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PETITIONER: DR. D.C. SAXENA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/07/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T K. Ramaswamy, J.      In a  clash of  competing interests  in  constitutional contours, this  case calls  to strike  a balance between the freedom of  speech and  expression, a  salutary right  in  a liberal democratic society and paramount countervailing duty to maintain  public  confidence  in  the  administration  of justice.  The   petitioner  has  initiated  public  interest litigation under  Article 32  of the  Constitution to direct Sri P.V.  Narasimha Rao,  the President  of Indian  National Congress and the former Prime Minister of the country to pay a sum  of Rs.8.29  lakhs and odd said to be due to the union of  Indian   for  use   of  Indian  Air  Force  aircraft  or helicopters from  October 1, 1993 to November 30, 1993. When writ Petition  No. 432/95  was posted  for hearing  on  July 17,1995 before  the  learned  Chief  Justice  of  India  and brother Justice  S.C. Sen  the solicitor  General for India, Shri Dipankar  P. Gupta  was sent for and the Court directed him to  have  the  averments  verified  to  be  correct  and directed the  petition to  be listed  after  two  weeks.  On August 7,1995,  the writ  petition  came  before  the  Bench comprising the  learned CJI,  Justice S.C.  Sen and  Justice K.S. Paripoornan.  It is  not in  dispute that the Solicitor General had  placed the  record before  the Court  and  upon perusal thereof  and after hearing the petitioner-in-person, the Bench summarily "dismissed"" the writ petition which had triggered the  petitioner to file yet another writ petition, this time  against  the  learned  Chief  Justice  of  India, Justice A.M.  Ahmadi. The Registry raised objections for its maintainability but,  at eh insistence of the petitioner, it was  posted,   with  office   objections,  for  hearing,  as unregistered Writ  petition (c)  NO.  -17209/95  on  January 13,1996 before a Bench of three learned Judges, viz. Justice J.S. Bharuchal.  The petitioner,  again appearing in person, persisted to  justify the averments made against the learned CJI, Justice  A.M. Ahmadi  in the writ petition. In spite of the  Court  having  pointed  out  that  the  averments  were scandalous, the  proceeding of  the Court  did indicate that the petitioner  reiterated that  he "stood  by the averments made therein"  and sought  for declaration  [1] that Justice

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A.M. Ahmadi  is unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India; [2] that he should be tripped of his citizenship; [3] to direct  registration of  an FIR against him under various provisions of  Indian penal  Code for committing forgery and fraud and  under the  prevention of  Corruption Act;  (4) to direct prosecution of him under the prevention of Corruption Act; (5)  to direct  him to  defray from his personal pocket the expenses  incurred by  the petitioner  in filing the two writ petitions,  i.e., W.P.  No. 432/95  and the second writ petition; (6)  to direct  justice A.M.  Ahmadi to  reimburse from his  pocket to  the public  exchequer the  entire  loss caused to the State,. as a consequence of non-payment of the dues by  Sri P.V.  Narasimha Rao  with interest  at 18%  per annum and (7) other consequential directions.      After hearing  the petitioner,  the Bench dismissed the second writ petition with the order as under:      "The several  averments in the writ      petition are  scandalous and  it is      surprising that the petitioner, who      is said  to be  a  Professor  in  a      University, has chosen to draft and      file  such  a  writ  petition.  His      understanding  of  the  meaning  of      Article 32  of the Constitution, is      to say the least, preposterous. The      allegations made  are reckless  and      disclose  irresponsibility  on  the      part of  the petitioner.  This writ      petition is wholly misconceived and      is an  abuse of  the process of the      Court. The  writ  petition  has  no      merit.      The writ  petition  is,  therefore,      dismissed.      In view  of  the  attitude  of  the      petitioner  even  at  the  hearing,      when the  persisted in  this  stand      and, on  our asking him, reiterated      that he  stood  by  the  scandalous      averment made  therein, we consider      it  our   duty  to   issue  to  the      petitioner a  notice to  show cause      why proceedings  to punish  him for      contempt of  this Court  should not      be  initiated   against  him.   The      Registry  to   take  the  necessary      steps for registering the matter as      a contempt petition. The petitioner      who is  present-in-person is  given      notice of the contempt petition. He      is  required   to  file  his  reply      within four  wheels to  show  cause      why proceedings for contempt should      not be  initiated against  him.  We      request   the   learned   Solicitor      General to assist the Court in this      contempt matter.      List the matter after notice of the      date fixed  by Registry is given to      Dr. D.C.  Saxena and  the Solicitor      General."      While dismissing  the petition,  this Court observed in the later  part of the order the petitioner’s conduct in his persistence  to  stand  by  the  scandalous  averments  made against the  learned Chief  Justice of India. This Court was

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constrained to initiate contempt proceedings and enlisted 14 instances which  would prima  facie constitute  contumacious conduct of  the petitioner  to scandalise  the Court. In the meanwhile, the  petitioner wrote  in a newspaper criticising Justice J.S. Verma. Resultantly, Justice J.S. Verma reclused himself from  the Bench.  Thus the  matter was posted before this Bench.      On April 12,1996, the petitioner filed his reply to the show  cause   notice  styling   the  same   as  "preliminary submissions" and reiterated his averments, which, as pointed by this  Court, would constitute scandalisation of the Court and yet  he had  given his  justification for  accusing  the chief Justice of India. However, at the end, as a foot-note, he has written in his own hand-writing as under:      "N.B.   If   some   passages   seem      strindent or pungent, the defendant      is  willing   to  suitably   modify      them."      On April 14,1996, this court passed the order as under;      "Pursuant to  the notice  issued by      this Court  the Contemnor  Dr. D.C.      Saxena is  present today in person.      He has  stated that he would modify      the offending portions noted in the      show cause notice in Item (ii),(iv)      (vi),        (vii),         (viii),      (x),(xii),(xiii)  and   wishes   to      withdraw    unconditionally    item      (xiv), paras B and C.      The learned  Solicitor General  has      pointed  out   that  even   if  the      Contemnor   withdraws    or   files      statement in the modified form what      the Court required to do is whether      his statements  made  in  the  writ      petition      originally      filed      constitute contempt of the Court or      not  statements  would  not  be  of      material       relevance        for      consideration. Since  the contemnor      seeks  time   to  submit  the  show      contemnor seeks  time to submit the      show cause in the modified language      which he wishes to place before the      court, at his request the matter is      adjourned to  may  2,1996  at  2.00      p.m. The  Registry is  directed  to      supply complete  set of  papers  to      learned solicitor General."      When the  case came  up for hearing on May 2, 1996, the petitioner  filed   amended  portions   to  substitute   the averments made,  at proper  places, in the second unnumbered writ petition.  We have  heard learned  Solicitor General as amicus curiae  and the  petitioner-in-person. Before opening the case,  the solicitor General, in view of the seriousness of the  averments made  by the  petitioner in  the  petition filed against the chief Justice of India, and in view of his stand in  both the  preliminary submissions  to the contempt notice and  the revised averments made in the writ petition, suggested that  it would  be advantageous for the petitioner to have consultation and legal assistance  of any counsel of his choice  and to  revise his  stand,  but  the  petitioner remained silent and got along with the case.      The learned  solicitor General  stated that on July 17, 1995, the  Court had  sent for  and  called upon him to have

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the allegations  made in  the first  writ petition, verified and to place the factual position before the Court. Pursuant thereto, on  August 7,1995,  he had placed the record before the Court  which are  confidential in  nature.  After  their perusal and hearings the petitioner, the Court did not think it necessary  to issue the directions as sought for. At this stage, we  would point out that when Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, as president  of Indian  National Congress  or as the former prime  Minister,  was  alleged  to  have  used  the  defence aircrafts, this  Court obviously  was of  the view  that the relationship between  the two wings of the Government or the political party,  i.e., the  Indian national  Congress is of debtor and  creditor and  that, therefore,  prerogative writ under Article  32 of  the  Constitution  would  not  lie  to enforce contractual  dues adjustable  as per their practice. The exercise  of the  power under Article 32 was, therefore, obviously thought  to be  uncalled for.  Supreme Court being the highest  Judicial forum,  the need  to record reasons is obviated since  there is no further appeal against the order of  this   Court.  Recording   reasons  is  not,  therefore, necessary nor is called for.      The learned  solicitor  General,  therefore,  contended that  when  the  Court  dismissed  the  writ  petition,  the petitioner, being  a  professor  of  English  in  Chandigarh University, should  have exercised  restraint and felt duty- bound not  to proceed  further in  the matter.  Instead,  he filed the  second writ  petition with  allegations which are ex-facie contumacious. The petitioner reiterated the same in his preliminary  submissions to  the notice of the contempt. His modified  statement filed on April 24,1996 itself is not relevant.  What   would  be   material  and   relevant   for consideration is  whether the  allegations made  against the learned Chief  Justice of  India in the Second Writ petition do constitute  contempt of  the Court.  The modified  stand, therefore, is not relevant to adjudge whether the petitioner has committed  contempt of this Court. The Court, therefore, has to  consider the  totality of  the averments  and  their effect on the judicial process to adjudge the conduct of the petitioner to be contumacious. The petitioner contended that he did  not seek  any personal  gain for himself. As a duty- bound citizen,  he was  actuated to see that the public dues are recovered  from any person how-so-high he may be. To the best of his understanding, the petitioner made the averments for public  good and  he has  no intention to scandalise the Court. He  had approached  this Court  earlier more  than 12 times to  vindicate public  justice. As a human being, he is fallible but  he has  no intention to denigrate the Court to which he  has highest  respect. His modified language in the statement  filed   on  April   24,1996  does   indicate  his intention.      In the proceedings of the Court dated July, 17,1995, it was recorded  that the  Solicitor   General had appeared for Sri P.V.  Narasimha Rao  who was  impleaded in  his personal capacity.  It   is  the  petitioner’s  contention  that  the solicitor  General   cannot  appear  for  him.  He  was  not assisting the Court as amicus. When the Chief justice called for  the  records  from  the  Government  through  solicitor General, it  is Court’s  duty to  give him  copies of  those documents but the same were denied to him. It is his      xiv)      Page       9       prayer      (a) Declare the respondent unfit to      hold office  as  chief  Justice  of      India;      (b) Strip  the  respondent  of  his      citizenship;

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    (c) Direct  the registration  of an      F.I.R. against the respondent under      the   Indian    penal   Code    for      committing forgery and fraud;      (d)   Direct    the    respondent’s      prosecution under the prevention of      corruption Act.      The alleged  contemnor  filed  written  submissions  in reply to  the contempt notice. His first submission was that the Bench  which had  heard and  dismissed the  second  writ petition had  been constituted  by the  respondent, who  had thereby become  a judge  in his  own cause.  The second writ petition  was,  accordingly,  not  listed  before  a  court, competent to  dispose it  of,  so  that  the  order  of  its dismissal was  non est,  and  it  was  still  deemed  to  be pending. The  contempt notice was, therefore, premature. The written submissions  then dealt  with the  portions  of  the second  writ  petition  which  had  been  indicated  in  the contempt notice and reiterated the same, except only that it was submitted  that the  allegation about fabrication of the court  proceedings   of  7th  August,  1995,  was  "somewhat unhappily would".  It  was  submitted  thereafter  that  the contempt of  Courts Act  was a legacy of British imperialism and,  while   appropriate  to   a  "banana   republic",  was imcompatible with  a democratic,  people’s polity;  it was a law-less law  because it fused the offices of the prosecutor and  the  judge  and  "belongs  with  the  infamous  Spanish inquisition". After his signature at the foot of the written submissions, the  alleged contemnor  added in hand, "N.B. If some passages  seem strident  or pungent,  the defendant  is willing to suitably modify them."      The contempt  notice came  up before this Bench on 15th April, 1996. The following order was then passed;      "Pursuant to  the notice  issued by      this court  the Contemnor Dr. D.C..      Saxena is  present today in person.      He has  stated that he would modify      the offending  portions   noted  in      the  show   cause  notice  in  Item      (ii),(iv),(vi),   (vii),(viii),(x),      (xi),(xii),(xiii)  and   wishes  to      withdrew unconditionally  item xiv,      paras B and C.      The learned  Solicitor General  has      pointed  out   that  even   if  the      Contemnor   withdraws    or   files      statement in the modified form what      the Court required to do is whether      originally     filed     constitute      contempt of  the  statements  would      not be of material reliance time to      submit  the   show  cause   in  the      modified Court,  at his  request eh      matter is  adjourned to  may 2,1996      at  2.00   P.M.  The   Registry  is      directed to  supply complete set of      papers   to    learned    Solicitor      General."      extract the  relevant portions  supplied to him by show cause and  his reply  thereto and of preliminary submissions and  his   modified  statement  as  a  substitution  to  the averments made  in the  second writ  petition and the effect thereof. In  respect of  the averments made in the offending portions  of  item  1,3,  5,9,13  and  14(a)  and  (d),  the petitioner  stood   by  them.   He  submitted  his  modified

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statement  on  April  24,1996  only  for  the  rest  of  the statements. Let  us first  consider the unmodified averments before examining the original and the modified averments.      The first  averment made  at page  4 in  paragraph 9 is that "it was improper for justice Ahmadi to hear it". Item 3 at page  6 in  paragraph 14  is:  "To  this  Justice  Ahmadi responded that  he (the  solicitor  General)  was  there  to assist the  Court, contrary  to the  evidence of  the  court proceedings". Item  5 relating to the averments made in page 6 in  paragraph 17  is; "the  subsequent course of action by Justice Ahmadi, in dealing with the grouse of the petitioner and dismissing  his  petition  is  totally  unjust,  unfair, arbitrary and  unlawful. It  is in flagrant violation of the mandates of Article 14 of the constitution, which "runs like a golden  thread" through it ad is the foundation of justice and fair  play". Item  9 relating  to the  averments made at page  8   in  paragraph   18(f)  is:  "what  are  the  legal consequences of  the violation  of the sacred oath of office by justice  Ahmadi?"  Item  14(a)  relating  to  the  prayer portion is:  "declare the  respondent (justice  A.M. Ahmadi) unfit to  hold office  as Chief  Justice of  India" and item 14(d) is:  "Direct the  respondent’s (Justice A.M. Ahmadi’s) prosecution under  the prevention  of Corruption  Act."  The petitioner in  his affidavit  filed in support of the second writ petition  has stated  in para  2 thereof  thus:  "I  am actuated purely  by national interests and no personal gains and have truthfully and carefully stated the facts (emphasis supplied), in  pursuance of my fundamental duties, which can be effectively performed only through the fundamental rights enjoyed  as   a  citizen   of  India."  In  his  preliminary submissions, he  has stated  that the  writ  petition  under Article 32  shall be  heard by  a Division Court of not less than 5 Judges. Emphasis was added by the petitioner himself. Since the  writ petition  was  not  listed  before  a  Court components to  dispose of  the same,  it made  the order  of dismissal non est  and it should be deemed to be pending and is "not  yet decided  and disposed  of constitutionally". No contempt  proceedings  can,  therefore,  be  initiated.  The notice is , therefore, pre-mature. Constitution of the Bench by the  chief Justice  is in  violation of the principles of natural justice  as no  one can be a judge of his own cause. Justice "should  not only  be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seem  to be  done. nothing  is to  be done which creates even  a suspicion  that there  has been  an improper interference of the course of justice.", he quoted the above statement of  Lord Heward, C.J. Regarding Item 1 referred to hereinbefore; he  justified the  imputation stating  that no person  can  be  a  Judge  in  his  own  cause  directly  or indirectly. In  spite of his objection, the respondent (CJI) chose to  constitute the bench himself as a presiding judge. According to  the petitioner the word " improper", therefore was used  in that  perspective, with regard to the averments made in  Item 3,  his reply  was that  the Court proceedings dated July  17,1995 recording  that the  solicitor  General, Shri Dipankar Gupta appeared in his official capacity to Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, a private party. He had stated that even assuming, though  not conceding,  that he (Solicitor General was acting  as amicus  curiae also  was not  recorded in the Court proceedings.  Therefore,  his  comment  that  CJI  had Fabricated false   record  is fair and an accurate report of the court proceedings protected under section 4 of the Act.      With regard  to Item  5, he  states thus:  " This  is a reaffirmation of  an unimpeachable  legal proposition in the most widely-prevalent legal phraseology, to which no umbrage can be  taken, for  by this  logic all  petitions containing

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this phrase  would be  deemed contemptuous. Even the part of the quotation  is from  a leading  decision of  this Hon’ble Court in Maneka Gandhi’s case."      With regard  to averments  made in item 9, he justified it stating  that "this  again is  an unresolved  question of great legal  significance and  he cited  as analogy  of  Mr. Fazlul Huq,  then Chief  Minister of  Bengal  and  quoted  a passage from  a special Bench  decision of the Calcutta High Court in  R.C. Pollard  v. Satya Gopal Majumdar [A.I.R. 1943 Cal. 594 (605)]. He added special emphasis to the words "the clear violation  of it  brands a  man as  unfit  for  public office"  and   stated  that   it  is  a  legal  question  of substantial importance  relating to the violation of oath of office, contained in the Third Scheduled of the Constitution and it  cannot be  disposed of  by a  three judge  Bench. It cannot be  considered as  personal  imputation  against  the judge. With  regard to imputation and prayer (a) in item 14, he says that the analogy he had taken from the Calcutta High Court decision.  It was  natural   corollary  to  the  legal proposition considered  by a constitution Bench. with regard to   prayer (d)  in Item  14, he  states that this is only a prayer for  relief sought.  The defence taken in relation to (xiv)(b) and  (c) would  equally be applicable and so he has reaffirmed them  to be  correct. The allegations, therefore, are   neither    "reckless"   nor    do    they    "disclose irresponsibility"  (put   within  inverted    comma  by  the petitioner himself)  and is  not "an abuse of the process of the Court."      He reiterated  that  "several  averments  in  the  writ petition" being  truthful, factual, and made without rancour or malice and for no personal, gain, should not be construed "scandalous" (inverted  commas were  put by  the  petitioner himself).      Let us  now consider other imputations, in the language of petitioner  himself with  regard to  the "truthfully  and carefully"  stated   facts.  At  page  5  in  para  10,  the petitioner     has  stated  that  "Justice  Ahmadi’s  utmost reluctance   to   perform   his   fundamental   duties   and constitutional obligations  was apparent. when after failing to browbeat the petitioner, he stated that it would be taken up at  the end  of  the  cause  list."  in  his  preliminary submissions he  has stated that "this is a fair and accurate submission of  the Court  proceedings on  matter  which  had already been  "heard and  finally decided"."(inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). He sought protection to it, as  a fair  comment, under  Section 4  of  the  Act.  He further justified  it stating that even the use of the would "browbeat"  by  the  petitioner  is  a  "fair  criticism  of judicial act"  (inverted comma  was put  by  the  petitioner himself) to  imply that proper hearing was not being granted to the  petitioner who  had approached  the highest Court of the land  to ’Protect  and safeguard  public  property".  he justified them  as a  "statement  of  truthful  facts",  for public good  should not  be construed  as disrespect  to the Hon’ble Court.  After offering justification in his modified statement, he  reiterates thus:  "The  petitioner  discerned reluctance on  the part  of the presiding judge to allow the relief claimed,  which was  in public interest, and actuated by the  desire   to "Preserve  and protect public property," without any  personal malice." It would, thus, indicate that the petitioner imputed motives to Justice A.M. Ahmadi, chief justice India,  in the  discharge of his constitutional duty and that  by not  admitting the  writ petition or dismissing the  petition,   the  CJI   was  reluctant  to  perform  his constitutional duty.  He knew  that the word "browbeat" is a

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strident imputation  to the  Court and,  therefore,  in  his modified reluctance".  Even in  the modified  statement,  he attributed  motives   to  CJI  in  the  performance  of  his constitutional   duty while  the Bench  that  dismissed  the first writ petition consisted of three judges. By inference, he suggested the other brother Judges to be mere non-entity.      With regard  to item 4 at page 6 in para 15, he imputed to the  CJI that  "and without  recording  the  reasons  for dismissing the  petition. So  much for the vaunted adherence to the  twin principles of transparency and accountability." In his  preliminary submissions,  he has given justification for his attributed motives to CJI stating that the Solicitor General handed  over some  documents to  the bench,  without supplying the  copy thereof  to the bench, without supplying the copy  thereof to the petitioner. When he had objected to it in his own  language, he avers that "justice Ahmadi asked him to  argue on the supposition that nothing had been given to the  bench.   In view of this, reference has been made to the "twin  principles  of  transparency  and  accountability which", according to the petitioner, "is a fair and accurate report of  court proceedings,  which is also for the "public good"."  (inverted   commas  were   put  by  the  petitioner himself). In  the modified  statement he  stated thus: "That justice Ahmadi  ultimately dismissed the petition, observing that the Government of India was capable to realise the dues from Shri  Rao (which  it had  no to  done in two years) and without recording  the reasons  for dismissing the petition, for which  lapse  it  has  often  berated  High  Courts,  in pursuance  of   the  twin  principles  of  transparency  and accountability". It would, thus be seen that as regards this imputation, the  petitioner gives  justification that  there was omission  to record  reasons for  dismissal of  the writ petition; he  imputed to  CJI that  the CJI  facilitated Sri Narasimha Rao  to avoid  payment of  public dues. The act of the Court  was not transparent. According to the petitioner, it is  a lapse  on the part of the Court for which the Court conduct, by  implication, was  not transparent and the Court must be accountable.      Item 6  at page  7 in  paragraph 18(c) reads thus: "For causing fabrication  of courts  proceedings of  7th  August, 1995, and  not mentioning  the fact  of  appearance  of  the solicitor General,  would justice  Ahmadi not  be liable  to prosecution under  the relevant  provisions  of  the  Indian penal code  in consonance  with the time-honoured maxim, ‘Be you ever  so high,  the law is above you"?" (inverted commas were put  by the  petitioner himself).  In  his  preliminary submissions he  stated  that  "Although  somewhat  unhappily worded, it is one of the substantial questions of law, which needed to  be determined by a constitution Bench of the apex court". According  to him,  above maxim is one to which this court has  repeatedly stated  to have  avowed allegiance. In his  modified  version,  he  stated  thus:  "For  inaccurate recording of  the court  proceedings of  7 August, 1995, and not mentioning  even the fact of appearance of the solicitor General for  the respondent, what responsibility would ensue on the  presiding  judge,  who  dictated  them?"  It  would, therefore,  in   the  language   of   the   petitioner,   be "discernible" difference  of the  imputation  as  originally made in  the writ petition and reiterated in his preliminary submissions and its impact was understood by the petitioner. Therefore,   he    made   the   amended   version   imputing responsibility to  justice  Ahmadi  personally  for  the  so called inaccurate  recording of  the Court  proceedings  and stated that the CJI should be prosecuted for the record said to be falsely  recorded by CJI after fabrication and it is a

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fraud and CJI is liable for prosecution for fraud etc.      Item 7  at page  6 in  paragraph 18(d) reads thus; "can justice Ahmadi  be allowed  to take shelter behind the cloak of the  judicial immunity, in the facts and circumstances of the instance case, particularly when unlike the president of India,  who   cannot  be  impleaded  in  Civil  or  criminal proceedings "during  his term of office," CJI enjoys no such constitutional protection?"  In his preliminary submissions, he stated  that this is yet another constitutional conundrum which needed  to be  resolved by a constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Court  under Article  145(3) read with Supreme Court Rules. According  to the  petitioner "Crucial to it are "the facts and  circumstances" (inverted  commas were  put by the petitioner  himself)   spelled  out   earlier".   implicitly conferring immunity  on the  congress  president,  Sri  P.V. Narasimha Rao,  from  laws of the land do not apply. Is this not a  negation of  all that the constitution holds sacred?" In the  modified version,  he stated  thus "when  under  the Constitution Judges  of superior  courts do  not, unlade the president   of India, enjoy total immunity during their term of office,  can the presiding judge, be allowed to make such a claim  for wrong  doing?" (Emphasis  supplied). He,  thus, imputed to  the  chief  justice  of  India,  Justice  Ahmadi motives  that   CJI  allowed  Sri  Narasimha  Rao,  Congress president, to  avoid payment  of dues  causing loss  to  the national exchequer  treating him  as a  class by himself and the CJI  neglected to  perform the constitutional duty which he holds  sacred which  is a  wrong-doing. therefore,  chief Justice of  India should  not be  allowed to  take  judicial immunity and  is liable  to criminal prosecution even during his term of office as CJI.      Item 8  of the imputation at page 7 in para 18(e) reads thus; "for  willfully and  advertently  violating  (emphasis supplied) the  fundamental rights of not only the petitioner as an  individual, but  that of the people of India, who are ultimately sovereign,  as stated  in  the  preamble  to  the Constitution, has  not justice  Ahmadi forfeited  any  legal protection, even  if it  were  available  to  him?"  In  his preliminary submissions,  he has stated that "The first part of the  sentence is  based on  the  implicit  constitutional provisions and  in fact  shows that the petitioner/defendant looks upon the apex court as the guardian of his fundamental rights and  those of the voiceless millions. The second part raises a constitutional question, which needed determination by  an  appropriate  bench."  In  the  amended  version,  he reiterated that "for violating the fundamental rights of not only the  petitioner, as an individual, but also that of the people of  India, who  are the ultimate sovereign, as stated in the  preamble to the Constitution, has not justice Ahmadi sent wrong  signals tot  he entire  judiciary of which he is the  head".   In  this  paragraph,  it  is  clear  that  the petitioner knew  the distinction  between the  imputation as originally attributed  to the Chief justice of India as Head of the  Institution, i.e.,  Judiciary and  reiterated in his preliminary   submissions    that   CJI    "willfully"   and "advertently"  violated   the  petitioner’s   and   people’s fundamental right  to redressal by wrongful dismissal of the writ petition.  He knew  its indelible  effect on the public confidence in  the efficacy  of  judicial  dispensation  and propriety of  the  judicial  process.  When  they  read  the imputation, he  attributed to  the Chief  Justice  that  CJI willfully and advertently violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner  and other  people  in  dismissing  the  writ petition. Thereby, justice Ahmadi forfeited legal protection of law,  if it  were available  to him  and he stated in his

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modified version  that the  action of Chief Justice of India sent wrong  signals to  the entire  judiciary of which he is the head.  In other  words, it would imply that CJI as judge and as head of the institution committed misconduct.      Imputation 10  made at  page 8 in paragraph 18(g) reads thus: "For  deliberate and  willful failure  to perform  his fundamental duties  and stultifying their performance by the petitioner, should  not justice  Ahmadi be  stripped of  his citizenship,   because   duties   alone   can   confer   the corresponding  legal  and  constitutional  rights?.  In  his preliminary submissions,  he has  stated that this is also a constitutional question  needed to  be  interpreted  on  the ambit and  enforceability of  fundamental duties  in Article 51-A; it  should not  be considered  by a  Division   bench. "Moreover, this  is a  logical corollary  of  the  foregoing question of  law.  It  is  respectfully  reiterated  that  a question  of   law  is   not  a   personal   imputation   or insinuation." In  his modified  version, he has stated thus: "For failure  to perform his fundamental duties and impeding their performance  by the  petitioner,  should  not  justice Ahmadi be  regarded as  accountable to  the people of India, because duties  alone can confer the corresponding legal and constitutional rights?" In this behalf, it is clear that the petitioner is well conversant with the effect of "a personal imputation and  the negation".  He attributed  that  Justice Ahmadi, Chief  Justice of  India deliberately  and willfully failed to  perform his  fundamental duties by dismissing the first writ  petition and  stultified the  performance of the duty by  the petition  and stultified the performance of the duty by  the petitioner. Thereby Justice Ahmadi "be stripped of his citizenship". He also knew that for exercise of legal or constitutional  rights one owes corresponding duties. The person who  fails to  perform the duty is accountable to the people. CJI  willfully, in  other words,  deliberately  with supine indifference  dismissed the  writ petition.  CJI does not get legal protection but also forfeits his citizenship.      Imputation 11  at page 8 in paragraph 18(h) reads thus: "For allowing  his son  who is  a practising  in the Supreme Court, to  stay with  him in  his  official  residence,  and presumably in  the supreme  Court, to  stay with  him in his official  residence,   and  presumably   misusing   official facilities and prestige of office of chief Justice of India, is not  Justice Ahmadi  liable to  be prosecuted  under  the prevention of corruption act, in view of the ratio decidendi of Veeraswami’s  case?" In  his preliminary  submissions, he reiterated that  this is a question law based on information he had received from "public documents"(inverted commas were put by  the petitioner  himself) from  an Article  which was said to  have   appeared  in  "India  Today",  with  Justice Ahmadi’s photograph  and yet  another one  said to have been published in  "The Times  of India",  authored  by  a  woman senior Advocate  of this Court. He states that "It is widely talked in  legal circles  that apart  from being favoured in appointment on  local commissions  (by the Delhi High Court) Justice Ahmadi’s  son (and  daughter also)  are  very  often assigned government  briefs". In  support of his imputation, he seeks  justification from  the observation  made by  this Court in  C. Ravichandran Iyer V. Justice A.M. Bhattacjarkee & Ors.  [(1995) 5 SCC 457] of transparency of the conduct of the Judge  on and  off the bench. He further added that "the criminal contempt application of one M.P. Shorewala  against the  petitioner/defendant   was  got   filed  and  in  gross violation of  statutory provision  (mentioned in  the office report) was  got listed  next to the petitioner’s civil writ petition on  the same  day. i.e.,  30th January,  1996,  for

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reasons which  need no  dilation’. The  petitioner  had  not modified in  his modified version, though he undertook to do so. He  stood by  the above  imputation and reiteration with further justification in that behalf made in his preliminary submissions. we  may observe    here  itself  that  personal imputation against  the  chief  Justice  of  India,  Justice Ahmadi of  allowing his son to practise in the supreme court is false. His permitting his son to  reside  in his official residence said  to be  in abuse of his official position has no relevance  to the  first writ  petition relating  to  the recovery of the alleged arrears said to be due from Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao.  During the  course   of hearing, when it was pointed out  to the  petitioner that  as a  fact the  son of justice Ahmadi  is not  practising in  the Supreme Court and that the  above imputation has no rational connection to the first writ  petition and  of the necessity to allege them in the second  one, no  answer was given by the petition and of the necessity  to allege  them in  the second one, no answer was given  by the petitioner. He sought to justify it on the basis of  the reports  said to  have been  published in  the newspapers. When  we further  inquired from  him whether  he made any  independent  inquiry  in  the  matter  or  on  the accuracy of  the newspaper  publications, he  stated that he relied upon the above statements as an accurate statement of fact reported  therein. We  may mention that this imputation has no  relevance to  the first  proceedings. As a fact, the son of  Justice Ahmadi  is not  practising  in  the  Supreme Court. The alleged facility of permitting his son to stay in his  official   residence  bears   no  relevance     to  the proceedings. The imputations were obviously off the cup.      Imputation 12  made at  page 8 in paragraph 18(i) reads thus: "  Is Justice Ahmadi not liable to pay from his pocket not only the legitimate costs incurred by the petitioners in C.W.P. No.  432 of  1995 and  the present petition, but also the loss  caused to  the public  exchequer by non-payment of dues  with   18%  interest  by  Shri  P.V.N.  Rao?"  In  his preliminary submissions  he  reiterated  it  giving  further justification thus:  "This is  the law  laid  down  by  this Hon’ble Court  in relation to public servants. Whether it is also applicable  to holders  of constitutional office or not is a  substantial question  of law,  which should  have been answered by  a constitution  bench." In his modified version he has  stated thus:  "who would  be liable to reimburse the legitimate costs incurred by the petitioner by filing C.W.P. No.432 of  1995, and  the present petition and the huge loss caused to  the public  exchequer because  of the  persistent default in  paying them  by P.V.  Narasimha  Rao,  with  18% interest?" it would, thus, be apparent that for dismissal of the writ  petition filed  by a party, by a judicial act, the presiding judge  of the  Court is liable to pay costs to the litigant and also the resultant loss to the public exchequer for non-payment  of the dues by the defaulter with interest. He justified  it stating  that when  a public servant causes loss to  the State  and the  same is  sought to be recovered from  him,   why  not  the  constitutional  functionary  for judicial act  is also  liable to pay over the same. In other words,  if  the  Court  dismisses  a  petition  filed  by  a litigant, the  resultant costs must be born by the presiding officer of  the Court. Equally, the loss caused to the State should also be recoverable from the presiding judge from his personal pocket .      Regarding imputation  13,  though  he  stated  that  he wished to  make modification  to it, in his amended version, he did not touch upon the same.      Imputation 13  at page  8 reads  thus: "since no person

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can be  a judge  in his  own cause, the senior-most judge of the  Hon’ble   Court  may   be  permitted  to  constitute  a constitution bench,  for expeditious hearing of the petition excluding any judge who owes his elevation to the apex court to justice  Ahmadi. Further  during  its  pendency,  Justice Ahmadi may  be advised  to proceed  on leave, so that he may not directly  or indirectly  influence  any  of  the  judges hearing the  matter." In  his preliminary   submissions,  he reiterates that  " The  prayer is  in strict conformity with the maxim  cited earlier  in the words of lord Heward, C.J." He justified it on the basis of Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was),  the  senior-most  judge’s  presiding  over  P.S. Gupta’s  case,   i.e.,  First   judges  case   when  justice Chandrachud was  imputed  with  some  allegations.  He  also justified  his  quoting  the  advice  given  to  Justice  V. Ramaswami to  proceed on  leave  when  enquiry  was  pending against him under the Judges [Inquiry] Act. It would be seen that in this imputation, he categorically asserts and relies that justice  Ahmadi, Chief  justice of  India  would  bring about influence  directly or  indirectly upon his colleagues when the  matter was to be heard. While he is in the office, he also  should not  function as  Chief Justice  pending his second writ  petition. CJI  also should  not constitute  any benches. That  should be  done  by  the  senior-most  puisne Judge. Any  Judge appointed  to this Court during his tenure as CJI  should not  hear  ht  e  case  as  CJI  directly  or indirectly would  influence them  when the  case relating to his was  dealt with.  In other words, his imputation is that Judges appointed  to the  Supreme Court during the tenure of Justice A.M. Ahmadi as CJI amenable to influence in deciding the cases  at the  behest of  the  CJI  as  they  owe  their appointments to  him. In  other words,  as soon  as  a  writ petition under  Article 32 or petition under Article 136 was filed attributing  motives or  bias to  the  CJI  [it  would equally apply  to any  Judge he  should  desist  to  perform judicial and administrative work. He should proceed on leave till that  case is  decided. The  senior-most  puisne  Judge should assume the work of the CJI.      Imputations in Prayer (b) and (c) read as under:      "(b) strip  the respondent (Justice      A.M. Ahmadi)  of his  citizenship";      and (c)  Direct the registration of      an  FIR   against   he   respondent      (Justice  A.M.  Ahmadi)  under  the      Indian Penal  Code  for  committing      forgery and fraud."      In his  preliminary submissions,  he  has  stated  with regard to  stripping of  citizenship of  CJI that  "this may have  been   the  consequence   of  the  constitution  bench affirming the  view taken  by the  Calcutta High Court cited earlier. Moreover,  this is only a prayer for relief sought, which does  not fall  within the mischief of the Contempt of Courts Act."  With regard to prayer (c) he states thus: "the plea taken  in relation  to (xiv  (b). Now,  in the modified statement, he  seeks to withdraw them and states "May kindly be treated  as deleted".  It would,  thus, be clear that his asking for stripping of the citizenship of the Chief Justice of India is for dismissing his writ petition and prosecution is the  consequence of  a decision  of this  Court which had affirmed the  judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Fazalul Haq’s, Chief Minister, Bengal’s case.      At this  stage, it  may be relevant to mention that the petitioner,  either   in  his   preliminary  submissions  or modified version  filed on April 24, 1996, during the course of hearing, did not tender any unconditional apology for the

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imputations made against CJI. On the other hand, it is clear that being  a professor of English. he knew the consequences of the language used, its purpose and effect and pressed for consideration. At  the time  of dismissing  the second  writ petition to  a pointed  reference of  the allegations  to be scandalous, it  was recorded  in the  order and there was no demur from  the petition  to the contra, that the petitioner stood  by   them.  In   other  words,   he  would  bear  the consequences that  would flow  therefrom. According  to  the petitioner,  many   an  imputation   bearing  constitutional contour require  interpretation by  a bench  of five  Judges under Article  145(3). We  need not  refer the  case to  the constitution Bench  merely because the petitioner has raised that contention  in the  petition;  nor  the  same  requires decision unless  the Court finds that the petition cannot be disposed of  without the  questions  being  decided  by  the constitution Bench.      When imputations  were made  against the Chief Justice, the petitioner  assumed, in  our view,  "wrongly"  that  CJI cannot  constitute  benches  nor  he  should  discharge  the functions of  Chief Justice  until the matter is decided. On appointment by  the president by a warrant and on his taking oath of  office, the  CJI becomes  entitled to discharge the functions and  duties of  that office including constitution of benches  and assignment of judicial work to judges as per procedure. This  responsibility flows  from the  office  and none including  a litigant  has right  to demand  for contra position. As regards his personal disposition to hear a case by a  bench of  which he is a member, it is his own personal volition. The  Chief  Justice’s  prerogative  to  constitute benches and  assignment of  judicial business would no hinge at the whim of a litigant.      The decisions of different benches are the decisions of the Court.  For the  convenient transaction of business, the senior judge  among the members composing the Bench gets the privilege to preside over the Bench but the decision is that of the  Court. The  members composing the Bench collectively speak for the Court and would bear collective responsibility for the  decision unless  separate opinions are expressed by individual members  composing the Bench. Majority opinion is the  law   as  envisage   under  Article   145(5)   of   the constitution. Their  opinion or order thus is the opinion or order of  the Court.  The minority  opinion also  would form part of the judgment or order but remains the minority view. The Chief justice is first among the colleagues.      The question,  therefore, arises:  whether  the  afore- enumerated imputations  constitute contempt  of this  court? Though the  petitioner contended  that the provisions of the Act are  ultra vires Article 19 [1] (a) of the constitution, it is  not necessary  for the purpose of this case to twelve upon  that   contention.  This  court  has  taken  suo  motu cognizance of  contempt of  this Court  under Article 129 of the Constitution  of India  which reiterates  as a  court of record, its  power to  punish for  contempt  of  itself.  As pointed out  in the  proceedings of this Court dated January 13, 1996,  in spite  of the  fact that this Court brought to his attention the gravity of the imputations, the petitioner insisted and  reiterated that  he stood  by  the  scandalous averments made  therein. This  Court being  duty bound, was, therefore, constrained  to issue  notice  of  contempt.  The question, therefore,  is: whether  the aforesaid imputations are scurrilous  attack intended  to scandalise the Court and do they  not impede due administration of Justice? Words are the skin  of the  language. Language  in which the words are couched is  media to  convey the thoughts of the author. Its

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effect  would  be  discernible  from  the  language  couched proprio vigore.  The  petitioner,  a  professor  of  English language in  clear and  unequivocal  language emphasised and reaffirmed  that   the  averments   were   "truthfully   and carefully" worded.  The question  is:  to  what  extent  the petitioner is  entitled to  the freedom of those expressions guaranteed under  Article 19[1](a)  of the  Constitution? If they are  found scandalous, whether he would get absolved by operation of  Article 19[1]  (a) ?.  As this Court has taken suo motu  action under  article 129  of the Constitution and the word ‘contempt’ has not been defined by making rules, it would be  enought to  been defined by making rules, it would be enought  to fall  back upon  the definition  of ’criminal contempt" defined  under section 2(c) of the act which reads thus:      "Criminal   Contempt"   means   the      publication  (whether   by   words,      spoken or  written, or by signs, or      buy  visible   representations,  or      otherwise   of    any   other   act      whatsoever which--      (i)   Scandalises   or   tends   to      scandalise, or  lowers or  tends to      lower the  authority of  any court:      or      (ii) Prejudices,  or interferes  or      tends to  interfere with,  the  due      course of any judicial proceedings;      or      (iii)  interferes   or   tends   to      interfere  with,  or  obstructs  or      tends     to      obstruct,     the      administration of  justice  in  any      other manner."           (emphasis supplied)      It  is   doubtless  that   freedom  of  speech  and  of expression guaranteed  by Article  19[1] (a)  is one  of the most precious  liberties in our secular, socialist republic. Freedom of  expression is  a prized privilege to speak one’s open mind  although not  always in perfect good taste of all institutions. Since it opens up channels of open discussion, the opportunity  of speech and expression should be afforded for vigorous  advocacy, no  less than  abstract  discussion. This  liberty   may  be   regarded  as   an  autonomous  and fundamental good and its value gets support from the need to develop our  evolving  society  from  unequal  pas  t  to  a vigorous homogeneous  egalitarian order  in which  each gets equality of  status and of opportunity; social, economic and political justice  with dignity  of person so as to build an integrated and united Bharat. Transformation for that strong social restructure  would be  secured when channels for free discussion are  wide  opinion  and  secular  mores  are  not frozen. All  truths are relative and they can be judged only in the  competition of  market. Liberty is not to be equated with certainty.  Freedom of expression equally generates and disseminates ideas  and opinions,  information of  political and social  importance in  a free  market place for peaceful social transformation  under rule  of law.  The doctrine  of discovery of  truth does  require free exchange of ideas and use of  appropriate language.  words are  the  skin  of  the language which  manifests the  intention of its maker or the speaker. The right to free speech is, therefore, an integral aspect of  right  to  self-development  and  fulfillment  of person’s duties  some of  which are proselytised in part IVA of the  Constitution as   Fundamental Duties. The end of the

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State is  to secure  to the  citizens freedom to develop his faculties, freedom  to think  as he  will, to  speak  as  he thinks and  read as  indispensable tools to the discovery of truth and  realisation of  human knowledge and human rights. Public discussion  is  political  liberty.  The  purpose  of freedom of speech is to understand political issues so as to protect the  citizens and  to  enable  them  to  participate effectively  in   the  working   of  the   democracy  in   a representative form  of Government.  Freedom  of  expression would play  crucial role  in the formation of public opinion on social,  political  and  economic  questions.  Therefore, political speeches  are given  greater degree  of protection and special  and higher  status than other types of speeches and  expressions.  The  importance  of  speaker’s  potential development  on  political  and  social  questions  is  also relevant  to   encourage  human  development  for  effective functioning of democratic institutions.      Equally, debate  on public issues would be uninhibited, robust  and   wide  open.  It  may  well  include  vehement, sarcastic  and   sometimes  unpleasant  sharp  criticism  of Government and  public officials.  Absence of  restraint  in this  area   encourages  a  well  informed  and  politically sophisticated electoral  debate to conform the Government in tune with  the constitutional mandates to return a political party  to  power.  Prohibition  of  freedom  of  speech  and expression on public issues prevents and stifles  the debate on social,  political and  economic questions  which in long term endangers  the stability of the community and maximises the source and breeds for more likely revolution.      If maintenance  of democracy is the foundation for free speech, society  equally is  entitled to regulate freedom of speech or  expression by  democratic action.  The reason  is obvious,  viz.,   that  society   accepts  free  speech  and expression   and also  puts  limits  on  the  right  of  the majority. Interest  of the  people involved  in the  acts of expressions  should   be  looked   at  not   only  from  the perspective of  the speaker  but also  the place at which he speaks, the  scenario, the  audience, the  reaction  of  the publication, the purpose of the speech and the place and the forum in  which the  citizen exercises his freedom of speech and  expression.   The  state   has   legitimate   interest, therefore, to regulate the freedom of speech and expression. The state  has legitimate  interest, therefore,  to regulate the  freedom   of  speech   and  expression   which  liberty represents the  limits of the duty of restraint on speech or expression not  to utter  defamatory or  libelous speech  or expression. There  is a  co-relative duty  not to  interfere with the  liberty of  others. each is entitled to dignity of person and  of reputation.  No body has a right to denigrate other’s right to person or reputation. Therefore, freedom of speech and  expression is  tolerated so  long as  it is  not malicious or  libelous so  that all  attempts to  foster and ensue orderly  and peaceful public discussion or public good should result  from free speech in the market place. If such speech or  expression was  untrue and  so reckless as to its truth, the  speaker or the author does not get protection of the constitutional right.      Freedom of  speech and  expression, therefore, would be subject to  Articles 19 [2],129 and 215 of the Constitution, in relation  to contempt  of court, defamation or incitement to an  offence etc.  Article 3  read with  Article 19 of the Universal   Declaration of  Human Rights  grants to everyone liberty and  right to  freedom of  opinion  and  expression. Article 19  of  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and political Rights, 1966 to which India is a signatory and had

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ratified, provides  that everyone  shall have  the right  to freedom of expression, to receive and impart information and ideas  of   all  kinds   but  clause   [3]  thereof  imposes corresponding duty  on  the  exercise  of    the  right  and responsibilities. It  may therefore,  be subject  to certain restrictions but these shall only be such as are provided by law  and   are  necessary   for  the  respect  of  life  and reputations  of   others  for  the  protection  of  national security or  public order  or of  public health or moral. it would thus  be seen  that liberty  of speech  and expression guaranteed by Article 19[1] (a) brings within its ambit, the corresponding duty  and responsibility  and puts limitations on the exercise of that liberty.      A citizen  is entitled  to bring  to the  notice of the public at  large the  infirmities from which any institution including judiciary  suffers from.  Indeed ,  the  right  to offer healthy  and constructive  criticism which  is fair in spirit must  be left  unimpaired  in  the  interest  of  the institution itself.  Critics are  instruments of  reform but not those  actuated by  malice but those who are inspired by public  weal.   Bona  fide   criticism  of   any  system  or institution including  judiciary is  aimed at  inducing  the administration of  the system  or institution to look inward and improve  its public image. Courts, the instrumentalities of the  state are  subject to  the Constitution and the laws and  are  not  above  criticism.  Healthy  and  constructive criticism are  tools   to augment  its  forensic  tools  for improving its  functions. A  harmonious blend  and  balanced existence of  free speech  and fearless justice counsel that law  ought   to  be   astute  to   criticism.  Healthy   and constructive criticism  are tools  to augment  its  forensic tools for  improving its  functions. A  harmonious blend and balanced existence  of  free  speech  and  fearless  justice counsel  that   law  ought   to  be   astute  to  criticism. Constructive public  criticism even if it slightly oversteps its limits  thus has  fruitful play in preserving democratic health of  public institutions. Section 5 of the Act accords protection to such fair criticism and saves from contempt of court. The  best way  to sustain the dignity and respect for the office of judge is to deserve respect from the public at large by fearlessness and objectivity of the approach to the issues  arising  for  decision,  quality  of  the  judgment, restraint, dignity  and decorum a judge observes in judicial conduct off and on the bench and rectitude.      In P.N.  Duda vs.  P. Shiv  Shankar [AIR  1988 SC 1208] this court  had held  that  administration  of  justice  and judges are  open to  public criticism  and public  scrutiny. Judges have  their accountability  to the  society and their accountability must  be judged by the conscience and oath to their office,  i.e., to  defend and  uphold the Constitution and the  laws without  fear and favour. Thus the judges must do, in  the light given to them to determine, what is right. Any criticism  about judicial  system or  the  judges  which hampers the  administration of  justice or  which erodes the faith in  the objective  approach of  the judges  and brings administration of justice to ridicule must be prevented. The contempt of  court proceedings  arise out  of that  attempt. Judgments can  be criticised. Motives to the judges need not be attributed.  It brings the administration of justice into disrepute. Faith  in the administration of justice is one of the pillars  on which  democratic  institution functions and sustains. In  the free market place of ideas criticism about the judicial  system or  judges should be welcome so long as such criticism   about  the judicial system or judges should be welcome  so long  as such  criticism does  not impair  or

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hamper the administration of justice. This is how the courts should exercise  the powers  vested in  them and  judges  to punish a  person for an alleged contempt by taking notice of the contempt  suo motu or at the behest of the litigant or a lawyer. In  that case  the speech  of the  Law Minister in a Seminar organised  by the  Bar  Council  and  the  offending portions therein  were held  not contemptuous and punishable under the  Act. In  a democracy judges and courts alike are, therefore, subject  to criticism  and if reasonable argument or  criticism  in  respectful  language  and  tempered  with moderation is  offered against  any judicial act as contrary to law  or public  good no  court would treat criticism as a contempt of court.      Advocacy touches  and  asserts  the  primary  value  of freedom of  expression. It  is a  practical manifestation of the principle  of freedom of speech which holds so dear in a democracy  of   ability  to   express  freely.   Freedom  of expression produces  the benefit  of the truth to emerge. It aids the revelation of the mistakes or bias or at times even corruption it  assists stability by tempered articulation of grievances  and   by  promoting   peaceful  resolution    of conflicts. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity., equality and justice. It plays  its part  in helping  to secure  the protection of other fundamental  human rights. Legal procedure illuminates how free  speech of  expression constitutes  one of the most essential foundations   of  democratic society.  Freedom  of expression, therefore,  is one  of the basic  conditions for the progress  of advocacy  and for  the development of every man including  legal fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom  of expression,  therefore,  is  vital  to  the maintenance of  free society. It is essential to the rule of law and  liberty of  the Citizens. The advocate or the party appearing  in   person,  therefore,   is  given  liberty  of expression.  As   stated  hereinbefore,   they  equally  owe countervailing duty  to maintain  dignity, decorum and order in the court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression  is not  to be  confounded or  confused with licence  to   make   unfounded   allegations   against   any institution, much less the judiciary.      In E.M.S.  Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar [1971) 1 SCR 697]  a Bench of three judges had held that the law of contempt stems  from the  right of  a held  that the  law of contempt stems  from the  right of  a court  to  punish,  by imprisonment or  fine, persons guilty of words or acts which obstruct or  tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curiae by the superior courts on their own behalf  or on behalf or courts subordinate to them, even if committed outside the Courts.      Scandalising the  judges or  courts tends  to bring the authority and  administration o  flaw  into  disrespect  and disregard and tantamounts  to contempt. All acts which bring the court  into disrepute  or disrespect or which offend its dignity  or   its  majesty   or  challenge   its  authority, constitute contempt  committed in respect of single judge or single  court  or  in  certain  circumstances  committed  in respect of  the whole  of the  judiciary or judicial system. Therein the  criticism by  the chief  Minister who described judiciary as  an instrument of oppression an d the judges as guided and  dominated by  class hatred,  class interest  and class prejudices  etc. was  held to be an attack upon judges calculated to give rise to a sense of disrespect an distrust of all  judicial decisions.  It was held that such criticism

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of authority  of the law and law courts constituted contempt court and the Chief Minister was found guilty thereof.      The  contempt   of  court   evolved   in   common   law jurisprudence was codified in the form of the Act. Section 2 [c] defines  " criminal  contempt" which  has been extracted earlier. In  A.M. Bhattacjarkee’s  case [supra] relied on by the petitioner himself, a Bench of the two judges considered the said  definition and  held that  scandalising the  court would mean  any act  done  or  writing  published  which  is calculated to  bring the court or judges into contempt or to lower its  authority or  to interfere with the due course of justice or  the legal  process of  the court. In para 30, it was stated  that scandalising  the court is a convenient way of describing  a publication  which, although  it  does  not relate to  any specific  case either  past or pending or any specific judge, is a scurrilous attack on the judiciary as a whole, which  although it  does not  relate to  any specific case either  past or  pending or  any specific  judge, is  a calculated to  undermine the  authority of  the  courts  and public confidence in the administration of justice. Contempt of court  is to keep the blaze of glory around the judiciary and to  deter people  from attempting  to  render    justice contemptible in  the eyes  of the  public. A  liable upon  a court is  a reflection upon the sovereign people themselves. The contemnor  conveys to the people that the administration of justice  is weak  or in  corrupt hands.  The fountain  of justice is  tainted. Secondly, the judgments that stream out of  that  foul  fountain  is  impure  and  contaminated.  In Halsbury’s Laws of England [4th Edn.] Vol. 9 para 27 at page 21 on  the topic "Scandalising the Court " it is stated that scurrilous abuse  of a  judge or  court, or  attacks on t he personal character of a judge, are punishable contempts. The punishment is  inflicted, not  for the purpose of protecting either the  court as  a whole or the individual judge of the court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and  especially those  who either  voluntarily or by compulsion are  subject subject  to the  jurisdiction of the court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal  is undermined or impaired. In consequence, the court has  regarded with  particular seriousness allegations of partiality  or bias on the part of a judge or a court. On the other  hand, criticism  of a  judge’s conduct  or of the conduct of  a court,  even if  strongly  worded,  is  not  a contempt provided  that the criticism is fair, temperate and made in  good faith,  and is  not directed  to the  personal character of  a judge  or to  the impartiality of a judge or court.      Therefore, it  is of necessity to regulate the judicial process free  from fouling  the fountain  of justice to ward off the people from undermining the confidence of the public in the purity of fountain of justice and due administration. Justice thereby  remains pure,  untainted and unimpeded. The punishment for  contempt, therefore,  is not for the purpose of protecting or vindicating either the dignity of the court as a  whole or  an individual judge of the court from attack on his  personal reputation  but it  was intended to protect the public  who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court and to prevent under interference with the administration of justice. If the authority of the court remains undermined or impeded  the  fountain  of  justice  gets  sullied  creating distrust and disbelief in the mind of the litigant public or the right-thinking  public at  large for  the benefit of the people. Independence  of the  judiciary for  due  course  of administration of  justice  must  be  protected  and  remain unimpaired.  Scandalising   the  court,   therefore,  is   a

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convenient expression of scurrilous attack on the majesty of justice calculated  to undermine  its authority  and  public confidence in  the administration  of justice. The malicious or slanderous  publication inculcates  in   the mind  of the people a  general disaffection  and dissatisfaction  on  the judicial determination  and indisposes in their mind to obey them.  If   the  people’s   allegiance  to  the  law  is  so fundamentally shaken it is the most vital and most dangerous obstruction of justice calling for urgent action. Action for contempt is  not for  the protection of the judge as private individual but  because  they  are  the  channels  by  which justice is administered to the people without fear or favor. As per  the Third  Schedule  to  the  Constitution  oath  or affirmation is  taken by  the judge  that he  will duly  and faithfully perform  the duties  of the office to the best of his ability,  knowledge and judgment without fear or favour, affection or  ill-will and  will so  uphold the Constitution and the  laws In  accordance therewith,  judges must  always remain impartial  and should  be known  by all  people to be impartial. Should  they be  imputed with  improper  motives, bias, corruption  or partiality,  people will  lose faith in them.  The   judge  requires  a  degree  of  detachment  and objectivity which  cannot be  obtained, if judges constantly are required  to look  over  their  shoulders  for  fear  of harassment  and   abuse  and   irresponsible   demands   for prosecution or  resignation.  The  whole  administration  of justice would  suffer due  to its rippling effect. It is for this reason  that scandalising  the judges was considered by the parliament  to be  contempt of  a court  punishable with imprisonment or fine.      Scandalising the  court, therefore,  would mean hostile criticism of  judges as  judges or  judiciary. Any  personal attack upon  a judge  in connection  with office he holds is dealt with  under law  of libel  or slender.  Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an inroad  on majesty  of justice. Any caricature of a judge calculated to  lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or  tend to  undermine public  confidence  in  the administration   of justice  or majesty of justice. It would therefore, be  scandalising the  judge as  a judge, in other words,  imputing   partiality,  corruption,  bias,  improper motives to  a judge is scandalisation of the court and would be contempt  of  the  court.  Even  imputation  of  lack  of impartiality or  fairness to a judge in the discharge of his official duties  amounts to  contempt. The  gravamen of  the offence is  that of  lowering his dignity or authority or an affront to majesty of justice. When the contemnor challenges the  authority   of  the   court,  he  interferes  with  the performance of  duties of judge’s office or judicial process or administration  of justice or generation or production of tendency bringing  the judge  or  judiciary  into  contempt. Section 2  (c)  of  the  Act,  therefore,  defines  criminal contempt  the   wider  articulation  that  any  publication, whether by  words, spoken  or written,  or by  signs, or  by visible representations,  or otherwise  of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalises or tends to scandalise,  or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any  court;   or  prejudices,  or  interferes  or  tends  to interfere with,  the due  course of any judicial proceeding; or interfere  with, or  obstructs or  tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner, is a criminal contempt. Therefore,  a tendency  to scandalise the Court or tendency to lower the authority of the court or  tendency to interfere with or tendency to obstruct the administration of

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justice in any manner or tendency to challenge the authority or majesty  of justice,  would be  a criminal  contempt. The offending act apart, any tendency if it may lead to or tends to lower  the authority of the court is a criminal contempt. Any conduct  of the  contemnor which  has  the  tendency  or produces a  tendency  to  bring  the  judge  or  court  into contempt or  tends to lower the authority of the court would also be contempt of the court.      It is true that in an indictable offence generally mens rea is an essential ingredient and requires to be proved for convicting the  offender but  for  a  criminal  contempt  as defined in  Section 2  (c] any  enumerated or  any other act apart, to  create disaffection  disbelief in the efficacy of judicial dispensation or tendency to obstruct administration of justice  or tendency to lower the authority or majesty of law  by   any  act  of  the  parties,  constitutes  criminal contempt. Thereby it excludes the proof of mens rea. What is relevant is  that the  offending  or  affront  act  produces interference with  or tendency to interfere with the courses of justice.  At this  stage, we  would dispose of one of the serious contentions  repeatedly emphasised by the petitioner that he had no personal gain to seek in the lies except said to have  been fired by public duty and has professed respect for the  Court. Those are neither relevant nor a defence for the offence  of contempt.  What is material is the effect of the offending  act  and  not  the  act  per  se.  In  E.M.S. Namboodiripad’s case  this court  had held  in paragraph  33 that   a law  punishes not  only  acts  which  had  in  fact interfered with the courts and administration of justice but also those  which have  that tendency,  that is  to say, are likely to  produce a particular result. It was held that the likely effect  of the  words must  be seen  and they clearly have effect  of lowering  the prestige  of  the  judges  and courts in  the eyes  of people.  Same view was reiterated in Sambu Nath  Jha vs.  Kedar Prasad Sinha [(1992(1) SCC 573 at 577]. As  stated earlier,  imputation of corrupt or improper motives in  judicial conduct  would impair  the efficacy  of judicial dispensation and due protection of the liberties of the citizen or due administration of justice. This paramount public interest  is protected by the definition in Section 2 [c] of the Act. It is, therefore, not necessary to establish actual intention  on the  part of the contemnor to interfere with  the   administration  of   justice.  making   reckless allegations or  vilification of  the conduct of the court or the judge would be contempt.      The question,  therefore, to  be considered is: whether the imputations  referred  to  hereinbefore  have  necessary tendency  to  impinge  or  tendency  to  impede  the  public confidence in  the administration of justice or would create disbelief in  the efficacy  of  judicial  administration  or lower the authority or interferes with majesty of Court? The court,  therefore,  is  required  to  consider  whether  the imputations made  by a  contemnor are calculated to bring or have the  effect of  bringing the  court  into  contempt  or casting aspersions on the administration of justice tends to impede justice  etc. The court has to consider the nature of the imputations,  the occasion of making the imputations and whether the  contemnor foresees  the possibility  of his act and whether  he was  reckless as to either the result or had foresight like  any other  fact in issue to be inferred from the facts and circumstances emerging in the case. The reason is obviously  that the court does not sit to try the conduct of a judge to whom the imputations are made. It would not be open  to  the  contemnor  to    bring  forward  evidence  or circumstances to  justify or  to show whether and how fairly

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imputations were  justified because  the judge is not before the Court.  The defence justification to an imputation would not,  therefore,   be  available   to  the   contemnor.  The imputation of  improper motives  or bias cannot be justified on the principle  of fair contempt.      In Ambard  v. Attorney-General  for Trinidad and Tobago [1936 AC  322 at  335] Lord Atkin in his oft-quoted judgment held that  justice is  not a  cloistered virtue  and must be allowed to  suffer the secutiny and respectfully, have been, though outspoken  comments of ordinary man". But in the same judgment it  was further  pointed  out  that  provided  that members of  the public should abstain from imputing improper motives to  those  taking  part  in  the  administration  of justice and  are genuinely  exercising a  right of criticism and not  acting  in  malice  or  attempting  to  impair  the administration of  justice. That  was a case of criticism of the Court proceedings as is saved by Section 5 of the Act.      Law is  not in  any doubt  that  in  a  free  democracy everybody is  entitled to  express his  honest opinion about the correctness  or legality of a judgment or sentence or an order of  a court  but he  should not  overstep the  bounds. Though he  is entitled to express that criticism objectively and with  detachment in  a language dignified and respectful tone with  moderation, the  liberty of expression should not be a  licence to  violently make personal attack on a judge. Subject to  that, an  honest criticism of the administration of justice  is welcome  since justice  is not  a  cloistered virtue and  is entitled  to respectful scrutiny. Any citizen is  entitled   to  express  his  honest  opinion  about  the correctness  of   the  judgment,   order  or  sentence  with dignified and  moderate language  pointing out  the error or defect or  illegality in  the judgment,  order or  sentence. That is after the event as post-mortem.      In Shri  Baradakanta Mishra  etc. v.  The Registrar  of Orissa High  Court &  Anr.  etc.  [1974)  1  SCC  374],  the appellant, a  District judge  was suspended  and a  spate of litigation in  that behalf  had ensued.  When  an  order  of suspension was  set aside  by the Government, in exercise of his power  under Article 235, the High Court further ordered suspension of  him pending  enquiry of  the allegations made against judges  in a  memorandum and  letters  sent  to  the Governor in  a vilificatory criticism of the judges in their function on  the administration  side. When  contempt action was initiated,  he challenged  the jurisdiction of the court and the  competency to  initiate action  for contempt on the specious plea  that the  acts done by the High Court were on the administration  side and  were not  judicial actions.  A three-Judge Bench  had negatived  the plea and convicted the appellant under  section 12  of the Act. When the matter had come up  before this  court, a constitution Bench considered the gravamen  of the  imputations  and  had  held  that  the allegations made  against the court in the memo submitted to the Governor  constituted scurrilous allegations against the High Court.  Again some  of the allegations made in the memo of appeal  and various  communications to  the Supreme Court were held  to constitute  contempt  of  the  Court  and  the conviction was  confirmed though  sentence was reduced. This Court held  that imputation  of improper  motives, bias  and prejudice constitutes  contempt under  Section 2[c]  of  the Act.      In Special  Reference No. 1 of 1964, popularly known as U.P. Legislature’s  Warrant of  Arrest of  the Judges of the Allahabad High  Court and Keshav Singh Reference, a Bench of seven judges of this Court observed that the power to punish for contempt  alleged must  always be  exercised cautiously,

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wisely and  with circumspection. The best way to sustain the dignity and  status of  their [judges]  office is to deserve respect from  the public  at large  by the  quality of their judgments, fearlessness  and objectivity  of their  approach and buy  the  restraint,  dignity  and  decorum  which  they observe in their judicial conduct. It would equally apply to the legislature.  Keeping the above perspective in view, the question   emerges;   whether   the   imputations   itemised hereinbefore constitute  contempt of  the Court. At the cost for petition,  we any  reiterate that  in a democracy though every one  is entitled  to express  his honest opinion about the correctness  or legality  of a  judgment or  an order or sentence,  judges   do  require  degree  of  detachment  and objectivity in  judicial dispensation, they being duty bound with the  oath of  office taken  by them in adjudicating the disputes  brought  before  the  court.  The  objectivity  or detachment cannot be  obtained if the judges have constantly to look  over their  shoulders for  fear of  harassment  and abuse and irresponsible demands for prosecution, resignation or to  refrain from discharging their duties pending further action. Cognisant to this tendency;, the founding fathers of the Constitution  engrafted Articles  121  and  211  of  the constitution  and   prohibited  the   parliament   and   the legislatures to  discuss on  the  floor  of  the  House  the conduct of  any judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court in the  discharge of  his duties  except upon  a motion  for presenting address  to the president praying for the removal of a  judge under  Article 124[4]  of  the  Constitution  in accordance with  the procedure  prescribed under  the judges [Inquiry] Act,  1968 and  the Rules made thereunder. In A.M. Bhattacharjee’s case  on which  great reliance was placed by the petitioner  emphasising the  rectitude on  the part of a judge, this  Court laid the rule for the advocates to adhere to a  code of  conduct in seeking redressal on the perceived aberration of  the conduct  of a  judge  otherwise  than  in accordance with  the procedure prescribed in Article 124 [4] of the  Constitution. The respect for and the dignity of the court thereby  was protected  from scurrilous  attack on the judge or  the court. if the forum of the judicial process is allowed to  mount scurrilous attack on a judge, the question arises  whether   the  forum  of  the  judicial  process  of vilification of  the judges  or imputations to the judges in the pleadings  presented to  the court would give liberty of freedom of expression to an advocate or a light of the above discussion, we  have little  doubt to  conclude that when an advocate or  a party  appearing before the court requires to conduct himself  in a  manner befitting  to the  dignity and decorum of  the court,  he cannot  have a  free  licence  to indulge     in  writing  in  the  pleadings  the  scurrilous accusations or  scandalisation  against  the  judge  or  the court. If  the reputation  and dignity  of  the  judge,  who decides the  case  are  allowed  to  be  prescribed  in  the pleadings, the respect for the court would quickly disappear and independence of the of the judiciary would be a thing of the past.      In Re:  Roshan Lal  Ahuja [(1993) Supp. 4 SCC 446] when the contemnor-petitioner’s  countless unsuccessful  attempts against his  order of  removal from  service became abortive and  in   spite  of   this  Court   granting  at  one  stage compensation of  a sum of Rs.30,000/- he had indulged in the pleadings with  scurrilous accusations on judges who granted compensation and  not reinstatement. It was held by a three- judge Bench  that the  contemnor had  permitted himself  the liberty of  using language  in the  documents and  pleadings which not  only had  the effect of scandalising and lowering

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the authority  of the  court in relation to judicial matters but also  had the effect of substantial interference with an obstructing the administration of justice. The unfounded and unwarranted aspersions  on the  judges of this Court had the tendency to  undermine the  authority of the court and would create distrust in the public mind as to the capacity of the judges  of   this  Court   to  met   out  fearless  justice. Accordingly, he  was convicted  and sentenced  to  under  go imprisonment for  a period  of four months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-  and in  default, to  undergo sentence  for  a further period of 15 days.      In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. [1984) 3 SCC 405], the conduct  of   an  advocate  in  using  abusive  language  in pleadings and vilification of a judge was held to constitute contempt under Section 2 [c] (i) of the Act and his sentence under Section  12 of  the Act  was upheld.  In Re:  Shri  S. Mulgaokar [(1978)  3  SCC  497]  the  conduct  of  a  senior advocate in  publishing a pamphlet imputing improper motives to  the   Magistrate  who  decided  his  case  was  held  to constitute  substantial      interference   with   the   due administration of  justice. His  conviction was  accordingly upheld though  sentence was reduced. In K.A. Mohammed Ali v. C.N. Prasannan  [(1994) Supp.  3 SCC  509] while arguing the case, the  counsel raised  his voice  unusually high  to the annoyance of  the Magistrate  and used  derogatory  language against the Magistrate before whom he conducted the trial of an accused.  His conviction  and sentence  for contempt  was accordingly upheld.      In Gillers "Regulation of Lawyers - Problems of Law and Ethics" [Third  Edition -  1992] at  page 747 it was pointed out that  in spite  of first  Amendment protection  of  free speech, lawyers  who committed  contempt of  the court  were punished by  American court  even if  they  were  advocating their clients  interest at  that time. The lawyer’s behavior threatens the  dignity and  authority of the Courts was held to constitute contempt of the court.      In Charan  Lal Sahu  v. Union of India & Anr. [(1988) 3 SCC 255], in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the advocate  indulged in mud-slinging against advocates and this Court.  It was  held that those allegations were likely to lower  the prestige of this Court. This Court accordingly held that  he committed  contempt in drawing up the petition and  directed   to  initiate  proceedings  against  him  for overstepping the limits in particular of self-restraint.      It would,  thus, be  seen  that  when  the  first  writ petition was  dismissed by  this  Court,  as  a  responsible citizen, the  petitioner would  have kept  quite.  When  the result animated  by the  petitioner  was  not  achieved,  he embittered  to  foul  at  the  process  of  this  Court  and emboldened to  file the second writ petition with imputation made against  this Court,  in particular targeting the Chief justice  of   India,  Justice   A.M.   Ahmadi.   As   stated hereinbefore and need not be reiterated once over that it is the duty  of the  Court to hear and decide any matter posted for admission.  Therefore, there is nothing improper for the first Court  presided over  by the Chief Justice of India to hear and  decide the  matter. When it came up for admission, the Court  appears to  have been  persuaded to ascertain the correctness of  the allegations  made in  the writ petition. This Court  obviously before issuing notice had sent for and directed the  solicitor General  to obtain  the  information from the Government as to the correctness of the allegations made before  deciding whether  the Court  would exercise its prerogative power  under Article  32 to  issue directions as sought for.  In furtherance  thereof, the  Solicitor General

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admittedly placed  before the  Court the  record. On perusal thereof, the first Court the record. On perusal thereof, the first Court had declined to exercise the power as enumerated and obviously  stated by the petitioner that the exercise of the power  under Article  32 was  not appropriate  since the Government in  the Defence Department could recover from the Prime Minister’s  Secretariat or from the Congress Party, as the case may be, all the arrears, if any, due and payable by the respective entities. It is not obligatory for this court to give reasons for dismissing the writ petition. Day in and day out in countless cases, while refusing to interfere with the orders  this Court  dismisses the  petitions be it filed under Article 32 or 136 of the Constitution in limine. It is also seen  that though the case was adjourned for two weeks, no doubt,  it was  not posted  on that day but it was listed some time  thereafter.  In  the  proceedings  of  the  Court recorded by  the staff,  it was  recorded that the Solicitor General or in personal capacity obviously acted as amicus on behalf of  the court. Being the Solicitor General for India, he  was   directed  to  have  consultation  with  Government Departments and to obtain needed information. In appropriate cases this  procedure  is  usually  adopted  by  the  Court. Recording of  the proceedings  by the court generally is not noted by  the Court. Is it improper for the Chief justice to hear the  case? Was  the dismissal totally unjust and unfair for not recording the reasons? The petitioner obviously with half-baked  knowledge  in  law  mixed  up  the  language  as "improper for Chief justice of India to hear it". "Dismissal of the  "grouse"  of  the  petitioner  was  totally  unjust, unfair, arbitrary and unlawful flagrant violation of mandate of Article 14" "Violation of the sacred oath of office " and to "declare  justice A.M. Ahmadi unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India". When these imputations were pointed out to  the petitioner by three-Judge Bench presided over by brother Verma, J. while dismissing the second writ petition, to be  scandalous and reckless, he had stated that he "stood by"  those   allegations.  He   reiterated  the   same  with justification in  his preliminary submissions. He has stated that the  accusations made  were  truthful  and  "carefully" worded. In  this backdrop  scenario,  the  effect  of  these imputations is  obviously reckless  apart from  scandalising this Court, in particular the Chief Justice of India and was intended to foul the process of the Court or lower or at any rate tends  to lower  the authority  of  the  Court  in  the estimate of  the public  and tends to undermine the efficacy of he  judicial process.  It would, therefore, be clear that the accusations  are gross contempt. At the height of it, he stated that  since the  first writ petition was not disposed of by  a bench  of not  less  than  five  judges,  the  writ petition was  not dismissed  in the eye of law and the order of dismissal  is non est and it is "not decided and disposed of constitutionally". This assertion of the petitioner flies in the  face of  the judicial  finality of the order of this Court and  the assertion  tends to question the authority of the   court.   It   creates   tendency   to   obstruct   the administration of  justice and,  therefore, it  would be  an outrageous criminal contempt.      Omission  to   record   reasons,   according   to   the petitioner,  is  violative  of  the  principles  of  natural justice.  The   Chief  justice   of  India   has   committed impropriety in  deciding the  matter. As stated earlier, the decision is that of the Bench on behalf of the Court and the Chief justice,  being  the  senior-most  among  the  members constituting the  bench, had  spoken on behalf of the Bench. Therefore, the  attribution of  improper motives scandalises

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the  efficacy   of  judicial   adjudication   and   per   se contumaciously lowers  or at  any rate  tends to  lower  the dignity  or   authority  of   the  Court.   The  prayer  for prosecution of  the Chief  justice, though sought in Item 14 (a)  and   (d)  to  be  withdrawn,  which  would  be  of  no consequence,     is,  therefore,   unbelievably   outrageous contempt.      These findings dispose of Items 1,3,5,9 and 14(a) which remain not even amended by the contemnor.      As regards  other imputations, it may be stated at this stage, as  rightly pointed  out  by  the  learned  solicitor general, that what we are required to consider is the effect of the  imputations made by the contemnor in the second writ petition and  not  what  he  sought  to  amend  some  of  he averments attributing  imputations to  this  Court  and  the effect thereof.  By his  own admission, they are "strindent" and "pungent".  They are  "truthful"   and were  "carefully" stated by  him. Even  the amended  averments did not advance the contemnor’s  stand. On  the other  hand,  they  compound perpetration of  contumacious conduct recklessly made by the contemnor in  the second  writ  petition.  It  item  4,  the contemnor  attributed   that  "justice  Ahmadi  "ultimately" dismissed the  petition observing  that  the  Government  of India was capable of realising the dues from Shri Rao (which it had  not done in two years) and without recording reasons for  dismissing  the  petition.  So  much  for  the  vaunted adherence to  the twin  principles of  the "transparency and accountability". It  would be  seen that  insinuations  that emerge from  these words in writ petitions together with the phrase that  CJI   browbeated him  ex facie  scandalise  the Court and tend to lower the authority of the Court. As seen, the insinuations  tend to  bring the  court into contempt in the estimate of the general public and that the court lacked fairness, objectivity  and dismissed  the writ  petition for known  reasons.   it  also   tends  to  interfere  with  the administration   of justice  and that  the court should give reasons last  the order  be believed  to  be  shrouded  with suspicion. Therefore,  it  is  ex  facie  contumacious.  The contemnor seeks  to justify his averments under Section 4 of the  Act  as  fair  and  accurate  report  of  the  judicial proceedings and that, therefore, they are not contempt. Even in his modified statement, for his statement  that the chief justice of  India browbeated  him  in  dismissing  the  writ petition, he  stated the  "discerned reluctance" on the part of  the   presiding  judge.  In  other  words,  his  revised imputation compounds  the commission of flagrant contempt by substituting  the word "discerned reluctance" on the part of the presiding  judge. In other words, his revised imputation compounds   the   commission   of   flagrant   contempt   by substituting the  word "browbeat"  with the words "discerned reluctance". In  other words,  he attributed  motives to the Court for  dismissal of  the first  writ petition. It would, thus, be clear that the contemnor animated to impute motives to the  chief Justice  of India  in  the  discharge  of  his constitutional duty  of deciding  a case.  When  his  grouse stated by the petitioner emphasis supplied] against sri P.V. Narasimha Rao  was not  redressed exercising the power under Article  32   a  result  which  he  wanted,  the  petitioner contumaciously  attributed   motives  to   the   Court,   in particular to  the presiding officer of the Court, the Chief Justice of India and thereby he scandalised the court in the estimate of  the general  public. We  fail to appreciate the stand of  the petitioner  that Section  4 bails  him out and purges  from  contempt.  It  would  be  applicable  only  to publication of  the report  of a judicial proceedings fairly

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and  with   accuracy  to  outside  the  world.  There  is  a distinction between  expression in  pleading and publication of he report of the judicial proceedings or an order without malice as fair and constrictive criticism to the readers. As stated earlier,  fair criticism  of the judicial proceedings outside the  pleadings of  the Court is a democratic feature so  as   to  enable  the  court  to  look  inward  into  the correctness of the proceedings fn the legality of the orders of  the  orders  of  the  Court  by  the  Court  itself  for introspection. But  a party has a duty and responsibility to plead as  a part  of the  averments or  the  prayer  in  the relevant portion with language befitting with the dignity of the Court  and the judicial process and not in self-abuse of the freedom  of expression  given under  Article 19 [1] (a). abuse of  the process  of the  court is  a self-evidence. As such Article  19(2) creates an embargo on the freedom of the expression and  excludes from  its operation  the  power  of contempt of  Court under  the Act. This Court being court of record, power of this Court under Article 129 is independent and is  not subject  to  Article  19[1]  (a),  Ex  abundanti cautela, Article 19[2] excludes the operation of Articles 19 [1] when  speech or  expression is  trapped in  contempt  of court or tends to trench into it. When the contempt of court is committed  by a litigant, the freedom of expression being contemptuous becomes  punishable under  Article  129  of  eh Constitution de horse the power under Section 12 of the Act.      Item 7 relates to the imputation that the Chief justice of India gets no judicial protection unlike the president of India for  being prosecuted  even while  Chief justice  A.M. Ahmadi holds  office  as  Chief  justice  of  India  and  is accordingly liable  to prosecution.  This bravado  not  only impinges upon  the protection given by Article 124[4] of the Constitution and under relevant provisions of the protection of officials  Act ex  facie it  is an outrageous tendency to lower the  authority of  the  Court  and  interference  with judicial administration.  The assertion  of  the  petitioner that this  is a  constitutional  conundrum  required  to  be decided by  a constitution  Bench of  this Court  highlights contumacious conduct of the contemnor.      In item 8 he attributes that this Court "willfully" and "advertently"  [emphasis   supplied]  violated   fundamental rights of  the contemnor and of other people in not granting relief of  direction to  Sri P.V.  Narasimha Rao  to pay the alleged dues.  The word  "advertently" was carefully used by the petitioner  and the  word "willfully"  was employed  for refusal of  the relief.  They do emphasise the emphatic tone of he  language and the motive of he contemnor and attribute motives to  this court  that the  relief sought  for in  the first writ  petition "advertently"  was not  granted and was "wilfully" declined  and thereby  the Chief  Justice  Ahmadi lost constitutional protection of not being prosecuted. This accusation is  a culmination  of the contumacious conduct of wanton scandalisation of the Court and reckless denigration. In his amended petition, her further aggravates the contempt stating   that the  dismissal of  the petition  by the first court sent  wrong signals  to the  entire judiciary of which justice Ahmadi  is the  head as  chief justice of India. The scurrilous attack,  therefore, is not only on Justice Ahmadi as a  judge but  also as the Chief Justice of India and also as head  of the institution of the whole country. Thereby he designedly and  deliberately allowed  himself being  brought within ex facie criminal contempt.      Item 9  relates to  the accusation  "what are the legal consequences of  the violation of oath of office by  justice Ahmadi". He  states in his preliminary submissions that it a

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constitutional  question   required  to   be  decided  by  a constitution Bench. As stated earlier, every question raised need not  necessarily be  decided unless  the case cannot be disposed of  without deciding  the question  for granting or refusing to  grant the relief. The oath of office taken by a judge of  this Court  is not that he should allow every case or dismiss  every case  but only  to uphold the constitution and  the  laws  and  to  administer  justice  in  accordance therewith  in   tune  with  the  oath  of  his  office.  The protection  of  Articles  124  [4],  121,211,  the  judicial officers protection  act and the  judges (protection) Act is to ensure  independence to the judiciary. Threat to judicial process is  a challenge  to the  authority of  the court  or majesty  of  justice.  It  would  be  ex-facie  contumacious conduct.      In  item  10  again,  the  petitioner  attributes  that justice Ahmadi  as Chief  justice of India and as a judge of this court  deliberately and willfully failed to perform his duties and  stultified the performance of fundamental duties by the petitioner. This imputation is the consequence of the dismissal of  he first  writ  petition.  Thereby,  he  seeks stripping  of  citizenship  of  justice  Ahmadi.  It  is  an unbelievable outrageous affront to the majesty of justice on the part  of the contemnor and scandalisation of this Court. It tends to lower the dignity and authority of the Court and also sows  seeds for  persons  with  similar  propensity  to undermine the  authority of  the Court or the judiciary as a whole;  he   crossed  all  boundaries  of  recklessness  and indulged in wild accusations. He sought justification in his preliminary submissions  that it being a question of law, it does not  amount to  personal imputation  or insinuation. In spite of  this Court  pointing it out to be scandalous, when the second  writ petition  was dismissed and his persistence that he  stood by  those allegations, it does not lie in his mouth to  contend either  in his  preliminary submissions or his modified  form that  the dismissal  of  the  first  writ petition amounts to failure to perform fundamental duties by the CJI  and,  therefore,  it  would  further  compound  the contempt.      In imputation  11, the  petitioner  attributed  to  the chief Justice  of India  that  he  had  allowed  his  so  to practise in  the supreme  Court and  to stay with him in his official residence  etc. The petitioner sought justification to the  said imputation  from  reports  said  to  have  been published in the "India Today" and "The Times of India" by a lady senior  advocate of  this Court.  But he petitioner has not placed on record the said material. Therefore, we do not have the  advantage to  verify their contents or correctness or otherwise  of the  statements said to have been published therein. When  we pointed  out to  the petitioner whether he had made  any independent enquiry, he had reiterated that he relied  upon   those  statements.   In   other   words,   by implication,  he   admitted  that   he  did   not  make  any independent enquiry  into the  alleged  misuse  of  official facility by the Chief Justice of India in permitting his son to practise  in this  Court or  to reside  in  his  official residence along  with him.  For the  said imputation he said that Justice Ahmadi, the Chief justice of India is liable to be prosecuted  under the prevention of Corruption Act and he seeks as a justification the ratio decidendi of Veeraswami’s case. it  is seen  that Veeraswami’s case has no application whatsoever.  As  stated  earlier,  Article  124  (4)  of  he constitution read  with the  Judges [Inquiry] Act prescribes the procedure  to take action against a judge of the Supreme Court or  of  the  High  Court  for  proved  misbehavior  or

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incapacity.  As  laid  down  in  Bhattacharjee’s  case,  Bar Association of  the concerned  Court was  given  liberty  to place any  material of  the aberration  of the  conduct of a judge before  the CJI  for redressal  as per  the "in-house" procedure laid  down therein.  For proved  misbehavior,  the address by  each house  of parliament  to the  president for removal  of   a  Judge  pursuant  to  a  finding  of  proved misbehavior or  incapacity under the judges (Inquiry) Act by a resolution  of not  less than  two-third of the members of the House  and voting  by two-third of the House present and an order  of removal  therein by  the president  of India is culmination. In  Bhattacharjee’s case,  this Court also laid down that  no other authority or person has power to conduct any enquiry against the conduct of a judge. Articles 121 and 211  prohibit  discussion,  in  the  parliament  or  in  the Legislature of  a State,  or the  conduct of  judge  of  the Supreme Court  or High  Court respectively.  Therefore, when the constitution  prohibits the discussion of the conduct of a Judge,  by implication, no one has power to accuse a judge of his  misbehavior or  incapacity except  and in accordance with the  procedure prescribed  in the  Constitution and the Judges [Inquiry]  act or  as per  the procedure laid down in Bhattacharjee’s case.  Irrelevancy of the accusations apart, the prayer  for prosecution  of the  Chief Justice  of India under the  prevention of  Corruption Act  is an  assault  on majesty of justice, affront to authority of law, the gravest contumacious conduct  and scurrilous  scandalisation of  the Court.      Item 12  of the  accusation relates  to the  payment of litigation cost  incurred by  the contemnor in both The writ petitions and  the loss  said to  have been  caused  to  the public exchequer  by non-payment  by Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, from personal  pocket of  Justice Ahmadi  as a Chief Justice for dismissal  of  the  Writ  petition.  He  stated  in  his preliminary submission that when loss was caused by a public servant in his official capacity to the public exchequer due to his  dereliction  of  duty  and  under  the  law  it  was recoverable from  pay or  pension of  the public servant, on the same  analogy Chief justice of India should be liable to make good  the loss  incurred by him and by the State due to non-payment by  Sri P.V.  Narasimha Rao.  The implication is that by  judicial act,  if a  presiding  Judge  dismisses  a petition, he is liable to bear personally not only the costs incurred by  the litigant but also the resultant loss to the state with  interest payable  thereon. This  imputation is a deliberate interference  with the judicial process and tends to lower  the authority  of the Court spreading the virus to repeat by drum beats of similar reckless imputations against the judiciary  at every  forum down to the lower rank of the judiciary spreading  rippling effect  on independence of the judiciary, authority  of the  Court and  wanton interference with judicial  process. It  must be  held to  he a  depraved contumacious conduct.      Item 13  relates to  the interference with the judicial management of  the Court  and the  duty of  a Judge. When an accusation  is   made  against   the  presiding   judge,  by implication, until  the matter  is  decided,  the  presiding officer has  to desist  from discharging the judicial duties by his  proceeding on leave and the senior-most puisne judge would assume  the office  of the  Chief Justice.  This is  a deliberate interference  in the  judicial management tending to son  disaffecting in  the efficacy   of  dispensation  of justice. The  further accusation  that the  Chief Justice of India should  not constitute a Bench of the Judges appointed during his  tenure so  that "he  (CJI)" "may not directly or

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indirectly or indirectly influence any of the Judges hearing the  matter".   It  would,  thus,  be  in  unequivocal  loud expression that  the contemnor attributed motives to the CJI that the judges appointed during his tenure as Chief Justice are amenable  to his  influence in judicial adjudication and would decide the causes by pressure or influence directly or indirectly brought  by the  Chief Justice of India. Equally, it  is  a  corollary  that  these  judges  are  amenable  to influence and  thereby they  do not  decide the cases posted before them legally and objectively. The Court is subject to pressures  and   decides  cases   under   influence.   These accusations are  flagrantly  outrageous  to  scandalise  the Court. Though  the contemnor has sought leave to modify this statement, ultimately,  in his amended statement, he did not touch upon  this aspect  of the  matter. In  other words, as stated earlier, he stood by his averments calculatedly made. His   justification    that   justification   that   justice P.N.Bhagwati (as  he then  was) decided  first S.P.  Gupta’s case when  allegations against CJI Chandrachud were made has no application.  In a  judicial proceedings  taken  by  this Court, the office of the chief Justice of India was directly involved in appointment of additional judges or extension of their tenure  as additional  Judges or  their transfer.  The Chief Justice  of India  reclused himself  from  the  Bench; resultantly, the  senior-most puisne  judge came  to preside over that  Bench. Thus,  the  contemnor  has  committed  the contempt  of   this  Court   under  Article   129   of   the Constitution.      The question  then is: what punishment is to be awarded to the  contemnor? As  pointed  out  earlier,  the  repeated assertions of the petitioner that he has no personal gain in the litigation  and was actuated by the public duty and laid the petitions, bear no relevance or a defence. It is already held that  in a  contempt proceedings,  the motive, in other words, the  mens rea  is not  relevant. What  would  be  the effect of  the act  or conduct or imputation is the relevant question for  decision? It  is true  that in  an  indictable offence under  penal law  generally mens rea is an essential ingredient and  the burden  lies on the prosecution to prove it affirmatively.  In  a  contempt  proceedings  of  summary nature, the  proof of  mens rea  is absolutely  unnecessary. What is  material is  the effect or the tendency of the act, conduct or  the publication of the words, written, spoken or by signs  or by  visible  representation  or  otherwise  and whether it  scandalises or  tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to  lower the  authority of the court or prejudices or tends to  prejudice or  interfere or tends to interfere with the due  course of any judicial proceedings or interferes or tends to  interfere with  or obstruct  the administration of justice in  any  other  manner.  The  tendency  due  to  the publication, whether  by words written or spoken or by signs or by  visible representation or otherwise, of any matter or the doing  of any  other  act  whatsoever  is  relevant  and material.      It is  already noted  that while  dismissing the second writ petition,  this Court  has pointed  out the  scandalous nature of  accusations which  found place in the second writ petition and when the petitioner persisted for consideration of scandalous  accusations to  lay proceedings  against  the Chief Justice  of India  for prosecution  and other  reliefs referred to  hereinbefore, he reiterated that he would stand by those accusations. Resultantly this Court was constrained to be  into merits  and dismissed the petition and initiated suo motu  contempt proceedings  and got the notice issued to him pointing  out specifically  14 items  which  constituted

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scandalous   and    reckless   litigations    pleaded   with irresponsibility. He  reiterated  them  in  his  preliminary submissions with  further justifications.  He admitted  that many of them are strident and pungent. He modified some but, as has been pointed out, by compounding further contempt. In spite of  the solicitor General pointing out the seriousness of the  accusations and  the need for the petitioner to have further consultation  with  a  counsel  of  his  choice  the contemnor remained  unmoved. On  April 15,  1996,  when  the matter came  up before  this Bench  for the first time after the service  of notice  of the  contempt and  his filing the preliminary submissions,  the petitioner  had orally  stated that some legal counsels in the Bar suggested to him that he should modify  the offending  portions noted in the contempt notice. It  would, thus, be seen that he appears to have had consultation with  some advocates at the Bar and that he did not retract  his steps.  He did not tender any unconditional apology, though  this Court  is not  bound to accept such an unconditional apology for consideration. Considered from the totality  of   the  facts  and  circumstances,  the  gravest magnitude of  the contumacious  conduct of the contemnor, we are left  with no opinion but to convict and sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three moths with a fine  or Rs.  2,000/- payable in a period of months and in case of  defaulted, to  undergo further  imprisonment for  a period of one month.      The contempt petition is accordingly disposed of.