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PETITIONER: DR. DURYODHAN SAHU AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JITENDRA KUMAR MISHRA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       25/08/1998

BENCH: S.C.AGARWAL, S. SAGHIR AHMAD, M SRINIVASAN.

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  J U D G E M E N T SRINIVASAN. J.          Leave granted. 2.Two questions have arisen for decision  (1)  whether an  Administrative Tribunal constituted under Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as  the  ’Act’) can  entertain a public interest litigation and (ii) whether on the facts of  this  case  the  Tribunal  has  exceed  its jurisdication in passing the impugned order? 3.The facts are as follows: The petitioner   in   S.L.P.     10472-10474/95  hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, a qualified surgeon with M.S. Degree in General Surgery and been working in the Department of Gastroenterology of S.C.B.  Medical Collage,  Cuttack  as an Assistant  Surgeon from 17.09.1987.  Earlier he worked as lecturer in General Surgery from 11.06.84 to 17.09.86.  From 17.09.87, he was assisting the professor  and  Head  of  the Department of Surgical gastroenterology for about five years during    which    period    he    had   acquired   ’Special training/experience’ in the said subject. 4.The  Orissa   Public   Service   Commission   caused advertisement No.    27 of 1991/92 inviting applications for the post of Junior Teacher (Lecturer) in several disciplines including Surgical Gastroenterology.    The  last  date  for receipt of   applications   was   15.05.92.     The  minimum educational qualification was prescribed as under         (a)   A candidate must have obtained a post Graduate         Degree in speciality or any other equivalent  degree         or  qualification  prescribed  by  the I.M.C./Dental         Council of India as the case  may  be  for  all  the         above posts.         (b)  For  the  post  of  surgical  gastroenterology,         candidates possessing   M.S.     (general  surgical)         Degree with 2 years  special  training  in  surgical         gastroenterology  from the institution recognised by         the M.C.I.  are eligible. 5.  Even before the issue of advertisement  the  Health  and Family Welfare Department of the Government of Orissa sought clarification regarding qualification for appointment to the post  of lecturer in the Department of Gastroenterology vide

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letter no.  43633/Hd 26.12.90.  The Medical Council of India (for short M.C.I.) in  Letter  No.    MCI-12(1)/91-Med/21954 dated 27.12.91 replied that the matter was considered by the council at its meeting and it was decided as under         "The  Postgraduate  Committee agreed for the         appointment  of  teachers  as   Lecturers   in   the         department   of   Gastroenterology  possessing  M.S.         (General Surgery) with 2 years special  training  in         Surgical  Gastroenterology  which  should  be  in  a         recognized institution as prescribed by the  MCI  in         recommendations     on     Teachers’     eligibility         qualifications for other similar departments.   This         arrangement   is   agreeable  for  five  years  till         sufficient   people   are   available    with    the         postgraduate      qualification      in     Surgical         Gastroenterology." It was only on that basis the minimum of two  years  special training  in a recognized institution was prescribed as part of the minimum qualification for the post of Lecturer in the case of  candidates  possessing  M.S.    (General   Surgery) degree. 6.  The institution in which  the  petitioner  was  working, namely S.C.B.      Medical   College  is  also  one  of  the institutions recognized by the  M.C.I  In  response  to  the aforesaid advertisement, the petitioner applied for the post of  Junior  Teacher (Lecturer) in the discipline of Surgical Gastroenterology.  Six other persons had  also  applied  for the same  post.   The case of the petitioner and that of Dr. P.K.  Dehata  were  referred  to  the  Director  of  Medical Education  &  Training  by the Public Service Commission for his opinion  on  their  eligibility  for  selection.     The Director expressed  his opinion in his letter no.  1387 MET. dated 20.7.92  that  the  petitioner  was  qualified  to  be considered  as  per  MCI  ruler  along  with  other eligible candidates.  The petitioner and Dr.  M.K.    Mohapatra  were called for the  viva  voce test.  The name of Dr.  Mohapatra was recommended to Government along with the advice that the Commission  had  maintained  a  reserve  list  of   suitable candidates  for  a  period  of  one  year  from  the date of recommendation.  Dr.   Mohapatra  was  appointed  as  Junior Teacher. 7.The Government found that the department of Surgical Gastroenterology was  under  staffed  as  it  had  only  one Professor and one Lecturer and it was not in accordance with MCI pattern.   Hence the Government created one more post of Lecturer on 25.08.93.   On  the  same  day,  the  Government requested  the  Public  Service  Commission to recommend the name of a suitable candidate from  the  reserve  list.    On 30.08.93,   the  Commission  recommended  the  name  of  the pititioner for appointment. 8.At that  stage  one  candi  charan  Routray  in  his capacity  as  General  Secretary, Cuttack Surakhya Committee filed O.A.   1439/93  before  the  Principal  Bench  of  the Central Administrative  Tribunal  at  Bhubaneswar.   Another application O.A.  1630/93 was filed by the Cuttack  surakhya Committee  through  Jitendra  Kumar  Mishra  before the same Bench.  A third application was  filed  before  the  Cuttack Bench in O.A.  No.  1614 (c)/94 by one Nibas Chandra Mishra. The  prayers  in  all  the three applications are identical. They are for (i) quashing the order of the Government  dated 25.08.93  creating  one  more  post  of Junior Teacher, (ii) debarring the petitioner  from  being  appointed  as  Junior Teacher  and (iii) preventing the Government from appointing any candidate as Lecturer  without  requisite  qualification and training  in  the super speciality.  The averment in all

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the three applications were almost identical.  The substance of the allegations was that the petitioner did  not  possess the  qualifications  prescribed for the post of Lecturer and the Government in order to accommodate him  created  another post which  was  not  advertised.    It was alleged that the petitioner  had  exerted  influence   over   the   concerned authorities   and   managed   to   secure  the  appointment. According to the applicants the  appointment  was  not  only malafide   and  illegal  but  it  was  also  against  public interest. 9.The  applications were opposed by the Government and the  petitioner  on  merits  as  well  as  on   grounds   of maintainability.  The  Tribunal  held  that the applications were maintainable at the  instance  of  the  applicants.  As regards  the  qualification  of  the petitioner the Tribunal observed as follow:-         The most important question to be decided is         whether Dr.      Sahoo   possesses   the   requisite         qualification   and  eligibility  for  the  post  of         Lecturer in Surgical Gastroenterology.  A perusal of         the clarificatory letter issued by the  IMC  to  the         Secretary, Health & F.W.  Deptt.  (Annexure-I) would         indicate   that   the  prescribed  qualification  is         Master’s degree in Surgical  Gastroenterology.    On         account of non-availability of candidates possessing         that   qualification,  a  temporary  relaxation  was         allowed for a short period of 5 years  till  doctors         with M.S.  in Surgical Gastroenterology.  On account         of  non-availability  of  candidates possessing that         qualification, a temporary  relaxation  was  allowed         for a short period of 5 years till doctors with M.S.         in Surgical Gastroenterology are available.  In Lieu         of M.S.   in  Gastroenterology,  M.S.    in  general         Surgery with  two  years  special  training  in  the         discipline, was   allowed.    For  interpreting  the         expression  "special  training   in   a   recognized         institution  as  prescribed  by  IMC", we would have         very much valued the views of IMC itself.   But  the         views  of  the  IMC  who  are  also  parties  to the         litigation, unfortunately are not  available  as  no         counter  or  submission  has  been  filed  on  their         behalf.  But it stands to common sense that  special         training  in  a  super  speciality  which  is  to be         substituted for a Master’s degree in that discipline         should be in an apex-medical  institution  like  the         AIIMS,   specially  notified  by  the  IMC  for  the         purpose.  There is no indication to  show  that  SCB         medical   college   has   been   recognized   as  an         institution  for  imparting  special   training   in         Surgical Gastroenterology.    The Government counter         also does not says so.  On the other  hand,  certain         averments  in  the  government counter that the said         department in SCB Medical College  is  under-staffed         and  that it was manned only by a Professor till Dr.         Mohapatra  joined  as  Lecturer,   points   to   the         conclusion  that  it  was not equipped with adequate         facilities for imparting special training.  No doubt         Dr.   Sahoo  has   acquired   sufficient   practical         experience by  assisting  the  Head of Deptt.  for a         long  period  of  six  years   and   the   list   of         publications  he  has to his credit, as given in his         counter, would support such a view.  But  it  cannot         be  said  that  he has acquired the special training         indicated by the IMC in their letter since  the  SCB         Medical  College has not been notified by the IMC as

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       a recognized institution for imparting such training         in that super speciality. 10.On  the  above  reasoning  the  Tribunal granted the second  prayer  of  the  applicants   and   restrained   the appointment of  the  petitioner  as  lecturer.  The Tribunal refused to quash the Government order creating the post  and rejected the first prayer.  The Tribunal directed the Health and  Family Welfare Department to take appropriate steps for filling up  the  post  after  complying  with  the  relevant statutory  provisions  and  issuing  a  fresh  advertisement through the Public Service Commission.  The  petitioner  has challenged the said  order  in S.L.P.  Nos.  10472-10474/95. The The  State   Government   has   filed   S.L.P.      Nos. 18714-18716/95 against  the  same  order.    It  is  in such circumstance the two questions set  out  in  thee  beginning arise for consideration. 11.These S.L.P.  came up for hearing on 15.02.95 before a Bench  of  two  Judges.    The  Bench passed the following order:-         "Whether  a  public  interest  litigation   can   be         entertained  by  the  Administrative  Tribunal under         Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985         is thee question raised by the  appellantt-State  of         Orissa & Ors?  Section 19, inter alia, provides that         a  person  aggrieved  by any order pertaining to any         matter within the jurisdiction  of  a  Tribunal  may         make an application to the Tribunal for redressal of         his grievance.    Prima  facie,  it  appears  that a         public interest litigant is not a  person  aggrieved         in that   sense.    The  State-appellant  relies  on         certain observations made by K.  Ramaswamy, J.    in         R.K.  Jain  Vs.    Union of India - (1993) 4 SCC 119         which are to the following effect:         "Shri Harish  Chander,  admittedly  was  the  Senior         Vice-President at the relevant time.  The contention         of   Shri   Thakur  of  the  need  to  evaluate  the         comparative merits of Mr.  Harish  Chander  and  Mr.         Kalyasundaram a seniormost member for appointment as         President  would  not  be  goes  into  in  a  public         interest litigation.     Only   in   a   proceedings         initiated  by  an aggrieved person it may be open to         be considered.  This writ petition  is  also  not  a         writ of  quo  warranto.  In service jurisprudence it         is settled law that it is for the  aggrieved  person         i.e.   non-appointee  to  assail the legality of the         offending action.  Third party has no  locuc  standi         to  canvass  the  legality  or  correctness  of  the         action.  Only public law declaration would  be  made         at  the  behest of the petitioner, a public-spirited         person."         These  observations  were  not  specifically         concurred  to  by the other two Members of the Bench         (one of  us   being   one   such   member).      The         Administrative    Service    Tribunals   have   been         recognised by this Court to be  substitutes  of  the         High  Court and other Courts having had jurisdiction         in the matter.  The High Court under Article 226  of         the  Constitution  has  power to issue a writ of quo         warranto and that can undeniably be  sought  by  any         person; not  necessarily  a person aggrieved.  Would         it be otherwise and locus  standi  being  determined         purely  on  the  axis  of Section 19, the purpose of         creating the Service  Tribunal  would  seemingly  be         frustrated.  It may therefore crop up that the above         observations of  K.    Ramaswamy,  J  may attract an

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       exception.  In any case, the matter is important  in         order  to  define  jurisdiction  of the tribunal and         therefore in the fitness of things, should be placed         before a three Member Bench.   We  therefore  direct         these  special  leave  petitions  to  be  heard by a         three-Member Bench."         12.   We have heard counsel on both sides at length. Several rulings have been relied on by them though  in  none of them, the questing arose directly for consideration.  The question   as   to  maintainability  of  a  public  interest litigation before the Tribunal depends for its answer on the provisions of the Act.  The Tribunal having been created  by the Act, the scope and extent of its jurisdiction have to be determined by  interpreting the provisions thereof.  In S.P. Sampath Kumar versus State of A.P.  (1987) 1 S.C.C.  124  it was  held  that  the Tribunal constituted under the Act were effective substitutes to the High Courts in  the  scheme  of aministration  of  justice and they were entitle to exercise powers thereof.    It  was  observed  that  they  were  real substitutes  not  only in form and dejure but in content and de facto.  On that premise the Court held that the power  of judicial  review exercised by High Courts in service matters under Articles 226 and 227 was completely excluded.  It  may be  noticed  that  the  order  of  reference  dated  15.2.96 extracted in the earlier paragraph makes a specific  mention of this aspect of the matter.  If that view had continued to prevail,  the  approach  to  the  question  might  have been different. 13.But the law has now been declared  differently in chandra  kumar versus Union of India (1997) 3 S.C.C.  261 that the Tribunals have to perform only, a ’supplemental  as opposed  to  a  substitutional  -  role’  in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 are not taken  away  by the Act.      it   is  only  against  such  a  backdrop  the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act  to  entertain  a public interest  litigation has to be decided.  No doubt, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that even from the inception of the Act  public  interest  litigations could  be entertained only by the high Courts in exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction and plenary powers  and  as such  powers were not available to the Tribunals, the latter could never have entertained such litigations.   It  is  not necessary for us to consider that contention.  As the status of  the  Tribunals  has  now  been  settled in Chandra Kumar (supra), we will discuss the question in the  light  of  the said pronouncement. 14.Section  14  of  the  Act  provides  that  the central  Administrative  Tribunal  shall  exercise  all  the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable by all courts except the Supreme Court immediately  before  the  appointed day   in  relation  to  matters  set  out  in  the  section. Similarly, section 15 provides for the jurisdiction,  powers and  authority  of  the  State  Administrative  Tribunals in relation to matters set out therein.  Sections 19 to  27  of the Act  deal  with  the  procedure.  Section 19 strikes the key-note.  Sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 19 are in the following terms:         S.19 (1) Subject to other provisions of this Act,  a         person  aggrieved  by  any  order  pertaining to any         matter within the jurisdiction  of  a  Tribunal  may         make   an   application  to  the  Tribunal  for  the         redressal of his grievance.         (a) by the Government or a  local  or  other         authority within the territory of India or under the         control  of the Govt. of India or by any corporation

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       (or society) owned or controlled by the  Government;         of         (b)   by an officer, committee or other body         or  agency  of  the  Government  or a local or other         authority or corporation (or society) referred to in         clause (a)                          *******************                          *******************         S.19  (4)  Where  an  application  has  been         admitted  by a Tribunal under sup-section (3), every         proceeding under the relevant service  rules  as  to         redressal  of  grievances in relation to the subject         matter  of  such  application  pending   immediately         before  such  admission  shall  abate  and  save  as         otherwise directed by the  Tribunal,  no  appeal  or         representation  in  relation  to  such  matter shall         thereafter be entertained under such rules. 15.   Section  20  provides  that  the  Tribunal  shall  not ordinarily  admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies  available  to him under  the  relevant  rules.   Section 21 provides for a period of  limitation  for  approaching  the  Tribunal.    A perusal  of the above provisions shows that the Tribunal can be approached only by ’persons aggrieved’  by  an  order  as defined.  The crucial expression ’ persons aggrieved’ has to be  construed in the context of the Act and the facts of the case. 16.In Thammanna versus K. Veera Reddy and other  (1980) 4  S.C.C.  62  it  was held that although the meaning of the expression ’person aggrieved’  may  vary  according  to  the context   of   the  statute  and  the  facts  of  the  case, nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man  who has  suffered  a  legal  grievance,  a  man  against  whom a decision has been pronounced which has  wrongfully  deprived him  of  something  or  wrongfully  refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. 17.In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Versus Roshan  Kumar  Haji Bashir  Ahmed  and others (1976) 1.S.C.C. 671 the Court held that the expression ’aggrieved person’ donotes  an  elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. The Court observed:         "...It  cannot  be  confined  within the bounds of a         rigid, exact, and comprehensive definition. At best,         its features can be described in a  broad  tentative         manner.  Its  scope  and meaning depends on diverse,         variable factors such as the content and  intent  of         the  statue  of  which contravention is alleged, the         specific circumstances of the case, the  nature  and         extent  of the petitioner’s interest, and the nature         and extent of the prejudice or  injury  suffered  by         him’. 18.The  constitution  of  Administrative  Tribunal  was necessitated because of large pendency of cases relating  to service matters  in  various  courts in the country.  It was expected that the setting up of Administrative Tribunals  to deal  exclusively  in service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the Courts but also  provide to  the  persons  covered  by the Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances.  The basic idea as evident from the various provisions of  the  Act  is  that  the  Tribunal should quickly redress the grievances in relation to service matters.   The  definition  of  ’service  matters’  found in Section 3 (q)  shows  that  in  relation  to  a  person  the expression   means  all  service  matters  relating  to  the conditions of his service.  The  significance  of  the  word ’his’ cannot  be  ignored.    Section 3 (b) defines the word

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’application’ as an application made under Section 19.   The latter Section  refers  to  ’person aggrieved’.  In order to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application has to be made and the same can be made only by a person aggrieved  by any  order  pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  We have already seen that the work ’order’ has been defined in the explanation to sub-s. (1) of Section 19 so that all matters referred  to  in  Section  3  (q)  as service  matters could be brought before the Tribunal. It in that context, Sections 14  and 15  are  read,  there  is  no doubt  that a total stranger to the concerned service cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If public  interest litigations  at  the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertained by  the  Tribunal  the  very  object  of  speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated. 19.Our  attention  has been drawn to a judgement of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal in Smt.    Amitarani  Khuntia Versus State of Orissa 1996.  (1) OLR (CSR)-2.  The Tribunal after  considering  the  provisions  of  the Act held that a private citizen or a stranger having no  existing  right  to any  post  and  not intrinsically concerned with any service matter is not  entitled  to  approach  the  Tribunal.    The following passage in the judgement is relevant:         "....A reading of  the  aforesaid  provisions  would         mean that an application for redressal of grievances         could  be  filed only by a ’person aggrieved’ within         the meaning of the Act.         Tribunals are constituted under Article 323 A of the         Constitution of  India.   The above Article empowers         the  Parliament   to   enact   law   providing   for         adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of         disputes  and complaints with respect to recruitment         and conditions of service of  persons  appointed  to         public  services  and  posts  in connection with the         affairs of the Union or of any State or any local or         other authority within the  territory  of  India  or         under  the  control  of  the Government and such law         shall specify the jurisdiction, powers and authority         which  may  be  exercised  by  each  of   the   said         Tribunals.   Thus,  it  follows  that Administrative         Tribunals are constituted for adjudication or  trial         of  the  disputes  and  complaints  with  respect to         recruitment and conditions  of  service  of  persons         appointed to   public   services  and  posts.    Its         jurisdiction and powers have  been  well-defined  in         the Act.  It does not enjoy any plenary power."         We agree with the above reasoning. 20.Learned  counsel  for the respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in S.P.  Gupta and others etc.  versus Union of India & Ors.  etc.  1982 (2) S.C>R.   365  and  read out  several  passages  from  the  judgement dealing with the question of ’standing’.  In  that  case  the  Court  was  not concerned with  a  Tribunal  constituted under a Statute.  It was discussing the question of  ’standing’  in  a  proceeding before the High Court or this Court.  That ruling cannot help the respondents  in  the present case.  Our attention is also drawn to a judgement in  University  of  Mysore  and  another versus C.D.   Govinda  Rao  and  another 1964 (4) S.C.R.  575 wherein the  scope  of  a  writ  of  quo  warranto  has  been discussed.   That decision will not apply in the present case as there was no application  for  issue  of  a  writ  of  quo warranto before  the  Tribunal.    Learned  counsel  for  the respondents submits that the proceedings before the  Tribunal is in the nature of quo warranto and it could be filed by any member  of  the  public  as  he is an aggrieved person in the

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sense public interest is affected.  We have  already  pointed out that the applications in the present case have been filed before  the  appointment  of the petitioner as a Lecturer and the relevant prayers are to quash the creation  of  the  post itself   and   preventing  authorities  from  appointing  the petitioner as lecturer.  Hence, the applications filed by the respondents cannot be considered to be quo warranto. 21.In  the  result,  we answer the first question in the negative  and   hold   that   the   Administrative   Tribunal constituted  under the Act cannot entertain a public interest litigation at the instance of a total stranger. 22.Turning to the second question, even  the  facts  set out  by  us  earlier would show that the petitioner satisfied the requisite  qualifications  prescribed  for  the  post  of lecturer.   The  only contention urged is that the petitioner did  not  have  two  years  special  training   in   Surgical Gastroenterology  from  an  institution recognised by MCI for giving special  training.    There  is  no   merit   in   the contention.  The list of recognised Medical Colleges in India published by  the  MCI  contains  the name of S.C.R.  Medical College, Cuttack in Sl.  No.  80.  Thus the said college is a recognised institution.     The   interpretation   that   the institution  should be recognised for giving special training is erroneous.  There is no such requirement in the rule. 23.Even  the  Tribunal has found that the petitioner had acquired sufficient practical  experience  by  assisting  the Head  of  the  Department of Surgical Gastroenterology in the said college for a long perliod of six years and had  several publications to his credit.  The Tribunal overlooked that the said  experience acquired by the petitioner was recognised to be sufficient to satisfy the requisite qualification  of  two years  special  training by the Director of Medical Education and Training when a reference was made to him by  the  Orissa Public Service  Commission.    It  was only after getting the matter  clarified,  the   Service   Commission   called   the petitioner for viva voce.  Once the concerned authorities are satisfied  with  the eligibility qualifications of the person concerned it is not for the Court or the Tribunal  to  embark upon   an   investigation   of   its  own  to  ascertain  the qualifications of the said person. 24.In State of Bihar versus Ramesh Chandra  and  another (1997) 4 S.C.C., 43 a Division Bench to which one of us (S.C. Agarwal,  J.)  was  party  had occasion to consider a similar regulation  prescribing  qualifications  for  appointment  of Professor/Associate Professor.   The rule used the expression ’two years special training’.  The High Court held  that  the appointee  did  not  have  the requisite special training and failed to establish that he possessed the same qualification. This Court reversed that conclusion and pointed out that  the said person had received more than two years training in thee concerned speciality  after  obtaining the degree of M.S.  It was held that the  training  received  as  resident  surgical officer  by  the concerned person between 1976 and 1980 could be regarded as special training though the concerned Unit was not an independent unit but it was having all  the  requisite facilities.   This  Court  also  referred  to the Certificate issued by the Head of the Unit and other materials on  record and held that the condition of special training for two years was fulfilled. 25.In  the  present case we have already referred to the opinion of the Director of Medical Education in the matter of qualifications of the petitioner.  There was no justification for the Tribunal to ignore the  same.    Hence  the  Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by considering a technical question after  brushing  aside  the  opinion  of  the experts and the

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concerned authorities.  There  is  no  material  whatever  to accept  the contention of the respondents that the petitioner wielded influence over the concerned authorities or that  the action of the authorities was vitiated by mala fides. 26.In   the   view   we  have  expressed  above,  it  is unnecessary  for  us  to  consider  the  contention  of   the appellants that the applications before the Tribunal were not bona  fide and the applicants therein had ulterior motives in filing the same. 27.In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgement and  order of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubneshwar in O.A. nos. 1439 and 1630 of 1992 and 1614 of  1994  is  set aside. There will however be no order as to costs.