http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

PETITIONER: E.S. REDDI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVT. OF A.P. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/05/1987

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1550            1987 SCR  (3) 146  1987 SCC  (3) 258        JT 1987 (2)   339  1987 SCALE  (1)919

ACT:     ’Senior  Counsel’ designated as such by  the  Court--Re- sponsibility  to put pleadings into proper and  satisfactory form--Need for mutual respect between the Bench and the  Bar while advancing arguments.

HEADNOTE:     An  officer involved in a defalcation case who was  sus- pended, challenged the order of suspension under Art. 14  of the Constitution on the ground that another officer similar- ly  situate  had  merely been  transferred.  The  order  was quashed by a Single Judge of the High Court, but, on appeal, his judgment was reversed by the Division Bench. The  matter came up before the Court by way of a Special Leave Petition.     The  counter-affidavit  filed by  the  State  Government indicated  that  it had initiated action  to  prosecute  two other officers involved in the case. When the Special  Leave Petition  came  up for hearing, the Court  made  an  interim order  directing the counsel to convey to the State  Govern- ment the Court’s concern at the petitioner alone having been placed  under suspension and, indicating that if  the  State Government  did not pass any order placing the  other  offi- cers,  who,  on a perusal of the investigation  report,  ap- peared  to  be equally culpable, under  suspension,  it  may become  necessary lot the Court to revoke the suspension  of the  Special Leave Petitioner at the next hearing. When  the matter  came up again, it had to be adjourned by  the  Court with another interim order directing the State Government to pass  necessary orders for suspension of all the  delinquent officers. In anticipation of action by the State Government, two  other officers involved in the case filed  applications praying  for  recall of the two  interim  orders  aforesaid. However, the two officers in question were also placed under suspension before the matter finally came up for hearing.     The  Court  impressed  upon counsel  appearing  for  the applicants  who had prayed for recall of the interim  orders that  the proper course for them was to move the State  Gov- ernment by way of appeal and/or representation against their suspension. While counsel for one of the applicants accepted that  suggestion and ,withdrew the application, counsel  for the other applicant did not do so. The latter applicant had,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

        147 in  his application, made certain reckless  allegations  and cast aspersions on the Court. The counsel appearing for  him gave the impression that the application had been settled by him without noticing the offending averments but went on  to advance  arguments  with  undue  vehemence  and  unwarranted passion.     The  Court, while dismissing the Special Leave  Petition as  infructuous and expressing disapproval of the manner  in which  arguments had been advanced on behalf of one  of  the applicants.     HELD: By virtue of the pre-eminence which ’Senior  Coun- sel’  enjoy in the profession, they not only  carry  greater responsibilities but they also act as a model to the  junior members  of  the profession. A senior counsel more  or  less occupies  a  position akin to a Queen’s counsel  in  England next  after the Attorney General and the Solicitor  General. It  is  an honour and privilege conferred  on  Advocates  of standing and experience by the Chief Justice and the  Judges of  this  Court. They thus become leading counsel  and  take precedence  on  all counsel not having that rank.  A  senior counsel though he cannot draw up pleadings of the party, can nevertheless  be engaged "to settle" i.e. to put the  plead- ings into "proper and satisfactory form" and hence a  senior counsel settling pleadings has a more onerous responsibility as  otherwise the blame for improper pleadings will be  laid at his doors. [153C-E]     In this case, not only were the arguments advanced  with undue vehemence and unwarranted passion, reflecting  identi- fication  of  interests beyond established  conventions  but were  of degrees not usual of enlightened senior counsel  to adopt.  The majesty of law and the dignity of Courts  cannot be  maintained  unless there is mutual respect  between  the Bench and the Bar and the counsel act in full realisation of their  duty to the Court alongside their duty to their  cli- ents  and have the grace to reconcile themselves when  their pleas  and arguments do not find acceptance with the  Court. Neither  rhetoric nor tempestuous arguments  can  constitute the sine qua non for persuasive arguments. [153A-C]     Rondel v. W, [1966] 3 All ER 657 and Rondel v.  Worsley, [1967] 3 All ER 993, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Miscellaneous  Peti- tion No. 25533 of 1986. IN THE MATTER OF T.V. CHOUDHARY, A MEMBER OF 148 THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE (UNDER SUSPENSION) WITH Special Leave Petition No. 14045 of 1985.     From  the  Judgment and Order dated  18.10.1985  of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 891 of 1985.     P.P..Rao,  Mrs. Shyamla Pappu, B. Kanta Rao, Ms.  Malini Poduval, B. Parthasarthi, Mrs. Indra Sawhney and B.B.  Sawh- ney for the Petitioner.     Dr. Y.S. Chitale, T.V.S.N. Chaff, Ms. Vrinda Grover  and Ms. Sunila Monigude for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SEN,  J. This is an application made by one T.V.  Choud- hary,  a Member of the Indian Administrative Service,  under suspension,  for recalling the Court’s orders dated  May  5, 1986  and August 11, 1986 passed in Special  Leave  Petition No. 14045 of 1985.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

   We  shall first deal with the Special Leave Petition  of E.S.  Reddi, a member of the Indian  Administrative  Service belonging  to  Andhra Pradesh cadre and who  worked  as  the Vice-Chairman-cum-Managing  Director of the  Andhra  Pradesh Mining Corporation. It is directed against a judgment of the Division  Bench  of the High Court dated  October  18,  1985 reversing  the judgment and order of a learned Single  Judge dated  September 2, 1985 and dismissing his  petition  under Art.  226  of the Constitution. By the  writ  petition,  the petitioner  had called in question the validity of an  order of the State Government of Andhra Pradesh dated February 11, 1985 placing him under suspension under sub-r. (1) of r.  13 of  the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification,  Con- trol & Appeal) Rules, 1963. The main grievance of the  peti- tioner before the High Court was that the impugned order  of suspension  was wholly mala fide, arbitrary  and  irrational and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution as there was no justification  for the differential treatment meted  out  to him while the applicant T.V. Choudhary, also a member of the Indian Administrative Service, who worked in various capaci- ties  viz. as General Manager, Functional Director,  Member, Board of Directors and Vice-Chairman-cure-Managing  Director and  149 was  involved in the commission of the  alleged  irregulari- ties,  had merely been transferred from the Corporation  and posted  as Managing Director, Andhra Pradesh  State  Textile Development Corporation. That objection of his was sustained before  the learned Single Judge who by his  judgment  dated September 2, 1985 quashed the impugned order of  suspension. The Division Bench however by the judgment under appeal  has reversed  that  judgment  and dismissed  the  writ  petition holding  that the findings arrived at by the learned  Single Judge are not warranted by the material on record.     Civil  Miscellaneous Petition No. 255 10/86 is filed  by R.  Parthasarthy,  a  member of  the  Indian  Administrative Service  who was Vice-Chairman-cum-Managing Director of  the Corporation  for the period from March 1979 to October  1979 and  was  working as the Commissioner of  Commercial  Taxes, while  Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 25533/86 is by  T.V. Choudhary, also a member of the Indian Administrative  Serv- ice  and  who was working as the Managing  Director  of  the Andhra Pradesh State Textile Development Corporation.  These two applications are for recalling the Court’s orders  dated May  5,  1986 and August 11, 1986 on the  ground  that  they prejudicially  affect the applicants. The matter relates  to defalcation  of a huge amount of Rs. 1.50 crores by  certain officers of the State Government whose services were  placed on  deputation  with the Corporation. Admittedly,  the  Anti Corruption  Bureau,  Andhra Pradesh has  registered  a  case against these officers for having committed alleged offences punishable  under  s. 120B read with s. 420  of  the  Indian Penal  Code and s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention  of  Corruption Act,  1947 as its preliminary report revealed a prima  facie case against them.     On  December  12, 1985 the Court issued  notice  on  the Special Leave Petition. It appeared from the counter-affida- vit  filed by the State Government that the Anti  Corruption Bureau  had  finalised the investigation  and  the  Director General had submitted his report dated March 25, 1986  which was under consideration of the Government. It also  appeared that  the State Government of Andhra Pradesh  had  addressed letters  dated May 2, 1984 for sanction of the Central  Gov- ernment  under s. 6(1)(a) of Prevention of  Corruption  Act, 1947 for the prosecution of R. Parthasarthy and of the State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

Government of Maharashtra for the prosecution of P. Abraham, I.A.S.  as he is borne on the Maharashtra cadre and  was  on deputation  to  the Andhra Pradesh. In compliance  with  the Court’s  order,  the State Government placed before  us  the letter of the State Government dated May 2, 1984  150 as also the report of the Director General, Anti  Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh dated May 25, 1986. After hearing the parties on May 5, 1986, we made the following order:               "In compliance to this Court’s order, Shri  P.               Ram  Reddy,  learned  counsel  for  the  State               Government places before us the letter of  the               State Government dated May 2, 1984 as also the               report  of the Director-General,  Anti-corrup-               tion  Bureau, Andhra Pradesh dated  March  25,               1986. It appears from the letter that sanction               of  the Central Government is necessary  under               s.  6(1)(a)  of the Prevention  of  Corruption               Act,  1947 for the prosecution of  R.  Partha-               sarthy,  IAS and that of the State  Government               of  Maharashtra  for  the  prosecution  of  P.               Abraham  we  have perused the  report  of  the               Director-General  and it cannot be  said  that               the  charges levelled against  the  petitioner               are groundless. It is somewhat surprising that               the  petitioner alone should have been  placed               under  suspension  by  the  State   Government               pending   contemplated  departmental   enquiry               under r. 13 of the A.P. Civil Services  (Clas-               sification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1963  and               not the other two officers T.V. Choudhary  and               S.M. Rao Choudhary, the then Managing Director               who it appears are equally culpable.                         The  matter is adjourned till  after               vacation  to  enable the State  Government  to               obtain the requisite sanction from the Central               Government  for the prosecution of R.  Partha-               sarthy  and  that of the State  Government  of               Maharashtra for the prosecution of P.  Abraham               under s. 6(1)(a) of the Act. Shri P. Ram Reddy               learned counsel for the State Government shall               in  the meanwhile convey to the State  Govern-               ment the concern expressed by this Court  that               the  petitioner alone could have  been  placed               under  suspension and not the  other  officers               who  are  alleged  to be  co-accused.  We  are               afraid, if the State Government does not  pass               any  order  placing the other  officers  under               suspension  it  may become necessary  for  the               Court  to revoke the suspension of  the  peti-               tioner at the next hearing."     When  the  matter came up after vacation on  August  18, 1986 it had to be adjourned with a direction that the  State Government should in the meanwhile pass necessary orders for suspension  of the delinquent officers. In  anticipation  of action by the State Government, the 151 two  applicants  R. Parthasarthy and  T.V.  Choudhary  moved applications  on September 2 and September 3, 1986  for  re- calling  the directions made on May 5, 1986 and  August  11, 1986. The applications were listed for directions on Septem- ber 5, 1986. On motion being made by learned counsel appear- ing  for the applicants, it was directed that  the  applica- tions be placed for heating on September 9, 1986. The  State Government  in  the meanwhile on September  6,  1986  passed

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

orders for suspension of P. Parthasarthy and T.V.  Choudhary under  r. 13(1) of the Rules. We were apprised of this  fact when  the applications came up for heating on  September  9, 1986 that the State Government had already placed them under suspension.     In  the special leave petition, the only  contention  of the  petitioner E.S. Reddi was that the action of the  State Government in making selective suspension suffered from  the vice  of arbitrariness and offended against Art. 14  of  the Constitution  inasmuch  as persons like the  applicant  T.V. Choudhary who were equally culpable have merely been  trans- ferred  while he has been singled out and placed under  sus- pension  under sub-r. (1) of r. 13 of the Rules without  any rational  basis and that such arbitrary action of the  State Government  was tantamount to denial of equal  treatment  to persons  similarly placed. In view of the  subsequent  order passed by the State Government on September 6, 1986  placing other officers including the applicant .T.V. Choudhary under suspension under r. 13(1) of the Rules pending their  prose- cution,  the special leave petition has become  infructuous. It is accordingly dismissed.     That takes us to C.M.P. Nos. 25510/86 and 25533/86 filed by  R.  Parthasarthy  and T.V.  Choudhary  respectively.  We impressed  upon the learned counsel appearing for them  that the proper course for the applicants was to move the Govern- ment  by way of appeal and/or representation  against  their suspension  and not by these applications for recalling  the Court’s orders. After the matter was heard at a considerable length,  Smt. Shyamala Pappu, learned counsel appearing  for R.  Parthasarthy very properly prayed for leave to  withdraw C.M.P.  NO.  255 10/86 as the applicant had already  made  a representation  to the State Government. She prayed  that  a direction  be made requiring the Government to consider  the representation  at an early date. Dr. Y.S. Chitale,  learned counsel  appearing  for the State Government  fairly  agreed that  the  said representation would be  considered  by  the Government on merits. Turning next to C.M.P. No. 25533/86. We must strongly depre- 152 cate  the conduct of the applicant T.V. Choudhary, a  member of the Indian Administrative Service and working as Managing Director  of  the Andhra Pradesh State  Taxtile  Development Corporation,  to  have made reckless  allegations  and  cast aspersions  on the Court. After denying his complicity,  the applicant T.V. Choudhary goes on to assert:               "The Order of this Hon’ble Court directing the               Government  to  suspend the  other  delinquent               officers is made without affording an opportu-               nity  to the Applicant and presumably  without               considering  the relevant provisions  of  law,               case law and the parameters of judicial  power               and the necessity to observe the principles of               natural justice.               It is submitted that the Order of this Hon’ble               Court  dated  11th  August  1986  is  illegal,               insofar  as  it  directed  the  Government  to               suspend  the applicant and others, in view  of               the fact that the Government has exercised its               discretion   and  transferred  the   applicant               taking  into consideration the  recommendation               of  the  Anti-corruption Bureau.  It  is  well               settled  that a Court of law cannot  compel  a               statutory authority to exercise its  statutory               discretion in a particular manner. The  legis-               lative  will  in conferring discretion  in  an

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

             essentially administrative function cannot  be               interfered with by Courts." To say the least, the averments are highly objectionable. It was expected that the applicant, who is a very senior member of  the  Indian Administrative Service,  should  have  shown greater responsibility before making such unfounded  allega- tions and uncalled for aspersions. On a motion being made on September 5, 1986 by Shri P.P. Rao, learned counsel for  the applicant,  it  was directed that the application  shall  be listed  for hearing on September 9, 1986. At the same  time, we drew the attention of the learned counsel to the improper and  objectionable averments made by the applicant. We  were given  the impression that the application had been  settled by the learned counsel without noticing the offending  aver- ments.     We wish we could have rested content with concluding the judgment  with the operative portion of our  conclusions  on the  merits of the case but we find with a sense of  anguish and  heaviness of heart that we have to express  our  disap- proval  of the manner in which the arguments  were  advanced before us on behalf of the applicant T.V. Choudhary. 153 Not  only were the arguments advanced with  undue  vehemence and unwarranted passion, reflecting identification of inter- est  beyond established conventions but were of degrees  not usual of enlightened senior counsel to adopt. The majesty of law  and the dignity of courts cannot be  maintained  unless there  is mutual respect between the Bench and the  Bar  and the  counsel  act in full realisation of their duty  to  the Court  alongside  their duty to their clients and  have  the grace to reconcile themselves when their pleas and arguments do not find acceptance with the Court. It is needless for us to  say that neither rhetoric nor tempestuous arguments  can constitute the sine qua non for persuasive arguments.     By virtue of the pre-eminence which senior counsel enjoy in the profession, they not only carry greater responsibili- ties  but they also act as a model to the junior members  of the  profession.  A senior counsel more or less  occupied  a position akin to a Queen’s counsel in England next after the Attorney General and the Solicitor General. It is an  honour and privilege conferred on advocates of standing and experi- ence by the Chief Justice and the Judges of this Court. They thus  become  leading  counsel and take  precedence  on  all counsel  not  having that rank. A senior counsel  though  he cannot  draw up pleadings of the party, can nevertheless  be engaged  "to settle" i.e. to put the pleadings into  "proper and  satisfactory form" and hence a senior counsel  settling pleadings has a more onerous responsibility as otherwise the blame for improper pleadings will be laid at his doors.     Lord Reid in Rondel v. Worsley, [1967] 3 All ER 993  has succinctly  set out the conflicting nature of the  duties  a counsel  has  to  perform in his own  inimitable  manner  as follows:-               "Every counsel has a duty to his client  fear-               lessly  to  raise every issue,  advance  every               argument,  and  ask  every  question,  however               distasteful,  which  he thinks will  help  his               client’s  case.  As an officer  of  the  court               concerned in the administration of justice, he               has  an overriding duty to the court,  to  the               standards  of his profession, and to the  pub-               lic,  which may and often does lead to a  con-               flict  with his client’s wishes or  with  what               the client thinks are his personal  interests.               Counsel  must not mislead the court,  he  must

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

             not lend himself to casting aspersions on  the               other party or witnesses for which there is no               sufficient  basis  in the information  in  his               possession,  he must not withhold  authorities               or  documents which may tell against his  cli-               ents but which               154               the  law  or the standards of  his  profession               require  him to produce. By so acting  he  may               well  incur  the displeasure or worse  of  his               client so that if the case is lost, his client               would  -or  might seek legal redress  if  that               were open to him."     Again as Lord Denning, M.R. in Rondel v. W, [1966] 3 ALL ER  657  would say ’he (the counsel) has time and  again  to choose  between his duty to his client and his duty  to  the Court. This is a conflict often difficult to resolve; and he should  not be under pressure to decide it wrongly.  When  a barrister  or an advocate puts his first duty to the  Court, he has nothing to fear’. In the words of Lord Denning:               "It  is  a mistake to suppose that he  is  the               mouthpiece  of  his  client  to  say  what  he               wants:   .......  He must disregard  the  most               specific  instructions of his client, if  they               conflict with his duty to the court. The  code               which  requires a barrister to do all this  is               not a code of law. It is a code of honour.  If               he  breaks  it, he is  offending  against  the               rules of the profession and is subject to  its               discipline."     We are constrained to give expression to our views  with a feeling of remorse to remind the counsel of that sense  of detachment  and  non-identification  they  are  expected  to maintain  with  the causes espoused by them and not  with  a view to belittle the profession or cast aspersions on  coun- sel.     After  bestowing our dispassionate consideration of  the matter we found ourselves left with no other alternative but to dismiss the application made by T.V. Choudhary which  was clearly  misconceived  and we direct the  applicant  to  pay Rs.5,000  as  costs to the State Government in view  of  the disapprobation his case and conduct has warranted. H.L.C.                                             Petitions dismissed. 155