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PETITIONER: DR.  DEVENDRA M. SURTI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/05/1968

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1969 AIR   63            1969 SCR  (1) 235

ACT: Bombay  Shops and Establishments.  Act, 79 of 1948, s.  2(4) Rule,   23(1)-Doctor’s  dispensary  whether   a   commercial establishment  as  defined  in  s.  2(4)-Non-maintenance  of register of employees under r.     23(1)whether an offence.

HEADNOTE: The appellant, a medical practitioner who also maintained  a dispensary was prosecuted for non-maintenance of a  register of employees as required by r. 23(1) of the rules made under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.  He contended that  he could not be prosecuted because his dispensary  was not  a ’commercial establishment’ as defined in s.  2(4)  of the  Act.  He was acquitted by the trial magistrate but  the High Court, on appeal by the State convicted him.  In appeal by special leave to this Court, HELD : Section 2(4) has used words of very wide import  and’ grammatically it may even include the consulting room  where a  doctor examines his patients with the help of a  solitary nurse  or  attendant.  But the language of s. 2(4)  must  be construed on the principle noscitur a sociis. i.e. when  two or  more words susceptible of analogous meaning are  coupled together the words take their colour from each other and the more  general are restricted to ’a sense analogous  to  less general. [240 A--C] The words ’commercial establishment’ and ’profession’ in  s. 2(4) are used along with the words ’business ’and trade’ and must  therefore  be  restricted  to  activity  analogous  to business or trade.  Professional activity cannot be  treated as  within the definition of s. 2(4) unless it is  organised as  trade  and business are organised i.e. the  activity  as systematically   or  habitually  undertaken  for   rendering material  services  to the community at large or a  part  of such  community with the help of the employees and  such  an activity generally involves cooperation of the employer  and the employees. [244 C-E] Tested  in the light of these principles the  appellant  did not  fall within. the purview of the Act and his  conviction was illegal. [244 E-F] The  National Union of Commercial Employees, and Anr. v.  M. R. Mehr, Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, [1962] Supp. 3  S.C.R. 157, relied On.

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Reed  v.  Ingham, 3 E-B 889, Scales v. Pickering.  (1828)  4 Bing. 448, 452, 453, McKay v. Rutherfurd, 6 Moore P.C.  425, Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Maxse, [1919] 1 K.B. 647, 657  and  William Esplen, Son, and Swainston Ld.  v.  Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1919] 2 K.B. 73 1, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 1966. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated February 14,  1966 of  the  Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No.  208  of’ 1964. 236 5.   Parliament  was  aware of the fact  that  employees  in establishments  other than those to which, the  Act  applies were  getting  bonus  under  adjudication  provided  by  the Industrial  Disputes  Act  and other similar  Acts.   If  it intended to deprive them of such bonus surely it would  have expressed so in the Act; 6.   Sec.  39 in clear terms saves the right to claim  bonus under  the Industrial Disputes Act or any corresponding  law by  providing  that the provisions of this Act shall  be  in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of those Acts. It  is  true  that the preamble states that the  Act  is  to provide for payment of bonus to persons employed in  certain establishments  and  sec. 1(3) provides that the Act  is  to apply, save as otherwise provided therein, to factories  and every  other establishments in which 20 or more persons  are employed.  Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 1 also provides that the Act is  to  have  effect  in  relation  to  such  factories  and establishments  from the- accounting year commencing on  any day in 1964 and every subsequent accounting year.  But these provisions  do not, for that reason, necessarily  mean  that the  Act  was  not  intended  to  be  a  comprehensive   and exhaustive law dealing with the entire subject of bonus  and the  persons  to whom it should apply.  Even  where  an  Act deals comprehensively with a particular subject-matter,  the Legislature  can  surely  provide that  it  shall  apply  to particular  persons  or groups of persons  or  to  specified institutions  only.  Therefore, the fact that  the  preamble states  that the Act shall apply to  certain  establishments does  not necessarily mean that it was not intended to be  a comprehensive  provision dealing with the subject-matter  of bonus.   While dealing with the subject-matter of bonus  the Legislature can lay down as a matter of policy that it  will exclude from its application certain types of establishments and  also  provide for exemption of certain other  types  of establishments   even  though  such   establishments   would otherwise  fall within the scope of the Act.  The  exclusion of establishments where less than 20 persons are employed in sec.  1(3)  therefore  is not a  criterion  suggesting  that Parliament  has not dealt with the subject-matter  of  bonus comprehensively in the Act. As  already seen, there was until the enactment of this  Act no  statute  under which payment of bonus  was  a  statutory obligation on the part of ,in employer or a statutory  right therefore  of  an employee.  Under the  Industrial  Disputes Act,   1947  and  other  corresponding  Acts,   workmen   of industrial establishments as defined therein could raise  an industrial   dispute   and  demand  by  way   of   bonus   a proportionate  share  in profits  and  Industrial  Tribunals could  under those Acts adjudicate such disputes and  oblige

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the  employers  to  pay bonus on  the  principle  that  both capital and 236 S.   T.  Desai,  Arun  H. Mehta and I. N.  Shroff,  for  the appellant. R. H. Dhebar and M. S. K. Sastri, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.-The question involved in this appeal is as  to whether  a Doctor’s dispensary is, a "Commercial  Establish- ment" within the meaning of the Bombay Shops and  Establish- ments  Act,  1948 (Bombay Act LXXIX  of  1948),  hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’. The  case  of the prosecution is that the  appellant  was  a doctor  having his, dispensary situated near Jakaria  Masjid at Ahmedabad.  The dispensary is registered as a ’Commercial Establishment’  under  the  provisions  of  the,  Act.   The complainant  Shri  Pale visited the dispensary on  Juno  13, 1963 at about 9.50 a.m and found that though the  dispensary was registered as ’Commercial Establishment’ under the  Act, the Register produced before him, ;at the time of his  visit was  not  maintained as required -tinder Rule 23(1)  of  the Rules framed under the Art.  Necessary remarks were made  by the  complainant  in  the  Visit  Book  of  the  dispensary. Thereafter,  a  complaint was filed  against  the  appellant after obtaining sanction for his prosecution under s.  52(e) of  the Act read with s. 62 of the Act and r. 23(1)  of  the Rules.   The  ease  was contested by the  appellant  on  the ground  that the doctor’s dispensary was not  a  "Commercial Establishment"  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act  and  the provisions  of  the  Act  did got  therefore  apply  to  his dispensary and the appellant bad not committed any  offence. The  City  Magistrate (First Court),  (Munjipal),  Ahmedabad held  that the appellant was not guilty and  acquitted  him. The  State of Gujarat took the matter in appeal TO the  High Court  of Gujarat in Criminal Appeal No. 208 of  1964.   The appeal  was allowed by the High Court by its judgment  dated February  14,  1966 and the appellant was convicted  for  an offence  under  s. 52(e) read with s. 62 of the Act  and  r. 23(1) of the Rules and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25, in default to undergo, simple imprisonment for a week. This  appeal is brought by certificate from the judgment  of the High Court. Before  considering the rival contentions of the parties  it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act.  The preamble to  the  Act states that it is an Act  "to  consolidate  and amend  the law relating to the regulation of  conditions  of work  and  employment in shops,  commercial  establishments, residential  hotels. restaurants, eating  houses,  theatres, other places of public amusement or entertainment and  other establishment".    Section   2(4)  ,of   the   Act   defined "Commercial establishment" as follows: 237               "’Commercial    establishment’    means     an               establishment which carries on, any  business,               trade or profession or any work in  connection               with,  or  incidental  or  ancillary  to,  any               business,  trade or profession and includes  a               society   registered   under   the   Societies               Registration  Act, 1860, and a  charitable  or               other trust, whether registered or not,  which               carries  on  whether for purposes of  gain  or               not, any business, trade or profession or work               in connection with or incidental or  ancillary               thereto but does not include a factory,  shop,               residential  hotel, restaurant, eating  house,

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             theatre or other place of public amusement  or               entertainment."               Section 2(8) states :               "’Establishment’  means  a  shop,   commercial               establishment, residential hotel,  restaurant,               eating  house,theatre,  or,  other  place   of               public  amusement  or entertainment  to  which               this  Act  applies  and  includes  such  other               establishment as the State Government, may, by               notification in the Official Gazette,  declare               to  be  an establishment for the  purposes  of               this Act."               Section 2(6) and s. 2(7) read as follows               "(6).   ’Employee’  means a person  wholly  or               principally  employed,  whether  directly   or                             through  any agency, and whether for wages  or               other consideration, in or in connection  with               any establishment; and includes an apprentice,               but  does  not  include a member  of  the  em-               ployer’s family."               "(7)  ’Employer’  means  a  person  owning  or               having ultimate control over the affairs of an               establishment."               Section  2(3) and 2(18) define the  expression               "closed"  an(] "opened" as meaning "closed  or               opened  for the service of any  ,customer,  or               for any business, of the establishment, or for               work, by or with the help of any employee,  of               or connected with the establishment."  Section               4 states :               "Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  this               Act,  the provisions of this Act mentioned  in               the  third  column of Schedule  It  shall  not               apply  to  the establishments,  employees  and               other  persons mentioned against them  in  the               second column of the said Schedule               Provided  that  the State Government  may,  by               notification   published   in   the   Official               Gazette,  add  to, omit or alter  any  of  the               entries  of the said Schedule subject to  such               conditions,  if  any, as may be  specified  in               such  notification and on the  publication  of               such notification,               238               the  entries  in  either column  of  the  said               Schedule   shall  be  deemed  to  be   amended               accordingly."               Section 5 provides as follows :                (1  ). Notwithstanding anything contained  in               this   Act,  the  State  Government  may,   by               notification in the Official Gazette,  declare               any  establishment or class of  establishments               to which, or any person or class of persons to               whom,  this  Act  or  any  of  the  provisions               thereof does not for the time being apply,  to               be an establishment or class of establishments               or  a person or class of persons to  which  or               whom  this Act or any provisions thereof  with               such  modifications or adaptations as  may  in               the   opinion  of  the  State  Government   be               necessary  shall apply from such date, as  may                             be specified in the notification.               (2)   On  such declaration  under  sub-section               (1),  any  such  establishment  or  class   of

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             establishments  or  such person  or  class  of               persons shall be deemed to be an establishment               or class of establishments to which, or to  be               an  employee  or class of employees  to  whom,               this  Act  applies  and  all  or  any  of  the               provisions of this Act with such adaptation or               modification  as  may  be  specified  in  such               declaration, shall apply to such establishment               or class of establishments or to such employee               or class of employees." Chapter  II deals with the Registration  of  establishments. Under  S. 7(1) within the period specified the  employer  of every establishment is required to send to the Inspector  of the local area concerned a statement in the prescribed  form together  with  necessary fees, containing the name  of  the employer  and  of  the establishment, the  category  of  the establishment,   whether   it   was   a   shop,   commercial establishment, residential hotel, restaurant, eating  house, theatre or other place of public amusement or  entertainment and  such other particulars.  Under S. 7(2) a  "registration certificate" is to be granted.  Chapter III deals with shops and  commercial establishment.  Sections IO and  II  provide for  the opening and closing hours of the shop.  Section  13 deals  with  the opening and closing hours of  a  commercial establishment.  Section 14 provides for the maximum limit of the daily and weekly hours of work of the employees in shops and commercial establishments.  Section 15 provides for rest interval,  and  S. 17 provides for spread-over of  hours  of work in commercial establishments.  Section 18 provides  for weekly  holidays  in shops  and  commercial  establishments. Chapter VI deals with employment of children, young  persons and  women, and applies to all establishments.   Section  32 provides that no child should be required 239 or  allowed  to work in any  establishment,  notwithstanding that  such child is a member of the family of the  employer. Similarly,  s.  33 provides that no young  person  or  women shall be required or allowed to work whether as an  employee or otherwise in any establishment before 6 a.m. and after  7 p.m.  notwithstanding that such young person or woman  is  a member of the family of the employer.  Section 34 prescribes daily  hours of work for young persons.  The  next  Chapter, i.e. Ch.  VII deals with leave pay and payment of wages  for such  leave.  Section 38 provides for the extension  of  the Payment   of  Wages  Act  by  the  State  Government  by   a notification  in the Gazette to all or any class  of  estab- lishments  or  to any class of employees to  which  the  Act applies.   Similarly, s. 38A provides for the  extension  of the  Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.  Chapter VIII  enacts provisions  for health and safety of the  workers  generally for  all establishments.  Chapter IX enacts  provisions  for setting up of the machinery for enforcement and  inspection. Chapter  X  deals with offences and penalties.   Section  52 deals  with contravention of certain provisions and cl.  (e) of  that  section provides for the penalty if  the  employer contravenes  the provisions of s. 62 by not maintaining  the prescribed register.  Section 62 provides for maintenance of registers  and  records  and display of notices  as  may  be prescribed  by  Rules.   Section 63  deals  with  wages  for overtime work. On  behalf of the appellant Mr. Mehta put forward the  argu- ment   that  under  s.  2(4)  of  the  Act   which   defines ’Commercial’   Establishment’  as  an  establishment   which carries  on any business, trade or profession, the  emphasis was not on the place from which the trading or  professional

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activity  was carried on but the emphasis was really on  the nature of the activity which must be a commercial  activity. In other words, the contention was that the intention of the legislature  in enacting s. 2(4) was to include  only  those professions which are carried on in a commercial manner’  It was  therefore  contended  that  in  the  present  case  the dispensary  of  the  appellant  does  not  fall  within  the definition  of ’Commercial Establishment’ under s.  2(4)  of the  Act.  In our opinion, the argument addressed on  behalf of the appellant is well-founded and must prevail. Under  s. 2(8) of the Act an ’establishment’ is  defined  as meaning  ’a  shop,  commercial  establishment,   residential hotel, restaurant, eating house, theatre, or other place  of public   amusement  or  entertainment  to  which  this   Act applies’.   Section  2(24)  again  defines  a   "Residential hotel", s. 2(25) a "Restaurant or eating house" and s. 2(27) similarly  defines  a  "Shop".   Section  2(29)  defines   a "Theatre".   It is clear therefore that the legislature  has taken  care separately to define each one of the  categories of ’the establishments mentioned in s. 2(8) of the Act.   It is, true: 240 that  s. 2(4) of the Act has used words of very wide  import and  grammatically  it may include even  a  consulting  room where  a  doctor examines his patients with the  help  of  a solitary  nurse or attendant.  But, in our opinion,  in  the matter  of construing the language of s. 2(4) of the Act  we must  adopt the principle of noscitur a sociis.  This  rule, means that, when two or more words which are susceptible  of analogous  meaning are coupled to-ether they are  understood to  be  used in their cognate sense.  The words take  as  it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is  restricted  to a, sense analogous to,  a  less  general. "Associated words take their meaning from one another  under the  doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of  which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference  to the meaning of words associated with it;  such doctrine  is  broiderthan  the  maximum  Ejusdein  Generis." (Words  and Phrases.  Vol.  XIV, p. 207).  For instance,  in Reed  v.  Ingham(1) it was upon the principle of  the  maxin nosscitur  a sociis, that a steam tug of  eighty-seven  tons burden  engaged  in moving another vessel was  not  a  craft within  the  meaning of the statute.  Again,  in  Scales  v. Pickering(-)  the question was what was the meaning  of  the word "footway" when used in a private Act which empowered  a water  company to break up the, soil and pavement of  roads. highways,   footways,  commons,  streets,  lanes,   alleys’, passages and public places. provided they did not enter upon any private lands without the consent of the owner.  It  was contend  that  this authorised the company to break  up  the soil of a private field in which there was a public footway, but it was held otherwise.  "Construing the word  ’footway,’ " said Best C. J. "from the company in which it is found the legislature  appears to have meant those paved  footways  in large  towns  which are too narrow to admit  of  horses  and carriages."  And  Park J. added : "The word  ’footway’  here noscitur  a sociis." In the present case, certain  essential features  or attributes are invariably associated  with  the words "business and trade" as understood in the popular  and conventional sense, and it is the colour of these attributes which is taken by the other words used in the definition  of s. 2(4’) of the Act, though. their normal import may be much wider.   We are therefore of opinion that  the  professional establishment of a doctor cannot come within the  definition of  s.  2(4) of the Act unless the activity carried  on  was

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also  commercial in character.  As to what exactly is  meant by "Commerce" it may be difficult to define but in an  early case-McKav  v.  Rutherfurd(3), Lord Camp-bell gave a  useful definition  : "Commerce is that activity where a capital  is laid out on any work and a risk run of profit or loss; it is a  commercial venture".  It is true that the  definition  of Lord  Campbell is the conventional definition attributed  to trade (1) 3 E. & B. 889.  (2) (1828)4Sup.448,45.453. (3)  6 M-c P. C. 425. 241 or  commerce but it cannot be taken to be wholly  valid  for the purpose of construing industrial legislation in a  modem welfare State.  It is clear that the presence of the  profit motive or the investment of capital tradition associated  to the  notion of trade and commerce cannot be given  an  undue importance  in  construing  the  definition  of  ’Commercial establishment’  under s. 2(4) of the Act.  In  our  opinion, the correct test of finding whether a professional  activity falls  within s. 2(4) of the Act is whether the activity  is systematically  and habitually undertaken for production  or distribution of goods or for rendering material services  to the community or any part of the community with the help  of employees  in the manner of a trade or business in  such  an undertaking.   It  is also necessary in this  connection  to construe the word "profession" under s. 2(4) of the Act.  In Commissioner’s of Inland Revenue v. Maxse(1), Scrutton  L.J. stated as follows               "I  am  very reluctant finally to  propound  a               comprehensive definition.  A set of facts  not               present   to   the  mind   of   the   judicial               propounder, and not raised in the case  before               him,  may  immediately arise to  confound  his               proposition.  But it seems to me as at present               advised that a ’profession’ in the present use               of language involves the idea of an Occupation               requiring either purely intellectual skill, or               of manual skill controlled, as in painting and               sculpture,  or  surgery, by  the  intellectual               skill of the, operator, as distinguished  from               an  occupation  which  IS  substantially   the               production  or  sale or arrangements  for  the               production  or sale of commodities.  The  line               of  demarcation  may vary from time  to  time.               The  word ’profession’ used to be confined  to               the  three  learned professions,  the  Church,               Medicine  and  Law.  IL has now,  I  think,  a               wider meaning." The  matter was again considered in another case  where  the question  was  whether  a company doing the  work  of  naval architect could be said to be carrying on a profession in  a naval  architecture.  The case was William Esplen, Son,  and Swainston,  Ld.  v. Inland Revenue  Commissioner’s(2)  where Rowlatt J. observed as follows :               "...... but :in my opinion the company is  not               carry   in,--  on  the  profession  of   naval               architects within the meaning of the  section,               because for this purpose it is of the  essence               of  a  profession that the profits  should  be               dependent    mainly    upon    the    personal                             qualifications  of  the person by  who m  it  is               carried   on,   and  that  can  only   be   an               individual."               (1)   [1919] 1 K.B. 647, 657.

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             (2) [1919]2K.B731               242               It  is  therefore clear  that  a  professional               activity must be an -activity carried on by an               individual   by   his   personal   skill   and               intelligence.    There   is   a    fundamental               distinction  therefore between a  professional               activity  and  an  activity  of  a  commercial               character and unless the profession carried on               by   the  appellant  also  partakes   of   the               character  of a commercial nature, the  appel-               lant cannot fall within the ambit of S. 2  (4)               of   the  Act.   In  The  National  Union   of               Commercial  Employees  and another  v.  M.  R.               Meher,  Industrial Tribunal, Bombay(1) it  was               held by this Court that the work of solicitors               is  not an industry within the meaning  of  s.               2(J) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  and               therefore any dispute raised by the  employees               of the solicitors against them cannot be  made               the  subject  of reference to  the  Industrial               Tribunal.   In  dealing  with  this  question,               Gajendragadkar,  J., speaking for  the  Court,               observed as follows at page 163 of ,the Report               :               "When  in the Hospital case ((1960)  2  S.C.R.               866)  this Court referred to the  Organisation               of the undertaking involving the  co-operation               of capital and labour or the employer and  his               employees, it obviously meant the co-operation               essential  and  necessary for the  purpose  of               rendering material service or for the  purpose               of production.  It would be realised that  the               concept  of -industry  postulates  partnership               between  capital  and labour  or  between  the               employer and his employees.  It is under  this               partnership that the employer contributes  his               capital and the employees their labour and the               joint contribution of capital and labour leads               directly to the production which the  industry               has in view.  In other words, the co-operation               between  capital  and labour or  between  -the               employer and his employees which is treated as               a  working  test in  determining  whether  any               activity  amounts to an industry, is  the  co-                             operation  which  is directly involved   in  the               production  of  goods or in the  rendering  of               service.   It cannot be suggested  that  every               form  or  aspect of human  activity  in  which               capital  and labour cooperate or employer  and               employees  assist each other is  an  industry.               The  distinguishing feature of an industry  is               that  for the production of goods or  for  the               rendering  of  service,  cooperation   between               capital and labour or between the employer and               his  employees  must  be direct  and  must  be               essential."               Again,    at   page   166   of   the    Report               Gajendragadkar, J. proceeds               ’to state               " Does a solicitor’s firm satisfy that test  ?               Serficially  considered, the solicitor’s  firm               is no doubt               (1)   [1962](3)Supp.S.C.R.157.

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             243               organised  as an industrial concern  would  be               organised.  There are different categories  of               servants  employed  by a firm,  each  category               being assigned separate duties and  functions.               But  it  must be remembered that  the  service               rendered  by  a solicitor  functioning  either               individually or working together with partners               is service which is essentially individual; it               depends   upon  the  professional   equipment,               knowledge  and  efficiency  of  the  solicitor               concerned.  Subsidiary work which is purely of               an  incidental type and which is  intended  to               assist  the solicitor in doing his job has  no               direct  relation to the  professional  service               ultimately rendered by the solicitor.  For his               own  convenience,  a solicitor  may  employ  a               clerk because a clerk would type his  opinion;               for  his convenience, a solicitor  may  employ               menial  servant to keep his chamber clean  and               in order; and it is likely that the number  of               clerks  may be large if the concern  is  pros-               perous  and so would be the number  of  menial               servants.  but  the work done  either  by  the               typist  or the stenographer or by  the  menial               servant  or other employees in  a  solicitor’s               firm  is  not  directly  concerned  with   the               service  which  the solicitor renders  to  his                             client  and  cannot,  therefore,  be said   to               satisfy  the test of cooperation  between  the               employer  and the employees which is  relevant               to  the -purpose.  There can be no doubt  that               for  carrying  on  the  work  of  a  solicitor               effiecently,  accounts  have to  be  kept  and               correspondence carried on and this work  would               need the employment of clerks and accountants.               But  has  the  work of  the  clerk  who  types               correspondence  or that of the accountant  who               keeps account,; any direct or essential  nexus               or connection with the advice which it is  the               duty  of the solicitor to give to his  client?               The  answer  to  this question  must,  in  our               opinion,  be  in the negative.  There  is,  no               doubt,  a  kind  of  cooperation  between  the               solicitor   and   his  employees,   but   that               cooperation   has,  no  direct  or   immediate               relation to the professional service which the               solicitor renders to his client.               ........  Looking at this question in a  broad               and  general way, it is not easy  to  conceive               that  a  liberal Profession like  that  of  an               attorney  could  have  been  intended  by  the               Legislature  to fall within the definition  of               ’industry’  under s. 2 (J).  The very  concent               of the liberal professions has its own special               and distinctive features which do not  readily               permit   the   inclusion   of   the    liberal               professions   into   the   four   corners   of               industrial law.               244               The  essential basis of an industrial  dispute               is  that  it  is  a  dispute  arising  between               capital   and  labour  in  enterprises   where               capital   and   labour  combine   to   produce

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             commodities   or  to  render  service.    This               essential basis would be absent in the case of               liberal  professions.   A person  following  a               liberal  profession  does  not  carry  on  his               profession in any intelligible sense with  the               active  cooperation of his employees  and  the               principal,  if not the sole, capital which  he               brings  into his profession is his special  or               peculiar    intellectual    and    educational               equipment.   That is why on broad and  general               considerations  which  cannot  be  ignored,  a               liberal  profession like that of  an  attorney               must,  we think, be deemed to be  outside  the                             definition of ’Industry’ under section  2(1)." Applying a similar line of reasoning we are of opinion  that the  dispensary  of  the appellant  would  fall  within  the definition  of  S. 2(4) of the Act if the  activity  of  the appellant  is  organised in the manner in which a  trade  or business  is  generally  organised or arranged  and  if  the activity  is  systematically or  habitually  undertaken  for rendering  material services to the community at large or  a part of such community with the help of the employees and if such  an  activity generally involves  co-operation  of  the employer  and  the employees.  To put  it  differently,  the manner  in  which the activity in question is  organised  or arranged,  the  condition of the  co-operation  between  the employer  and the employees being necessary for its  success and  its  object  being to render material  service  to  the community  can  be regarded as some of  the  features  which render  the carrying on of a professional activity  to  fall within the ambit of S. 2(4) of the Act.  Tested in the light of these principles, we hold that the case of the  appellant does  not  fall  within  the purview  of  the  Act  and  the conviction of the appellant of the offence under S. 52(e) of the Act read with S. 62 of the Act and r. 23(1) of the Rules is illegal. For  these  reasons we allow this appeal and set  aside  the judgment  of the Bombay High Court dated February  14,  1966 convicting and sentencing, the appellant. G.C. Appeal allowed. L10Sup.C.1/68 --2,500- 20-8-69Sec.VI- GIPF. 245