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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 441  of 2001         Special Leave Petition (crl.)   5373     of 1997

PETITIONER: E.S.P.RAJARAM & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       10/01/2001

BENCH: D.P.Mphapatro, Doraswamy Raju, S.V.Patil

JUDGMENT:

D.P.  MOHAPATRA, J. L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

     Leave granted.

     The   appellants  who  were   appointed   as   Traffic Apprentices  in Southern Railway prior to May 15, 1987, have filed  this  appeal challenging the judgment of  the  Madras Bench  of the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short the CAT)  dated  October  4,  1996  in  OA  No.   1096  of  1996 dismissing  the  case with the observation that it would  be appropriate for the applicants to approach the Supreme Court for  any  clarification/review of the judgment in  the  case titled Union of India and others vs.  M.  Bhaskar and others 1996  (4) SCC 416.  The controversy which arose in that case was  regarding  the claim of Traffic  Apprentices  appointed prior  to  15-5-1987 that they should be given the scale  of pay  of  Rs.1600-2660,  benefit of which  was  available  to Traffic  Apprentices  recruited  after  15-5-1987.   Similar claims  were  raised  before different benches of  the  CAT. There  had been divergence of opinion between the  different benches,  some  accepting  the  claim of  pre  1987  Traffic Apprentices  for the higher scale of pay, some other benches taking  a  contrary  view.  The Ernakulam bench of  CAT  had quashed the memorandum dated 15-5-1987 issued by the Railway Board  in which it was provided that the higher scale of pay would   be  admissible  only  to  the  Traffic   Apprentices recruited   after  the  date  of  the   memorandum.    These conflicting views taken by different benches of the CAT came up  for consideration by this Court in the case of Union  of India  and  others vs.  M.  Bhaskar and others  (supra),  in which  a  Bench of three learned Judges held inter alia  (i) that Rule I-A of the Indian Railway Establishment Code which had  come to be made pursuant to the power conferred by  the proviso  to  Article 309 of the Constitution  permitted  the Railway  Board  to  issue necessary  instructions  regarding recruitment  in  the lowest grade and the  memorandum  dated 15-5-1987  having been issued in exercise of that power, the Board had valid authority to issue the memorandum;  ii) that

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since  the  recruitment  of apprentices under  the  impugned memorandum  was  to man the posts, not of Assistant  Station Masters,  Assistant  Yard  Masters etc.  as before,  but  of Station  Masters  and  Yard  Masters  and  the  standard  of examination  for  the  apprentices  to  be  recruited  after 15-5-1987  was  required  to be higher than that  which  was prevailing,  giving  them higher pay scales or reducing  the period  of  their  training,  could  not be  said  to  be  d iscriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable.  iii) That the cut off  date  15-5-1987 is not arbitrary since the  court  felt satisfied  that the date is of relevance and the  memorandum as  given came to be issued in the circumstances noticed  in the  judgment.   This  Court  upheld  the  validity  of  the memorandum.   The conclusions arrived at by this Court  were summed  up  in paragraph 17 of the judgment which  reads  as follows:

     "17.All  the appeals, therefore, stand disposed of  by setting  aside  the judgments of those tribunals which  have held  that  the pre-1987 Traffic/Commercial Apprentices  had become  entitled to the higher pay scale of Rs.1600-2660  by the  force of memorandum of 15-5-1987.  Contrary view  taken is  affirmed.   We  also  set  aside  the  judgment  of  the Ernakulam  Bench  which declared the memorandum as  invalid; so  too of the Patna Bench in appeal @ SLP (C) No.  15438 of 1994  qua  Respondent  1.   We  also  state  that  cases  of Respondents  2  to 4 in appeals @ SLPs (C) Nos.  2533-35  of 1994 do not stand on different footing."

     In paragraph 18 of the judgment this Court considering the hardship which may be caused to the appellants concerned directed  Union of India and its officers not to recover the amount  already  paid.  The said paragraph is quoted  herein below:   18.  Despite the aforesaid conclusion of ours,  we are of the view that the recovery of the amount already paid because  of  the aforesaid judgments of the Tribunals  would cause  hardship to the respondents/appellants concerned and, therefore, direct the Union of India and its officers not to recover  the  amount already paid.  This part of  our  order shall  apply (1) to the respondent/appellants who are before this  Court;   and (2) to the pre-1987 apprentice  in  whose favour  judgment had been delivered by any CAT and which had become  final  either because no appeal was carried to  this Court  or, if carried, the same was dismissed.  This benefit would be available to no other."

     In pursuance of the directions issued by this Court in the  judgment, the departmental authorities gave appropriate placement  in  the scale of pay to the appellants  who  were recruited  as Traffic Apprentices prior to 15-5-1987.   They were  given  the  pay of scale of Rs.  455-700  which  stood revised as Rs.1400-2300 on the recommendation of the 4th Pay Commission and not the scale of Rs.550-750 which was revised to  Rs.1600-2660.   Feeling aggrieved by the said order  the appellants  filed OA No.1096/96 which was disposed of by the judgment  dated 4th of October, 1996 of the Madras Bench  of the  CAT  in  the  manner  noted  earlier.   Thereafter  the appellants  filed SLP No.  5373 of 1997 giving rise to  this appeal.   In the said SLP a bench of three learned Judges of this  Court  by the Order passed on 6-11-1997 directed  that the  matter be placed before a constitution bench, since the judgment  in  M.   Bhaskar’s case (supra) was  delivered  by co-equal  bench.   The referral order is  quoted  hereunder; "In  this  special  leave  petition  the  grievance  of  the petitioners  is against the Direction No.2 contained in Para

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18  of  the judgment of this court in Union of India &  Ors. Vs.   M.   Bhaskar  & Ors., 1996 (4) SCC 416 passed  by  the Bench  of Three learned Judges whereby it has been  directed that  the order contained in para 18 would apply to pre-1987 apprentices  (Traffic)  in  whose favour judgment  has  been delivered  by  any  CAT and which had  become  final  either because  no appeal was carried to this Court or, if carried, the  same  was  dismissed.   The  learned  counsel  for  the petitioners   has  challenged  the   correctness  of   these directions  on the ground that finality of the orders passed in  the  case of the petitioners as a result of the  special leave  petition  filed against the order of the  CAT  having been  dismissed  by this Court, could not be reopened  as  a result  of  the  said directions.  Since the judgment  in  M Bhaskar’s  case  (supra) was delivered by a Bench  of  three learned  judges  of this Court, we consider  it  appropriate that the matter be placed before the Constitution Bench.  It is directed that the matter may be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for directions in this regard.

     In  the meanwhile, it is directed that the Status  quo with regard to reversion in rank and reduction in pay scales shall be maintained, as it exists today."

     The  main  thrust of the arguments of learned  counsel appearing  for the appellants was that the observations  and directions given by this Court in M.  Bhaskar’s case (supra) particularly in paragraph 18 thereof are unsustainable since it  was  passed without giving any notice to the  appellants and/or  other similarly placed employees who were  seriously prejudiced by such directions.  Elucidating the contentions, the  learned  counsel submitted that the appellants who  had been  given fitment in the higher scale of pay, Rs.1600-2660 and  on  that basis some of them had got further  promotions should  not  have  been subjected to the directions  in  the judgment  of this Court particularly when the special  leave petition  filed  by  the  Union of India  and  the  Railways against  the  judgment  of CAT (Madras Bench) dated  4th  of December,  1989 in OA No.  322 of 1988 and 488 of 1987  (the appellants  were  applicants  in OA 322 of  1988)  accepting their  claim for the higher scale of pay had been  dismissed in limine by this Court.  In any view of the case, submitted the  learned  counsel,  the  principle  of  natural  justice required  that the appellants should have been given  notice and  afforded  an  opportunity of hearing before  the  order prejudicially  effecting  their  interest was  passed.   The learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  appearing  for  the respondents  on the other hand contended that in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the controversy raised, this Court rightly passed the order, issuing  the directions in paragraph 18 of M.  Bhakar’s case (supra) for the purpose of bringing about uniformity amongst all  the employees similarly placed, that is, those who were recruited  as  Traffic Apprentices prior to 15-5-1987.   The further  submission of the learned Addl.  Solicitor  General was that this Court taking note of the hardship which may be caused   to  the  appellants   and  other  similarly  placed employees  issued  the  further direction that  no  recovery shall  be made of the amount which they might have  received in  the  higher  scale  of pay.  In the  submission  of  the learned   Addl.   Solicitor  General,   the  directions   in paragraph  18 of the judgment were issued with a view to  do complete  justice  between all pre-1987 Traffic  Apprentices and therefore calls for no interference.

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     Since,  the  thrust  of the arguments of  the  learned counsel  appearing  for  the petitioners and  the  intending interveners  was that the observations in paragraphs 17 & 18 of  the  judgment in M.Bhaskar’s case (supra) by which  they have  been seriously prejudiced were not made without giving notice to them, we specifically asked the learned counsel to place  their  arguments  on  the merits  of  the  directions contained  in  the  said  paragraphs   for  the  purpose  of satisfying  ourselves  if a re-look at the said decision  is necessary.    The  learned  counsel   could  not  raise  any contention  of substance questioning the correctness of  the decision in the aforementioned case except stating that many of  the persons who were parties in the cases decided by the Tribunal  taking  the contra- view and some others had  been given  benefit on the basis of the decision of the  Tribunal and some of them have even got further promotions which have become  vulnerable in view of the decision of this Court  in M.  Bhaskar case (supra).  It was their contention that this Court  should  have  made it clear that the decision  in  M. Bhaskar  case  (supra) will not affect the parties in  whose favour judgments have been delivered by any bench of CAT and which  had become final either because no appeal was carried to  this  Court  or if carried the same  was  dismissed  and further  the benefit should have been extended to others who though not parties in any proceeding before any bench of CAT had  been given service benefit on the basis of the judgment delivered  by  a bench of the CAT taking the view which  was rejected by this Court in M.  Bhaskar case (supra).  We have carefully  perused  the  judgment  in  M.   Bhaskar’s   case (supra).   The  decision  in that case has been taken  on  a detailed  analysis of the relevant provisions of the  Indian Railway   Establishment   Code  and   the   Indian   Railway Establishment  Manual  (1968  Edn.),  and in  the  light  of certain  general  principles of law relating to  recruitment cogent  reasons  have been given in support of the  findings and  conclusions  arrived  at  in the  judgment.   As  noted earlier  no  contention was advanced before us pointing  out any serious error in the decision therein.  We are satisfied that  in  the  facts and circumstances of  the  case  placed before  their Lordships the decision is correct and warrants no interference.

     If  it  is necessary to trace the source of  power  of this  Court to issue the directions and pass the order as in paragraph   18  of  M  Bhaskar’s   case  (supra)   one   can straightaway  look to Article 142 of the Constitution.   The said provision vests power in the Supreme Court to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice  in  any  case  or mater  pending  before  it.   The provision contains no limitation regarding the causes or the circumstances  in which the power can be exercised nor  does it lays down any condition to be satisfied before such power is  exercised.  The exercise of the power is left completely to  the  descretion of the highest court of the country  and its  order  or decree is made binding on all the  Courts  or Tribunals  throughout the territory of India.  However, this power  is  not  to  be exercised  to  override  any  express provision.   It is not to be exercised in a case where there is no basis in law which can form an edifice for building up a super structure.  This Court has not hesitated to exercise the  power under Article 142 of the Constitution whenever it was  felt necessary in the interest of justice.  In the case of  M  S Ahlawat vs.  State of Haryana and another (2000)  1 SCC  278)  a  bench of three learned Judges  of  this  Court considering  the power of the Court to recall its own  order

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in  a criminal case referred to the relevant observations in Supreme  Court  Bar Association v.  Union of India (1998)  4 SCC 409) and held that under Article 142 of the Constitution the  Supreme Court cannot altogether ignore the  substantive provisions  of a statute and pass orders concerning an issue which  can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute.  The following passage from the headnote of the case of Supreme Court Bar Association v.  Union of India (supra)  was  quoted with approval :  "However,  the  powers conferred  on  the  Court by Article 142 being  curative  in nature  cannot  be construed as powers which  authorise  the Court  to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant  while dealing  with a cause pending before it.  This power  cannot be used to ’supplant’ substantive law applicable to the case or  cause  under consideration of the Court.   Article  142, even  with  the  width of its amplitude, cannot be  used  to build  a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express  statutory  provisions  dealing with a  subject  and thereby  to  achieve  something indirectly which  cannot  be achieved  directly.  The very nature of the power must  lead the  Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those  powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities  between  the conflicting claims of the  litigating parties  by  ’ironing out the creases’ in a cause or  matter before  it.   Indeed  the Supreme Court is not  a  court  of restricted  jurisdiction  of   only  dispute-settling.   The Supreme  Court  has  always been a law-maker  and  its  role travels   beyond   merely  dispute   settling.   It   is   a ’problem-solver  in the nebulous areas’ but the  substantive statutory  provisions  dealing with the subject-matter of  a given  case  cannot  be altogether ignored  by  the  Supreme Court,  while  making an order under Article  142.   Indeed, these   constitutional  powers  cannot,  in  any   way,   be controlled  by any statutory provisions but at the same time these  powers  are  not  meant to be  exercised  when  their exercise  may  come directly in conflict with what has  been expressly  provided for in a statute dealing expressly  with the subject."

     In the case of R.C.Sahi and others vs.  Union of India and  others  (1999)  1 SCC 482 concerning  applicability  of certain  service  rules to officers of the CRPF  this  Court relying  on  the  power  vested in Article  142  "for  doing complete  justice  in  any  cause   or  matter"  issued  the following  directions:  "There are two petitioners in  WP(C) No.211 of 1997.  Out of these two, it is stated that one has already  retired  from  the service.  In the  light  of  the interim  orders  dated  19.1.1998 and 27.1.1998,  the  first petitioner  (C.M  Bahuguna)  is  still  in  service  in  the promoted  post.   In the circumstances, we are of  the  view that notwithstanding the dismissal of the writ petition, the petitioner,  viz.   C.M Bahuguna who is still in service  in the promoted post, should be allowed to continue in the said promoted  post,  if necessary, by creating  a  supernumerary post.  However, we make it clear that all further promotions shall be made in the light of this order."

     In  the  case of Gaurav Jain vs.  Union of  India  and others  (1998)  4  SCC  270) considering  the  petition  for review,  a  Bench  of  three learned Judges  of  this  Court interpreting Article 142(1) held that the provision does not and  cannot  override Article 145(5) and observed  that  the

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decrees  or  orders issued under Article 142 must be  issued with  concurrence of the majority of the Judges hearing  the matter.   This Court referred to the following  observations made   by  the  Court  in   Prem  Chand  Garg  vs.    Excise Commissioner  U.P.1963 Supp.(1) SCR 885 :  "It does not  and cannot  override  Article  145(5).  The  decrees  or  orders issued under Article 142 must be issued with the concurrence of  the majority of Judges hearing the matter.  In the  case of Prem Chand Garg v.  Excise Commnr.  U.P.  a Bench of five Judges  of  this Court considered a Rule made by this  Court providing  for  imposition  of terms as to costs and  as  to giving of security in a petition under Article 142 were very wide  and could not be controlled by Article 32.  Negativing this contention, this Court said :

     "The  powers of this Court are no doubt very wide  and they  are intended to be and will always be exercised in the interest  of justice.  But that is not to say that an  order can  be  made by this Court which is inconsistent  with  the fundamental   rights   guaranteed  by   Part  III   of   the Constitution.   An order which this Court can make in  order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent  with  the fundamental rights guaranteed  by  the Constitution,  but  it cannot even be inconsistent with  the substantive  provisions  of  the  relevant  statutory  laws. Therefore, we do not think it would be possible to hold that Article  142(1)  confers  upon this Court powers  which  can contravene the provisions of Article 32."

     Similarly,  powers  conferred by Article  142(1)  also cannot contravene the provisions of Article 145(5).  Article 142  would  not  entitle a Judge sitting on a Bench  of  two Judges,  who differs from his colleague to issue  directions for  the enforcement of his order although it may not be the agreed order of the Bench of two Judges.  If this were to be permitted,  it  would lead to conflicting  directions  being issued by each Judge under Article 142, directions which may quite possibly nullify the directions given by another Judge on the same Bench.  This would put the Court in an untenable position.   Because  if in a Bench of two Judges, one  Judge can resort to Article 142 for enforcement of his directions, the  second Judge can do likewise for the enforcement of his directions.   And even in a larger Bench, a Judge holding  a minority view can issue his order under Article 142 although it may conflict with the order issued by the majority.  This would  put this Court in an indefensible situation and  lead to  total  confusion.  Article 142 is not meant for  such  a purpose and cannot be resorted to in this fashion."

     In  the  case  of  State  of  Punjab  and  others  vs. Bakshish  Singh (1998) 8 SCC 222) concerning a  departmental proceeding  against a police constable this Court  rejecting the  contention  raised  by the appellant that  the  Supreme Court  could  not cure inconsistency because the  respondent had  not  filed  any cross appeal, this  Court  removed  the inconsistency  by  invoking Article 142 of the  Constitution and  by referring to Order 41, Rule 33 and Section 107(1)(a) of  the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.  This Court referring to  the decision of the Constitution Bench in Supreme  Court Bar  Association  case (supra) reiterated the position  that while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution the  Court cannot ignore the substantive right of a litigant while  dealing with a cause pending before it and can invoke its  power  under Article 142.  The power cannot however  be

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used to supplant substantive law applicable to a case.  This Court  further observed that Article 142 even with the width of  its  amplitude,  cannot be used to build a  new  edifice where  none  existed earlier, by ignoring express  statutory provisions  dealing  with  a  subject  and  thereby  achieve something  indirectly which cannot be achieved directly.  In the  case  of  Spencer  &  Company  Ltd.   and  another  vs. Vishwadarshan  Distributors  Pvt.  Ltd.  and others  (1995)1 SCC  259  this Court dealing with the binding nature of  the orders  issued  by  the  Supreme Court  to  the  High  Court referring to the provisions of the Articles 141, 142 and 144 of the Constitution made the significant observations:  "The afore-narrated  words,  we think, presently, are  enough  to assert  the singular constitutional role of this Court,  and correspondingly  of  the assisting role of all  authorities, civil  or  judicial, in the territory of India, towards  it, who  are mandated by the Constitution to act in aid of  this Court.   That the High Court is one such judicial  authority covered  under  Article  144 of the Constitution  is  beyond question.   The  order  dated 14.1.1994 of  this  Court  was indeed a judicial order and otherwise enforceable throughout the   territory   of  India  under   Article  142   of   the Constitution.   The  High Court was bound to come in aid  of this Court when it required the High Court to have its order worked  out.   The language of request oftenly  employed  by this  Court  in  such situations is to be read by  the  High Court  as an obligation, in carrying out the  constitutional mandate,  maintaining  the writ of this Court running  large throughout the country."

     In the case of Ram Krishna Verma and others vs.  State of  U.P.   and  others (1992) 2 SCC 620 a case  relating  to grant of permit to private operators on nationalised routes, this  Court  referring to Articles 136, 142 and 226  of  the Constitution  held  that  the   Court  should  endeavour  to neutralise  any undeserved and unfair advantage gained by  a party invoking its jurisdiction.  Therein it was observed by this Court (at p.630):

     "This  Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd.  v.  ITO held that the  High Court while exercising its power under Article 226 the  interest  of  justice requires that any  undeserved  or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of  the court must be neutralised.  It was further held that the  institution  of  the  litigation by it  should  not  be permitted  to  confer  an  unfair  advantage  on  the  party responsible for it.  In the light of that law and in view of the  power  under  Article 142(1) of the  Constitution  this Court,  while exercising its jurisdiction would do  complete justice and neutralise the unfair advantage gained by the 50 operators   including  the  appellants   in   dragging   the litigation  to run the stage carriages on the approved route or  area  or  portion thereof and forfeited their  right  to hearing  of the objections filed by them to the draft scheme dated February 26, 1959."

     In  the case of Re:  Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995)2  SCC 584)  relating to a proceeding for criminal contempt a Bench of  three  learned  Judges of this Court  dealing  with  the priliminary  objection raised on behalf of the contemner and the  State Bar Council held that this Court is not only  the highest court of record, but under various provisions of the Constitution,   is   also  charged   with  the  duties   and responsibilities   of  correcting  the   lower  courts   and

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tribunals and or protecting them from those whose misconduct tends  to  prevent  the  due performance  of  their  duties. Therein this Court distinguished the decisions in Prem Chand Garg  (supra) and relied on the decisions in Delhi  Judicial Service  Association  vs.  State of Gujarat (1991)4 SCC  406 and  Union  Carbide  Corporation.etc.  vs.  Union  of  India (1991) 4 SCC 584, and this Court made the following relevant observations  in  connection  with the  power  vested  under Article 142 :

     "Apart  from the fact that these observations are made with reference to the powers of this Court under Article 142 which are in the nature of supplementary powers and not with reference  to this Court’s power under Article 129, the said observations  have been explained by this Court in its later decisions  in  Delhi  Judicial Service Assn.  v.   State  of Gujarat  and  Union Carbide Corpn.  v.  Union of India.   In para  51 of the former decision, it has been, with  respect, rightly  pointed  out that the said observations  were  made with  regard  to  the  extent of this  Court’s  power  under Article  142(1) in the context of fundamental rights.  Those observations  have  no  bearing on the  present  issue.   No doubt, it was further observed there that those observations have  no  bearing on the question in issue in that  case  as there  was  no provision in any substantive law  restricting this  Court’s  power  to quash  proceedings  pending  before subordinate  courts.  But it was also added there that  this Court’s  power  under Article 142(1) to do complete  justice was  entirely  of  a  different level  and  of  a  different quality.   Any  prohibition  or   restriction  contained  in ordinary   laws   cannot  act  as   a  limitation   on   the constitutional  power of this Court.  Once this Court is  in seisin  of  a  matter before it, it has power to  issue  any order  or direction to do complete justice in the matter.  A reference  was  made  in that connection to  the  concurring opinion  of  Justice A.N.Sen in Harbans Singh v.   State  of U.P.   where  the learned Judge observed as  follows:   (SCC pp.107-08, para 20):

     "Very  wide  powers have been conferred on this  Court for  due  and proper administration of justice.  Apart  from the  jurisdiction  and powers conferred on this Court  under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution, I am of the opinion that  this Court retains and must retain, an inherent  power and   jurisdiction  for  dealing   with  any   extraordinary situation  in  the  larger interests  of  administration  of justice  and  for preventing manifest injustice being  done. This  power  must  necessarily  be sparingly  used  only  in exceptional  circumstances  for  furthering   the  ends   of justice."

     The  Court  has then gone on to observe there that  no enactment  made by Central or State legislature can limit or restrict  the  power of this Court under Article 142 of  the Constitution,  though the Court must take into consideration the  statutory provisions regulating the matter in  dispute. What  would  be the need of complete justice in a  cause  or matter,  would  depend upon the facts and  circumstances  of each case.

     In  the  case of Union Carbide Corporation and  others Vs.  Union of India and others (supra), a Constitution Bench of  this  Court dealing with the power of the Apex Court  to

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withdraw  unto itself cases pending in the district court at Bhopal,considered the scope and ambit of the power vested in the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.  In para 60 of the judgment it was observed :

     "Any  limited interpretation of the expression  "cause or  matter"  having regard to the wide and  sweeping  powers under  Article 136 which Article 142(1) seeks to effectuate, limiting  it only to the short compass of the actual dispute before  the  Court  and not to what  might  necessarily  and reasonably  be  connected with or related to such matter  in such  a  way that their withdrawal to the apex  Court  would enable  the  court to do "complete justice", would  stultify the  very wide constitutional powers.  Take, for instance, a case  where  an interlocutory order in a  matrimonial  cause pending  in the trial court comes up before the apex  Court. The  parties  agree  to have the main matter  itself  either decided  on  the merits or disposed of by a compromise.   If the  argument  is correct this Court would be  powerless  to withdraw  the main matter and dispose it of finally even  if it  be  on  consent  of both sides.   Take  also  a  similar situation  where some criminal proceedings are also  pending between  the  litigating  spouses.   If  all  disputes   are settled,  can the court not call up to itself the  connected criminal  litigation  for a final disposal?  If matters  are disposed  of by consent of the parties, can any one of  them later  turn around and say that the apex Court’s order was a nullity  as  one without jurisdiction and that  the  consent does  not confer jurisdiction?  This is not the way in which jurisdiction  with such wide constitutional powers is to  be construed.   While it is neiehter possible nor advisable  to enumerate  exhaustively the multitudinous ways in which such situations may present themselves before the Court where the Court  with the aid of the powers under Article 142(1) could bring  about  a  finality  to  the  matters,  it  is  common experience that day in and day out such matters are taken up and  decided in this Court.  It is true that mere  practice, however  long,  will not legitimize issues of  jurisdiction. But  the argument, pushed to its logical conclusions,  would mean  that when an interlocutory appeal comes up before this Court  by  special  leave,  even with  the  consent  of  the parties,  the  main matter cannot be finally disposed of  by this  Court  as  such a step would  imply  an  impermissible transfer  of  the main matter.  Such technicalities  do  not belong  to the content and interpretation of  constitutional powers.

     In  para  83  of the judgment this Court  rejected  as unsound  and  erroneous the proposition that a provision  in any  ordinary  law  irrespective of the  importance  of  the public  policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the apex Court under Article 142(1).

     In  paragraph  214  of  the judgment  summing  up  the conclusions reached this Court observed :

     (i)  The  contention  that  the  apex  Court  had  no jurisdiction  to  withdraw  to  itself  the  original  suits pending  in the District Court at Bhopal and dispose of  the same  in terms of the settlement and the further  contention that,  similarly, the Court had no jurisdiction to  withdraw the criminal proceedings are rejected.

     It   is  held  that  under   Article  142(1)  of   the

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Constitution, the Court had necessary jurisdiction and power to do so.

     Accordingly,  contentions  (A)  and (B) are  held  and answered against the petitioners.

     In  the  case of Ved Prakash and others vs.  Union  of India  and others (1994) 1 SCC 45 taking note of the piquant situation  caused  due  to inordinate delay  in  payment  of compensation  for  the property acquired under section 4  of the  Land  Acquisition  Act, this Court made  the  following observation:

     "The  petitioners because of the delay and inaction on the part of the respondents are in a great predicament.  Any amount  determined as market value of their lands  acquired, with  reference  to the dates of issuance  of  notifications under  sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act i.e.  at  the rate  prevalent 15-21 years prior to the dates of the making of the award, cannot be held to be compliance of the mandate regarding  payment  of market value of the land so  acquired under  the Constitution and the Act.  This Court faced  with such  a  situation, where proceedings have remained  pending for years after issuance of declarations under Section 6, in order  to protect the petitioners concerned from irreparable injury  i.e.  getting compensation for their lands  acquired with reference to the date of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, which may be more than a decade before the date  of  the making of the award, has advanced the date  of notification  under  sub-section  (1) of  Section,  so  that market  value of the land so acquired is paid at a just  and reasonable  rate.  Reference in this connection may be  made to the cases of Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v.  Raj Kumar Johri (1992)  1 SCC 328;  Akhara Brahm Buta, Amritsar v.  State of Punjab,  (1992)  4 SCC 243 and Bihar State Housing Board  v. Ram  Bihari Mahato, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2134.  This Court has  advanced the date of notification under sub-section (1) of  Section  4 of the Act, in the cases referred  to  above, without  assigning  any reason, as to how the date fixed  by Sections  11  and  23  of  the   Act,  can  be  altered  for ascertainment  of  the market value of land.  The  power  of this  Court  under  Article  142 is very  wide  and  can  be exercised  in  the ends of justice.  The scope of  the  said Article  was recently examined in the case of Union  Carbide Corpn.   v.   Union  of  India (1991) 4  SCC  584  (Emphasis supplied)

     In the case of N.A.  Mohammed Kasim (Dead) and another vs.  Sulochana and others (1995) Supp(3) SCC 128 which arose from  a civil suit this Court in the facts and circumstances of  the  case considered it fit for invoking  Court’s  power under  Article  142  for  giving  equitable  relief  to  the plaintiff-respondents,  not on ground on which they  claimed relief  in the suit but on the ground of promissory estoppel equity and fair play.

     From  the  conspectus  of the views expressed  in  the decided  cases  noted above it is clear that this Court  has invoked   the  power  vested  under   Section  142  of   the Constitution in different types of cases involving different fact  situations  for  doing complete  justice  between  the

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parties.

     In  the  case on hand the controversy relates  to  the scale  of  pay  admissible for Traffic  Apprentices  in  the Railways   appointed  prior  to   the  cut-off  date.    The controversy  in its very nature is one which applies to  all such  employees  of the Railways;  it is not  a  controversy which  is confined to some individual employees or a section of the employees.  If the judgment of the tribunal which had taken  a view contrary to the ratio laid down by judgment of this  Court  in  M.  Bhaskar’s case (supra) was  allowed  to stand  then the resultant position would have been that some Traffic  Apprentices  who were parties in those cases  would have  gained  an unfair and undeserved advantage over  other employees  who  are  or were holding the  same  post.   Such enviable   position  would  not  only   have  been  per   se discriminatory  but could have resulted in a situation which is undesirable for a cadre of large number of employees in a big  establishment  like  that of the Indian  Railways.   To avoid  such a situation this Court made the observations  in paragraph  17 of the judgment.  At the cost of repetition we may  reiterate that since the main plank of argument of  the appellants  was that since they were not parties in the case they  had  no  opportunity to place their case  before  this Court  made the observations in paragraph 17 of the judgment as  aforementioned  we  specifically asked  learned  counsel appearing  for the parties to place the argument in  support of their challenge to the observations made by this Court on merits.  No point of substance assailing the observations on merits could be placed by them.  The only contention made in that regard was some of the employees who were given benefit in  the judgments of the CAT have got further promotions and they  may  lose  the benefit of such promotion in  case  the observations  made  in  paragraph  17 of  the  judgment  are allowed  to  stand  as it is.  We are not impressed  by  the contention  raised.   If  some employees were  unjustly  and improperly  granted a higher scale of pay and on that  basis were given promotion to a higher post then the basis of such promotion  been on a non-existent;  the superstructure built on  such foundation should not be allowed to stand;  This is absolutely  necessary  for the sake of maintaining  equality and  fair  play with the other similarly  placed  employees. However, in our considered view, it will be just and fair to clarify  that  any amount drawn by such employees either  in the basic post (Traffic Apprentice) or in a promotional post will  not  be  required  to  be  refunded  by  the  employee concerned  as a consequence of this judgment.  This position also  follows as a necessary corolary from the  observations made  by  this  Court  in paragraph 18 of  the  judgment  in M.Bhaskar’s case (supra).

     On  the discussions made and the reasons set forth  in the preceeding paragraphs the appeal is dismissed but in the@@     JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ circumstances of the case without any order for costs.

       (G.B.PATTANAIK)

     J.  (S.RAJENDRA BABU)

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