07 December 1989
Supreme Court
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ESS DEE CARPET ENTERPRISES Vs UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Bench: VENKATARAMIAH,E.S. (CJ)
Case number: Appeal Civil 1372 of 1987


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PETITIONER: ESS DEE CARPET ENTERPRISES

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/12/1989

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (CJ) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (CJ) SINGH, K.N. (J) KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR  455            1989 SCR  Supl. (2) 417  1990 SCC  (1) 461        JT 1989 (4)   527  1989 SCALE  (2)1246

ACT:     Employees  Provident Funds and Miscellaneous  Provisions Act, 1952: Section 1(3)(a) and Schedule I clause (b)--Carpet weaving-Whether   comes  under  the  expression   "textiles" --Carpet  manufacturing industry--Whether comes  within  the scope of the Act.

HEADNOTE:     The appellant is a partnership firm carrying on business of manufacturing and selling carpets in the State of  Rajas- than.  It owns three factories. When the Regional  Provident Fund Commissioner took steps to direct the appellant firm to comply with the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Funds and  Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952, the  appellant  con- tested  the applicability of the Act on the ground  that  it was not manufacturing textiles included in Schedule I of the Act. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner held that  the business  of manufacturing carpets carried on by the  appel- lant  included textiles and that the Act was  applicable  to the appellant.     Aggrieved  by the said order, the  appellant  approached the  Central Government under section 19A of the Act,  which upheld the order of the Regional Provident Fund  Commission- er.  Thereafter  the appellant moved the  High  COurt  under Article  226  of  the Constitution. The  writ  petition  was dismissed. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court and that appeal was also dismissed.     This  appeal, by special leave, is against the order  of the Division Bench. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  1.1  The  activity of  manufacturing  carpets  is generally  understood as the weaving of carpets and the  man who  is  engaged in such activity is popularly  known  as  a ’carpet weaver’. Weaving means to form a fabric by interlac- ing  yarn on a loom. It also means the method or pattern  of weaving or the structure of a woven fabric, [420B-C] 418     1.2 Though there may be knotting of the yarn, the fabric which is ultimately produced does not cease to be a  textile fabric.  The  fact  that the Handicrafts  Board  has  issued

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certificate  under the Import Trade Control Policy  Handbook of Rules that carpet is a product of handicrafts does not in any  way  improve the matter. Even then the carpets  do  not cease  to be textiles. That certificate is not enough  since it  is very clear that the activity of making carpet  though it  involves knotting, in substance, amounts to weaving  and the carpet is a fabric which is woven. Thus it comes  within the  meaning  of the expression "textiles" as  explained  in clause  (d)  to the Explanation of Schedule I  to  the  Act. [420D-F]     1.3 The non-inclusion of knotting in the explanation  to Schedule  defining  ’textiles’  is,  therefore,  immaterial. [42ID]     Porrits Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana,  [1979] 1 SCR 545, relied on.     2. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the Govern- ment of India and the High Court were right in holding  that the establishment of the appellant came within the scope  of the  Act  and the appellant was liable to  comply  with  the requirements of the Act in all respects. [421D]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1372  of 1987.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  29.1.1986  of  the Rajasthan High Court in Spl. Appeal No. 336 of 1984.     Soli.  J.  Sorabjee, Roxena Swamy, Sushil Kr.  Jain  and L.C. Agarwala for the Appellant.     Anil  Dev Singh, Hemant Sharma, C.V.S. Rao, Mrs.  Sushma Suri  (N.P.) and Ms. A. Subhashini (N.P.) for  the  Respond- ents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     VENKATARAMIAH,  CJ.  The question for  consideration  in this appeal is whether an establishment which is manufactur- ing carpets is subject to the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (Act XIX of 1952)  (here- inafter referred to as ’the Act’). The appellant is a  part- nership firm carrying on the business of 419 manufacturing and selling carpets in the State of  Rajasthan at three factories belonging to it. When steps were taken to direct  the appellant to comply with the provisions  of  the Act  by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner the  appel- lant  contested the applicability of the Act on  the  ground that  the  establishment owned by it was  not  manufacturing ’textiles’  included in Schedule I to the Act. The  Regional Provident  Fund  Commissioner after  giving  opportunity  of being  heard to the appellant passed an order on 27th  July, 1979  holding  that the business  of  manufacturing  carpets carried on by it made the Act applicable to the appellant as carpets  were  textiles.  Aggrieved by the  said  order  the appellant  filed  a petition under section 19A  of  the  Act before the Central Government. The Central Government passed an  order  on  4th May, 1981 holding  that  the  appellant’s establishment  was engaged in the manufacture of  ’textiles’ and accordingly the order of the Regional Provident  Commis- sioner was upheld. The appellant thereafter filed a petition under  Article 226 of the Constitution before the  Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench). The High Court by its order dated 15th  October, 1984 dismissed the writ petition. The  appel- lant  then appealed to the Division Bench of the High  Court and the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court dismissed the  appeal  on 29th January, 1986. This appeal  by  special

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leave  is filed against the order of the Division  Bench  of the High Court of Rajasthan.     The  only point urged before us by the  learned  counsel for  the  appellant is that the  products,  namely,  carpets which  are being manufactured by the appellant did not  come within the meaning of the expression ’textiles’ described in Schedule  I to the Act and hence the Act was in  applicable. Clause  (a) of sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act  pro- vides  that subject to the provisions contained  in  section 16, the Act applies to every establishment which is a facto- ry  engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I  and  in which 20 or more persons are employed. The relevant part  of Schedule I to the Act reads thus:          "Any industry engaged in the manufacture of any  of the following, namely: Cement. Cigarettes. Electrical, mechanical or general engineering products. Iron and Steel. Paper. Textiles  (made wholly or in part of cotton or wool or  jute or silk, whether natural or artificial  ......... 420     Clause (d) of the Explanation contained in Schedule I to the Act reads thus:               "(d)  the expression "textiles"  includes  the               products  of carding, spinning, weaving,  fin-               ishing and dyeing yarn and fabrics,  printing,               knitting and embroidering."     It  is  not disputed that was material  with  which  the carpets  are  made  is wool which is one  of  the  materials mentioned  in the Schedule, namely, textiles made wholly  or in  part of cotton or wool or jute or silk, whether  natural or  artificial.  The activity of  manufacturing  carpets  is generally  understood as the weaving of carpets and the  man who  is  engaged in such activity is popularly  known  as  a ’carpet weaver’. Weaving means to form a fabric by interlac- ing  yarn on a loom. It also means the method or pattern  of weaving  or the structure of a woven fabric. The warp  means yarn  arranged  length wise on a loom. The fabric  which  is woven  includes the weft which means yarn woven  across  the width  of the fabric through the length wise yarn. Thus  the activity of the weaving involves passing of the weft through the warp. While doing so even if there are any knots in  the yarn still the activity is weaving. The mere fact that there is  knotting  of the yarn, the fabric  which  is  ultimately produced  does  not cease to be a textile fabric.  The  fact that the Handicrafts Board has issued certificate under  the Import Trade Control Policy Handbook of Rules that carpet is a  product  of handicrafts does not in any way  improve  the matter.  Even then the carpets do not cease to be  textiles. That certificate is not enough since we are very clear  that the activity of making carpets though it involves  knotting, in substance, amounts to weaving and the carpet is a  fabric which  is  woven. Thus it comes within the  meaning  of  the expression  "textiles:"  as explained in clause (d)  to  the Explanation of Schedule I to the Act.     We are, therefore on the view that the establishment  in question comes within Schedule I to the Act.     In  Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of  Haryana, [1979]  1  S.C.R. 545 this Court held that  the  concept  of ’textiles’ is not a static concept. It has, having regard to newly developing materials, methods techniques and  process- es, a continually expanding content and new kinds of  fabric may  be  invented which may legitimately without  doing  any

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violence to the language be regarded as textiles.  The  word ’textiles’  is derived from Latin ’texere’ which  means  ’to weave and it means woven fabric. When yarn, whether  cotton, silk, woollen, rayon, 421 nylon  or  of any other description made out  of  any  other material  is woven into a fabric what comes into being is  a ’textile’  and  is known as such. Whatever be  the  mode  of weaving  employed, woven fabric would be ’textile’. What  is necessary  is no more than the meaning of yarn  and  weaving would mean binding or putting yarn together by some  process so as to form a fabric. A textile need not be of any partic- ular size or strength or weight. The use to which it may  be put is also immaterial and does not bear on its character as a textile. The fact that the ’dryer felts’ are used only  as absorbents  of moisture in the process of manufacture  in  a paper  manufacturing  unit, cannot militate  against  ’dryer felts’ falling within the category of textiles, if otherwise they satisfy the description of textiles.     It  is  not necessary to refer to  the  other  decisions cited before us in this case.     The  non-inclusion  of knotting in  the  Explanation  to Schedule  defining ’textiles’ is, therefore, immaterial.  No other  point was pressed before us in this case. We,  there- fore,  hold that the Regional Provident  Fund  Commissioner, the  Government  of India and the High Court were  right  in holding that the establishment of the appellant came  within the scope of the Act and the appellant was liable to  comply with  the requirements of the Act in all respects.  The  ap- peal, therefore, fails and it is dismissed. G.N.                                                  Appeal dismissed. 422