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PETITIONER: DURGA PRASHAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS & EXPORTS & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/11/1968

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. HEGDE, K.S.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  769            1969 SCR  (2) 596  1969 SCC  (1) 185

ACT: Constitution  of  India, Art.  226-Mandamus  seeking  import licence-Delay  in filing writ petition-Relief if  should  be given.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  who carried on the business  of  export  and import  applied  for  an import licence  to  import  certain goods.   The licence was issued in 1959 for only a  part  of the  value applied for.  He filed appeals and exhausted  all the  remedies  under para 85 of the order  relating  to  the Export  Promotion  Scheme, as a result of which  finally  in March 1962 he was granted a supplementary licence to  import a  small  part of the goods. In April  1964,  the  appellant approached the Minister, and he was informed that no further licence  would be issued to him.  Thereupon,  the  appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution  seeking a  mandamus for the issue of the import licence.   The  High Court   dismissed  the  petition  in  limine   but   granted certificate Under Art. 133(1)(a) of the  Constitution. ’ HELD: The  appeal must fail.     The  petition  under Art. 226 of  the  Constitution  was filed  after great delay.  No explanation was given  in  the petition for the delay in filing the petition and it was not explained  what  the appellant was doing  between  March  6, 1962, when  the supplementary licence was issued, and  April 1964.  The exchange position of this country and the  policy of  the  Government regarding  international  trade,  varies from year to  year and it would be rather odd for this Court to  direct that an import  licence  be granted in  the  year 1968  in  respect  of alleged  default   committed  by   the Government  in  1959  or  1962.  In  these  matters  it  was essential  that persons who were aggrieved by orders of  the Government  should approach the High Court after  exhausting the  remedies  provided by law, rule or  order  with  utmost expedition.    Even  in  the  case  of  alleged  breach   of fundamental rights the matter must be left to the discretion of the High Court. [864 G, 865 B]     Smt. Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar,  C.A.  No. 140 of 1964 judgment dated, September 22, 1964,  Maharashtra State  Road Transport Corporation  v.  Shri Balwant  Regular

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Motor Service, Amravati,  [1969]  S.C.R. 808 and Moon  Mills v.  Industrial  Court, A.I.R., 1967 S.C. 1450,  1453,  1454, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1116 of 1965.   Appeal from the order dated August 26, 1964 of the  Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 498-D of 1964.     M.C..Chagla,  Sardar Bahaclur, Ajit Prasad Jain,  Vishnu B. Saharya ,and Yougindra Kaushalani, for the appellant. V.A. Seyid Muhammad and S.P. Nayar, for the respondents. 862 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Sikri, J. The appellant, Durga Prashad, filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the  respondents. The  High Court of Punjab, Circuit Bench,  Delhi,  dismissed the   petition in limine.  Thereupon the appellant   applied for   a    certificate  under  Art.   133  (1)(a)   of   the Constitution.   The High Court gave this certificate on  the ground  that  the  value  of  the  subject-matter   directly involved in the petition exceeds Rs. 20,000/-.   In  our opinion this appeal must fail on the  ground  that the  petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution  was  filed after  great delay.  The relevant facts are as  under.   The appellant was carrying on business of export and import, and exported goods of the value of Rs. 8,10,325/-, F.O.B.  value Rs.  8,03,530.45,  during the period August 25,   1958,   to September   29,   1958.  On   November   12,    1958,    the appellant   applied   for  an import licence  for  art  silk yarn   of the  f.o.b.  value  of  Rs. 8,03,530.45  nP  under the Export Promotion Scheme. The Export Promotion Scheme was discontinued with effect from March 6, 1959.  On October  9, 1959, import licence of the value of Rs. 3,27,841/- only was issued  to  the appellant by the Joint Chief  Controller  of Imports and Exports, Bombay.  His appeal against this  order was rejected by the Joint Chief Controller on March 4, 1960. It  is  alleged  by the appellant that he was  not  given  a hearing.   The appellant filed a second appeal to the  Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, and this was dismissed on April 22,  1961.  Here again it is alleged that no’  hearing was  given  to  the appellant.  He  filed  a  representation against  the  order  dated April 22,   1961,   and  on  that representation a supplementary import licence for import  of art  silk  yarn  of  the  value  of Rs. 30,000/- was  issued to  the  appellant. This exhausted all the remedies  he  had under para 85 of the order relating to the Export  Promotion Scheme,  but he instead of filing a writ chose to wait.  The appellant    apparently   approached   the    Minister    of International Trade by letter dated April 6, 1964-  this  is the  letter  referred  to  in  the  letter  of  the  Private Secretary  to  the Minister of International  Trade-and  the Private  Secretary, vide  his letter  dated April 16,  1964, wrote  to him saying that his letter had been passed  on  to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi,  and if  so  desired  the appellant may see him  in  the  matter. Apparently the Chief Controller invited him and on June  22, 1964,  he  was  informed that no further  licence  would  be issued to him.  On August 24, 1964, the appellant filed  the petition above-mentioned in the High Court.  No  explanation has  been given in the petition for the delay in filing  the petition  and it has not been explained what  the  appellant was doing between March 863

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   5, 1962, when the supplementary licence was issued,  and April 6, 1964.     It  is  well-settled that the relief under Art.  226  is discretionary, and one ground for refusing relief under Art. 226  is  that the petitioner has filed  the  petition  after delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation.     Gajendragadkar,  C.J.,  speaking  for  the  Constitution Bench,  n  Smt. Narayani Debi  Khaitan  v.  The   State   of Bihar(1), observed.                     "It is well-settled that under Art. 226,               the  power  of  the High  Court  to  issue  an               appropriate writ is discretionary.  There  can               be  no doubt that if a citizen moves the  High               Court  under  Art. 226 and contends  that  his               fundamental  rights have been  contravened  by               any  executive  action, the High  Court  would               naturally like to give relief to him; but even               in  such  a case, if the petitioner  has  been               guilty of laches, and there are other relevant               circumstances which indicate that it would  be               inappropriate  for the High Court to  exercise               its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of               the  petitioner, ends of justice  may  require               that  the High Court should refuse to issue  a               writ.  There can be little doubt that if it is               shown that a party moving the High Court under               Art. 226 for a writ is, in substance, claiming               a relief which under the law of limitation was               barred at the time when the writ petition  was               filed,  the High Court would refuse  to  grant               any relief in its writ jurisdiction.  No  hard               and fast rule can be laid down as to when  the               High  Court  should  refuse  to  exercise  its               jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it               after  considerable  delay  and  is  otherwise               guilty of laches.  That is a matter which must               be  left to the discretion of the  High  Court               and like all matters left to the discretion of               the Court, in this matter too discretion  must               be exercised judiciously and reasonably."     Relying  on  the judgment of this Court  in  Maharashtra State  Road Transport Corporation v. Shri  Balwant   Regular Motor  service,  Amravati(2)  the learned  counsel  for  the appellant  contends hat the delay should not debar him  from seeking  relief because he respondents have not suffered  in any  manner because of the delay.  In this  case  Ramaswami, J., speaking for the Court, referred to an earlier  decision in Moon Mills v. Industrial Court(a). (1)   C.A.  No. 140 of 1964; judgment  dated  September  22, 1964. (2)  [1969] 1 S.C.R. 808. (3) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1450, 53, 54. Sup CI/69- 4 864 In  that  case  Ramaswami,  J.,..speaking  for  the   Court, observed:                     "It is true that the issue of a writ  of               certiorari  is  largely  a  matter  of   sound               discretion.   It is also true ’that  the  writ               will   not  be  granted  if  there   is   such               negligence  or  omission on the  part  of  the               applicant  to  assert his right as,  taken  in               conjunction  with the lapse of time and  other               circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse               party.   The principle is to a  great  extent,               though  not  identical with,  similar  to  the

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             exercise   of  discretion  in  the  Court   of               Chancery." It  would be noticed that Ramaswami, J., had first  examined the  question  of delay and came to a finding that  in  fact there was n delay.  Ramaswami, J., observed:       "On  behalf  of the respondent Mr.  B.  Sen,  however, pointed  out  that  the conduct of the  appellant  does  not entitle  it  to  the grant of a writ, because  it  has  been guilty of acquiescence or delay. It was pointed out that the award  of  Mr.  What was given on April  25,  1958,  but  an application  to the High Court for grant of a writ was  made long  after on November 16, 1959.  We do not think there  is any   substance  in  this  argument,  because   the   second respondent had made an application, dated August 19, 1958 to the  Labour  Court  for enforcement of  the  award  and  the appellant  had  contested  that  application  by  a  Written Statement,  dated  September  15, 1958.   The  Labour  Court allowed the application on August 4, 1959 and the  appellant had  preferred an appeal to the Industrial Court  on  August 31, 1959.  The decision of the industrial Court was given on October  24,  1959 and after the appeal  was  dismissed  the appellant  moved  the  High Court for grant  of  a  writ  on November 16, 1959."     The  appellant  in this case had claimed a  mandamus  or direction  to  the  respondents to issue  to  the  appellant import  licence  for  art  silk yarn of  the  value  of  Rs. 8,03,530.45.  It is well-know that the exchange position  of this   country  and  the  policy  of  Government   regarding International trade varies from year t year and it would  be rather odd for this Court to direct that a Import licence be granted  in  the year 1968 in respect  of  allege,,  default committed  by  the  Government in 1959 or  1962.   In  these matters  it is essential that persons who are  aggrieved  by order of the Government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order  with utmost expedition. 865     The learned counsel for the appellant contends that this matter  involved fundamental rights and this Court at  least should not refuse to give relief on the ground of delay. But we  are  exercising our jurisdiction not under Art.  32  but under Art. 226, and as observed. by Gajendragadkar, C.J., in the  passage  extracted above, even in the case  of  alleged breach of fundamental rights the matter must be left to  the discretion of the High Court. In the result the appeal fails.  Parties will bear their own costs. Y.P.                                     Appeal dismissed. 366