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PETITIONER: (MRS.) ROSHAN SAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: B.R. COTTON MILLS LTD. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/04/1990

BENCH: KANIA, M.H. BENCH: KANIA, M.H. KULDIP SINGH (J) SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR 1881            1990 SCR  (2) 381  1990 SCC  (2) 636        JT 1990 (3)   522  1990 SCALE  (1)718

ACT:     Contempt  of Courts Act, 1971: Section 2(b)--Civil  Con- tempt-Nature       of      proceeding----Punishment       of Contemnor--Standard of proof required.     Constitution of India,  1950: Article  142(1)--Jurisdic- tion of Supreme Court--Exercise of in a contempt  proceeding in order to do justice.     Bombay  Rents, Hotel and Lodging House  Rates  (Control) Act,  1947:  Eviction of tenant--Time granted  for  vacating premises--Undertaking    to    give    vacant     possession filed--Declaratory  suit  for  sub-tenancy  filed  and  stay obtained thwarting execution of eviction decree--In order to do justice, Court directing landlord to be put in possession of suit premises pending disposal of declaratory suit.

HEADNOTE:     The appellant-landlord obtained a decree of eviction  of respondent No. 1 company from the suit premises.  Aggrieved, respondent  No.  1  filed a Writ Petition  before  the  High Court. Dismissing the Petition, the High Court granted eight weeks’ time to respondent No. 1 for vacating the suit  prem- ises,  subject to the filing of an undertaking that it  will not  part  with  the possession of, or  create  third  party interest  in,  the suit premises in any  manner  whatsoever. After some correspondence respondent No. 3, by an affidavit, filed the required undertaking on behalf of respondent No. 1 but  without  mentioning that the respondent No. 1  had  not already  parted  with  possession of the  suit  premises  or created any third party interest therein. Later, counsel for respondent No. 1 clarified that when the undertaking  stated that  respondent  No. I would not part  with  possession  it meant  that respondent No. 1 was in possession. But, in  the meantime,  respondent  No. 2 Chairman of  respondent  No.  1 Company filed a suit claiming a declaration that he was  the lawful sub-tenant and the decree for possession was a nulli- ty and obtained an injunction, thus preventing the appellant from executing the decree. Thereupon, the appellant filed  a petition for contempt before the High Court praying that the respondents  should be punished under the provisions of  the Contempt  of Courts Act, 1972. The High Court  rejected  the

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petition. 381     In  the  appeal before this Court, it was  contended  on behalf of the landlord-appellant that the High Court was  in error  in holding that no contempt was  established  against the  respondents, that the undertaking clearly implied  that respondent  No. 1 was in possession of the premises and  was in a position to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the  same after eight weeks, which was also made clear  from the clarification given by counsel for respondent No. 1 that this  assurance/undertaking was false, as by that  time  re- spondent No. 2, had already filed a suit claiming sub-tenan- cy from respondent, that the record disclosed that  respond- ents  No. 1 and 2, were acting in collusion with a  view  to defeat  the decree obtained by the appellant and to  prevent the  execution of the decree and that the resolution of  the respondent  No. 1 under which respondent No. 2 was  claiming sub-tenancy was fabricated and antedated.     It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that before a  Court  could  take any action for contempt,  it  must  be strictly  established  that  the contempt  had  been  proved beyond  reasonable doubt, as an action for contempt  was  in the nature of a criminal proceeding. Allowing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  .  I The Proceedings in the contempt  are  quasi- criminal  in nature, and law of contempt has to be  strictly interpreted,  and  the  requirements of  that  law  must  be strictly  complied with before any person can  be  committed for contempt. However, where there is patent dishonesty writ large  on the face of the record, the law does  not  require that  this Court should sit back with folded hands and  fail to take any action in the matter. In exercise of its  juris- diction under clause (1) of Article 142 of the Constitution, this  Court  may pass such decree or make such order  as  is necessary  for doing complete justice in any case or  matter pending before it. [391G-H; C-D]     1.2 In the instant case, respondent No. 1 gave an under- taking based on an implication or assumption which was false in  its knowledge and to the knowledge of respondent  No  2. Respondent  No. 2 was equally instrumental in the giving  of this  undertaking. This implication or assumption  was  made explicit  by  the  clarification given by  the  counsel  for respondent  No. 1. Respondent No. 2 was equally  responsible for instructing counsel to give this clarification which was false  to the knowledge of both, respondents Nos. 1  and  2. Both  respondent  No. 1 and respondent No. 2 have  tried  to deceive  the  Court and the appellant. In view of  this,  it cannot be said that they are not guilty of contempt. 382 Respondent  No. 1 is guilty of misconduct amounting to  con- tempt and must be held to have committed contempt by  giving the  undertaking  and instructing its counsel  to  give  the clarification  of  the meaning of  the  undertaking  knowing fully  well that it was not in possession of the suit  prem- ises,  and was not in a position to give possession  of  the suit  premises, to the appellant in execution of the  decree in  favour of the appellant or otherwise. There is no  doubt that  respondent  No. 2 was a party to this  breach  of  the undertaking  being  committed and, in fact, it  was  at  his instance  that respondent No. 1 committed the breach of  the undertaking. [391H, 392A-B, 391E-F]     1.3 Respondents No. 1 and 2 cannot be allowed to  thwart the  execution of the decree and continue to remain in  pos- session of the suit premises. No doubt, the claim set up  by respondent  No.  2 in the declaratory suit filed by  him  to

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establish  that he is a sub-tenant of the suit premises  and entitled to protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and  Lodg- ing  House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 cannot  be  foreclosed. However,  by  reason of any interim order obtained  in  that suit, the appellant can no longer be deprived of the posses- sion of the said premises pursuant to the decree obtained by her, till the claim in the declaratory suit is  established. [392C, E]     1.4 The Court Receiver. High Court, who has already been appointed should appoint the appellant as his agent in place of the existing agent, and hand over possession of the  suit premises to her on such terms and conditions as he may think fit.  It  would  be open to respondent No. 2  to  apply  for vacation  or  variation of the order, in the  event  of  his being  able  to establish his right to  sub-tenancy.  [392G, 393C]     Noorali  Babul Thanewala v. Sh. K.M.M. Shetty and  Ors., J.T. 1989 4 S.C. 573, relied on.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1778  of 1990.     From the Judgment and Order dated 5.7.1988 of the Bombay High Court in Contempt Petition No. 106 of 1987.     P.  Chidambaram,  Ms.  Raian  Karanjawala,  Mrs.  Manish Karanjawala and Mrs. Meenakshi Arora for the Appellant.     K.S.  Cooper, K. Parasaran, Anil B. Divan, A.S.  Bhasme, P.H. Parekh, Sunil Dogra, Gopal Subramaniam, Ms. Indu Malho- tra for the Respondents. 383 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     KANIA,  J.  Leave granted. The appeal is  taken  up  for final hearing. Counsel heard.     The short facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:     The appellant is the owner of a Bungalow known as "Villa Hormazd" at 8-A, Carmichel Road, Bombay. The suit  premises, comprising  two floors of the said bungalow, were leased  to Mayer Mills Ltd. under a lease deed dated April 16, 1948 for a period of three years from November 1, 1947. At that time, the bungalow belonged to the father of the appellant. On the death of the father of the appellant in 1949, the  appellant became the landlady of the said bungalow. Respondent no.  1, B  .R. Cotton Mills. Ltd., is the  successor-in-interest  of Mayer Mills Ltd. and at the relevant time was in  possession of  the suit premises as a tenant. Respondent no. 2  is  the Chairman  of respondent no. 1 and the other respondents  are some  of  the Directors of respondent no. 1.  The  appellant filed a suit being R.A.E. No. 763/ 6563 of 1966 in the Small Causes Court at Bombay for eviction of respondent no. 1 from the  suit premises and for possession on the ground of  rea- sonable  and bona fide requirement. During the  pendency  of this  suit, another suit for eviction was also filed by  the appellant  against  respondent  no. 1 for  eviction  on  the ground  of  default in the payment of rent for a  period  of more than six months. The Trial Court by its judgment  dated September  13,  1975  decreed the  aforesaid  eviction  suit R.A.E. No. 763/6563 of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the said  suit")  but the other suit for eviction filed  by  the appellant  was  dismissed  in view of  the  eviction  decree passed  in the said suit. Respondents nos. 1 and 2 filed  an appeal  against the decree for eviction but the said  appeal was dismissed. In February, 1986, the husband of the  appel-

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lant  died and after that the appellant is the  landlady  of the  said  bungalow. On the other hand, the  appeal  of  the appellant  against  the  dismissal of her  other  suit,  for eviction  on  the ground of default in payment of  rent  was allowed  and that suit was also decreed  against  respondent no. 1. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court at Bombay challenging the decrees for eviction  passed by the Court of Small Causes as aforestated. On February 27, 1987,  respondent no. 2 filed a suit in the Court  of  Small Causes  for a declaration that he was the lawful  sub-tenant of  the  suit premises and was not bound by the  decrees  of eviction passed in respect of the suit premises against  the tenant, namely, respondent no. 1. The said Writ Petition 384 No.  1066 of 1987 filed by respondent no. 1 challenging  the decrees for eviction passed against respondent no. 1 in  the said  suits  and  confirmed in appeal came  up  for  hearing before  a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High  Court  on March  5, 1983. The learned Judge by his judgment and  order of  the  same date, dismissed the said  writ  petition.  The relevant  part  of the order of the learned Judge  reads  as follows: "The  petitioner requests for time of eight weeks to  vacate the premises. He is granted the said time subject to execut- ing  written  undertaking that he shall not  part  with  the possession of the suit premises or create third party inter- ests  in  the suit premises in the meantime  in  any  manner whatsoever. ’ ’     On  March  11,  1987, the matter was  brought  up  again before  the learned Single Judge by learned counsel for  the appellant  for  pointing out that respondent no. 1  had  not filed the requisite undertaking as directed under the  order dated 5.3. 1987. It appears that at that stage it was point- ed  out to the Court by Mr. Dalvi, learned counsel  for  the appellant that respondent no. 2 had filed a declaratory suit in  the Court of Small Causes as aforestated claiming to  be the  sub-tenant  of  the suit premises.  The  order  of  the learned  Judge dated March 11, 1987 shows that  the  learned Judge stated that he did not wish to take any action at that time  on  the  conduct of respondent no. 1 but,  as  a  last chance,  granted respondent no. 1 time upto March  17,  1987 for  furnishing the undertaking as ordered failing which  it would  be deemed that the condition was not  fulfilled.  Re- spondent  No. 3, as a Director of respondent no. 1,  by  his affidavit,  affirmed on March 17, 1987, gave an  undertaking merely  stating that respondent no. 1 would not  commit  any act  contrary  to or in breach of the order dated  March  5, 1987.  It was pointed out by the appellant that this  under- taking  was not in compliance with the orders passed by  the learned Single Judge. After some correspondence,  respondent no. 3, by his affidavit affirmed on March 25, 1987 filed  an undertaking on behalf of respondent no. 1 inter alia stating that respondent no. 1 would not part with the possession  of suit premises or create any third party interest in the suit premises  in any manner whatsoever. The undertaking did  not state that respondent no. 1 had not, before the  undertaking was given parted with the possession of the suit premises or created  any third party interest therein. When  the  matter came  up on March 31, 1987 before the learned  Single  Judge who  had given time to respondent no 1 to vacate  as  afore- stated, it was pointed out by learned counsel for the appel- lant  that  the undertaking was objected to as  it  did  not state that 385 respondent  no.  1 was in possession.  Thereupon  Shri  R.J.

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Joshi, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 Company,  stated that  the  undertaking spoke for itself and when  it  stated that  respondent "shall not part with possession"  it  meant that respondent no. 1 company was in possession. In view  of this, the learned Judge did not give any further  clarifica- tion. Respondent No. 1 preferred a special leave petition to this  court against the judgment of the learned  Judge  dis- missing  the said writ petition but the said  special  leave petition  was  dismissed. Thereafter the suit filed  by  re- spondent  no. 2 in the Court of Small Causes for a  declara- tion that he was the lawful sub-tenant of the suit  premises was  dismissed but he preferred an appeal against  the  said decision  and in that appeal obtained an interim  injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with his  posses- sion  of the suit premises. In view of this, the decree  for eviction could not be executed. Thereafter in June 1987, the appellant  filed  Contempt Petition No. 106 of 1987  in  the Bombay High Court setting out the facts and praying that the respondents  should be punished under the provisions of  the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It has been inter alia alleged in  the contempt petition by the appellant that in spite  of the  said  undertaking, respondent no. 2 had filed  a  suit, being suit no.2911 of 1987 in the City Civil Court at Bombay claiming a declaration that the decree for possession was  a nullity and for an injunction restraining the appellant from executing the decree and obtained an ad-interim injunction a few  days after the summary dismissal of the  special  leave petitions  filed by the respondents in this Court as  afore- stated.  The  said suit was thereafter  dismissed  for  non- prosecution but, in the meantime, respondent no. 2 filed the suit in the Court of Small Causes for a declaration that  he was the lawful sub-tenant of the premises as aforestated. It was submitted by the appellant in the contempt petition that the  said  undertaking  given by respondent  no.  1  clearly implied that on the date of the undertaking, respondent  no. 1  was  in possession of the suit premises and in  order  to defeat  the decree for possession, respondent no. 1 had  set up  its  Chairman, respondent no. 2, to file  the  aforesaid suit  in the Court of Small Causes claiming sub-tenancy.  It was  further  submitted by the appellant that  although  re- spondent  no.  1 continued to be in possession of  the  suit premises it had set up respondent no. 2 to file the suit  on the ground that he was in possession of the suit premises as a sub-tenant in his own right and continued to be in posses- sion  thereof. The learned Judge before whom the  said  con- tempt petition came up for hearing took the view that in the order  of the learned Single Judge dated March 5,  1987,  he was  unable to read any direction to file an undertaking  to give possession. He took the view that the aforesaid  under- taking  given on behalf of respondent no. 1, that  it  would not part 386 with  possession or create any third party interest  in  the suit  premises, did not imply that respondent no. 1  was  in actual physical possession of the suit premises and that the fact that respondent no. 2 was claiming an independent title in  himself  as a sub-tenant by virtue of  a  Resolution  of respondent no. 1 was not sufficient to hold that  respondent no.  1 or the other respondents were guilty of contempt.  He took  the view that there was no undertaking  by  respondent no. 1 to deliver possession of the suit premises and on  the basis  of these conclusions, he rejected the contempt  peti- tion.  At the same time the learned Judge did  observe  that respondent  no. 1 may have indulged in sharp  practices  but held that it was not guilty of contempt. The present  appeal

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is directed against this order.     It was submitted by Mr. Chidambaram, learned counsel for the  appellant  that respondent no. 1 and respondent  no.  2 were guilty of contempt and the learned Single Judge was  in error when he took the view that no contempt was established in  the matter against the respondents. It was submitted  by learned counsel that on 5th March, 1987 when the writ  peti- tion preferred by respondent no. 1 was summarily rejected by Justice  Puranik of the Bombay High Court,  learned  counsel for  respondent no. 1, on instructions, made an  application to  the  learned Judge to grant respondent no.  1  time  for eight  weeks  to  vacate the suit premises.  This  time  was granted subject to respondent no. 1 executing an undertaking that  he would not part with the possession of the  premises or create third party interests therein as set out  earlier. After  delaying the matter for some time, respondent  no.  3 filed  on  March 25, 1987, an affidavit, as  a  director  of respondent no. 1 wherein he set out inter alia that respond- ent  no. 1 agreed to give an undertaking as set out  earlier as respondent no. 1 was desirous of approaching the  Supreme Court to challenge the order of the learned Judge dismissing the writ petition. It was submitted by Mr. Chidambaram  that this  undertaking clearly implied that respondent no. 1  was in possession of the premises and was in a position to  hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises after eight weeks, if the special leave petitions  preferred by respondent no. 1 were dismissed or no interim relief  was obtained  thereunder. This undertaking was taken note of  by Justice  Puranik when the case reached before him  on  March 31,  1987.  It appears that an objection was  taken  to  the language  of the said undertaking on the ground that it  did not  state  that respondent no. 1 was in possession  of  the suit premises and thereupon, Mr. R.J. Joshi, learned counsel for respondent no. 1, stated that the undertaking spoke  for itself  and that when it stated that respondent no. 1  shall not part with the possession of the suit premises it 387 meant  that respondent no. 1 was in possession of the  prem- ises.  It was submitted that this statement must  have  been made after taking proper instructions and that, by instruct- ing its counsel to make the statement, respondent no. 1  had clearly attempted to mislead the Court and the appellant. It was  urged that, m any event, this undertaking  clearly  im- plied  that if no interim order was obtained  by  respondent no. 1 from this Court, respondent no. 1 would hand over  the possession   of   the  premises  to  the   appellant.   This assurance/undertaking  was  false to the  knowledge  of  the appellant,  as  by that time, respondent no. 2  had  already filed  a  suit in the Court of Small  Causes  claiming  sub- tenancy from respondent no. 1 and had obtained an interim ex parte  injunction restraining the appellant  from  executing the  decree in her favour. It was submitted that the  record discloses that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were acting in collu- sion with a view to defeat the decree obtained by the appel- lant  and  to prevent the execution of the  decree.  It  was contended on behalf of the appellant that the resolution  of respondent  no. 1 under which respondent no. 2 was  claiming sub-tenancy was fabricated and antedated.     It  was,  on the other hand, contended  by  Mr.  Cooper, learned  counsel for respondent no. 1 that no  contempt  was made  out  by  the appellant in the  matter.  He  vehemently argued  that the case for taking action in contempt, set  up by  the  appellant,  was one of civil  contempt.  Under  the provisions of sub-clause (b) of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, in order to establish civil contempt,  the

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alleged  contemner  must be proved to be  guilty  of  wilful disobedience  to any judgment, decree direction, order  writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertak- ing given to a court. He drew our attention to the statement contained  in  Halsbury’s  Laws of England,  Volume  9  IVth Edition,  at  para  66 (page 40) that the  court  will  only punish  as  a contempt a breach of injunction  if  satisfied that the terms of the injunction are clear and  unambiguous, that the defendant has proper. notice of the terms and  that breach  of the injunction has been proved beyond  reasonable doubt. It was further submitted by him that there is no such thing  in law as an implied contempt. Learned counsel  urged that, in the present case, there was no mandatory injunction or  order given by the court to the effect  that  respondent no.  1 must vacate the premises after eight weeks  from  5th March  when the undertaking was agreed to be given.  It  was submitted  that  even  if a view was taken  that,  in  these circumstances,  respondent no. 1 must be held to have  given an undertaking to give possession of the said suit  premises to the appellant after the said period of eight weeks, there was no wilful breach on the part of respondent no. 1 in  not complying with that undertaking as 388 it was respondent no. 2 who was claiming to be in possession of  the said premises in his independent right as  a  lawful sub-tenant and it was he who had obtained an interim injunc- tion  from the Small Causes Court. It was urged  by  learned counsel that so far as respondent no. 2 was concerned he had not  given  any personal undertaking to the  court.  It  was submitted  by learned counsel for all the  respondents  that before a court could take any action for contempt it must be strictly  established  that  the contempt  had  been  proved beyond reasonable doubt as an action for contempt was in the nature of a criminal proceeding.     Mr.  Cooper drew our attention to the decision  of  this Court  in The Aligarh Municipal Board & Ors. v.  Ekka  Tonga Mazdoor Union and Others, [1970] 3 SCC p. 98 wherein it  has been held that "In order to bring home a charge of  contempt of  Court for disobeying orders of Courts those  who  assert that the alleged contemners had knowledge of the order  must prove  that fact beyond reasonable doubt. In case of  doubt, however,  benefit  ought to go to the  person  charged."  He further  relied upon the decision of this Court in Babu  Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin & Anr., [1979] 3 SCR p. 685 wherein a Bench  of two learned Judges of this Court held that "it  is not open to the Court to assume an implied undertaking  when there is none on the record."     We  now  propose to examine the facts appearing  on  the record  in the light of the aforesaid submissions and  deci- sions.  What we do find on the record is that when the  writ petitions  filed by respondent no. 1 in the High Court  were dismissed by Puranik, J. by his order dated 5th March, 1987, learned  counsel for respondent no. 1 applied for  time  for eight  weeks  to vacate the premises and the  learned  Judge gave  the said time to respondent no. 1 to vacate the  prem- ises  subject  to its filing a written undertaking  that  it would  not part with the possession of the suit premises  or create third party interest in the suit premises. It may  be that  time  to vacate was applied for as  respondent  no.  1 desired  to file an appeal to the Supreme Court.  The  fact, however,  remains that, if the claim of respondent no. 2  is correct,  on that day he was already a lawful sub-tenant  of the  suit premises and occupying the same. Respondent no.  2 was none other than the Chairman of respondent no. 1  compa- ny.  It is, therefore, inconceivable that respondent  no.  1

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could have been unaware of the claim of respondent no. 2. It is, therefore, apparent that respondent no. 1 clearly  tried to  mislead the court when it gave instructions through  its officers  to learned counsel appearing for respondent no.  1 to apply for time to vacate the premises and remained silent when  time was given on the condition that a written  under- taking as aforestated would be filed, suppressing from the 389 court the fact that respondent no. 2 claimed to be the  sub- tenant  of the said premises and we have no doubt  that  re- spondent  no.  2 must have been a party to  this  course  of action.  After some hesitation, the written undertaking  was filed  as aforestated which clearly implied that  respondent no. 1 was in possession of the suit premises and in a  posi- tion  to  hand over possession of the suit premises  to  the appellant after the period of eight weeks expired.  Respond- ents Nos. 1 and 2 knew fully well that this was not possible unless  respondent no. 2 gave up his claim which he  had  no intention  of  doing.  Further, on March  31,  1987  learned counsel  for respondent no. 1 appeared in court  and  stated that  the  undertaking spoke for itself and when  it  stated that respondent no. 1 would not part with the possession  of the  premises it meant that respondent no. 1 was in fact  in possession thereof. As we have already pointed out  respond- ent no. 2 was and continued to be the Chairman of respondent no. 1; his nephew, Prem Kumar Gupta, who was residing in the said  premises in 1973, according to the evidence  given  by him in the Court of Small Causes, was a Director of respond- ent no,. 1 company. After all, respondent no. 1 is a company and  it can have no knowledge or intention other  than  .the knowledge  and  intention of the people who control  it.  We have no doubt at all that it was respondent no. 2 who, along with  some of his family members, was in full charge of  the affairs of respondent no. 1 company. In these circumstances, it  appears  clear to us that all the actions taken  by  the legal advisors and counsel of respondent no. 1 including, in particular, the giving of the aforesaid undertaking as  well as the clarification given by learned counsel regarding  the meaning  of  that undertaking as aforestated were  with  the fullest  knowledge  and consent of respondent no. 2.  It  is impossible  to maintain this dichotomy, for the purposes  of the contempt petition, between respondent no. 1 and respond- ent  no. 2. Respondent no. 2 knew fully well when he  autho- rised the giving of the undertaking on behalf of  respondent no. 1 or consented to its being given that respondent no.  1 was  in  no  position to hand over possession  of  the  suit premises in execution of the decree because respondent no. 2 claimed to be in possession of the said premises and claimed subtenancy rights in the same and had no intention whatsoev- er  of  giving up the claim. In fact, the entire  course  of conduct adopted on behalf of respondent no. 1 was only  with one  aim  in view and that was to frustrate or to  at  least delay  indefinitely  the execution of the decree  which  the appellant  had  obtained after the lapse of many  years  and after  such  sustained and lengthy legal  proceedings  which must  have  caused the appellant considerable  expenses  and anguish.  It  is significant that till Mr. R.J.  Joshi,  the learned  counsel, who gave the clarification in  respect  of the said undertaking was alive, no contention was ever 390 raised  that  the  clarification was given  by  him  without taking  instructions or that respondent no. 1 or  respondent no.  2  were not aware of the same. It was  only  after  the sudden  demise of the learned counsel that  this  contention was  first raised by respondent no. 1. This  conduct  speaks

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volumes  for the dishonest attitude adopted  by  respondents nos. 1 and 2. Raising this contention after the death of Mr. R.J.  Joshi can only be regarded as one more of  the  tricks which  respondents nos. 1 and 2 have played  throughout  the case  in  order  to defeat and delay the  execution  of  the decree for possession against respondent no. 1.     In  the  circumstances  set out  earlier,  although  the learned Judge of the High Court might have felt  constrained by  what he considered to be the limits of his  jurisdiction in a contempt proceeding, we feel that our hands are not  so tied  and, where there is patent dishonesty on the  part  of respondents  Nos.  1  and 2 writ large on the  face  of  the record,  the  law does not require that we should  sit  back with folded hands and fail to take any action in the matter.     We  find  that under clause (1) of Article  142  of  the Constitution, it is provided that this court in exercise  of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order  as is  necessary  for  doing complete justice in  any  case  or matter  pending before it and any decree so passed or  order so made shall be enforced throughout the territory of  India in the manner set out therein. In the circumstances which we have  already set out earlier, we are of the view  that  re- spondent no. 1 is guilty of misconduct amounting to contempt and  must be held to have committed contempt by  giving  the said  undertaking  and instructing its counsel to  give  the clarification  of  the meaning of the  said  undertaking  as aforestated knowing fully well that it was not in possession of  the  suit  premises and was not in a  position  to  give possession  of the suit premises to the appellant in  execu- tion of the decree in favour of the appellant or  otherwise. It  is significant that the claim of sub-tenancy set  up  by respondent  no.  2 is pursuant to an alleged  resolution  of respondent no. 1. We have also no doubt that respondent  no. 2  was a party to this breach of the undertaking being  com- mitted and, in fact, it was he at whose instance  respondent no. 1 committed the breach of the undertaking as  aforestat- ed. We are, of course, quite conscious of the fact that  the proceedings  in the contempt are quasi-criminal  in  nature, that the law of contempt has to be strictly interpreted  and that the requirements of that law must be strictly  complied with before any person can be committed for contempt. Howev- er, as we have pointed out, respondent no. 1 gave an  under- taking based on an implication or assumption which was false to its knowledge and to the knowledge of respondent 391 no.  2.  Respondent no. 2 was equally  instrumental  in  the giving  of this undertaking. This implication or  assumption was made explicit by the clarification given by the  learned counsel for respondent no. 1 as set out earlier.  Respondent no.  2  was equally responsible for instructing  counsel  to give this clarification which was false to the knowledge  of both,  respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Both respondent no.  1  and respondent  no.  2 have tried to deceive the Court  and  the appellant.  In  view of this, we fail to see how it  can  be said  that  they are not guilty of contempt.  Even  assuming that  a  view  were to be taken that no  contempt  has  been technically  established  against respondents Nos  1  and  2 (with  which  view  we do not agree), we  cannot  allow  the matter  to  rest there and fail to take any action  and,  in particular,  we  cannot allow respondents Nos. 1  and  2  to thwart  the execution of the decree in this manner  at  this stage  and  continue  to remain in possession  of  the  suit premises.  We  find some support for the  course  of  action which  we  are  taking from the decision of  this  Court  in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. Sh.K.M.M. Shetty and others, J.T.

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1989 4 S.C 573 where, on facts which bear some similarity to the facts of this case, a Division Bench of this Court  held that  "it  is settled law that breach of  an  injunction  or breach  of an undertaking given to a court by a person in  a civil proceeding on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular  course  of  action is  misconduct  amounting  to contempt."  At the same time, we are conscious of  the  fact that  we  cannot altogether foreclose the claim  set  up  by respondent no. 2 in the declaratory suit filed by him in the Court  of Small Causes to establish that he is a  sub-tenant of  the suit premises and entitled to the protection of  the Bombay Rents, Hotel Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. However,  we  are firmly of the view that by reason  of  any interim  order obtained in that suit and till that claim  is finally established, the appellant can no longer be deprived of  the  possession  of the said premises  pursuant  to  the decree  for  eviction  obtained by her.  All  the  necessary parties to that suit are before us and have had and adequate opportunity to be heard.     In  these  circumstances, we allow the  appeal  and  set aside  the impugned order passed by the High Court and  pass in its place the following order:     The Court Receiver, High Court of Bombay who has already been  appointed  by our order dated January 25,  1990  shall take possession of the suit premises from the present  agent and  shall appoint the appellant as his agent in respect  of the suit premises and hand over possession to the  appellant of  the  suit premises on such terms and conditions  as  the Court Receiver may think fit but with the limitation 392 that the royalty for use and occupation of the suit premises shall  be  limited  to the actual outgoings plus  a  sum  of Rs.200 per month in order to meet unforeseen  contingencies. This  order shall be complied with within a period of  eight weeks  from a copy of this order being served on  the  Court Receiver.  It is clarified that the possession of the  prem- ises  will  be  taken from whoever might  be  in  possession thereof  and, if the Court Receiver finds any difficulty  in obtaining possession, he shall take the necessary assistance from  the police authorities. It is further  clarified  that this  order shall supersede any interim orders  which  might have been passed by the Court of Small Causes or the  Bombay City Civil Court or any other Court excepting this Court. In the  event of respondent no. 2 being able to finally  estab- lish  his right to the sub-tenancy of the suit  premises  as claimed by him in the declaratory suit in the Court of Small Causes,  it  shall be open to him to apply for  vacation  or variation  of this order as he may be  advised.  Respondents Nos.  1 and 2 to pay the appellant the costs of this  appeal fixed at Rs.20,000 the liability for the payment of the said aggregate amount being joint and several as between respond- ents Nos. 1 and 2. As far as respondent no. 3 is  concerned, we do not propose to take any action against him. N.P.V.                                                Appeal allowed. 394