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PETITIONER: DR. SMT. KUNTESH GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MANAGEMENT OF HINDU KANYA MAHAVIDYALAYA, SITAPUR (U.P) &ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/09/1987

BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) MISRA RANGNATH

CITATION:  1987 AIR 2186            1988 SCR  (1) 357  1987 SCC  (4) 525        JT 1987 (3)   670  1987 SCALE  (2)667

ACT:      Constitution of  India-Art. 226  When an authority acts wholly without  jurisdiction,  the  High  Court  should  not refuse to  exercise its  jurisdiction under  Art. 226 on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy.      Administrative Law-A  quasi-judicial  authority  cannot review its  own order  unless power  of review  is expressly conferred on  it by  the statute  under which it derives its jurisdiction.      U.P. State  Universities Act,  1973-The Vice Chancellor in considering  an order of dismissal of a principal acts as a quasi-judicial authority.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  was the principal of an institution, the management of  which had  been entrusted  to  an  Authorised Controller under  s. 58  of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973. Following  upon certain  disputes and differences with regard to  the management  of the institution, the appellant was suspended  by the Controller but the order of suspension was stayed  by the  Vice Chancellor.  The Controller,  after holding an  ex-parte inquiry,  dismissed the  appellant from service in  exercise of  the power  vested  in  him  by  the University Statute  17.06 which  provided the  giving of  an opportunity of  being heard  to the  teacher  concerned  and prescribed a  procedure for inquiry. The Vice Chancellor, on the ground  that the  charges against  the appellant did not warrant her  dismissal, disapproved  the order  of dismissal and  directed   reinstatement  of  the  appellant,  granting liberty to  the Controller  to impose a lesser punishment on her. The  Controller passed  an order allowing the appellant to function  as the  Principal but at the same time imposing various restraints and constraints on her powers and duties, which was  challenged by  her in a petition filed under Art. 226. The  High Court  quashed the said order with liberty to the Controller to impose a minor penalty on the appellant in accordance with the order of the Vice Chancellor. Three days before the  High Court  delivered  its  judgment,  the  Vice Chancellor had reviewed her earlier order at the instance of H 358

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the appellant, and, on the basis of two reports of the Joint Director of Higher Education alleging that the appellant had committed grave  financial irregularities,  had approved the order of dismissal passed earlier by the Controller; but the Controller, who  was a  party to  the writ  petition did not bring it  to the  notice of  the High  Court. The  appellant challenged the aforesaid order of the Vice Chancellor passed in review  by a  petition under Art. 226 which was dismissed by  the  High  Court  on  the  around  of  existence  of  an alternative  remedy   under  s.   68  of   the  U.P.   State lUniversities Act.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: It is well established that an alternative remedy is not  an absolute  bar to  the maintainability  of a  writ petition.  When   an  authority  has  acted  wholly  without jurisdiction, the  High Court  should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction  under Art.  226 on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. [362C-D]      In the  instant case,  the Vice Chancellor had no power of review  and the  exercise of  such a  power  by  her  was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice  Chancellor on  review was a nullity; such an order could surely  be challenged  before  the  High  Court  by  a petition under  Art. 226 and, in our opinion, the High Court was not  justified in  dismissing the  writ petition  on the ground that  an alternative  remedy  was  available  to  the appellant under  s. 68  of the  U.P. State Universities Act. [362D-E]      2. It  is now  well established  that a  quasi judicial authority cannot  review its  own order  unless the power of review is  expressly conferred  on it  by the  statute under which it  derives its  jurisdiction. The  Vice Chancellor in considering  the   question  of  approval  of  an  order  of dismissal  of   the  Principal,  acts  as  a  quasi-judicial authority. It  is not  disputed that  the provisions  of the U.P. State  Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do  not confer  any power  of review  on the Vice Chancellor. In  the circumstances,  it must be held that the Vice  Chancellor   acted  wholly   without  jurisdiction  in reviewing her  order dated  January 24,  1987 by  her  order dated March 7, 1987. [361H; 362A-B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2468 of 1987      From the  Judgment and  order dated  13.5.1987  of  the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 1822 of 1987. 359      R.K. Jain and R.P. Gupta for the Appellant.      S.N. Kacker,  Dileep Tandon, R.B. Mehrotra, P.N. Bhatta and R.A. Gupta for the Respondents      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DUTT,  J.   Both  the   parties  have   made  elaborate submissions at  the preliminary hearing of the special leave petition filed  by the appellant Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta. The special leave  is granted  and we  proceed to dispose of the appeal on merit.      The appeal  is directed  against the  judgment  of  the Allahabad High  Court dismissing  the writ  petition of  the appellant on  the ground  of  existence  of  an  alternative remedy under  section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973.

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    The appellant,  Dr. Smt.  Kuntesh Gupta,  was appointed the Principal  of Hindu  Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur, U.P., on June 4, 1984 and was confirmed in the said post on May 4, 1985.  In  view  of  existence  of  two  unrecognised  rival Committees of  Management the  State Government, in exercise of its power under section 58 of the U.P. State Universities Act, appointed one of the Additional District Magistrates of the District  the Authorised  Controller of the Institution. The Authorised  Controller was  entitled to exercise all the powers of the Committee of Management.      It appears  that the appellant, as the Principal of the Institution, and the Authorised Controller could not see eye to  eye   with  each  other  and  there  were  disputes  and differences between  them in regard to the management of the Institution. The  differences between them reached to such a degree that  the Authorised  Controller by  his order  dated January 27,  1986 suspended  the  appellant.  The  order  of suspension was,  however, stayed  by the  Vice-Chancellor of the University  on  January  29,  1986.  After  hearing  the appellant and the Authorised Controller, the Vice-Chancellor maintained  the   stay  order.  Thereafter,  the  Authorised Controller held  an ex  parte enquiry and by his order dated April 21,  1986 dismissed  the  appellant  from  service  in exercise of  the powers  of the Managing Committee vested in him by  Statute 17.06  of the  Statutes of  the  University. Statute 17.06  provides for  the giving of an opportunity of being heard  to  the  teacher  concerned  and  prescribes  a procedure for enquiry which, according to the appellant, was not followed by the Authorised Controller. A copy of 360 the said  order of  dismissal was  sent to  the Director  of Education  and  to  the  Vice-Chancellor  for  approval,  as required under Statute 17.06(3).      The Vice-Chancellor  after hearing  the parties, by her order dated  January  24,  1987  disapproved  the  order  of dismissal of  the appellant  on the  ground that the charges against the  appellant did  not warrant  her dismissal  from service and directed that the appellant should be allowed to function as Principal of the College forthwith.      After the  said order was passed by the Vice-Chancellor reinstating  the  appellant  and  granting  liberty  to  the Authorised Controller  to impose  lesser punishment  on  the appellant, if  deemed necessary,  the Authorised  Controller without passing  any lesser  punishment, by  his order dated January 27,  1987 allowed  the appellant  to function as the Principal, but put various restraints and constraints on her powers and  duties as  Principal and  directed her to vacate the quarters  in which  she was residing. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant  moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution  of   India  against  the  imposition  of  such restraints and  constraints on  her powers and duties as the Principal of  the College. The High Court, after considering the fact  and circumstances  of the  case, by  its  judgment dated March  10, 1987  quashed the  said order dated January 27, 1987  of the  Authorised Controller  and directed him to allow  the   appellant  to   function  as  the  full-fledged Principal of  the Institution  in accordance  with law.  The High  Court   further  granted  liberty  to  the  Authorised Controller to  go ahead with the imposition of minor penalty on the  appellant in  accordance with law and as provided in the said order of the Vice-Chancellor.      It appears that while the matter was pending before the High Court,  at the  instance of  the appellant,  the  Vice- Chancellor passed  an order  dated March 7, 1987, that is to say, three  days before the date of the judgment of the High

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Court,  reviewing   her  earlier   order  disapproving   the dismissal of  the appellant from service. By the order dated March 7, 1987 passed on review, the Vice-Chancellor approved the  order  of  the  Authorised  Controller  dismissing  the appellant from  service on  the basis  of two reports of the Joint Director  of Higher  Education, U.P., one dated August 1, 1986  and the  other dated  July 18, 1986, alleging great financial  irregularities   committed  by   the   appellant. Although the  said order  dated March  7, 1987 was passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review three days before the delivery of the  judgment by  the High  Court, no steps were taken by the Authorised  Controller, who  was a  party  in  the  writ petition, to  bring to the notice of the High Court the said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 361      It is  alleged by the appellant that the said order was passed  by   the  Vice-Chancellor   in  collusion  with  the Authorised Controller  with a  view to  rendering  the  writ petition of  the appellant and also the judgment of the High Court infructuous.  While we  reject the  allegation of  the appellant that  the said  order  was  passed  by  the  Vice- Chancellor in  collusion with the Authorised Controller, for there  is   no  material   whatsoever  in  support  of  that allegation,  we   are  of   the  view  that  the  Authorised Controller should  have brought  to the  notice of  the High Court the order of the Vice-Chancellor passed on review.      Be that  as it  may, the  appellant again  filed a writ petition under  Article 226  of the  Constitution  of  India against the  said order  dated March  7, 1987  of the  Vice- Chancellor passed  on review.  The High Court, however, took the view  that the  impugned order  could be challenged on a reference to  the Chancellor  of University under section 68 of the  U.P. State  Universities Act, 1973 and, accordingly, dismissed the writ petition on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. Hence this appeal.      It has  been strenuously  urged by  Mr. Jain,  learned. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that the Vice- chancellor had  no power of review under the Statutes of the University or  under the  U.P. State  Universities Act, 1973 and, as  such,  the  Vice-Chancellor  acted  wholly  without jurisdiction in entertaining an application for review filed by the  Authorised Controller.  On the  other  hand,  it  is submitted by Mr. Kacker, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor, that as the two reports dated August 1, 1986  and July  18, 1986  of the Joint Director of Higher Education,   U.P.,    alleging   certain   grave   financial irregularities, were  not before  the  Vice-Chancellor,  the Vice-Chancellor was  entitled to  review her order and after considering the said reports reviewed her order and approved the order  of  dismissal  of  the  appellant  from  service. Further, it  is submitted  by the  learned Counsel  that the High Court  was  justified  in  not  entertaining  the  writ petition of  the appellant,  as  there  was  an  alternative remedy under  section 68  of the U.P. State Universities Act and the  impugned  order  could  be  challenged  before  the Chancellor of  the University on a reference of the question to the Chancellor under the provision of section 68.      It is  now  well  established  that  a  quasi  judicial authority cannot  review its  own order, unless the power of review is  expressly conferred  on it  by the  statute under which it  derives its  jurisdiction. The  Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of 362 dismissal  of  the  Principal,  acts  as  a  quasi  judicial authority. It  is not  disputed that  the provisions  of the

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U.P. State  Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do  not confer  any power  of review on the Vice- Chancellor. In  the circumstances,  it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor  acted   wholly  without   jurisdiction   in reviewing her  order dated  January 24,  1987 by  her  order dated March 7, 1987. The R said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity.      The next  question that  falls for our consideration is whether the  High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of  the appellant  on the ground of availability of an  alternative  remedy.  It  is  true  that  there  was  an alternative remedy  for challenging  the impugned  order  by referring the question to the Chancellor under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. It is well established that an  alternative  remedy  is  not  an  absolute  bar  to  the maintainability of  a writ  petition. When  an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on  the ground  of existence  of an alternative remedy. In  the instant  case., the  Vice-Chancellor had  no power of  review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor  on review  was a nullity; such an order could surely  be challenged  before  the  High  Court  by  a petition under  Article 226  of the Constitution and, in our opinion, the  High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition  on the  ground that an alternative remedy was available to  the appellant  under section  68 of  the  U.P. State Universities Act.      As the  impugned order  of  the  Vice-Chancellor  is  a nullity, it  would be a useless formality to send the matter back to  the High Court for disposal of the writ petition on merits. We  would, accordingly,  quash the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor  dated March  7,  1987  and  direct  the reinstatement of  the appellant  forthwith to  the  post  of Principal of the Institution. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.      We, however, make it clear that the respondents will be at liberty to initiate a departmental proceeding against the appellant, if  they so think fit and proper, on the basis of the allegations  as made  in the  said reports  of the Joint Director of Higher Education, U.P. H.L.C.                                       Appeal allowed. 363