500/- per month; in 1962,it was increased from Rs.500/- to Rs.1,000/-; in 1976,  it was increased from 1,000/- to Rs.1,600/-; in 1985, it was increased from 1,600/-  to Rs.2,500/-; in 1990, it was increased from Rs.2,500/- to Rs.3,500/-, in 1994, it  was increased from Rs.3,500/- to Rs.5,000/-; and lastly to Rs.6,500/- in the year  2001.         In so far as the employees of the newspaper industries are concerned, they  have not been included in the category of ’excluded employee’ for the last more  than 47 years.  By notification dated 4th December, 1956 issued by the Central  Government, Chapter X was inserted in the scheme incorporating therein special  provisions in the case of newspaper establishments and newspaper employees.   Paragraph 80 thereof, substituted the definition of expression ’excluded employee’  in relation to its application to newspaper establishments and newspaper  employees.  The relevant part of Paragraph 80 reads as follows : "80. Special provisions in the case of newspaper  establishment and employees.\027The Scheme shall, in  its application to newspaper establishments and  newspaper employees, as defined in Section 2 of the  Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and  Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, come into force  on the 31st day of December, 1956 and be subject to  the modifications mentioned below: (1)     In Chapters I to IX, references to ’industry’,  ’factories’ and ’employees’ shall be construed  as references to ’newspaper industry’,  ’newspaper establishments’ and ’newspaper  employees’, respectively: (2)     ’excluded employee’ means,\027 (i)     an employee who, having been a member  of the Fund, has withdrawn the full  amount of his accumulations in the Fund  under clause (a) or (c) of sub-paragraph (1)  of paragraph 69; (ii)    an apprentice.                 Explanation.\027’Apprentice’ means a  person who, according to the standing  orders applicable to the newspaper  establishment concerned, is an apprentice  or who is declared to be an apprentice by  the authority specified in this behalf by the  appropriate Government."

The aforesaid paragraph came into force on 31st December, 1956.   Therefore, since the said date, instead of paragraph 2(f), the employees of the  newspaper establishments have a separate and distinct definition.  The effect of  definition as contained in the impugned paragraph 80(2) is that since 1956, the  income ceiling has not been applied to the employees of newspaper  establishments.  The result is that newspaper establishments and newspaper  employees do not come in the category of ’excluded employee’.  In other words,  irrespective of pay, all such employees are entitled to the benefit of the scheme.         The main attack of the petitioners to the constitutional validity of Paragraph  80(2) is that only in case of employees of newspaper industry, the test of income  has been excluded by keeping the newspaper establishments and employees as a  class apart which is wholly discriminatory.  There is no rationale or valid basis for

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artificially treating newspaper establishments and employees as a distinct class so  as to make them ineligible on the basis of income ceiling.  The impugned  definition of ’excluded employee’ in paragraph 80(2) suffers from the vice of  arbitrariness and offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India apart from  imposing a serious financial burden only on newspaper establishments.  According  to the petitioners, there is no valid basis to single out newspaper establishments for  additional burden.         The petitioners have tried to explain that though the impugned provision  came into effect in 1956, they tried to bear the burden with equanimity and with a  certain sense of rectitude but, with passage of years, there has been severe setback  to the newspaper industry in general and the petitioners’ organization in particular  and, therefore, this challenge at this stage.  In this regard, it has been pointed out  that the recent trends have witnessed a recession of several financial crises in  newspaper industry as a result of decline in their revenue from advertisements  because of diversion of advertisements to electronic media.  The inroads made by  Television is said to have taken the sheen off the print media.  In any case, delay  in such matters, when constitutional validity is in issue, cannot be of any  consequences, is the submission of Anil Dewan, Senior Advocate appearing for  the petitioners.  It has been further submitted that the mere fact that other  newspaper organizations have not challenged the impugned provision is also of no  consequence.         In order to appreciate the challenge in question, it is also necessary to  examine certain provisions of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper  Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (for  short, ’the Working Journalists Act’).         The Working Journalists Act was enacted to regulate certain conditions of  service of working Journalists and other persons employed in the newspaper  establishments.  "Newspaper Employee" means any working journalist, and  includes any other person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any  newspaper establishment [Sec.2(c)].  The expression ’newspaper establishment’ is  defined in Section 2(d).  The expression ’non-journalist newspaper employee’ is  defined in Section 2(dd).  The working journalists and those who are not  journalists but are employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any newspaper  establishment, are newspaper employees.  Chapter II of the Working Journalists  Act, inter alia, deals with conditions of service of working journalists,  incorporating therein special provisions in respect of certain cases of  retrenchment, payment of gratuity, hours of work, leave, fixation or revision of  rates of wages, constitution of a Wage Board, Tribunal etc.  Chapter IIA, inter alia,  provides for fixation or revision of rates of wages of non-journalist newspaper  employees, constitution of Wage Board for fixing or revising their rates of wages,  constitution of Tribunal etc.  Section 15 of the Working Journalists Act, inter alia,  stipulates that the PF Act, as in force for the time being, shall apply to every  newspaper establishment in which twenty or more persons are employed on any  day, as if such newspaper establishment were a factory to which the aforesaid Act  had been applied by a notification of the Central Government under sub-section  (3) of Section 1 thereof, and as if a newspaper employee were an employee within  the meaning of that Act.  The applicability of the PF Act to the employees of the  newspaper establishments is not in issue.  The issue here is about not subjecting  the employees of the newspaper establishments to income ceiling whereas  employees of all other establishments and industries to which the PF Act is  applicable, are subjected to income ceiling.   The Constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Working Journalists  Act was examined in the celebrated decision of the Constitution Bench in Express  Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors. [(1959) SCR  12], and one of the questions was about violation of equality clause.  We will  revert to the said decision a little later.         The contention is that the impugned provision which applies exclusively to  the employees of newspaper industry suffers from the vice of arbitrariness because  there is no rational or distinctive basis for culling out a separate class called  "newspaper establishment and newspaper employees" and to provide for a harsher  and more financially crippling measure by providing a special definition thereby  totally eliminating the income test.  There is no valid classification to split the  employers into newspaper organizations and non-newspaper organizations for  different and discriminatory treatment in the matter of Provident Fund  Contribution.  It has also been contended that as a matter of fact the extent of

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financial power  available to newspaper industry is much less than many other  industries like Steel, Heavy Engineering and other cash rich industries and if, at  all, there is a case for providing a lesser burden it is newspaper industry which  deserves it as a class.  Instead of that, a heavy burden has been imposed upon a  weaker section of the industries, viz., newspaper industry.  The petitioners have  also faintly suggested  violation of right of freedom of speech and expression as  guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) contending that in view of additional burden, it  becomes very difficult to maintain price line by keeping the price of the  newspaper at certain level without increasing it and even a marginal increase  would affect the number of readers, particularly, in a country like India with a  large number of economically weaker sections.  This reduction in the access of  newspapers to the members of the public is a matter that is fraught with serious  consequences because it not merely affects the fundamental rights of the  petitioners to disseminate the news freely but it also affects the right of the  members of the public to know, which is the essence of democracy.  The  contention is that any action which has effect of increasing the price of newspaper  has very serious ramifications.  It is claimed that the effect of the impugned  provision is to place additional financial burden which is hardly conducive to the  furtherance of the freedom of press and there is no warrant for providing harsh  special impositions which are not applicable to other business organizations.  The  continuation of such a definition year after year would result in petitioners’ totally  going out of business since the amount involved have become astronomical.         The stand of the respondent in brief is that having regard to various  considerations concerning newspaper establishments, the Government has  distinguished the said establishments from non-newspaper establishments.  The  impugned provision is a welfare legislation made for the welfare of the employees  of the newspaper establishments so as to cover a wider range of employees and  grant to them the benefit of the beneficial legislation.  Such a legislation is in  furtherance of the freedom of press enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the  Constitution of India.  The Journalist and the persons working in the newspaper  establishments form as much integral part of freedom of press as the establishment  itself and it is to promote and protect the journalist and other employees of  newspaper establishments who also form the bed rock of freedom of speech and  expression that the benefit of Provident Fund to even those who draw higher pay  has been extended.         Undoubtedly, the employees of the newspaper establishments are in a better  position than the employees of other establishments and industries since the  newspaper employees, without any income ceiling limit, are entitled to the  benefits the PF Act and the Scheme.  That has been the position for the last nearly  half a century.  On the other hand, right since inception of the PF Act, the benefit  of the Scheme has been denied to those employees who have more than specified  income.  The benefit has been extended to weaker sections of employees of other  establishments and industries and not to all sections.  The income ceiling has been  amended by notifications issued from time to time as already noticed.   The question for determination also is whether this benefit given to the  employees of newspaper industry in the year 1956 and continuing till date can be  challenged at this stage after lapse of so many years by only one of the newspaper  establishments in the country.   The principles under Article 14 of the Constitution are well settled. It is not  necessary to burden this judgment with various decisions on the subject of  arbitrariness and the classification, except to notice the principles laid In Re The  Special Courts Bill, 1978 [(1979) 1 SCC 381] as under :   "(5) By the process of classification, the State has the  power of determining who should be regarded as a  class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law  enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt,  in some degree is likely to produce some inequality;  but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of  well-defined classes, it is not open to the charge of  denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no  application to other persons. Classification thus means  segregation in classes which have a systematic  relation, usually found in common properties and  characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does  not mean herding together of certain persons and

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classes arbitrarily.  (6) The law can make and set apart the classes  according to the needs and exigencies of the society  and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even  degree of evil, but the classification should never be  arbitrary, or evasive.  (7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be  rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on  some qualities or characteristics which are to be found  in all the persons grouped together and not in others  who are left out but those qualities or characteristics  must have a reasonable relation to the object of the  legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions  must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification  must be founded on an intelligible differentia which  distinguishes those that are grouped together from  others and (2) that differentia must have a rational  relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.  (8) The differentia which is the basis of the  classification and the object of the Act are distinct  things and what is necessary is that there must be a  nexus between them. In short, while Article 14 forbids  class discrimination by conferring privileges a  imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected  out of a large number of other persons similarly  situated in relation to the privileges sought to be  conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it  does not forbid classification for the purpose of  legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary  in the sense above mentioned."

We will now examine other cases on which reliance has been placed by Mr.  Anil Dewan in support of challenge to the impugned provision.         Motor General Traders & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. [(1984)  1 SCC 222] has been relied in support of the contention that the mere fact that the  discrimination is allowed to be continued for a long time is not a ground to dispel  the attack and also that what may have been once a non-discriminatory piece of  legislation, in course of time, can become discriminatory.  Motor General  Traders’ case  is a case under Rent Laws where challenge was to the  constitutional validity of clause (b) of Section 32 of Andhra Pradesh Buildings  (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which exempts all buildings  constructed on and after 26th August, 1957 from the operation of the Act.  The  provision was enacted to provide an incentive to the house building activity to  meet the shortage of accommodation and encourage new constructions.  The effect  of the impugned provision was that the Act was not to apply to any building  constructed on and after 26th August, 1957.  Earlier, when the constitutionality of  the said provision was questioned before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the  ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution, the petition was dismissed by  the High Court [Chintapalli Achaiah v. P. Gopalakrishna Reddy [AIR 1966 AP  51] observing that the hardship caused to the tenants by the exemption given in the  case of buildings constructed after 26th August, 1957 was short-lived and the  concession should be tolerated for a short while.  This Court noticed that the  exemption had continued for more than a quarter of a century and the landlords  who earned their exemption under Section 32(b) had continued to enjoy for a long  number of years the freedom to indulge in malpractices which the Act intended to  check while others are governed by the Act.           In  view  of  Section  32(b) of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Act,  there  were to  sets of buildings in every area in which the Act applied \026 (1) those to which the  Act applied; and (2) those which are exempted under Section 32(b).  It was  noticed that the buildings to which the Act was applicable are aged more than 26  years and those to which it was not applicable are aged about 26 years or less.   During these 26 years from August 26, 1957, thousands of buildings may have  been constructed and all of them are continuing to enjoy the immunity from the  provisions of the Act.  It was contended in that case that the result was that there  were two class of landlords \026 one  class governed by the Act and the other not.  

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There were also two class of tenants as well \026 one having the protection of the  remedial provision of the Rent Act and the other not having such protection.  The  contention that was urged in support of challenge to the constitutional validity of  Section 32 (b) was that whatever may have been the position in the first few years,  after the Act was passed, there is no justification for continuing the exemption for  all time to come.  It was observed that the object of granting exemption was only  to provide an incentive to the building activity and also that even the State  Government was not quite satisfied with the existing law.  The question of  discrimination was determined having regard to these factors.  The  classification  of buildings for purposes of Section 32(b) was held not to have satisfied the true  tests of classification.  It was observed that while it may be that there is some  justification for exempting new buildings say which are five, seven or ten years  old from the Act, in order to provide an incentive to builders of new buildings,  there is hardly any justification to allow buildings which were constructed more  than ten years ago to remain outside the scope of the Act.  The landlords of such  buildings, it was noticed, must have realized a large part of investment made on  such buildings by way of rents during all these years.  The Court took into account  that owing to continuous influx of population into urban areas in recent years the  rates of rents have gone up everywhere and that the landlords of such buildings  have been able to take advantage of the situation created by the shortage of urban  housing accommodation which is now a universal phenomenon.  Under these  circumstances, it was held that there was no longer any need to continue the  exemption.  It was said that there cannot be any valid justification to apply the Act  to a building which was 27 years old and not to apply it in the case of a building  which is 26 years old.  It was held that the classification of buildings into two  classes for purposes of Section 32(b) of the Act, therefore, does not any longer  bear any relationship to the object, since the buildings which are exempted have  already come into existence and their owners have realised a major part of their  investment.         In Motor General Traders’ case, two answers were given to the contention  that since the impugned provision has been in existence for over 23 years and its  validity has once been upheld by the High Court, this Court should not pronounce  upon its validity at this late stage.  First, the very fact that nearly 23 years are over  from the date of enactment and the discrimination is allowed to be continued  unjustifiably for such a long time is a ground of attack pointing out that what  should have been just an incentive has become a permanent bonanza in favour of  those who constructed building subsequent to August 26, 1957; there being no  justification for the continuance of the benefit to a class of persons without any  rational basis whatsoever, the evil effects flowing from the impugned exemption  have caused more harm to the society than one could anticipate.  What was  justifiable during a short period has turned out to be a case of hostile  discrimination by lapse of nearly a quarter of century.  The second answer given  was that mere a lapse of time does not lend constitutionality to a provision which  is otherwise bad.   Rattan Arya & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. [(1986) 3 SCC 385]  again is a decision in which a provision of the Rent Act exempting from protection  of the Act residential buildings paying monthly rent exceeding Rs.400/- whereas  no such restriction was imposed in respect of tenants of non-residential buildings  was struck down being violative of Article 14, following the Motor General  Traders’ case (supra).   In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya & ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.  [(1998) 2 SCC 1] challenge was to the validity of certain provisions of the  Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 insofar the  same provided that the landlords cannot charge rent in excess of the standard rent.    It was held that there is considerable judicial authority for the proposition that with  the passage of time, a legislation which was justified when enacted may become  arbitrary and unreasonable with the change of circumstances.  A three Judge  Bench said that : "It is true that whenever a special provision, like the  Rent Control Act, is made for a section of the society it  may be at the cost of another section, but the making  of such a provision or enactment may be necessary in  the larger interest of the society as a whole but the  benefit which is given initially if continued results in  increasing injustice to one section of the society and an

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unwarranted largess or windfall to another, without  appropriate corresponding relief, then the continuation  of such a law which necessarily, or most likely, leads  to increase in lawlessness and undermines the  authority of the law can no longer be regarded as being  reasonable. Its continuance becomes arbitrary."

       None of the aforesaid decisions, in our view, have any applicability to the  case in hand for various reasons.  The aforesaid decisions were concerned with  validity of provisions which intended to grant only a temporary benefit having  regard to the prevailing conditions but were continued for long number of years  without review of change of conditions and as purpose had been achieved, the  provisions were held to be violative of equality clause.  Further, after coming to  the conclusion as above that the impugned provisions have become  discriminatory, this Court rejected the contention that since the provisions had  been unsuccessfully challenged earlier and held the field for a long time, the same  do not deserve to be invalidated.  In the present case it is not the contention that  only temporary relief was granted to the employees of the newspaper industry.   Apart from this, the employees of newspaper industry have always been treated as  a class apart, an aspect which we have dealt in later part of the judgment..   Moreover, the mere fact that the similar benefit even after lapse of about half a  century has not been given to the employees of other industries will not make the  benefit given to the newspaper industry discriminatory.  The principle that a  provision which may be constitutional when enacted may become unconstitutional  later due to changed scenario, has no applicability whatsoever to the present case.         Undoubtedly, the classification cannot be arbitrary.  It has to be rational and  must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved.  The  classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia.  There is no difficulty  in accepting these principles relied upon by Mr. Dewan.  The difficulties generally  do not arise in formation of principles under Article 14.  But at times, difficulties  do arise in the application of such principles to concrete cases.   We may also notice the aspect of long delay in laying challenge to the  validity of the impugned provisions. No hard and fast principle can be laid down  that under no circumstances delay would be a relevant consideration in judging  constitutional validity of a provision.  It has to be remembered that the  constitutional remedy under Article 32 is discretionary.  In one case, this Court  may decline discretionary relief if person aggrieved has slept over for long number  of years.  In another case, depending upon the nature of violation, court may  ignore delay and pronounce upon the invalidity of a provision.  It will depend  from case to case.  In Rabindra Nath Bose & Ors. . v. Union of India & Ors.  [(1970) 2 SCR 697], the extreme proposition that this court has no discretion and  cannot dismiss a petition under Article 32 on the ground that it has been brought  after inordinate delay, was not accepted by the Constitution Bench.  The plea to  reconsider law laid down in M/s.Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors.  v.  H.B.Munshi & Anr. [(1969) 1  SCC 110] did not succeed.  It was held that:  "But after carefully considering the matter, we are of  the view that no relief should be given to petitioners  who, without any reasonable explanation, approach  this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after  inordinate delay.  The highest Court in this land has  been given Original Jurisdiction to entertain petitions  under Article 32 of the Constitution.  It could not have  been the intention that this Court would go into stale  demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right.  So  it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the  intention of the Constitution makers that this Court  should discard all principles and grant relief in  petitions filed after inordinate delay."

In Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra  & Ors. [(1974) 1 SCC 317] on aspect of belated and stale claims, the Bench said  that it is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper  exercise of discretion.  In Tilokchand (supra) Chief Justice Hidayatullah pointed

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out that the question "is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to  case.  There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit..... It will depend on what  the breach of the Fundamental Right and remedy claimed are and how the delay  arose" In the present case, there is no satisfactory explanation for delay of over  forty five years.  The petition can be rejected by declining to exercise discretion in  favour of petitioners only on this count. Further, as already noticed, a provision  though constitutional when enacted, may with passage of time become  unconstitutional,  but the said principle has no applicability to the present case.   The contention here is that the impugned provision was unconstitutional from its  inception in the year 1956 since there was never any legal basis for classification  of newspaper establishments as a separate class.  We have, also examined  hereafter this contention as well.         Mr.Dewan contends that newspaper industry cannot be singled out for  harsh treatment.  Reliance is placed upon observation made in Indian Express  Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1985) 1  SCC 641 at 685 para 66] to the effect that levy of tax on newspaper industry  should not be overburden on newspapers which constitute the Fourth Estate of the  country which should not be singled out for harsh treatment. One of the questions  that came to be considered was whether newspapers have immunity from taxation.  Considering the earlier decisions, namely, Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. The  Union of India [(1962) 3 SCR 842] and Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union  of India & Ors. [(1972) 2 SCC 788], the first being concerned with the newspaper  price page policy and in the second the challenge being to the newsprint policy  imposed by the Government, it was held that none of these two decisions were  concerned with the power of the Parliament to levy tax on any goods used by the  newspaper industry.  Holding that taxes have to be levied for the support of the  Government and newspapers which derive benefit from the public expenditure  cannot disclaim their liability to contribute a fair and reasonable amount to the   public exchequer, the above observations were made about not singling out  newspaper industries for harsh treatment.  It was further observed that a wise  administrator should realize that the imposition of a tax like the customs duty on  newsprint is an imposition of knowledge and would virtually amount to a burden  imposed on a man for being literate and for being conscious of his duty as a citizen  to inform himself about the world around him.  It was further said that the  fundamental principle involved was the people’s right to know.  Freedom of  speech and expression should, therefore, receive a generous support from all those  who believe in the participation of people in the administration.  It is on account of  this special interest which society has in the freedom of speech and expression that  the approach of the Government should be more cautious while levying taxes on  matters concerning newspaper industry than while levying taxes on others.  This  Court held that while the contention that no tax can be levied on newspaper  industry cannot be accepted, it had to be held that any such levy is subject to  review by courts in the light of the provisions of the Constitution.  The  observations in the judgment were pressed into service in support of the contention  that freedom of speech and expression would be adversely affected by continuing  the definition of ’excluded employee’ in respect of the newspaper industry which  has been singled out for harsh treatment.  As can be seen from above, observations  have been made in a different context.  In any case, the decision, far from  supporting the contention of the petitioners, in fact, to an extent lends support to  the benefit that was given to the employees of the newspaper industry in the year  1956 as a result of the impugned provision.  It has to be remembered that in  spreading information, the employees of newspapers industry play dominant role  and considering the employees of newspaper industry as a ’class’, this benefit was  extended almost at the same time when the Working Journalist Act was enacted.   Thus, there can be no question of any adverse effect on the freedom of press. The  financial burden on employer, on facts as herein, cannot be said to be a ’harsh  treatment’.  The contention that now the petitioners are unable to bear the financial  burden which they have been bearing for the last over forty five years is wholly  irrelevant. It is for petitioners to manage their affairs if they intend to continue  with their activity as newspaper establishment.         In Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India &  Ors. [(1959) SCR 12], the question as to the vires of the Working Journalists  (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 came up for  consideration.  Tracing the history of the events which led to the enactment of the

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said Act, it was noticed that newspaper industry in India did not originally start as  an industry but started as individual newspapers founded by leaders in national,  political, social and economic fields.  During the last half a century, however, it  developed characteristics of a profit making industry in which big industrialists  invested money and combined controlling several newspapers all over the country  also became the special feature of this development.  The working journalists  except for the comparatively large number that were found concentrated in the big  metropolitan cities, were scattered all over the country and for the last ten years  and more agitated that some means should be found by which those working in the  newspaper industry were able to have their wages and salaries, their dearness  allowance and other allowances, their retirement benefits, their rules of leave and  conditions of service, enquired into by some impartial agency or authority, who  would be empowered to fix just and reasonable terms and conditions of service for  working journalists as a whole.  The Government of India appointed a Press  Commission to, inter alia, enquire into the state of press in India, its present and  future lines of development and in particular to examine the method of  recruitment, training, scales of remuneration, benefits and other conditions of  employment of working journalists, settlement of disputes affecting them and  factors which influence the establishment and maintenance of high professional  standards.  The commission also considered that there should be certain minimum  wage paid to a journalist.  The possible impact of such a minimum wage was also  considered by it and it was considered not unlikely that the fixation of such a  minimum wage may make it impossible for small papers to continue to exist as  such but it thought that if a newspaper could not afford to pay the minimum wage  to the employee which would enable him to live decently and with dignity, that  newspaper had no business to exist.  It also considered the applicability of the  Industrial Disputes Act to the Working Journalists and came to the conclusion that  the working journalists did not come within the definition of workman as it stood  at that time in the Industrial Disputes Act nor could a question with regard to them  be raised by others who were admittedly governed by the Act.  It, therefore,  considered the question as to the tenure of appointment and the minimum period  of notice for termination of the employment of the working journalists, hours of  work, provision for leave, retirement benefits and gratuity, made certain  recommendations and suggested legislation for the regulation of the newspaper  industry which should embody its recommendations with regard to notice period,  bonus, minimum wages, Sunday rest, leave and provident fund and gratuity.   Almost immediately after the report of the Press Commission, Parliament passed  the Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955 (1 of 1955).  It was an Act  to apply the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the working journalists.  The  application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the working journalist was not,  however, deemed sufficient to meet the requirements of the situation.  There was  considerable hesitation in Parliament for the implementation of the  recommendations of the Press Commission.  Ultimately, the Government  introduced a Bill on 30th November, 1955 in Rajya Sabha being Bill No.13 of  1955.  It was a Bill to regulate conditions of service of working journalists and  other persons employed in newspaper establishments.  The recommendations of  the Press Commission in regard to the minimum wages and other aspects, above  noticed, was left to the Minimum Wages Board to be constituted for the purpose  by the Central Government.  Finally, the Working Journalist (Conditions of  Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) was passed and  received the assent of the President on 20th December, 1955.  The Act was  challenged on the ground that it violates the fundamental right under Article  19(1)(a) of the Constitution guaranteeing to all citizens the right to freedom of  speech and expression.  Pointing out that the regulations of the conditions of  service is the main object which is sought to be achieved by the impugned Act, it  was considered that if a general law in regard to industrial or labour relation had  been applied to press industry as a whole, no exception could have been taken to  it.  Further, if the matter had rested with the application of the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947 to the working journalist or with the application of the Industrial  Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 or the Employees’ Provident Fund Act,  1952 to them, no exception could have been taken to this measure.  The contention  urged was that apart from application of these general laws to the working  journalists, there are provisions enacted in the impugned Act in relation to  payments of gratuity, hours of work, leave and fixation of the rates of wages  which are absolutely special to the press industry qua the working journalists and

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they have the effect of singling out the press industry by creating a class of  privileged workers with benefits and rights which have not been conferred upon  other employees and the provisions contained therein have the effect of laying a  direct and preferential burden on the press, have a tendency to curtail the  circulation and thereby narrow the scope of dissemination of information, fetter  the petitioners’ freedom to choose the means of exercising their right and are  likely to undermine the independence of the press by having to seek Government  aid.         This Court noticed that the journalist are but the vocal organs and the  necessary agencies for the exercise of the right of free speech and expression and  any legislation directed towards the amelioration of their conditions of service  must necessarily affect the newspaper establishments and have its repercussions  on the freedom of press.  The impugned Act can, therefore, be legitimately  characterized as a measure which affects the press and if the intention or the  proximate effect and operation of the Act was such as to bring it within the  mischief of Article 19(1)(a), it would certainly be liable to be struck down.  The  real difficulty, however, in the way of the petitioners is that whatever be the  measures enacted for the benefit of the working journalists neither the intention  nor the effect and operation of the impugned Act is to take away or abridge the  right of freedom of speech and expression enjoyed by the petitioners.  The  question of violation of right of freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed  under Article 19(1)(a) in the present case on account of additional burden as a  result of impugned provision does not arise.         An attack was also made in the said case to the constitutional validity of the  Act on the ground that it selected the working journalists for favoured treatment  by giving them additional benefits which other persons in similar or comparable  employment had not got and in providing for the fixation of their salaries without  following the normal procedure envisaged in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.   The following propositions were advanced : "1. In selecting the Press industry employers from all  industrial employers governed by the ordinary law  regulating industrial relations under the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947, and Act I of 1955, the impugned  Act subjects the Press industry employers to  discriminatory treatment.  2. Such discrimination lies in  (a) singling out newspaper employees for differential  treatment;  (b) saddling them with a new burden in regard to a  section of their workers in matters of gratuities,  compensation, hours of work and wages;  (c) devising a machinery in the form of a Pay  Commission for fixing the wages of working  journalists;  (d) not prescribing the major criterion of capacity to  pay to be taken into consideration;  (e) allowing the Board in fixing the wages to adopt any  arbitrary procedure even violating the principle of audi  alteram partem;  (f) permitting the Board the discretion to operate the  procedure of the Industrial Disputes Act for some  newspapers and any arbitrary procedure for others;  (g) making the decision binding only on the employers  and not on the employees, and  (h) providing for the recovery of money due from the  employers in the same manner as an arrear of land  revenue.  3. The classification made by the impugned Act is  arbitrary and unreasonable, in so far as it removes the  newspaper employers vis-a-vis working journalists  from the general operation of the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947, and Act I of 1955."

       The aforesaid propositions were considered in the light of the principles  laid down in various decision on the aspect of Article 14.  The well established

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principle to be always borne in mind is that while Article 14 forbids class  legislation, it does not forbids reasonable classification.  In Budhan Choudhry &  Ors. v. State of Bihar [(1955) 1 SCR 1045] Das, J. (as His Lordship then was)  speaking for the court said: "The provisions of article 14 of the Constitution have  come up for discussion before this Court in a number  of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The  Union of India [(1950) S.C.R. 869], The State of  Bombay v. F. N. Balsara [(1951) S.C.R. 682], The  State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [(1952)  S.C.R. 284], Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of  Saurashtra [(1952) S.C.R. 435], Lachmandas  Kewalaram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay [(1952)  S.C.R. 710], Quasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad  [(1953) S.C.R. 581], and Habeeb Mohamad v. The  State of Hyderabad [(1953) S.C.R. 661]. It is,  therefore, not necessary to enter upon any lengthy  discussion as to the meaning, scope and effect of the  article in question. It is now well-established that while  article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid  reasonable classification for the purposes of  legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of  permissible classification two conditions must be  fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be  founded on an intelligible differentia which  distinguishes persons or things that are grouped  together from others left out of the group and (ii) that  that differentia must have a rational relation to the  object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.  The classification may be founded on different bases;  namely, geographical, or according to objects or  occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there  must be a nexus between the basis of classification and  the object of the Act under consideration. It is also  well-established by the decisions of this Court that  article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a  substantive law but also by a law of procedure."

       In the light of the aforesaid principles, in Express Newspapers (supra) the  Court considered whether the Act impugned therein violated the fundamental right  guaranteed under Article 14.  It was observed that in framing the scheme, various  circumstances peculiar to the press had to be taken into consideration.  These  considerations weighed with the Press Commission in recommending special  treatment for working journalists in the matter of amelioration of their conditions  of service.  The position as prevailing in other countries was also noticed.  In  nutshell, the working journalists were held as a group by themselves and could be  classified as such.  If the Legislature embarked upon a legislation for the purpose  of ameliorating their conditions of service, there was nothing discriminatory about  it.  They could be singled out for preferential treatment.  It was opined that  classification of this type could not come within the ban of Article 14.   Considering the position in regard to the alleged discrimination between press  industry employers on one hand and the other industrial employers on the other, it  was said that even considering the Act as a measure of social welfare legislation,  the State could only make a beginning somewhere without embarking on similar  legislations in relation to all other industries and if that was done in this case no  charge could be levelled against the State that it was discriminating against one  industry as compared with the others.  The classification could well be founded on  geographical basis or be according to objects or occupations or the like.  The only  question for consideration would be whether there was a nexus between the basis  of classification and the object of the Act sought to be achieved.  Both he  conditions of permissible classification were fulfilled.  The classification was held  to be based on an intelligible differentia which had a rational relation to the object  sought to be achieved, viz., the amelioration of the conditions of service of  working journalists.  The attack on constitutionality of the Act based on Article 14

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was negatived.         Though challenge in the aforesaid case was to special treatment to working  journalists but what is to be seen is, that the press industry was held to be a class  by itself.  The definition of ’newspaper employee’ takes into its fold all the  employees who are employed to do any work in, or relation to, any newspaper  establishment.  The decision in Express Newspaper’s case  amply answers the  main contention about the Press Industry having been singled out, against the  petitioners.  This decision also holds that to provide social welfare legislation and  grant benefit, a beginning had to be made somewhere without embarking on  similar legislation in relation to other industries.  The fact that even after about  half a century similar benefit has not been extended to the employees of any other  industry, will not result in invalidation of benefit given to employees of press  industry.  It is not for us to decide when, if at all, to extend the benefit to others.   In view of aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contention that the impugned  provision is violative of Article 14 on the ground that it singles out newspaper  industry by excluding income test only in regard to the said industry.   Apart from the fact that it may not be always possible to grant to everyone  all benefits in one go at the same time, it seems that the impugned provision and  the enacting of the Working Journalists Act was part of a package deal and that  probably is the reason for other newspaper establishments not challenging it and  petitioners also challenging it only after lapse of so many years.  Further Section  2(i), 4 and Schedule I of Provident Fund Act shows how gradually the scope of the  Act has been expanded by the Central Government and the Act and Scheme made  applicable to various branches of industries.  From whatever angle we may  examine, the attack on the constitutional validity based on Article 14 cannot be  accepted.         In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in the contentions  urged on behalf of the petitioners.  The petition is accordingly dismissed.