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PETITIONER: DR. BALIRAM WAMAN HIRAY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JUSTICE B. LENTIN AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1988

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) SHARMA, L.M. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR 2267            1988 SCR  Supl. (2) 942  1988 SCC  (4) 419        JT 1988 (4)   265  1988 SCALE  (2)688

ACT:     Commission  of Inquiry Act, 1952: Section  3--Commission of  Inquiry--Constituted  under  Act--Whether  ’Court’   for purposes of Section l95(1)(b) Cr. P.C. 1973. %     Criminal   Procedure  Code,  1973--Section   195(1)(b)-- Commission  of  Inquiry’  constituted  under  Commission  of Inquiry Act, 1952--Whether a ’Court’.     Words and Phrases: ’Court’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     On February 21, 1986 the State Government of Maharashtra appointed Shri Justice B. Lentin as a one-man Commission  of Inquiry  to  probe  into the death of  14  patients  in  the government   run  J.J.B.  Hospital  between  22.1.1986   and 7.2.1986 after they were administered contaminated glycerol, and   to  fix  responsibility.  The  inquiry  revealed   the existence  of  a corrupt and venal nexus  between  the  drug firms,  the  delinquent  Food  &  Drugs  Administration  and hospital  staff  on the one hand, and  the  appellant,  some other persons and certain Government officials on the other. The  Commission’s  report was an indictment of  the  State’s public health system.     The  Commission having found the evidence given  by  the appellant self-contradictory, issued a show-cause notice  to him as to why he should not be prosecuted for the offence of giving  false  evidence on oath under s. 193 of  the  Indian Penal  Code, 1860 read with s. 340 of the Code  of  Criminal Procedure,   1973.   After   considering   the   appellant’s objections,  the Commission directed filing of  a  complaint under  ss.  193  and 228 of I.P.C.  The  appellant  filed  a petition  in  the  High Court  assailing  the  legality  and propriety of the order of the Commission directing filing of the complaint, and the same was dismissed by the High Court.     Before  this  Court, it was contended on behalf  of  the appellant that (1) the Commission could not be deemed to  be a  Court  for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of  the  Code  of Criminal  Procedure  unless declared by  the  Commission  of Inquiries Act itself, as stipulated in sub-s. (3) of s. 195,                                                    PG NO 942                                                    PG NO 943

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which  provides  that  in cl. (b) of sub-s.  (1),  the  term ’Court’  means  a  Civil, Revenue  or  Criminal  Court,  and includes  a  tribunal  constituted by or  under  a  Central, Provincial  or  State Act if declared by that Act  to  be  a Court  for the purposes of this Section; (2) the  Commission of  Inquiry appointed by the State Government was  merely  a fact-finding  body  appointed  by  the  Government  for  the ’information  of  its  mind’, and the  mere  fact  that  the procedure  adopted was of a legal character and it  had  the power  to  administer  an oath would not impart  to  it  the status of the Court and therefore was not a ’Court’ for  the purposes  of s. 195(1)(b) of the Code; (3) the question  was not  whether the appellant could be prosecuted  for  perjury for  giving false evidence which was an  offence  punishable under  section 195(1)(b), but whether the Commission  was  a ’Court’  for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b); (4)  that  sub-s. to  put an end to the controversy, and this was nothing  but ’legislative  declaration  of the law’ contrary to  the  law declared by this Court in Lalj Haridas case, and a number of statutes  contain  such a provision in accordance  with  the existing legislative practice.     The  Advocate-General appearing on behalf of  the  State contended  that (1) the inclusive part of the definition  of ’Court’  in s. 195(3) of the Code was ex  abundanti  cautela and  was  merely declaratory of the law, and (2)  the  first part  of  sub-s.  (4)  of s. 5  of  the  Act  satisfied  the requirements  of  the inclusive part of  the  definition  of ’Court’  as contained in sub-s. (3) of s. 195 of  the  Code.     Allowing the appeal, it was,     HELD: (1) It could not be doubted that sub-s. (3) of  S. 195 of the Code had been enacted by Parliament to  implement the recommendations of the 41st Report of the Law Commission to  remedy  the uncertain state of law due  to  conflict  of opinion  between different High Courts as to the meaning  of the  word  ’Court’ in s. 195(1)(b) and to  that  extent  the introduction  of the inclusive clause in the  definition  of ’Court’  in sub-s. (3) of s. 195 had brought about a  change in the law. [966D]     (2)  Law  must be definite, and certain. If any  of  the features of the law could usefully be regarded as normative, it  was  such  basic postulates as  to  the  requirement  of consistency   in  judicial  decision-making.  It  was   this requirement of consistency that gave to the law much of  its rigour.   At   the   same   time,   there   was   need   for flexibility.[968F-G]     (3)  A  Commission of Inquiry was  fictionally  a  Civil                                                    PG NO 944 Court for the limited purpose of proceeding under s. 482  of the  old Code or s. 345 of the present Code. A fortiori  the legal fiction contained in sub-s. (5) of s. of the Act which related  to  the  proceedings  before  the  Commission   was necessarily confined to offences that were punishable  under ss. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and did not  extend beyond that. [970F-G]     (4) A Commission of Inquiry was not a Court properly  so called.   A  Commission  is  obviously  appointed   by   the appropriate Government ’for the information of its mind’  in order  for  it to decide as to the course of  action  to  be followed.  It was therefore a fact-finding body and was  not required  to adjudicate upon the rights of the  parties  and has  no adjudicatory function. The Government was not  bound to  accept its recommendation or act upon its findings.  The mere  fact that the procedure adopted by it was of  a  legal character  and it had the power to administer an oath  would not impart to it the status of a Court. [972D-E]

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   (5) Parliament in its wisdom whenever thought it fit had inserted a special provision for deeming a tribunal to be  a Court  for  the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) but  had  left  the other   enactments  like  the  Commission  of  Inquiry   Act untouched  although  sub-s. (3) of s. 195 had  been  on  the Statute Book for the last over 14 years. [965D-E]     (6)  The  judgment will not however  prevent  the  State Government   from  launching  a  prosecution   against   the appellant  for commission of the alleged offences under  ss. 193 and 228 I.P.C. if otherwise permissible in law. [977E-F]     Lalji  Haridas v. The State of Maharashtra [1964] 6  SCR 700;  M.V. Rajwade v. Dr. S.M. Hasan, ILR (1954)  Nagpur  1; Brajnanandan  Sinha  v.  Jyoti Narain,  [1955]  2  SCR  955; Puhupram & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1968] MPLJ 629; Balakrishnan  v. Income-Tax Officer, Ernakulam,  [1976]  KLT 561;  Jagannath Prasad v. .State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963]  2 SCR  650; Virinder Kumar Satyawadi v. The State  of  Punjab, [1955]  2 SCR 1013; Balwant Singh & Anr. v.  L.C.  Bharupal, I.T.O.,  New  Delhi, [1968] 70 ITR 89; Chandrapal  Singh  v. Maharaj Singh, [1982] 1 SCC 466; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. Union   State   of  Bihar,  [1955]  2  SCR  608;   R.   M.D. Chamarbaugwalla   v.  Union  of  India,  [1957]  SCR    930; Commissioner of Income-tax Madhya Pradesh & Bhopal v.  Sodra Devi, [1958] SCR l; St. Aubyn v. Attorney General, LR (1952) AC  15;  Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal  Commissioner  of Taxation, LR (1931) AC 275; Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1961] 1 SCR 778; M.M. khan v. Emperor, ILR  (1931) 12  Lah. 391 and In re. Maharaja Madhava Singh LR (1905)  31 IA 239.                                                    PG NO 945

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 114 of 1988.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  11.8.1987  of  the Bombay High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 733 of 1987.     Dr.  Y.S. Chitale, Shambhu Prasad Singh,  Mrs.  Jayshree Wad, Mrs. Aruna Mathur, Manoj Wad and Vijay Tulpule for  the Appellant.     A.S.   Bobde,   Advocate  General  for  the   State   of Maharashtra,  A.M.  Khanwilkar  and  A.S.  Bhasme  for   the Respondents.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SEN,  J. This appeal by special leave  directed  against the  judgment  and order of a Division Bench of  the  Bombay High  Court dated August 11, 1987 raises a question of  far- reaching importance. The question is whether a Commission of Inquiry constituted under s. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act,  1952  (hereinafter  referred to as  the  ’Act’)  is  a "Court" for purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.     We had the benefit of hearing Dr. Y.S. Chitale,  learned counsel  appearing  on behalf of the appellant  Dr.  Baliram Waman  Hiray,  who at one time was the  Health  Minister  of Maharashtra, and Shri A.S. Bodbe, learned counsel  appearing on  behalf  of the State Government, as to the  purport  and effect of the inclusive of sub-s. (3) of s. 195 of the  Code which  provides  that  in cl.  (b) of  sub-s.(1),  the  term "Court"  means  a  Civil, Revenue  or  Criminal  Court,  and includes  a  tribunal  constituted by or  under  a  Central, Provincial  or  State Act if declared by that Act  to  be  a Court for the purposes of this section.     In  Lalji  Haridas v. The State of Maharashtra  &  Anr.,

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[1964]  6 SCR 700, a Constitution Bench of this Court  by  a majority of 3:2 held that the proceedings before an  Income- tax  Officer  under s. 37(4) of the Indian  Income-tax  Act, 1922  were judicial proceedings under s. 193 of  the  Indian Penal   Code  and  such  proceedings  must  be  treated   as proceedings in any Court for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of the  Code. We thought that the controversy had been  set  at rest  by  the decision of the Constitution  Bench  in  Lalji Haridas’ case. Dr. Chitale, learned counsel however contends that   there  is  a  change  in  the  law  because  of   the introduction of sub-s. (3) of s. 195 of the Code and  points out  that  Parliament  has  brought  about  the  change   to implement  the 41st Report of the Law Commission and  relies                                                    PG NO 946 on paras 15.90, 15.93, 15.94 and 15.99. In the course of his submissions,  he  has  brought to our notice  the  words  in parenthesis  added by the Finance Act, 1985 introducing  the following  change  in  s. 136 of the  Income-tax  Act,  1961 w.e.f.  April  1,  1974  from which  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1973 came into force. S. 28 of the  Finance  Act amended  s. 136 of the Income-tax Act, and it  was  provided that  the  words "and every income-tax  authority  shall  be deemed  to be a Civil Court for the purposes of s.  195  but not for the purposes of Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973", shall be inserted and shall be deemed  to have been inserted at the end w.e.f. 1st day of April, 1974. Dr. Chitale’s contention is that unless there was a  similar change  brought about in the Commissions of  Inquiries  Act, the  Commission  cannot  be deemed to be  a  Court  for  the purposes  of  s.  195  (1)(b) of the  Code.  We  find  great difficulty  in  dealing with the question involved  in  this appeal  because  many  diverse  problems  will  have  to  be considered.     In  order  to  appreciate  the  point  involved,  it  is necessary  to  state a few facts. The  State  Government  of Maharashtra  by  a  notification dated  February  21,  1986, issued  under s. 3 read with s. 5(1) of the  Commissions  of Inquiry Act, 1952 appointed Shri Justice B. Lentin, Judge of the High Court of Bombay as a one-man Commission of  Inquiry to  probe into the deaths of 14 patients in the  government- run Jamsetjee Jee Bhoi Hospital, Bombay between January  22, 1986  and  February  7, 1986 after  they  were  administered contaminated  glycerol.  The aforesaid notification  of  the State Government was to the effect:                     "MEDICAL EDUCATION AND DRUGS                             DEPARTMENT     Mantralaya, Bombay 400 032. dated 21st February, 1986.     COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY ACT, 1952.     No.  JJH.  2088/712/MED-4--Whereas  certain  deaths   of patients  alleged  to be due to drug reaction,  occurred  in Neuro   Surgery,  Neurology,  Opthalmology  and   Nephrology Departments  of  J.J.  Hospital,  Bombay,  during   January- February 1986:     And  whereas  the Government of Maharashtra  is  of  the opinion  that  it is necessary to appoint  a  Commission  of Inquiry  under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952  (60  of                                                    PG NO 947 1952)  for the purpose of making an inquiry into the  causes and the circumstances leading to the aforesaid incidents  of death  at J.J. Hospital, Bombay, being definite  matters  of public  importance  and for making a report thereon  to  the State Government:     Now,  therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred  by section  3 and sub-section (1) of section 5 of the said  Act and  of  all other powers enabling it in  this  behalf,  the

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Government  of Maharashtra hereby appoints a  Commission  of Inquiry  consisting of Shri Justice B. Lentin, Judge of  the High  Court  of Judicature at Bombay, to  inquire  into  and report  on  the  causes and  circumstances  leading  to  the occurrence  of the said deaths in Neuro Surgery,  Neurology, Opthalmology  and Nephrology Departments of  J.J.  Hospital, Bombay, during January-February 1986; and particularly-- ***        ***        ***        xxx         xxx         xxx The  Government  of Maharashtra hereby directs  that  having regard to the nature of inquiry to be made by the Commission and  other sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section  5 of the said Act shall apply to the said Commission.     The   Commission  shall  submit  its  report  to   State Government  within  a period of 3 months from  the  date  of publication of this Notification in the Official Gazette.     By order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra.                                               J.P. BUDHAVANT                              Deputy Secretary to Government"     By  the terms of reference, the Commission was  required inter  alia  to enquire into and report on  the  causes  and circumstances  leading to the occurrence of the  unfortunate deaths  and  to fix the responsibility of  the  persons  and officers  responsible  for the purchase and supply  of  sub- standard  drugs  on  the  basis  of  the  mounting  evidence gathered  by Lentin Commission. There emerged a corrupt  and venal nexus between the drug firms engaged in  manufacturing and  supply  of sub standard and adulterated drugs  and  the                                                    PG NO 948 delinquent Food & Drugs Administration and Hospital staff on the  one hand and the appellant and Bhai Sawant, two  former Health  Ministers  and certain Government officials  on  the other.  In  the course of its investigation,  it  discovered that  there  were  as many as 582  grossly  defaulting  drug companies whose products, including the crucial  life-saving drugs,  were  sub-standard. The Commission’s report  was  an indictment of the State’s public health system and  constant ministerial interference. It was particularly severe on  the machinations  of Bhai Sawant, the then Health Minister  who, the Commission observed, had a hairbreadth escape from being served  with  a notice to show cause why he  should  not  be prosecuted  for perjury under ss. l93 and 228 of the  Indian Penal  Code,  1860. The Court issued show cause  notices  on four persons including the appellant Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray for  giving  false evidence in an attempt to  cover  up  the charges of rampant corruption brought against them.     The  State  Government placed the report of  the  Lentin Commission  before the State Legislature on March  30,  1988 and accepted its recommendations. One of the recommendations was that a separate enquiry be held by a retired High  Court Judge  into the charges of corruption against the  appellant Dr.  Baliram  Waman Hiray and Bhai Sawant,  the  two  former Health  Ministers and in particular of the  misfeasance  and malfeasance  on the part of one Dr. S.M. Dolas who  was  the Food   &   Drugs  controller  of  the  State  who   had   an unprecedented  long time for as many as 15 years  and  other delinquent  officers  of the concerned  departments  holding them  responsible for the deaths. The report  indicted  both the  Health Ministers in no uncertain terms. But we are  not concerned with the follow up action that the Government  has taken in bringing the guilt to book. The controversy  before us  is limited to the question whether the Commission was  a "Court"  for  the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973.     On  June 23, 1987 the Commission by its  order  directed its Secretary to issue a show cause notice to the  appellant

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as  to  why he should not be prosecuted for the  offence  of giving  false  evidence on oath under s. 193 of  the  Indian Penal  Code, 1860 read with s. 340 of the Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973,the relevant portion whereof reads:     "AND  WHEREAS you are summoned by the  Commission  under Section  4 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, to  give evidence  before it and you did give evidence before  it  on                                                    PG NO 949 22nd  April  1987, 23rd April 1987, 24th  April  1987,  27th April 1987, 28th April 1987, 29th April 1987, 4th May  1987, 5th May 1987, 8th June 1987 and 9th June 1987; ******                     ******                     ******     AND WHEREAS the Commission is prima facie of the opinion that  it  is expedient in the interests of justice  that  an inquiry should be made into the offence under Section 193 of the  Indian  Penal Code referred to in clause  (b)  of  sub- section  (1) of Section 195 of the Criminal  Procedure  Code which  appears  to  have  been committed by  you  in  or  in relation to the proceedings before this Commission; *****              ******     NOW  THEREFORE TAKE NOTICE that the Hon’ble Mr.  Justice B. Lentin, Commission of Inquiry, has fixed this Notice  for hearing on Friday, the 26th June 1987 at 2.45 p.m., in Court Room  No. 37, First Floor, Main High Court Building,  Bombay 400 032, when you are required to appear either in person or by an Advocate to show cause, if any, why proceedings should not be initiated against you as hithertofore stated for  the offence ot giving false evidence before the Commission." It  was stated in the notice that the appellant  gave  self- contradictory  answers specified in columns ’A’ and  ’B’  in Schedule  I, one of which had necessarily to be  false.  The relevant  excerpts of ss. 191 and 193 of  the  Indian  Penal Code. s. 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and ss. 4(a), 5(5) and 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act were set out in Schedule  II.  In  response to  the  notice,  the  appellant appeared  through  counsel and showed cause.  Amongst  other grounds,  the appellant contended, firstly, that in law  the appellant’s   evidence  would  not  technically   constitute perjury  and  even if it were so. this was not  a  fit  case where  in the interests of justice it was expedient that  an inquiry  should  be  made against  the  appellant  into  the alleged  offence  under  s. 193 of the  Indian  Penal  Code. referred  to in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 195 of the  Code of Criminal Procedure which appeared to have been  committed in or in relation to the proceedings before it Secondly, the Commission of Inquiry was not a Court for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b)  and s. 340 of the Code. It was stated that  while perjury  before the Commission was doubt punisable,  it  was not for the Commission to give a finding in terms of s. 340,                                                    PG NO 950 or to file a complaint, but for ’the Government or a  public spirited  person’  to  do so. The Commission  by  its  well- considered  order dated July 7,1987 repelled each  of  these contentions  and held that the case was a fit one  where  in the  interests of justice it was expedient to prosecute  the appellant. Any other course would, in its words, ’bring  the sanctity of oath and administration of justice into ridicule and  contempt’. The Commission observed that  the  appellant was  not illiterate or semi-literate person who could  plead confusion of mind in the witness-box, as indeed he does not. By profession he was a medical practitioner but he played  a prominent  part  in public life; for several years  he  held various portfolios as Cabinet Minister in the Government  of Maharashtra, including Health. According to the  Commission, he was by far the most intelligent and shrewdest witness who

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had given evidence before it. Unlike the other witnesses  he never  recanted, in an attempt to deliberately  distort  the truth.  It went on to observe that normally,  witnesses  are not  allowed  to  be represented by counsel.  However  in  a departure from normal practice, the Commission allowed  this latitude  to the appellant, so that justice should not  only be  done but should be seen to be done to him and he  had  a counsel of his choice. Accordingly, the Commission  directed its Secretary to take necessary steps for expeditious filing of  the complaint in the proper forum and directed that  the appellant should, in the meanwhile, furnish a personal  bond in  the  sum  of  Rs.500  for  his  appearance  before   the Metropolitan Magistrate.     The  Secretary  to the Commission  accordingly  filed  a complaint  on July 17, 1987 against the appellant under  ss. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code being Criminal Case No. 1121((w)  of  1987  in the Court  of  the  Additional  Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate at Esplanade, Bombay. On  the  same day, the appellant filed a petition in the High Court  under Art.  226  of the Constitution assailing  the  legality  and propriety of the impugned order passed by the Commission and the  consequent  direction  to  its  Secretary  to  lodge  a complaint   against  the  appellant  for  giving  of   false evidence.   On  July  20,  1987  the  learned   Metropolitan Magistrate  issued process under s. 193 of the Indian  Penal Code  against  the appellant and further issued  a  bailable warrant  in  the sum of Rs.500 with one surety in  the  like amount.  A Division Bench of the High Court by its  judgment dated  August 117 1987 repelled the contentions advanced  by the appellant and accordingly dismissed the writ petition.     We may first reproduce the statutory provisions  bearing on the controversy. The relevant provision of s. 191 of  the Indian Penal Code, insofar as material, reads:                                                    PG NO 951 "191. Giving false evidence--Whoever being legally bound  by an  oath  or  by an express provision of law  to  state  the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon  any subject,  makes any statement which is false, and  which  he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe  to be true, is said to give false evidence." Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: " 195(1) No Court shall take cognizance-- (b)(i)  of  any offence ....    , or in relation  to,  any proceeding in any Court, or except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate."     Sub-s.  (3) of s. 195 of the Code provides that  in  cl. (b)  of sub-s. (1), the term ‘Court’ means a Civil,  Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section.     We  may  then  set out the relevant  provisions  of  the Commissions  of  Inquiry Act, 1952. The  relevant  provision contained in sub-s. (1) of s. 3 provides as follows:     "3.  Appointment  of  Commission--(1)  The   appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary  so to  do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is  passed by  the  House  of the People or, as the case  may  be,  the Legislative  Assembly of the State, by notification  in  the Official  Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry  for  the purpose  of  making an inquiry into any definite  matter  of public  importance and performing such functions and  within such  time as may be specified in the notification, and  the Commission  so appointed shall make the Inquiry and  perform the functions accordingly."

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   Section 4 vests in the Commission the powers of a  Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil  Procedure and reads as follows:                                                    PG NO 952     "4. Powers of Commission--The Commission shall have the powers of a civil court, while trying a suit under the  Code of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  in  respect  of  the  following matters, namely:     (a)  summoning  and  enforcing the  attendance  of  any person from any part of India and examining him on oath;     (b)  requiring  the  discovery and  production  of  any document;     (c) receiving evidence on affidavits;     (d)  requisitioning any public record or  copy  thereof from any court or office;     (e)   issuing  commissions  for  the   examination   of witnesses or documents;     (f) any other matter which may be prescribed."     Section  5  empowers the appropriate Government,  by  a notification  in  the  Official Gazette, to  confer  on  the Commisson additional powers as provided in all or any of the sub-ss. (2), (3), (4) and (5) of that section.     Sub-ss.  (4)  and  (5) of s. 5 of the  Act,  which  are relevant for our purposes, provide as follows:     "(4).  The  Commission shall be deemed to  be  a  civil court  and when any offence as is described in  section  175 section 178, section 179, section 180 or section 228 of  the Indian  Penal Code (45 of 1860)is committed in the  view  of presence  of  the  Commission,  the  Commision  may.   after recording  the facts constituting the offence and  statement of  the  accused  as provided for in the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1898  (5  of  1898),  forward  the  case  to   a magistrate  having  jurisdiction  to try the  same  and  the magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall  proceed to hear the complaint against the accused as if the case had been  forwarded to him under section 482 of the Code of  the Criminal Procedure, 1898."     "(5)  Any  proceeding  before the  Commission  shall  be                                                    PG NO 953 deemed  to  be a judicial proceeding within the  meaning  of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." Section 6 provides:     "6.  Statements made by persons to  the  Commission--No statement made by a person in the course of giving  evidence before  the  Commission  shall subject him to,  or  be  used against  him in, any civil or criminal proceeding  except  a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement: Provided that the statement--     (a) is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or     (b) is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry."     By s. 8 the Commission is empowered to regulate its own procedure including the time and place of its sittings etc.     In  support  of  the appeal Dr.  Y.S.  Chitale,  learned counsel  for  the appellant submits that the  Commission  of Inquiry  appointed by the State Government under sub-s.  (I) of  s. 3 of the Act read with s. 5 is merely a fact  finding body appointed by the Government for the ‘information of its mind’, and the mere fact that the procedure adopted is of  a legal  character and that it has the power to administer  an oath  will  not  impart to it the status of  the  Court  and therefore is not a Court for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of the  Code.  He  submits  that it  is  well  settled  that  a Commission  of  Inquiry has not the attributes  of  a  Court inasmuch  there is no lis before it and it has no powers  of

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adjudication  of  rights.  He further points  out  that  the language of s. 6 of the Act is plain enough to show that  no statement  by  a person before a Commisson of  Inquiry  ‘can subject  him  to, or be used against him’ in  any  civil  or criminal  proceedings,  except in a prosecution  for  giving false  evidence before the Commission. The  question  before the Court, the learned counsel contends, is not whether  the appellant  can  be prosecuted for perjury for  giving  false evidence  which is an offence punishable under s.  195(l)(b) or  for the offence of intentional insult of the  Commission punishable  under  s.  228 of the  Indian  Penal  Code,  but whether the Commission was a ‘Court’ for the purposes of  s. 195(1)(b).  A  Commission  by reason of s. 4  has  the  same powers  of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the  Code                                                    PG NO 955 of  Civil Procedure, 1908 but such investiture of  power  is for  a  limited  purpose  i.e. in  respect  of  the  matters specified therein, namely, summoning of witnesses, requiring the  discovery  and production of  the  relevant  documents, receiving evidence on affidavits, requisitioning any  public record  or  copy thereof from any court or  office,  issuing commissions  for examination of witnesses or documents  etc. etc.  Still  in the very nature of  things, it has  not  the trappings  of a Court. The learned counsel relies  upon  the decision  of  the Nagpur High Court in M.V. Rajwade  v.  Dr. S.M.  Hassan & Ors., ILR (1954) Nagpur 1 where the  question arose whether the Commission of Inquiry was a ‘court’ within the  meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952  and  which was  referred to by this Court in Brajnandan Sinha v.  Jyoti Narain, [1955] 2 SCR 955 while holding that the public under the  Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 is not a  ‘Court’ within  the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act.  He  also relied  upon the later decision of a Division Bench  of  the Madhya  Pradesh  High Court in Puhupram & Ors. v.  State  of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [1968] MPLJ 629 and to a judgment  of a  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  Kerala  High  Court   in Balakrishnan v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam & Anr., [1976] KLT 561.     Dr.  Chitale  submits that sub-s. (3) of s. 195  of  the present  Code  has  brought about a change in  the  law.  He traced the legislative history behind the enactment of  sub- s. (3) of s. 195 and pointed out that in Jagannath Prasad v. State  of  Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 2 SCR 850 this  Court  held that  a  Sales Tax Officer acting under  the  Uttar  Pradesh Sales  Tax  Act, 1948 was merely an instrumentality  of  the State  for purposes of assessment and collection of tax  and even  if he was required to perform  certain  quasi-judicial functions,  he  was  not a ‘Court’ for the  purposes  of  s. 195(1)(b)  of  the  Code. Nor could he be treated  to  be  a Revenue  Court within the meaning of s. 195(2) of the  Code. He  then referred to the decision in Lalji Haridas v.  State of Maharashtra & Anr. (supra) where a Constitution Bench  by a majority of 3:2 took a view to the contrary and held  that proceedings before an Income Tax Officer under s. 37 of  the Indian  Income  Tax Act, 1922 while  exercising  his  powers under  sub-ss.  (1),  (2)  and  (3)  thereof  were  judicial proceedings for the purposes of ss. 193, 196 and 228 of  the Indian   Penal  Code  and  therefore  must  be  treated   as proceedings in any Court for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of the  Code  although the Act did not expressly said  so.  The learned counsel points out that the definition of ‘Court’ in s.  195(2)  as  originally enacted, used  the  word  ‘means’ instead of the word ‘includes’, which later was  substituted by  the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1973.  This gave  rise  to a controversy whether tribunals  or  officers

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                                                  PG NO 955 acting  in  judicial capacity or  exercising  quasi-judicial functions  should be regarded as Courts for the purposes  of s.  195(1)(b) . The substitution of the word ‘includes’  for the  word ‘means’ in the definition, if anything,  added  to the difficulties of this complex issue. It necessarily  gave rise  to the question what else besides Civil,  Revenue  and Criminal Courts was covered by the generic term ‘Court.’.     The  learned counsel drew our attention to the  decision of this Court in Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The  State of Punjab, [1955] 2 SCR 1013, a three-Judges Bench  speaking through Venkatarama Ayyar, J. observed at p. 1018:     "It  is a familiar feature of modern legislation to  set up  bodies  and  tribunals, and entrust to them  work  of  a judicial character, but they are not Courts in the  accepted sense of that term, though they may possess, as observed  by Lord  Sankey L.C. in Shell Company of Australia  v.  Federal Commissioner  of  Taxation,  [1931]  AC  275,  some  of  the trappings of a Court." It was then observed:     "It  may  be stated broadly that  what  distinguishes  a Court  from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is  charged with  a  duty to decide disputes in a  judicial  manner  and declare  the rights of parties in a definitive judgment.  To decide  in a judicial manner involves that the  parties  are entitled  as  a matter of right to be heard  in  support  of their  claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it.  And  it also  imports an obligation on the part of the authority  to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as  to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court  as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided  is whether having regard to the provisions  of  the Act is possesses all the attributes of a Court."     In  support of his submissions, Dr. Chitale relied  upon the  41st Report of the Law Commission, paragraphs 15.93  to 15.101  and in particular referred to the following  passage in  para 15.99 where it was observed that ‘in  any  concrete case   this   question  is  bound  to  create   problem   of interpretation’ and accordingly suggested a change in law he purposes of s. 195(1)(b):                                                    PG NO 956     "We  consider  that for the purpose of clauses  (b)  and (c), "court" should mean a civil court or a revenue court or a  criminal court properly so called, but where  a  tribunal created by an Act has all or practically all the  attributes of  a court, it might be regarded as a court only if  it  is declared by that Act to be a court for the purposes of  this section."     The learned counsel contends that Parliament accordingly enacted  sub-s.  (3)  of  s.  195  to  put  an  end  to  the controversy.  In view of the change in law brought about  by s.  195(3),  it is urged that a tribunal constituted  by  or under a Central, Provincial or State Act can be deemed to be a  ‘Court’ only if it is declared to be so by that  Act  for the purposes of s. 195. According to the learned counsel, it is  now  a  familiar  feature of recents  Act  to  insert  a specific  provision  deeming a tribunal to be  a  Court  and wherever  such  a provision is not there, the  Court  cannot deem  a tribunal to be a Court. According to him, it  is  no more  a  question  of  interpretation  but  one  of  express enactment.   He  accordingly  contends  that  the   majority decision  in Lalji Haridas’ case no longer holds the  field. There appears to be considerable force in the argument .     Pursuing the same line of thought i.e. there is a change

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of  law brought about by sub-s. (3) of s. 195 of  the  Code, the learned counsel contends that Parliament had to step  in and  expressly amend s. 136 of the Income-tax Act,  1961  to put  the  matter beyond controversy. Sec 136  of  Income-tax Act,  1961 as originally enacted provided by  legal  fiction that  "any  proceeding under this Act before  an  income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the  meaning of ss. 193 and 228 and for the purposes  of  s. 196  of  the Indian Penal Code, 1860". Interpreting  s.  136 before  its amendment, the Court has, as already stated,  in Lalji  Haridas’  case held that the proceedings  before  the Income-tax  Officer being deemed to be judicial  proceedings under  s.  193,  Indian  Penal  Code,  must  be  treated  as proceedings  in any Court for the purpose of  s.  195(1)(b), Criminal  Procedure  Code.  It also  added  that  under  the provisions  of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922,  it  could not be held that the Income-tax Officer is a Revenue  Court, contrary  to the rule laid down in Jagannath Prasad’s  case. In  the  course of his arguments, the  learned  counsel  has brought  to our notice the words in parenthesis added by  s. 28  of  the Finance Bill, 1985. The Finance Bill  by  s.  28 brought about a change in the law and added the words:    "28. Amendment of section 136 of the  Income-tax Act, the                                                    PG NO 957 words  and figures "and every incometax authority  shall  be deemed  to be a Civil Court for the purposes of section  195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  (2 of  1974)",  shall be inserted and shall be deemed  to  have been  inserted  at the end with effect from the 1st  day  of April, 1974."     The  reason  for  the change is given in  the  Notes  on Clauses in the Finance Bill, 1985 and it reads:     "Clause 28 seeks to amend section 136 of the  Income-tax Act relating to proceedings before income-tax authorities to be judicial proceedings.     This  amendment seeks to secure retrospectively that  an income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the  purposes  of  s. 195 and Chapter XXVI of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973, from the date of its commencement, that is, 1st April, 1974. "     This   is  also  evident  from  paragraph  119  of   the Memorandum  explaining provisions in Finance Bill, 1985  and it reads:     "119. Under the existing provisions. proceedings  before income-tax authorities are deemed to he judicial proceedings within  the  meaning  of sections 193 and 228  and  for  the purposes  of  section 196 of the Indian Penal  Code.  It  is proposed  to provide that an income-tax authority  shall  be deemed  to be a Civil Court for the purposes of section  195 and  Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973. This  amendment  is  intended  to  secure  that  prosecution proceedings  for offences under the relevant  provisions  of the  Indian Penal Code may be launched on the  complaint  of the  concerned income-tax authority. The proposed  amendment will  take  effect from 1st April, 1974, that is,  the  date from  which the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, came  into force."     According   to   Dr.  Chitale  this  was   nothing   but "legislative  declaration of the law.", contrary to the  law declared  by  this Court in Lalji Haridas’  case,  which  is permissible  under Art. 141 of the Constitution.  While  the learned counsel accepts that under Art. 141 the law declared by  the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts in India,  in other  words, the law declared by the Supreme Court is  made                                                    PG NO 958

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the  law  of  the  land, there is  nothing  to  prevent  the legislature to bring about a change in the law. Finally, the learned   counsel  also  drew  attention  to  the   existing legislative practice where certain enactments constituting a Tribunal  contain  a provision that the  Tribunal  shall  be deemed  to be a Court for the purposes of s. 195(2)  of  the Code. The learned counsel referred us to s. 40 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, s. 23 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923  and  s. 18 of the Payment of Wages  Act,  1936.  These provisions  which  are  almost  similar  provide  that   the Tribunal  under  the Indian Railways Act,  the  Commissioner under  the  Workmen’s  Compensation Act  and  the  authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act shall be deemed  to be a Civil Court for the purposes of s. 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Likewise, s. 18  of the  Payment  of  Wages  Act  provides  that  the  authority appointed under the Act shall be so deemed to be a Court for the  purposes of s. 195 of the Code. We shall  consider  all these aspects in their proper context.     In his reply Shri Arvind Bobde, learned Advocate-General appearing  on  behalf of the State  Government  argued  with great  clarity  and precision and repelled  the  contentions advanced  on  behalf  of the  appellant.  According  to  the learned Advocate-General, there was no need to amend the Act merely because of the enactment of sub-s. (3)   of s. 195 of the  Code  and the majority view in Lalji Haridas’  case  is binding on us and is still good law. His submissions were on these  lines.  While under s. 4 of the Act a  Commission  of Inquiry  has the power of a Civil Court while trying a  suit under  the Code of Civil Procedure, l908 in respect  of  the matters  enumerated therein, the legislature has not  rested at  that. Parliament has made express provision, by the  use of a legal fiction in sub-s. (4) of s. 5 of the Act, that  a Commission  of Inquiry shall be deemed to be a  Civil  Court and has further, by the use of another legal fiction in sub- s.  (5)  thereof,  enjoined that any  proceedings  before  a Commission  of  Inquiry  shall  be  deemed  to  be  judicial proceedings. On a combined reading of sub-ss. (4) and (5) of s.  5,  the  learned  Advocate-General  contends  that   the conclusion is irresistible that a Commission of Inquiry is a Court  for   the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) as  laid  down  in Lalji Haridas’ case. In other words, the submission is  that while s. 4 invests a Commission of Inquiry with the power of a  Civil  Court following the familiar pattern  of  statutes constituting  special  tribunals, the legislature  has  gone further and put the matter beyond doubt by enacting  sub-ss. (4)  and (5) of s. 5. The contentions advanced on behalf  of the appellant were, it is said, the submissions made  before the  Court in Lalji Haridas’ case, and the Court  has  dealt                                                    PG NO 959 with  the  question as to whether there  was  a  distinction between  a  case  where a statute  constituting  a  tribunal provides that the tribunal shall be deemed to be a Court for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) and a case where a statute does not expressly say so. The majority on a construction of  the various provisions of the Act, expressed the considered view that the absence of such a provision makes no difference. It was  further  not open for us to say that  the  decision  in Lalji  Haridas’ case was no longer binding on us  merely  by the enactment of sub-s. (3) of s. 195 of the Code.     The   learned   Advocate-General  then  read   out   the provisions   of  s.  195(1)(b)  of  the  Code  of   Criminal Procedure,  1898  and of the present Code, as  well  as  the interpretation clause in sub-s. (3) of s. 195 of the present Code and the analogous provisions in sub-s. (2) of s. 195 of

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the  old Code, to impress upon us that there was no  textual difference  in the language of s. 195(1)(b). As regards  the interpretation  clause,  it was pointed out that  the  first part  of  s. 195(2) of the old Code used  the  word  ‘means’ which  was  later substituted by the  word  ‘includes’.  The first  part of s. 195(2) was therefore an inclusive one  but the  second was an exclusionary clause so as to exclude  the Registrar or the SubRegistrar under the Indian  Registration Act  from the purview of the expression ‘Court’, as  defined by the first part of s. 195(2). In contrast, the  definition of  the term ‘Court’ in sub-s. (3) of s. 195 of the  present Code  is exhaustive. However, it is urged that all  that  s. 195(3) of the present Code does is to provide that in cl.(b) the  term  ‘Court’  as defined in s. 195(3)  means  a  Civil Revenue   or   Criminal  Court  and  includes   a   tribunal constituted  by or under a Central, Provincial or State  Act if  declared by that Act to be a Court for the  purposes  of this section. The definition of ‘Court’ in the first part of s.  195(3)  of the Code is therefore restrictive  while  the second is inclusive. It is contended that the definition  of a word may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning  or it may be extensive of the same. Sometimes, definition of  a term  contains  the  words ‘means and  includes’  which  may inevitably raise a doubt as to interpretation. According  to the  learned  Advocate-General, the inclusive  part  of  the definition  of  ‘Court’  in s. 195(3) of  the  Code  was  ex abundanti cautela and was merely declaratory of the law.  It is  submitted that the first part of sub-s. (4) of s.  5  of the  Act fulfils the requirements of the inclusive  part  of the  definition  of  ‘Court’  in  s.  195(3)  of  the  Code. Therefore,  the Act was in line with sub-s. (3) of s 195  of the Code, there was no occasion for Parliament to effect  an amendment  of  the Act, particularly having  regard  to  the majority decision in Lalji Haridas’ case.                                                    PG NO 960     The  learned  Advocate-General with  much  learning  and resource   submits  that  there  are  different   types   of legislative  practices. One such instance is that of  sub-s. (4) of s. 37 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, inserted in the  Act in 1956, which provides that any proceeding  before an  Income  Tax  Officer shall be deemed to  be  a  judicial proceeding, like in sub-s. (5) of s. 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry  Act here. Our attention was drawn to the  following observations of Gajendragadkar, CJ speaking for the majority in Lalji Haridas’ case as       to the purport and effect of s. 37 of the Indian Income Tax Act, at pp. 709-710:     "The expression "judicial proceeding" is not defined  in the  Indian  Penal Code, but we have the definition  of  the said  expression  under s. 4(m) of the Cr.  Procedure  Code. Section  4(m) provides that "judicial  proceeding"  includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may  be legally taken on oath. The expression "Court" is not defined either  by  the  Cr. P.C. or the I.P.C.,  though  ’Court  of Justice’ is defined by s. 20 of the latter Code as  denoting a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone,  or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as  a  body,  when such Judge or body of  Judges  is  acting judicially. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines a  "Court’ as  including  all Judges and Magistrates  and  all  persons except the Arbitrators legally authorised to take  evidence. Prima  facie, there is some force in the contention that  it would  not be reasonable to predicate al out every  judicial proceeding  that it is a proceeding before a Court. and  so, it  is  open  to  the appellant  to  urge  that  though  the proceeding  before an Income-tax officer may be  a  judicial

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proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C. it would not follow that the said  judicial  proceeding  is a proceeding in  a  Court  as required by s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C."     And  to the operative part of the judgment delivered  by the learned Chief Justice at pp. 710-711:     "It is true, the Additional Solicitor-General has mainly relied  upon the relevant provisions of several statutes  in support of his construction and in so far as it appears that certain  provisions  in some of the said statutes  in  terms extend the application of s. 195 Cr. P.C. to the proceedings to which they relate, the argument does receive support, but                                                    PG NO 961 we  hesitate  to  hold  that the omission  to  refer  to  s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C. in s. 37(4) of the Act necessarily means that  the intention of the legislature in enacting s.  37(4) was  merely and solely to provide for a higher  sentence  in regard  to  the  offence  under s. 193,  I.P.C.  if  it  was committed  in proceedings before the Income-tax Officer.  It is  plain that if the argument of the  Additional  Solicitor General  is accepted, the result would be that  a  complaint like  the  present  can be made by any  person  and  if  the offence  alleged is proved, the accused would be  liable  to receive  higher penalty awardable under the first  paragraph of  s.  193, I.P.C. without  the  safeguard  correspondingly provided  by s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C. Could it have  been  the intention of the legislature in making the offence committed during  the  course  of a proceeding  before  an  Income-tax Officer  more  serious  without  affording  a  corresponding safeguard in respect of the complaints which can be made  in that behalf? We are inclined to hold that the answer to this question must be in the negative."      The learned Chief Justice then concluded:     "After  careful  consideration,  we  have  come  to  the conclusion  that  the view taken by the  Bombay  High  Court should be upheld though for different reasons. Section 37(4) of  the  Act  makes the proceedings  before  the  Income-tax Officer  judicial proceedings under s. 193 T.P.C. and  these judicial  proceedings must be treated as proceedings in  any Court  for  the purpose of s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C.  That,  we think,   would  really  carry  out  the  intention  of   the legislature in enacting s. 37(4) of the Act."     Incidentally, the learned Advocate-General also drew our attention to the following observations at p. 706 where  the majority  was dealing with s. 195(2) of the old Code  saying that  it was not necessary to deal with the effect  of  that provision  because,  they  did not  propose  to  base  their decision  on  the ground that the Income-tax Officer  was  a Revenue Court under that sub-section, and added:     "The only point of interest to which we may incidentally refer  is that this sub-section gives an  inclusive,  though not exhaustive, definition and takes within its purview  not only  Civil  and Criminal Courts, but also  Revenue  Courts,                                                    PG NO 962 while  excluding  a  Registrar or  Sub-Registrar  under  the Indian Registration Act."     Another  decision to which the learned  Advocate-General relied upon is that of this Court in Balwant singh & Anr. v. L. C. Bharupal, Income-Tax Officer, New Delhi & Anr., [1968] 70  ITR  89  where a  three-Judges  Bench  speaking  through Shelat,  J. reiterated the majority view in  Lalji  Haridas’ case  and  held that: the proceedings before  an  Income-tax Officer  for the registration of a firm under s. 26A of  the Indian  Income-tax Act, 1922 were judicial proceedings in  a Court for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of the Code.  Another legislative practice to which our attention was drawn by the

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learned  Advocate-General was the one employed in s.  34  of the  U.P.  Urban Buildings (Regulation of  Letting,  Rent  & Eviction)  Act,  1972.  Sub-s.  (l) of s.  34  of  that  Act provides  that  the  District  Magistrate,  the   Prescribed Authority or any appellate authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under the  Act, have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court  under the  Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a  suit  in respect of the matters enumerated therein, just like s. 4 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. Then comes sub-s. (2)  which may be extracted below:     "(2)  The District Magistrate, the Prescribed  Authority or appellate or revising authority, while holding an inquiry or  hearing an appeal or revision under this Act.  shall  be deemed  to be a Civil Court within the meaning  of  sections 345  and  346 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908  and  any proceeding  before  him or it to be  a  judicial  proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 to 228 of the India Penal Code (Act No. XLV of 1860)."     In  Chandrapal  .Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj  Singh  &  Anr. [1982]  1 SCC 466, a 3-Judges Bench speaking through  Desai, J. held that in view of the specific provision made in  sub- s.(2)  of  s. 34 of the UP Rent Act. a  District  Magistrate must be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of  s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as for the purposes of ss. 195(1)(b) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  We were referred to the following passage in that judgment:     "Now, sub-section (2) of Section extracted  hereinbefore would  show that the expression ‘District Magistrate’  which would  include  any officer authorised by him  to  exercise, perform  and  discharge his powers,  functions  and  duties,                                                    PG NO 963 shall  be deemed to be a civil court within the  meaning  of Sections  480  and 482 of the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, 1898. Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973,  are  corresponding  to Sections 480 and  482  of  the Cr.P.C., 1898. As a corollary it would follow that the  Rent Control  Officer shall be deemed to be a civil court  within the  meaning of Sections 345 and 346 of the Cr.  P.C.,  1973 and  in  view of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of  the  Rent Act, shall be a civil court for the purpose of section  193, IPC.  Section 195(3), Cr.P.C. provides that  the  expression ‘Court’  in  Section 195(1)(b)(i) will  include  a  tribunal constituted  by or under a Central, Provincial or State  Act if  declared by that Act to be a court for the  purposes  of the  section. Section 195(1)(b)(i) provides a  pre-condition for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 193,  IPC, viz.  a  complaint in writing of the court. In view  of  the specific provision made in sub-section (2) of Section 34  of the Rent Act that for the purposes of Sections 345 and  346. Cr.P.C., Rent Control Officer, assuming it to be a  tribunal as  held by the High Court and not a court, would be  deemed to be a civil court and, therefore, for purposes of Sections 193  and 228, IPC a fortiori any proceeding before it  would be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section  193, IPC.  If,  therefore,  according to  the  complainant  false evidence  was given in a judicial proceeding before a  civil court  and  the  persons giving  such  false  evidence  have committed  an  offence  under  Section 193,  IPC  in  or  in relation  to a proceeding before a court, no court can  take cognizance of such offence except on a complaint in  Writing of that court."     Placing  reliance  on these  observations,  the  learned Advocate-General  contends  that according to the  ratio  in Chandrapal Singh’s case, a Commission of Inquiry is a  Court

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for  the  purposes of s. 195 (1)(b). According to  him,  the first  part  of sub-s.(4) of s.5 of the  Act  satisfies  the requirements  of  the inclusive part of  the  definition  of ‘Court’ as contained in sub-s.(3)  of s.195 of the Code.     Another  legislative practice, according to the  learned Advocate  General,  was  the one adopted by  s.  28  of  the Finance  Act,  1985 where the law enacted contains  a  legal fiction that any proceeding under the Income-tax Act  before an  income-tax  authority shall be deemed to be  a  judicial proceeding within the meaning of ss. 193 and 228 and for the                                                    PG NO 964 purposes  of  s.  196 of the Indian Penal  Code  viz.  every income-tax authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the  purposes of s. 195 but not for the purposes of  Chapter XXVI  of  the Code. According to him the  amendment  brought about  in  s.  136 of the Income-tax  Act  was  nothing  but ‘legislative  exposition of the law’, as declared  in  Lalji Haridas’  case.  To  substantiate his  submission  that  the legislature  adopted different methods to achieve  the  same end,  he  drew  our  attention to s.  23  of  the  Workmen’s Compensation  Act,  1923 and s. 18 of the Payment  of  Wages Act, 1936 where, like s. 136 of the Income-tax Act, 1961  as now amended by s. 28 of the Finance Act, 1985 the  analogous provision which, he says is a combination of two  provisions like  sub-ss.  (4)  and (5) of s. S of  the  Commissions  of Inquiry   Act,  into  one,  enacts  that  the   Commissioner appointed  under  the Workmen’s Compensation  Act  shall  be deemed to be a Civil Court for all purposes of s. l9S of the Code,  and  by s. 18 of the Payment of Wages Act,  that  the authority  appointed under the Act shall be deemed to  be  a Court  for  the  purposes  of  s.  195  of  the  Code.   The phraseology  may  differ but, the  learned  Advocate-General contends, the method is the same. He also referred to sub-s. (4) of s. 108 of the Customs Act, 1952 which provision is in pari  materia with sub-s. (5) of s. 5 of the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act,  and  enacts that every  proceeding  before  a Customs Officer shall be deemed to be a judicial  proceeding within  the  meaning of ss.193 and 228 of the  Indian  Penal Code.  It  would be seen that the underlying  theme  of  all these  submissions  of  the learned  AdvocateGeneral  is  by placing emphasis on sub-s. (4) of s. 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry  Act  which provides that a  Commission  of  Inquiry shall  be deemed to be a Court. He contends that  the  legal fiction  must  be given its full effect  and  therefore  the Commission  must  be treated to be a Civil  Court  for  ‘all purposes’. And in the alternative, he submits that the  word ‘deemed’ is also sometimes used by the legislature in  order to  remove  any doubt in the matter. We shall  consider  all these aspects in their proper context.     After the conclusion of the hearing Dr. Chitale, learned counsel  for  the  appellant, has furnished  a  list  of  11 enactments where Parliament while enacting a law has made an express provision that the Tribunal shall be deemed to be  a Court  for  the purposes of s. 195 and Chapter XXVI  of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973. For instance. sub-s.  (6) of  s.  20  of the Aluminium Corporation  of  India  Limited (Acquisition  and  Transfer of Aluminium  Undertaking)  Act, 1984  provides that any investigation before the  Commission shall  be  deemed  to be a judicial  proceeding  within  the meaning of ss. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and  the Commissioner  shall  be deemed to be a Civil Court  for  the                                                    PG NO 965 purposes  of  s.  195  and Chapter XXVI of  the  Code  of  A Criminal  procedure, 1973. Similar provisions are  contained in  s.  18(6) of the Amritsar Oil Works  (Acquisition  etc.)

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Act,  1982, s. 22(6) of the Bengal C. & P. Works  Ltd.  Act, 1980, s. 21(6) of the Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd.  (Acquisition &  T.O.U.); Act, 1984, s. 19(6) of the Bird &  Company  Ltd. (Acquisition  etc.)  Act,  1980, s.  12(3)(d)  of  the  Cine Workers etc. (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1981, S.  37(2) of  the  Emigration  Act, 1983, s.  13(5)  of  the  Consumer Protection  Act,  1986,  ss.  14  of  the  Sick   Industrial Companies  (Special  Provisions)  Act, 1985, s.  19  of  the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983  and s. 95 of the Coast Guard Act, 1978, deeming the Commissioner or  the  Tribunal appointed under the  respective  Acts  for investigation of claims to be a Civil Court for the purposes of  s.  195  and  Chapter XXVl   of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1973.  Of these eleven enactments, 5  relate  to acquisition of certain industrial undertakings and there  is provision made for investigation of claims for the  purposes of payment of compensation. The sixth relates to  regulation of  the conditions of employment of a class of workmen.  The remaining five enactments provide for creation of a tribunal for  investigation  of  claims or   entrusted  with  certain adjudicatory  functions.  It  would  therefore  appear  that Parliament  in  its  wisdom  wherever  thought  it  fit  has inserted a special provision for deeming a tribunal to be  a Court  for  the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) but  has  left  the other  enactments  like  the  Commissions  of  Inquiry   Act untouched  although  sub-s. (3) of s. 195 has  been  on  the Statute Book for the last over 14 years. This lends  support to  the  submission  of Dr. Chitale that it  is  no  more  a question of interpretation but one of express enactment.     The crucial question that falls to be determined in this appeal  is whether sub-s. (3) of s. 195 has brought about  a change  in  the law and therefore the majority  decision  in Lalji  Haridas’ case no longer holds the field as  submitted by Dr. Chitale, appearing on behalf of the appellant, or was merely  declaratory of the law as declared by the  Court  in Lalji  Haridas’  case,  as argued by  the  learned  Advocate General, and therefore, the decision in Lalji Haridas’  case is  still good law. It cannot be doubted that sub-s. (3)  of s.  195  of  the  Code has been  enacted  by  Parliament  to implement the recommendations of the 41st Report of the  Law Commission  which brought about the unsatisfactory state  of law due to conflict of opinion between different High Courts as  to the meaning of the word ‘Court’ in s. 195(1)(b)  read in  the  context  of  s. 195(2) of  the  earlier  Code.  The interpretative  exercise undertaken by the Courts  over  the years  as  to  the precise meaning of the  term  ‘Court’  as defined  in  s.  195(1)(b)  of the old  Code  prior  to  the introduction  of  sub-s.(3) of s. 195 of the  present  Code,                                                    PG NO 966 reveals  an  endless  oscillation  between  two  views--each verging on a fringe of obscurity and vagueness. As echoed by Lord Macmillan in his Law & Other Things at p. 48:     "In  almost  every case, except the  very  plainest,  it would  be  possible  to decide the  issue  either  way  with reasonable  legal  justification  and that  in  such  cases, ethical considerations operate and ought to operate."     In  that  uncertain  state of law,  the  Law  Commission observed in paragraph 15.99 of its Report that it felt  that in  any  concrete  case this question  is  bound  to  create problem of interpretation and accordingly suggested a change in law for the purposes of s. 195 of the Code. It felt  that the  term  ‘Court’ for the purposes of clauses (b)  and  (c) should  mean a Civil, Revenue or a Criminal Court,  properly so called, but where a tribunal created by an Act has all or practically  all  the  attributes of a Court,  it  might  be

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regarded  as  a Court only if declared by the Act  to  be  a Court   for  the  purposes  of  s.  195.  Indibutably,   the introduction  of the inclusive clause in the  definition  of ’Court in subs. (3) of s. 195 has brought about a change  in the  law.  No  rule  is more  firmly  established  than  the principles  enunciated  in Heydon’s case.  which  have  been continually  cited  with approval not only  by  the  English Courts but also by the Privy Council as well as this  Court. The  principles  laid  down  in  Heydon’s  case  have   been enunciated  in Craies on Statute Law, 6th edn. at p.  96  as follows:     "That  for  the  sure and  true  interpretation  of  all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial restrictive or  enlarging  of  the common law), four things  are  to  be discerned and considered: (1) what was the common law before the  making of the Act (2) What was the mischief and  defect for which the common law did not provide (3) What remedy the Parliament  hath resolved and appointed to cure the  disease of  the commonwealth (4) The true reason of the remedy.  And then  the  office of all the judges is always to  make  such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance  the remedy,  and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions  for the continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo, and to  add force and life to the cure and remedy  according  to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico."                                                    PG NO 967     These rules are still in full force and effect, with the addition  that  regard  must  now be had  not  only  to  the existing  law  but  also to prior  legislation  and  to  the judicial interpretation thereof. The Court applied the  rule in  Heydon’s case in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited  v. The  State  of  Bihar  &  Ors., [1955]  2  SCR  603  in  the construction   of  Art.  286  of  the  Constitution.   After referring  to  the  state  of law  prevailing  in  the  then Provinces prior to the Constitution as also to the chaos and confusion  that was brought about in inter-State  trade  and commerce  by indiscriminate exercising of taxing  powers  by the different provincial legislatures founded on the  theory of  territorial  nexus,  S.R. Das, Actg.  CJ.  speaking  for himself  and  Vivian Bose and Jafer Imam, JJ.  proceeded  to say:     "It  was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation  and to  preserve the free flow of inter-State trade or  commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit  without any  provincial barrier that the constitution-makes  adopted Art. 286 of the Constitution."     An  illustration of the application of the rule is  also furnished  in  the  construction of s.  2(d)  of  the  Prize Competitions  Act,  1955. In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla  v.  The Union of India [1957] SCR 930 Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for  the Court after referring to the previous state of  the law,  to that mischief that continued under that law and  to the resolutions passed by different State Legislatures under Art.  252 (1) of the Constitution authorising Parliament  to pass the Act stated:     "Having  regard to the history of the  legislation,  the declared  object thereof and the wording of the statute,  we are of opinion that the competitions which are sought to  be controlled   and  regulated  by  the  Act  are  only   those competitions  in  which  success  does  not  depend  on  any substantial degree of skill."     A further example is furnished in the construction of s. 16(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which provides: "In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of  assessment. there shall be included (a) so much  of  the

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income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly  or indirectly." The question before the Court  was whether  the word ‘individual’ occurring in s.  16(3)  meant only  a male or also included a female. After  finding  that the  said  word in the setting was ambiguous,  Bhagwati,  J. speaking for himself and J.L. Kapur, JJ. in The Commissioner                                                    PG NO 968 of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh & Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, [1958] SCR 1 observed:     "In order to resolve this ambiguity therefore we must of necessity  have  resort to the state of the law  before  the enactment of the provisions, the mischief and the defect for which  the  law  did  not  provide;  the  remedy  which  the legislature  resolved and appointed to cure the defect;  and the true reason of the remedy;     After  taking  into account these  factors  the  learned Judge went on to say:     "It  is  clear  that the evil which  was  sought  to  be remedied was the one resulting from the widespread  practice of  husbands entering into nominal partnerships  with  their wives  and  fathers admitting their minor  children  to  the benefits  of  the partnerships of which they  were  members. This  evil was sought to be remedied by the enactment of  s. 16(3) in the Act."     There  is no need to burden the judgment  with  numerous citations. Following the rule in Heydon’s case it appears to us  that to construe sub-s. (3) of s. 195 of the Code it  is not  only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both  to the  former Code and the state of uncertainty brought  about due to conflict of views between different High Courts,  and to  the present Code which seeks to provide the  remedy.  It was to cure this mischief that Parliament brought in  sub-s. (3)  of  s.  195   of the  Code  and   put  an  end  to  the controversy.     Law  must  be  definite,  and certain.  If  any  of  the features  of the law can usefully be regarded as  normative, it   is  such  basic  postulates  as  the   requirement   of consistency   in  judicial  decision-making.  It   is   this requirement of consistency that gives to the law much of its rigour.  At  the same time, there is need  for  flexibility. Professor  H.L.A.  Hart  regarded  as  one  of  the  leading thinkers  of our time observes in his influential book  ’The Concept of Law’, depicting the difficult task of a Judge  to strike a balance between certainty and flexibility:     "Where there is obscurity in the language of a  statute, it results in confusion and disorder. No doubt the courts so frame  their judgments as to give the impression that  their decisions  are  the necessary consequence  of  predetermined                                                    PG NO 969 rules.  In very simple cases it may be so; but in  the  vast majority  of cases that trouble the courts, neither  statute nor precedents in which the rules are legitimately contained allow  of only one result. In most important cases there  is always a choice. The judge has to choose between alternative meanings  to be given to the words of a statute  or  between rival interpretations of what a precedent amounts to. It  is only the tradition that judges ‘find’ and do not ‘make’  law that conceals this, and presents their decisions as if  they were deductions smoothly made from clear pre-existing  rules without intrusion of the judge’s choice."     Faced with the difficulty, the learned Advocate  General with his usual astuteness says that although he cannot  fall back  on the inclusive part of the definition of ‘Court’  in sub-s.  (3) of s. 195 of the Code, laid particular  emphasis on  the main part of the definition and contended  that  the

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mere  absence ot an express provision in the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act  deeming the Commission to be a Court  for  the purposes  of  s. 195 of the Code, it would  not  necessarily imply that the Commission is not a Court for the purposes of s. 195 particularly when sub-s. (4) of s. 5 in express terms provides  that the Commission shall be deemed to be a  Civil Court and sub-s. (5) expressly provides that any  proceeding before  the  Commission  shall  be  deemed  to  be  judicial proceeding  within  the meaning ot ss. 193 and  233  of  the Indian Penal Code.The learned Advocate General contends that the  use  of  the words deemed to  be’  indicates  that  the proceedings  before a Commision of Inquiry are not  judicial proceedings,  but by legal fiction they have to be  regarded as judicial proceedings for the purposes of ss. 193 and  228 of  the  Indian Penal Code. It is contended  that  the  word ‘deemed’  is  however sometimes used by the  legislature  in order  to  remove  any  doubt in the  matter.  He  drew  our attention to the following observations of Lord Radcliffe in St. Aubyn v . Attorney General LR 1952 AC 15:     "  ...The word ‘deemed’ is used a great deal  in  modern legislation. Sometimes it is used to impose for the  purpose of a statute an artificial construction of a word or  phrase that  would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is  used  to put  beyond  doubt  a  particular  construction  that  might otherwise  be  uncertain.  Sometimes it is used  to  give  a comprehensive  description  that includes what  is  obvious, what  is  uncertain  and what is,  in  the  ordinary  sense, impossible."                                                    PG NO 970     The main thrust of the argument of the learned  Advocate General that a Commission of Inquiry should be regarded as a Court for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) stems from a wrongful hypothesis  that  subs.  (4) of s. 5 of the Act  is  in  two parts.  He contends for the purpose of his  submission  that sub-s.  (4)  of  s. 5 of the Act consists  of  two  separate provisions,  the first of which deals with the status  of  a Commisson  of Inquiry as a Civil Court and the second  deals with the power of the Commission to forward a case under  s. 482  of  the earlier Code (corresponding to s.  346  of  the present Code) when any offence as is described in s. 175, s. 179, s. 180 or s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code is  committed in  view of or presence of the Commission, to  a  Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same. The submission is  that sub-s..  (4) is in two parts dealing with separate  subject- matters  and  merely  because they are joined  by  the  word ‘and’,  the first part cannot be projected into the  second. We  are  afraid, we are unable to agree with  this  line  of reasoning. It would not be correct to contend that the legal fiction  contained  in  the  first part  of  sub-s.  (4)  is complete  in  itself and therefore a Commission  of  Inquiry must,  by reason of the legal fiction contained therein,  be deemed to be a Civil Court ‘for all purposes’. The  argument fails  to  take  note of the fact that the  words  ‘for  all purposes’ are not there in the first part of sub-s. (4)  and the Court cannot in the guise of interpreting the provision, supply  any  casus  omissus. The first part  of  sub-s.  (4) merely  provides by the legal fiction that a  Commission  of Inquiry  shall  be deemed to be a Civil Court and  it  stops there. We are quite clear that the first part cannot be read in  isolation but must take its colour from the  context  in which  it appears. It would not be correct to  contend  that the  fiction  created by the first by the  words  ‘shall  be deemed to be a Civil Court’ is full and complete in  itself. The  purpose and object of the legal fiction created by  the first  part  of  sub-s. (4) is reflected in  the  second.  A

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Commission of Inquiry is therefore fictionally a Civil Court for  the limited purpose of proceeding under s. 482  of  the old  Code or under s. 346 of the present Code.  A  fortiori, the  legal  fiction contained in sub-s. (5) of  s.  5  which relates   to  the  proceedings  before  the  Commission   is necessary confined to offences that are punishable under ss. 193  and  228 of the Indian Penal Code and does  not  extend beyond that.     In  Lalji Haridas case the majority of this  Court  held that  the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under  s. 37(4)  of  the  Indian Income-tax Act,  1922  were  judicial proceedings  under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code and  such proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any Court  for the  purposes  of  s.  195(1)(b) of the  Code.  It  must  be remembered  that  the decision in Lalji  Haridas’  case  was rendered  prior to the enactment of sub-s. (3) of s. 195  of                                                    PG NO 971 the present Code. The Court was therefore concerned with the defintion of the term ‘Court’ under s. 195(2) of the earlier Code  which  was an inclusive one. There  being  no  express provision akin to s. 40 of the Indian Railways Act, s. 23 of the  Workmen’s Compensation Act or s. 18 of the  Payment  of Wages Act, the matter was one of construction. The  question therefore whether an Income-tax Officer was a Court for  the purposes   of   s.  195(1)(b)  was  more   a   question   of interpretation  than  one  of express  enactment  after  the amendment of s. 126 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by s. 28  of the Finance Act, 1985. The decision of the majority in Lalji Haridas’ case is now more of academic interest. The decision in  Balwant  Singh’s  case does not  carry  the  matter  any further.     It  would be convenient at this stage to deal  with  the decision of this Court in Chandrapal Singh’s case. Under the scheme  of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of  Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972. various functions are  entrusted to different authorities. The District Magistrate as defined in  s. 3(c), is vested with the power of making an order  of allotment  under  s. 16(1)(a). In making such  an  order  of allotment   under  cl.  (a)  or  on  order  of  release   of accommodation  under  cl.  (b) of  s.  16(1),  the  District Magistrate  clearly exercises a quasijudicial  function  and therefore  has a duty to hear. The landlord has a  right  to have  the order passed by the District Magistrate  under  s. 16(1)(b) for release of the building or part thereof for any of the purposes set out in s. 16(2). The District Magistrate may  release  the building or any part thereof or  any  land appurtenant  thereto  under  s. 16(1)(b) where  any  of  the aforesaid   conditions   are   proved  to   exist   to   his satisfaction.   The  expression  ‘District  Magistrate’   as defined  in s. 3(c) is an inclusive one and it  includes  an officer  authorised by the District Magistrate to  exercise, perform  and discharge all or any of his  powers,  functions and  duties. Such an officer is normally designated  as  the Rent Control & Eviction Officer. Under s. 20 of the Act  the powers  of  eviction are exercisable by  the  regular  Civil Courts.  In cases not falling under s. 20 but under  s.  21, the  powers are exercisable by the Prescribed  Authority.  A landlord  may apply for release of the accommodation on  the ground  of bona fide  requirement under s.  21(1)(a)  before the   Prescribed  Authority.  The   expression   ‘Prescribed Authority’  as  defined in s. 3(e) means a  Civil   Judicial Officer  or Judicial Magistrate authorised by  the  District Magistrate  to exercise perform and discharge all or any  of the powers, functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority under   the  Act.  The  hierarchy  of  Courts   is   clearly

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established because s. 18 of the Act contemplates an  appeal from  an  order of the District Magistrate to  the  District                                                    PG NO 972 Judge.  Although  therefore  Desai,  J.  in  delivering  the judgment of the Court has not referred to the definition  of District  Magistrate in s. 3(c) and that of  the  Prescribed Authority under s. 3(e) or the provision for an appeal under s. 18 of the Act. but has referred the authority as the Rent Control  Officer  which expression is not used in  the  Act. Presumably,   when the learned Judge when he  described  the Rent  Control  Officer at p. 471 of the Report  as  a  Civil Court,  meant that the authorities designated under the  Act were  ‘Civil Courts In any event, considering the nature  of functions  to  be  performed under  the  U.P.Rent  Act,  the authorities  designated would be Civil Courts. In  contrast, a Commissions of Inquiry constituted under the Commission of Inquiry Act is neither a Civil Court nor a Criminal Court or a Court properly so called in the strict sense of the them.     In view of the change in law, we fail to appreciate  the contention of the learned Advocate-General, without  meaning any  disrespect,  that  the  principles  laid  down  by  the majority  in Lalji Haridas’ case that on a combined  reading of sub-ss. (4) and (5) of s. 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act read in the context of sub-s. (4), an Income-tax Officer must still be regarded to be a Court for the purposes of  s. 195(1)(b),despite  the enactment of sub-s. (3) of s  195.  A Commission  of Inquiry is not a Court properly so called.  A Commission  is  obviously  appointed   by  the   appropriate Government  ‘for the information of its mind’ in  order  for it  to decide as to the course of at action to be  followed. It is therefore  a fact-finding body and is not required  to adjudicate  upon  the  rights  of the  parties  and  has  no adjudicatory  function.  The   Government is  not  bound  to accept  its  recommendations or act upon its  findings.  The mere  fact  that the procedure adopted by it is of  a  legal character  and It has the power to administer an  oath  will not impart to it the status of a Court.     In Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, supar, a threejugdes  Bench  speaking through Venkatarama  Ayyar,  J. relying  upon the celebrated decision of the House of  Lords in  Shell  Co.  of  Australia  v.  Federal  Commissioner  of Taxation.  LR (1931) AC 275 explained the legal  connotation of the term ‘Court’in these words:     "What  distinguished  a  Court  from  a   quasi-judicial tribunal  is  that  it  is charged with  a  duty  to  decide disputes  in  a  judicial manner and declare  the  right  of parties  in  a definitive judgment. to decide in  a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right  to be heard in support of their claim and  to  adduce evidence in proof of it.  And it also imports an  obligation                                                    PG NO 973 on  the  part of the authority  to decide the  matter  on  a consideration  of  the adduced and in accordance  with  law. When a question  therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a  quasi- judicial tribunal,  what has to be decided is whether having regard  to  the provisions of the Act it possesses  all  the attributes of a Court."     It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies  and   tribunals,  and entrust them with  work  of  a judicial,  quasi-judicial or administrative  character,  but they  are  not Courts in the accepted sense  of  that  term, though they may possess, as observed by Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shall  Co. of Australia’s case, some of the trappings  of  a Court. Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi has

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referred  to several decisions of the Courts in England  and Australia as to what are the essential characteristics of  a Court  as  distinguished from  tribunals  exercising  quasi- judicial functions.     About  a  decade later in Jagannath  Prasad  v.State  of Uttar Pradesh, supra, case, this Court following its earlier decision in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1961] 1  SCR 778 held that no doubt a Sales The Officer  appointed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 is an instrumentality  of the  State  employed  for the  purposes  of  assessment  and collection  of  taxes  and merely because  he  has.  in  the discharge  of his duties, to perform certain  quasi-judicial functions  i.e. has certain powers which are similar to  the powers  exercised  by  Courts,  still  is  not  a  Court  as understood in s. 195 of the Code. The Court relied upon  the decision  of the House of Lords in .Shell Co.  of  Australia for the view that a Sales Tax Office was not a Court in  the strict sense of that term. It referred with approval to  the following  observations  of  Lord  Sankey,  L.C.  where   he enumerated some negative  propositions to contra-distinguish a tribunal from a Court:     "In  that connection it may be useful to enumerate  some negative propositions on this subject: I. A tribunal is  not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives  a final decision 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath  3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before  it between  whom  it  has to decide. 4. Nor  because  it  gives decisions  which  affect  the rights  of  subjects.  5.  Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it  is a  body to which a matter is referred by another  body.  See Rex. v.Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 K.L.B. 171                                                    PG NO 974     There  had been prior to the enactment of sub-s. (3)  of s.  195  of the present Code, a sharp  conflict  of  opinion between  the High Courts as to what are the Courts and  what are  not for the purposes of s. 195(1)(b) of the  old  Code. The  question  whether a Commission of  Inquiry  constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act was a Court within  the meaning of the  Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and whether the proceedings  before the Commission of Inquiry were  judicial proceedings  directly arose before a Division Bench  of  the Nagpur  High  Court  in M. V. Rajwade v.  Dr.  S.M.  Hassan, supra.  Bhutt, J. speaking for himself  and B.P.  Sinha,  CJ held  that  a Commission of Inquiry  constituted  under  the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 was not a Court within  the meaning  of  the Contempt of Courts Act. The  learned  Judge rightly observed that the legal fiction created by the first part  of sub-s. (4) is for the limited purpose specified  in the  second  and that the purpose for which the  fiction  is created is therefore to be gathered from what follows  after the  words  which create the fiction. In  dealing  with  the fiction, Bhutt, J. observed:     "Applying this test in the instant case, it would appear that  the purpose for which the fiction is created  in  sub- section (4) of Section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry  Act, 1952,  is  to  be inferred from the words  that  follow  the expression  the  Commission shall be deemed to  be  a  Civil Court".  It would not be correct to contend that  the  above expression  is full and complete in itself and what  follows it  only denotes the limitation on the  full-fledged  status and  powers  of  a civil Court  that  the  Commission  would otherwise  have possessed. If that was the intention of  the Legislature,  the sentence would have been  completed  after the words "civil court" and what follows it would have  been the  subject of a separate sub-section or sentence.  It  is,

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therefore, clear that under the Commissions of Inquiry  Act, 1952, the Commission  is fictionally a civil court only  for the purpose of the contempts punishable under ss. 175,  178, 179, 180 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, subject  to the condition that it has not the right itself to punish the contemners, a right which other Courts possess under Section 480  of  the code of Criminal Procedure 1898.  Similarly  it follows that the fiction relating to the proceedings  before the  Commission is confined to offenses that are  punishable under  Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code,  I860, referred  to  in sub-section (5) of the Act,  and  does  not extend beyond this limit."                                                    PG NO 975 The  learned Judge then dealt with a Commission  of  Inquiry constituted   under the Commissions of Inquiry Act and  held that  the Commission has not the attributes of a  Court.  In repelling   the  contention   that  the  function   of   the Commission being of a advisory nature which was akin to  the Judicial  Committee to the Privy Council which only  advised His Majesty and did not deliver any judgment themselves,  as well as distinguishing the decision of the Lahore High Court in M.M. Khan v. Emperor, ILR (1931) 12 Lah. 391 holding that the   Special  Commissioners  appointed  under  the   Public Servants  (Inquiries) Act, 1850 constituted a  Court  within the meaning of s. 195, the learned Judge observed:     "An  enquiry  under  the  Commissions  of  Inquiry  Act, 1952,on  the other hand, is of wholly  different  character. There is no accuser, no accused and no specific charges  for trial;  nor  is the Government under the  law,  required  to pronounce.  one  way or the other, on the  findings  of  the Commission " The learned Judge relied upon the following observations  of the Judicial committee of the Privy Council In re.  Maharaja Madhava  Singh,  LR  (1905) 31 IA 239   where  the  Judicial Committee in dealing with the Commissioners appointed by the Viceroy and the Governor  General-in-Council for the purpose of enquiring into the truth of a certain imputation  against the Maharajah, observed:     "It is sufficient to say that the Commission in question was one appointed by the Viceroy himself for the information of  his  own mind, in order that he should not  act  in  his political   and  sovereign  character  otherwise   than   in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity, and  was not  in any sense a Court, or, if a Court, was not  a  Court from which an appeal lies to His Majesty in Council." The learned Judge rightly observed that the ratio  decidendi in that case was that the Commissioner were not a Court  and held  that the observations  made by the Judicial  Committee apply   mutatis  mutandis   to  a  Commission   of   Inquiry constituted  under  the Commissions  of  Inquiry   Act,  and observed:     "The  Commission in question was obviously appointed  by the State Government" for the information of its own  mind", in  order that it should not act, in exercise of  it  power, "otherwise  than in accordance with the dictates of  justice                                                    PG NO 976 and  equity" in ordering a departmental enquiry against  its officers. It was, therefore, a fact finding body meant  only to instruct the mind of the Government without producing any document  of a judicial nature. The two cases are  parallel, and  the  decision must be, as in--‘In re  Maharaja  Madhava Singh, (D)’, that the Commission was not a Court.     The  term ‘Court’ has not been defined in the   Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Its definition in the Indian   Evidence Act,  1872,  is  not exhaustive and is  intended  only   for

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purposes  of  the Act. The Contempt of  Courts  Act,   1952, however,  does  contemplate a ’Court of Justice’  which   as defined in S. 20, Penal Code, 1860 denotes ’a Judge who   is empowered  by  law to act judicially’. The word  ‘Judge’  is defined in Section 19 as denoting every person--     "Who   is  empowered  by  law  to  give  in  any   legal proceeding,  civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or  a judgment   which,   if  not  appealed  against,   would   be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some  other authority, would be definitive ..       ’     The  minimum test of a ‘Court of Justice, in  the  above definition,  is,  therefore,  the  legal  power  to  give  a judgment  which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be   definitive.  Such  is  the  case  with  the  Commission appointed   under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, whose  recommendations constitute a definitive judgment when confirmed by the Government. This, however, is not the  case with  a  Commission  appointed  under  the  Commissions   of Inquiry  Act, 1952, whose findings are not contemplated   by law as liable at any stage to confirmation by any  authority so as to assume the character of a final decision. ’     We are in agreement with these observations.     P.V. Dixit, CJ. speaking for himselt and G.P. Singh,  J. In   Puhupram  & Ors. v. .State of Madhya  Pradesh  &  Ors., [1968] MPLJ   629 stated the law thus:     "It  is not necessary to stress that the inquiry,  which the   Commission  is going to hold, is not an inquiry  by  a civil or criminal Court and the proceedings thereof are  not                                                    PG NO 977 judicial  proceedings of a Court of law. [See: Chiman  Singh v. State, AIR (195]) MB 44; M.V. Rajwade v. Dr. S.M. Hassan, AIR  (1954)  Nag.  71 and Ram  Krishna   Dalmia  v.  Justice ‘Tendolkar,  AIR  (l958) SC 538.1 The  decision  just  cited point out what is "Court" and what are judicial  proceedings of  a Court of law. Judged by the tests laid down  in  those decisions, there can be no doubt that the inquiry, which the Commission is going to held, is not a judicial proceeding of a Court of law. The Commission has not been asked to give  a decision as to the respective rights and liabilities of  any person or to punish any wrong. In an inquiry of this nature, there  is  no issue between parties for  the  Commission  to decide  and no defendant or an accused person to  be  tried. There is no ‘lis’."     We  are satisfied that the decision of the  Nagpur  High Court in M.V. Rajwade’s case and that of the Madhya  Pradesh High  Court in Puhupram lay down the correct law. The  least that  is required of a Court is the capacity to  delivery  a ‘definitive  judgment’.  and merely  because  the  procedure adopted  by it is of a legal character and It has  power  to administer  an  oath will not impart to it the status  of  a Court   That being so, it must be held that a Commission  of Inquiry  appointed  by the appropriate Government  under  s. 3(1)  of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is not a  Court  for the purposes of s. 195 of the Code.     In conclusion, we wish to clarify that this judgment  of ours will not prevent the State Government from launching  a prosecution  against  the appellant for commission   of  the alleged  offences under ss. 193 and 228 of the Indian  Penal Code, 1860, if otherwise permissible in  law.     In  the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The judgment  and order passed by the High Court are  set  aside and  the proceedings pending in the Court of the  Additional Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  at  Esplanade,  Bombay   in Criminal Case No. 1121 (W) of 1987 against the appellant for having  committed alleged offences punishable under ss.  193

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and 228  of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on a complaint filed by the Secretary to the Commission, are quashed. R.S.S.                                       Appeal allowed.