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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 880  of  2001 Special Leave Petition (civil)  14516    of  1999

PETITIONER: EMPLOYER IN RELATION TO MANAGEMENT OF CENTRAL MINE PLANNING AND DESIGN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: V.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       25/01/2001

BENCH: S.N. Phukan, S.S.M.Quadri

JUDGMENT:

L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

     J U D G M E N T

     Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.

     Leave  is  granted.  This appeal is from the  judgment and  order  of  a  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of Judicature  at  Patna,  Ranchi  Bench,  in  L.P.A.No.177  of 1999(R) dated August 9, 1999.  The appellant is the employer and  28  of its workmen are represented by respondent  No.2. The  parties are, hereafter, referred to as the employer and  the workmen respectively.  The facts giving rise to this  appeal  lie  in a short compass.   The  Government  of India,  Ministry of Labour, referred the following  question under  Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for  short,  the  I.D.  Act) to  the  Central  Government Industrial  Tribunal  (No.2)  at Dhanbad  (for  short,  the Tribunal),  :   Whether the action of the  management  of Central  Mine  Planning & Design Institute Ltd.,  Ranchi  in terminating  the  services of Shri Naresh Jha and 27  others (as per annexure) w.e.f.  1.7.1992 is justified?  If not, to what  relief the workmen are entitled? On May 1, 1997  the Tribunal passed the award holding that the termination of 28 workmen  was  not justified and that they were  entitled  to reinstatement  and  regularisation with 40% back  wages  and other  benefits.  The validity of that award was assailed by the  appellant before the High Court at Patna (Ranchi Bench) in  CWJC  No.2406  of 1979(R).  The workmen  claimed  relief under  Section 17B of the I.D.  Act in that CWJC.  On  April 26,  1999, a learned Single Judge of the High Court  allowed the  application  and directed the appellant to pay  to  the workmen  full  wages last drawn by them on the date  of  the termination of their services.  The appellant challenged the correctness  of  that  order in L.P.A.   No.177  of  1999(R) before  the Division Bench of the High Court which held that against  the  order  passed by the learned Single  Judge  in terms  of  Section 17B of the I.D.  Act, the Letters  Patent Appeal  was  not  maintainable because that  order  was  not

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judgment  within  the meaning of Clause 10 of the  Letters Patent.   It  is  that judgment and order  of  the  Division Bench,  which  is under challenge in this  appeal.   Mr.Ajit Kumar,  the  learned  counsel appearing for  the  appellant, contended  that the order of the learned Single Judge passed under  Section 17B of the I.D.  Act is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent so the High Court ought  not  to have dismissed the LPA as  not  maintainable. Mr.P.S.   Mishra,  the learned senior counsel appearing  for respondent  No.2, has contended that the order passed by the learned  Single  Judge is interlocutory order and is  not  a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 as explained by the dicta  of this Court in Shah Babulal Khimji Vs.  Jayaben  D. Kania  and  Anr.  [1981 (4) SCC 8] The short  question  that arises  in  this  appeal is:  whether LPA  177  of  1999(R), against  the order of the learned Single Judge passed on  an application under Section 17B of the I.D.  Act, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna, before the Division Bench of  the  High Court, is maintainable?  We may  mention  here that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Calcutta, Bomaby and Madras is in iisdem terminis Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of  Allahabad,  Patna, Punjab & Haryana and Madhya  Pradesh. It  will be useful to read it here :  15.  Appeal from the Courts  of  original jurisdidction to the High Court in  its appellate  jurisdiction.-  And we do further ordain that  an appeal  shall  lie to the said High Court of  Judicature  at Madras,  Bombay,  Fort William in Bengal from  the  judgment (not  being  a judgment passed in the exercise of  appellate jurisdiction  in  respect of a decree or order made  in  the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence  of  the  said High Court and not  being  an order made in the exercise of a revisional jurisdiction, and not  being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of section 107  of  the Government of India Act, or in the exercise  of criminal  jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High  Court or  one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section 108 of  the  Government of India Act, and  that  notwithstanding anything  hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to  the said  High  Court from a judgment of one Judge of  the  said High  Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant  to section  108 of the Government of India Act, on or after the first  day  of  February 1929 in the exercise  of  appellate jurisdiction  in  respect of a decree or order made  in  the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence  of the said High Court where the Judge  who passed  the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal;   but that the right of appeal from other  judgments of  Judges of the said High Court or of such Division  Court shall  be  to  Us, Our heirs or successors in Our  or  Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.

     A  close reading of the provision, quoted above, shows that  it has three limbs:  the first limb specifies the type of  judgments  of  one  judge of the  High  Court  which  is appealable  in  that  High  Court   and  the  categories  of judgments/orders  which  are excluded from its  ambit;   the second  limb provides that notwithstanding anything provided in  the  first limb, an appeal shall lie to that High  Court from  judgement of one judge of the High Court or one  judge of  any  Division  Court,  pursuant to Section  108  of  the Government of India Act (now Article 225 of the Constitution of  India), on or after February 1, 1929, passed in exercise of  appellate  jurisdiction in respect of a decree or  order made  in  exercise  of  appellate jurisdiction  by  a  court

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subject  to the superintendence of the said High Court where the  judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a  fit  one  for appeal;  and the third limb says  that  the right  of appeal from other judgments of judges of the  said High  Court  or  such Division Court shall be to  us,  our heirs  or  successors  in  our or their  Privy  Council,  as hereinafter  provided.   Here, we are concerned  with  the type  of  judgments mentioned in the first limb.  The  above analysis  of  Clause 15 of the Letters Patent  will  equally apply  to  Clause  10 of the Letters Patent  of  Patna.   It follows  that  an appeal shall lie to a larger Bench of  the High  Court  of Judicature at Patna from a judgment  of  one judge  of  the said High Court or one judge of any  Division Court  pursuant to Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The  following categories of judgment are excluded from  the appealable  judgments  under the first limb of Clause 10  of the  Letters Patent :  (i) a judgment passed in exercise  of appellate  jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in  exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to superintendence  of the said High Court;  in other words  no letters patent appeal lies to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the High Court passed in second appeal;

     (ii)  an order made by one judge of the High Court  in exercise of revisional jurisdiction;  and

     (iii)  a sentence or order passed or made in  exercise of  power under the provisions of Section 107 of  Government of  India Act, 1915 (now Article 227 of the Constitution  of India) or in exercise of criminal jurisdiction.

     From  the above discussion, it is clear that from  all judgments   except   those  falling   under   the   excluded categories, an appeal lies to the same High Court.  The next question  which  needs  to be considered is, what  does  the expression  judgment mean?  That expression is not defined in  Letters Patent.  It is now well-settled that  definition of  judgment  in Section 2(9) of Code of Civil  Procedure, has  no application to Letters Patent.  That expression  was interpreted  by different High Courts of India for  purposes of Letters Patent.  In Asrumati Debi Vs.  Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot  & Ors.  [1953 SCR 1159], a four- Judge Bench of this Court  considered  the pronouncements of the High  Court  of Calcutta in Justices of the Peace for Calcutta Vs.  Oriental Gas  Co.  [8 Beng.  L.R.  433], the High Court of Rangoon in Dayabhai  Vs.   Murugappa Chettiar [I.L.R.  13 Rang.   457], the  High Court of Madras in Tuljaram Vs.  Alagappa  [I.L.R. 35  Mad.   1],  the  High Court at  Bomaby  in  Sonebai  Vs. Ahmedbhai  [9 Bombay H.C.R.  398] as also the High Court  at Nagpur,  the  High Court at Allahabad and Lahore High  Court and  observed as follows:  In view of this wide divergence of  judicial opinion, it may be necessary for this Court  at some  time or other to examine carefully the principles upon which  the  different  views mentioned above purport  to  be based  and attempt to determine with as much definiteness as possible  the true meaning and scope of the word  judgment as  it  occurs  in clause 15 of the Letters  Patent  of  the Calcutta  High Court and in the corresponding clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts.

     Such an exercise was undertaken by a three-Judge Bench of  this Court in Shah Babulal Khimji Vs.  Jayaben D.  Kania and  Anr.   [1981  (4) SCC 8] Fazal Ali,  J.   speaking  for himself  and  Varadarajan, J.  after analysing the views  of different  High  Courts,  referred  to  above,  observed  as

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follows  :  The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word judgment should receive a much  wider  and more liberal interpretation than  the  word judgment used in the Code of Civil Procedure.  At the same time,  it  cannot be said that any order passed by  a  Trial Judge  would amount to a judgment;  otherwise there will  be no  end  to the number of orders which would  be  appealable under  the  Letters  Patent.  It seems to us that  the  word judgment  has  undoubtedly  a  concept of  finality  in  a broader and not a narrower sense.

     It  was pointed out that judgment could be of  three kinds :

     (1)  A  final  judgment.  - in this category  falls  a judgment by which suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or full;

     (2)  A  preliminary judgment.- this category  is  sub- divided into two classes :

     (a)  where  the Trial Judge by an order dismisses  the suit,  without going into the merits of the suit, only on  a preliminary  objection raised by the defendant/respondent on the ground of maintainability;

     (b)  where maintainability of the suit is objected  on the  ground  of bar of jurisdiction, e.g., res  judicata,  a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under Section 80 and the like;  and

     (3)  Intermediary or interlocutory judgment.- in  this category  fall  orders referred to in clauses (a) to (w)  of Order 43 Rule 1 and also such other orders which possess the characteristic  and trappings of finality and may  adversely affect  a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding.

     Elucidating  the  third  category, it  is  observed  : Every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but  only  those  orders  would be  judgments  which  decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties  and  which  work  serious injustice  to  the  party concerned.

     In  the  instant case, we are concerned with the  last mentioned  category.  From the above discussion, it  follows that  to  determine  the question whether  an  interlocutory order  passed by one judge of a High Court falls within  the meaning  of  judgment for purposes of Letters  Patent  the test  is  :   whether  the order is  a  final  determination affecting  vital and valuable rights and obligations of  the parties  concerned.  This has to be ascertained on the facts of  each case.  Adverting to the facts of this case, Section 17B  of the I.D.  Act confers valuable rights on the workmen and  correspondingly  imposes an onerous obligations on  the employer.   The  order  in question passed  by  the  learned Single  Judge  determines the entitlement of the workmen  to receive  benefits and imposes an obligation on the appellant to  pay  such benefits provided in the said  section.   That order  cannot but be judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of Letters Patent, Patna.  The High Court is obviously in error  in holding that the said order is not judgment within the  meaning  of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent  of  Patna. For the above reasons, we hold that the order of the learned

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Single  Judge passed on application under Section 17B of the I.D.   Act on April 26, 1999 is judgment within the  meaning of  Clause  10  of  the  Letters Patent  of  Patna  and  is, therefore,  appealable.   The  order of the  High  Court  is accordingly set aside, the Letters Patent appeal is restored to  the  file of the High Court and the case is remanded  to the  High Court for deciding the LPA on merits in accordance with  law.   The  appeal  is accordingly  allowed.   In  the circumstances  of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.