REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  139      OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No. 2135 of 2007)

EERATI  LAXMAN     … APPELLANT

Versus

STATE OF A.P.            … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Appellant  was  convicted  for  commission  of  an  offence  punishable

under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.  He was sentenced to undergo

imprisonment  for  life.  Allegations  against  him  were  that  on  or  about

9.5.1994  at  about  1.00  p.m.  he  committed  murder  of  one  Pittala

Chandrakala by pouring kerosene over her and setting her on fire with a

matchstick.   

3. One  of  the  grounds  taken  by him during  trial  was  that  he  was  a

juvenile within the meaning of the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986

(for  short,  “the  said  Act”)  on  the  date  of  commission  of  offence.

Indisputably, the date of birth of the appellant is 10.5.1978.  The question,

however, which arises for consideration is as to whether he had completed

the  age  of  16  years  on  9.5.1994.   During  the  trial,  it  appears,  such  a

contention was rejected by the learned trial judge opining that he was not a

juvenile as no reliance could be placed on the date of his birth recorded in

the  registers  of  the  primary  school.   A  revision  application  was  filed

thereagainst  before the  High Court.   By reason of  a judgment  and order

dated 26.7.2000, the matter was remanded back to the trial court.  Relying

on or on the basis of a decision of this Court in Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar

[(2000) 5 SCC 488], it was held that the date of production of the appellant

before the learned Magistrate being 25.5.1994 and assuming that the date of

birth  of  the  accused  was  10.5.1978,  he  was  not  a  juvenile  within  the

meaning of the provisions of the said Act.   

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The learned Sessions Judge, held:

“The learned Advocate feebly contended that the accused should be treated as a juvenile on the date of  offence  as  per  the  decision  reported  in  2000 Supreme  Court  (Crl)  1270,  ALT  2002  AP  511 page, ALT 2002 AP 485, SCC 2000 Vol. II page 1270 and AIR 1972, SC 1557.  With due respect to all the above decisions, I express my inability to accept the contention of the learned advocates for the accused.  As already stated by me earlier the accused  in  this  case  has  preferred  Criminal Revision Case No. 418 of 2000 before the Hon’ble High Court  of  Andhra Pradesh aggrieved by the earlier order of this Court refusing to accept him as a juvenile.   In  the order  dated 26.7.2000, the Hon’ble  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  has specifically  directed  this  Court  to  follow  the decision reported in Arnit Das Vs. State of Bihar 2000 (4) Supreme 186.  Therefore, I am bound by the order of the Hon’ble High Court and I cannot take a divergent view.  I therefore, find that there is  no  force  in  the  argument  advanced  by  the learned counsel for the accused in this behalf.   I accept  the  contention  of  the  learned  Public Prosecutor that the accused was not a juvenile on the date when he was brought before the Court. On an analysis of the entire evidence on record, I hold that the prosecution has successfully driven home the  guilt  of  the  accused  under  Section  302  IPC beyond the reasonable doubt.”

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4. An appeal preferred by appellant thereagainst has been dismissed by

reason of the impugned judgment, holding:

“We do not agree with such a statement in view of the fact that a year is completed on 9.5.1994, if the date of birth of a person is 10th May of any of the preceding year, because in the case of reckoning of a calendar year which starts with 1st January of a particular year, a year is not completed on first January of the next year but is completed on 31st December,  of  the  same year.   So,  by  10th May, 1994, the accused would start 17th year of his life and on 9th May, 1995, it shall be presumed that he completed 16 years of his life, if his date of birth is 10.5.1978.   

Under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short “the Act”), “Month” shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar. “Year” as defined under section 3(66) of the Act shall  mean  a  “Year”  reckoned  according  to  the British  Calendar.   The  Halsbury’s  Laws  of England in Paragraph 143, Volume No. 37 (Third Edition), described “Month” as under:-

‘When  the  period  prescribed  is  a calendar  month  running  from  any arbitrary date the period expires with the  day  in  the  succeeding  month immediately  preceding  the  day corresponding to the date upon which the  period  starts;  save  that,  if  the period starts as the end of a calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month the period

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expires  at  the  end  of  the  latter month.’”

5. Indisputably, Arnit Das (supra) has been overruled by a Constitution

Bench of this Court in  Pratap Singh vs.  State of Jharkhand [(2005) 3 SCC

551] wherein it was clearly laid down that the date on which the offence had

been  committed  and  not  the  date  when  the  accused  was  first  produced

before  the  court/competent  authority  would  be  the  relevant  date  for  the

purpose of ascertaining as to whether the accused before it was a juvenile

within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act or not.  In Pratap Singh

(supra) this Court in regard to Arnit Das (supra) stated:

“84. With great respect,  we cannot agree to the said statement of law. It is incorrect to say that the preamble speaks of the things of post-delinquency only. The Act not only refers to the obligations of the country to re-enact the existing law relating to juveniles bearing in mind, the standards prescribed in  various  conventions  but  also  all  other international instruments. It states that the said Act was  enacted  inter  alia  to  consolidate  and  amend the law relating to juveniles. Once the law relates to  delinquent  juveniles  or  juveniles  in  conflict with law, the same would mean both pre-and post- delinquency.

85. The definition of “juvenile” under the 1986 Act,  of  course  refers  to  a  person  who  has  been found to have committed offence but the same has been clarified in the 2000 Act. The provisions of the 1986 Act,  as noticed hereinbefore,  sought  to protect  not  only  those  juveniles  who  have  been

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found to have committed an offence but also those who  had  been  charged  therefor.  In  terms  of Section 3 of the 1986 Act as well as the 2000 Act, when  an  enquiry  has  been  initiated  even  if  the juvenile has ceased to be so as he has crossed the age  of  16  and 18 as  the  case may be,  the  same must be continued in respect of such person as if he had continued to be a juvenile. Section 3 of the 1986 Act therefore cannot be given effect to if it is held  that  the  same  only  applied  to  post- delinquency of the juvenile.

86. The  field  covered  by  the  Act  includes  a situation leading to juvenile delinquency vis-à-vis commission of an offence. In such an event he is to be provided the post-delinquency care and for the said purpose the date when delinquency took place  would  be  the  relevant  date.  It  must, therefore,  be  held  that  the  relevant  date  for determining the age of the juvenile would be one on which the offence has been committed and not when he is produced in court.”

{See also Balu @ Bakthvatchalu vs. State of Tamil Nadu [2008 (2) SCALE

419],  Jyoti  Prakash  Rai  @  Jyoti  Prakash vs.  State  of  Bihar [2008  (3)

SCALE 348, Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 584],

Vimal Chadha vs. Vikas Choudhary & Anr. [2008 (8) SCALE 608]}  

6. The offence, as noticed hereinbefore, was committed on 9.5.1994.  A

“delinquent juvenile” in terms of the provisions of the said Act would be a

juvenile who has been found to have committed an offence.  In terms of the

provisions of the said Act, “juvenile” means a boy who has not attained the

age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years.

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The said Act was repealed and replaced by the Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection  of  Children)  Act,  2000  (for  short,  “the  2000  Act”)  in  terms

whereof  “juvenile”  or  “child”  means  a  person  who  has  not  completed

eighteenth year of age.    

Section 20 of the 2000 Act as amended by Act 33 of 2006 reads as

under:

“20. Special  provision  in  respect  of  pending cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,  all  proceedings  in  respect  of  a  juvenile pending in any court  in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that  court  as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has  committed  an  offence,  it  shall  record  such finding  and  instead  of  passing  any  sentence  in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which  shall  pass  orders  in  respect  of  that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.

Provided  that  the  Board  may,  for  any adequate and special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile.

Explanation.—In  all  pending  cases including  trial,  revision,  appeal  or  any  other criminal  proceedings  in  respect  of  a  juvenile  in conflict with law, in any court, the determination

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of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (1) of section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed.”

7. In our opinion, the High Court is not entirely correct in arriving at the

said  conclusion.   The  said  Act  is  a  beneficent  legislation.   It,  however,

would not mean that the principle of literal interpretation thereof should not

be resorted to.   

8. Section  3  of  the  Indian  Majority  Act,  1875  provides  for  age  of

majority of persons domiciled in India and the criteria for computation of

age of majority.  It reads as under:

“3.  Age  of  majority  of  persons  domiciled  in India.-(1)  Every person  domiciled  in  India  shall attain  the age of  majority  on his  completing  the age of eighteen years and not before.

(2) In computing the age of any person, the day on which he was born is to be included as a whole day  and  he  shall  be  deemed  to  have  attained majority  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth anniversary of that day.”

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In Prabhu Dayal Sesma vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [ (1986)  4 SCC

59], this Court categorically held that in absence of any express provision,

while calculating a person’s age, the day of his birth must be counted as a

whole day and any specified age in law is to be computed as having been

attained on the day preceding the anniversary of the birthday.  A legal day

commences at 12 o’clock midnight and continues until the same hour the

following night.   [See Salag Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 10

SCC 77]  

9. Appellant, therefore, having been born on 10.5.1978, the said day was

to be counted as a whole day and, thus, he had not attained the age of 16

years before 12 o’clock in the midnight of the previous day, i.e. 9.5.1978.   

This aspect of the matter has recently been considered in  Achhaibar

Maurya  vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. [(2008) 2 SCC 639], wherein it

was held:

“14. It  is  interesting  to  note,  however,  that  the common law rule stated in Shurey, Re, Savory, LR (1918) 1 Ch 263, in respect  of anniversaries has been  abrogated  by  virtue  of  the  Family  Law Reform Act, 1969. The effect of the change is that,

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in respect of anniversaries falling after 1-1-1970, the time at which a person attains a particular age expressed  in  years  is  the  commencement  of relevant anniversary of the date of his birth. (See Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England,  4th  Edn.,  Reissue, p. 209.)  We do not  have  such  statute.  We have, therefore, to determine the cases on the touchstone of  statute  operating  in  the  field  and  in  absence thereof by common law principle.”

10. We, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, are of the opinion that the

impugned judgment cannot be sustained.  It is set aside accordingly and the

matter is remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board in terms of Section 20 of the

Act.  

11. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned direction.  

.……………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

...…………………………..…J. [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi; January 23, 2009

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