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PETITIONER: DOSA SATYANARAYANAMURTY ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROADTRANSPORT CORPORATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/09/1960

BENCH:

ACT: Motor  Vehicles-Nationalisation of road transport  services- Preparation   and  enforcement   of   schemes-Constitutional validity  of  enactment-Varying frequency  of  services,  if variation  of  ’the scheme-Validity of  rule-Motor  Vehicles Act,  1939 (IV of 1939), as amended by Act 100 of 1956,  Ch. IV, ss. 68C, 68E-Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, r.  5- Constitution of India, Arts. 19 (1)(g), 19(6)(ii), 14.

HEADNOTE: These petitions by certain stage carriage permit-holders for appropriate writs quashing seven schemes for nationalisation of  road  transport  services  in  West  Godavari  District, approved and enforced from different dates by the Government of  Andhra  Pradesh, called in question  the  constitutional validity  of  Ch. IVA of the Motor Vehicles  Act,  1939,  as amended by Act 100 of 1956, and the validity of r. 5 of  the Andhra  Pradesh  Motor Vehicles Rules framed  by  the  State Government  under s. 68(1) of the Act and the note in  terms of  the said rule appended to the schemes which was said  to be inconsistent with the Act and was as follows:- "The frequency of services of any of the notified routes  or within  any  notified area shall, if  necessary,  be  varied having regard to the traffic needs during any period." Held, that in view of the decision of this Court in H. C.                             643 Narayanappa v. The State of Mysore, it was no longer open to the  petitioners to contend that the provisions of Ch.   IVA of  the Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), as amended  by  the Central Act 100 of 1956, were ultra vires the powers of  the Parliament. H.   C. Narayanappa v. The State of Mysore, [1960] 3  S.C.R. 742, followed. Nor  was it correct to contend that Ch.  IVA of the Act  was invalid on the ground that it infringed Art. 19(i)(g) of the Constitution  and was not saved by Art. 19(6) as the  powers conferred  on  the State by s. 68C of the Act  exceeded  the limits  of  Art.  19(6)(ii) of  the  Constitution.   Article 19(6)(ii) is couched in very wide terms, the word  ’service’ used  by it is wide enough to include all species  of  motor service  and it does not in any way limit the States’  power to  confer  on  itself a monopoly in  respect  any  area  in exclusion of any person or persons. The  only classification that Ch.  IVA of the Act  makes  is between   the  State  Transport  Undertaking   and   private transport undertakings, whether carried on by individuals or firms  or companies, and that classification  is  reasonably connected  with  the  object it has in view.   It  was  not, therefore, correct to say that it contravenes Art. 14 of the

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Constitution.   That Chapter does not confer  any  arbitrary and   discriminatory   power  upon   the   State   Transport Undertaking nor does the quasi-judicial procedure prescribed by it seek to cover such power.  Any mala fide or  collusive exercise  of  the  power, therefore, in  deprivation  of  an individual’s  rights  can only be a ground  for  quashing  a particular  scheme alone but not for declaring  the  chapter void.  Since  that  chapter provides a complete  and  satisfactory machinery for reasonably regulating the exclusion of all  or some of the private operators from a notified area or  route it requires no liberal construction. Gullapalli  Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh  Road  Transport Corporation, [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 319, referred to. Saghir  Ahmad  v. The State of U. P., [1955] 1  S.C.R.  707, considered. Official bias inherent in the discharge of a statutory duty, as  has  been pointed out by this Court,  is  distinct  from personal  bias for or against any of the parties.  Since  in the  instant case, the State Road Transport Corporation  was neither  legally  nor factually a department  of  the  State Government and the State Government in deciding the  dispute between  the said undertaking and the operators  of  private buses  was  only  discharging  its  statutory  function,  no question of official bias could arise. Gullapalli  Nageswara  Rao v. The State of  Andhra  Pradesh, [1960]  1 S.C.R. 580 and H. C. Narayanappa v. The  State  of Mysore, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 742, considered. 644 The  observations made by this Court in Srinivasa  Reddy  v. The  State of Mysore, in regard to piecemeal  implementation of a scheme were directed against any abuse of power by  way of  discrimination  as between operators  and  operators  in respect  of  a single scheme.  Since the  seven  schemes  in question  were  intended  to  avoid  the  vice  inherent  in piecemeal  implementation of a single scheme and were  meant to be implementated in their entirety from different  dates, those observations did not apply to them. Srinivasa Reddy v. The State of Mysore, [1960] 2 S.C.R  130, explained. There can be no doubt that r. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh  Motor Vehicles   Rules  in  conferring  on  the  State   Transport Undertaking  the  power to vary the frequency  of  services, gave  it the power to effect a substantial  modification  in the scheme permissible only under s. 68E of the Act, and  as such  the  rule must be declared void.  But since  the  note appended  to  the  schemes  in  pursuance  of  the  rule  is severable  from  the schemes, it should be deleted  and  the schemes must be declared valid. The  word ’route’ in s. 68C of the Act does not refer  to  a preexisting route.  It is permissible under that section  to frame  a  scheme  in respect of any area  or  route  or  any portions thereof, or a new route, since there is no inherent inconsistency between an ’area’ and a ’route’.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 76, 217 to 228 of 1960. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. A.   V.  Viswanatha Sastri and T. V. R. Tatachari,  for  the petitioners (In petitions Nos. 76, 87, 93-104 and 217-228 of 1960).

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T.   V. R. Tatachari, for the petitioners (In petitions Nos. 72 and 229-233 of 1960). D.   Narasaraju,  Advocate General for the State  of  Andhra Pradesh,  P.  R.  Ramchandra  Rao and T.  M.  Sen,  for  the respondents (In all the petitions). 1960.  September 8. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by SUBBA RAO J.-These petitions are filed under Art. 32 of  the Constitution   for  the  enforcement  of  the   petitioners’ fundamental  right  to  carry  on  the  business  of   motor transport in West Godavari District in                             645 the  State  of Andhra Pradesh by the issuance  of  writs  of certiorari  or  any  other  appropriate  writs,  orders   or directions  to quash the schemes of road transport  services as  finally approved by the Government of Andhra Pradesh  on March 21, 1960, and for other incidental reliefs. In  exercise of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the  Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), as amended by the Central Act 100 of  1956, (hereinafter called the Act), Shri  Guru  Pershad, the  Chief  Executive  Officer, Andhra  Pradesh  State  Road Transport  Corporation,  (hereinafter called  the  Transport Corporation)  published  seven proposals dated  December  7, 1959, in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated December 17, 1959, propounding  seven  schemes for the nationalization  of  the road  transport  in  respect  of  different  parts  of  West Godavari  District in that State.  Under  that  notification objections from the public and affected parties were invited to  be filed within 30 days of the publication thereof  More than 3000 objections were received by the Government against the  said  schemes.  After considering the  objections,  the Government   issued  notices  to  the  objectors  or   their representatives  and  the representatives of  the  Transport Corporation informing them of the time, place and the  dates of hearing.  On the notified dates, namely, March 10, 11 and 12,  1960, 200 objectors were present and most of them  were represented  by  Advocates.  The Transport  Corporation  was also  represented  by its Chief Executive  Officer  and  its legal advisers.  The Minister in charge of the portfolio  of transport  held  an  enquiry,  considered  the   conflicting arguments  advanced,  gave definite findings on  the  points urged, rejected all the objections but one and approved  the schemes with a slight modification.  The seven schemes  were directed to be put in force from different dates which  were given  in  the order made by  the Minister.   The  aggrieved operators  who  were  not satisfied with the  order  of  the Minister filed the present petitions for the said reliefs. Shri  A.  V.  Viswanatha Sastri,  learned  counsel  for  the petitioners, raised before us the following points. 646 (1)The provisions of Ch.  IVA of the Act are ultra vires the powers  of Parliament because they are within the  exclusive legislative  field of the States. (2) The provisions of  Ch. IVA  of  the  Act infringe the  fundamental  rights  of  the petitioners under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and  are not  saved  by  el.  (6) of  the  said    Article.  (3)  The provisions of Ch.  IVA are also violative of Art. 14 of  the Constitution. (4) The order of the Government confirming the schemes is vitiated by the doctrine of bias and,  therefore, void. (5) Though in fact seven schemes are framed, in effect they  are component parts of one scheme and that device  has been  adopted  to circumvent the judgment of this  Court  in Srinivasa Reddy v. The State of Mysore (1). (6) The schemes- are void inasmuch as they area prepared and published by the Chief  Executive Officer who was not one of the persons  who

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could act on behalf of the Transport Corporation under s. 13 of  the Road Transport Corporations Act. (7) The schemes  as propounded  by  the Transport Corporation did not  give  the number of vehicles proposed to be operated in each route  as it should have given under r. 4 of the Andhra Pradesh  Motor Vehicles  Rules  (hereinafter  called  the  rules)  and  the modification  made by the Minister directing  the  Transport Corporation  to  do  so  does  not  also  comply  with   the requirements of the said rule. (8) In exercise of the  power conferred  under  r.  5 of the-Rules,  the  State  Transport Under,  taking conferred upon itself power to vary the  fre- quency  of  the  services and that rule and  the  note  made pursuant thereto are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act  and, therefore, void. (9) The proposed schemes  include three  new routes and that is illegal as the said  Transport Undertaking  has  no power to include any new  routes  in  a scheme  proposed  by it.  Though many  other  questions  are raised in the petitions, they are not pressed before us. Learned  Advocate  General for the State of  Andhra  Pradesh sought to sustain the schemes as approved by the Minister in their entirety. (1)  (1960] 2 S.C.R. 130.                             647 We  shall  now proceed to deal with the contentions  in  the order they were raised. Re. (1) : The first contention does not now merit a detailed consideration as it has been considered and rejected by this Court  in H. C. Narayanappa v. The State of Mysore (1).   In that  case,  after  considering  the  question,  Shah,   J., speaking for this Court, observed: "We  are  therefore  of  the view  that  Chapter  IVA  could competently be enacted by the Parliament under entry No.  21 read with entry No. 35 of the Concurrent List." Nothing further Deed be said on this point.  With respect we accept and follow the said decision. Re.  (2): The next contention is based upon Art. 19  of  the Constitution.   The question is whether Ch.  IVA of the  Act is saved by Art. 19(6) of the Constitution.  If Chiva, which provides for the nationalization of road transport  services in  the manner prescribed, thereunder is not  a  permissible legislation covered by Art. 19(6), it would certainly offend against  the  fundamental  right of the  petitioners  to  do business in motor transport.  The constitutional validity of Ch.   IVA of the Act was raised in Gullapalli Nageswara  Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation (2).  There  it was  argued  that  Ch.   IVA  of the  Act  was  a  piece  of colourable  legislation whose real object was to  take  over the  business of the petitioners therein under the cover  of cancellation  of permits in contravention of Art. 31 of  the Constitution and that plea was rejected by this Court.   But no attack was made on the validity of Ch.  IVA of the Act on the ground that it infringed the provisions of Art. 19(1)(g) of  the  Constitution and was not saved by cl.  (6)  of  the Article.   That point is now raised before us.   Under  Art. 19(1)(g),  all  citizens shall have the right  to  carry  on trade or business.  The material part of (6) of Art. 19,  as amended   by   the  Constitution  (First   Amendment)   Act, 1951,reads: "  Nothing  in  sub-clause (g) of the  said  clause..  shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far (1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 742. (2) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319. 83 648 as  it relates to, or prevent the State from making any  law

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relating to............ the carrying on by the State, or  by a  corporation  owned  or controlled by the  State,  of  any trade,  business,  industry  or  service,  whether  to   the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise." The only question is, how far and to what extent Art.  19(6) secures the validity of Ch.  IVA of the Act from attack that it offends against Art. 19(1)(g) ?  Learned counsel for  the Petitioners  contends that Art. 19(6)(ii) provides only  for partial  exclusion of citizens, that is, the exclusion of  a certain  class  of persons as a whole and  not  for  partial exclusion  of  some among the same class.  As  s.  68C,  the argument  proceeds, enables the State Transport  Undertaking to  frame a scheme for excluding some among the same  class, the  said  provision  is  not saved by  Art.  19(6)  of  the Constitution.  Relevant portions of s. 68C of the Act read: "  Where  any  State transport  undertaking  is  of  opinion that..............  it is necessary in the  public  interest that  road transport services in general or  any  particular class  of such service in relation to any area or  route  or portion  thereof  should be run and operated  by  the  State transport  undertaking, whether to the exclusion,  complete, or partial, of other persons or otherwise...." Under this section a scheme may be framed in respect of road transport  service in general or in respect of a  particular class  of  such  service  empowering  the  State   Transport Undertaking to run the said service ; it may be in  relation to any area or route or a portion thereof; it may also be to the exclusion of all or some of the persons running the said service in general or a particular class of it.  The section enables  the  State  to  take over  particular  class  of  a service,  say, the bus service, and exclude all or  some  of the  persons  doing  business  in  that  class  of  service. Learned counsel says that this section confers a wide  power beyond  the  permissible  limits of Art.  19(6)(ii)  of  the Constitution.  To state it differently, the argument is that while Art. 19(6)(ii) does not enable a partial exclusion                             649 of some among the same class of service, s. 68C permits  the said exclusion. The answer to this argument depends upon the true meaning of the  provisions of the said Article.  Under sub-cl. (ii)  of Art.  19(6),  the  State  can make a  law  relating  to  the carrying  on  by  the State or by  a  corporation  owned  or controlled  by  the  State,  of  any  particular   business, industry  or service, whether to the exclusion, complete  or partial, of citizens or otherwise.  Article 19(6) is only  a saving  provision and the law made empowering the  State  to carry on a business is secured from attack on the ground  of infringement  of the fundamental rights of a citizen to  the extent  it  does not exceed the limits of the scope  of  the said  provision.   Sub-clause (ii) is couched in  very  wide terms.   Under it the State can make law for carrying  on  a business  or service to the exclusion, complete or  partial, of  citizens or otherwise.  The law, therefore, can  provide for  carrying  on  a service to the  exclusion  of  all  the citizens; it may, exclude some of the citizens only; it  may do  business in the entire State or a portion of the  State, in a specified route or a part thereof The word " service  " is wide enough to take in not only the general motor service but all the species of motor service.  There are, therefore, no limitations on the State’s power to make laws  conferring monopoly on it in respect of an area, and person or  persons to  be excluded.  In this view, it must be held that s.  68C does  not exceed the limits prescribed by Art. 19(6)(ii)  of the Constitution.

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Re. (3): The next contention is that the provisions of Ch. IVA of the Act, and particularly those of s. 68C    thereof, offend against Art. 14 of the Constitution.  The argument is that  Ch.   IVA enables the State to make  a  discrimination between the State Road Transport Corporation on the one hand and private operators and private transport undertakings  on the other, and also to make a similar discrimination between the private operators or the private transport undertakings, and  that  this  discrimination is  left  to  the  arbitrary discretion  of the Transport Corporation.  It is  true  that the provisions of this Chapter 650 enable  a scheme to be framed conferring a monopoly  on  the State  in  respect of transport services to the  partial  or complete   exclusion   of  other  persons.    However,   the provisions of the scheme do not make any distinction between individuals  operating  a  transport  service  and   private transport  undertakings; they are all treated as  one  class and  the  classification  is only  made  between  the  State Transport  Undertaking and private  transport  undertakings, whether  the business is carried on by individuals or  firms or companies.  The only question, therefore, is whether such a classification offends against the equality clause of  the Constitution.  Article 14 says: " The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." This doctrine of equality has been so frequently  considered by  this  Court  that  it  does  not  require  any   further consideration.  It has been held that this Article does  not prohibit  reasonable  classification  for  the  purpose   of legislation,  but such a classification cannot be  arbitrary but  must  be  based upon differences  which  have  rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.  Doubtless  in the present case, the Legislature placed the State Transport Undertaking  in a class different from  other  undertakings. The question is whether the classification made in Ch.   IVA of the Act is just and has reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.  The object of Ch.  IVA, as disclosed by the  provisions of s. 68C, is to provide in the interest  of the  public an efficient, adequate, economical and  properly coordinated road transport service.  To achieve that  object s. 68C confers a power on the State Transport Undertaking to prepare  a  scheme  to  run  the  service,  whether  to  the exclusion,   complete  or  partial,  of  other  persons   or otherwise.   The  classification  has  certainly  reasonable nexus  to  the object sought to be achieved.   Ordinarily  a State  Transport  Undertaking, compared with  per.  sons  or private  undertakings, should be in a better  Position  than others to carry on the said services for the benefit of  the public administratively, financially                             651 and  technically  it can be expected to be in a  far  better position  than  others.  It can provide more  well  equipped buses, give better amenities to the travelling public,  keep regular timings, repair or replace the buses in emergencies. It  may  also  employ efficient supervisory  staff  to  keep things  going at an appreciably high standard.  We  are  not suggesting   that  there  are  no  individuals  or   private companies  who  can efficiently run the  service.   But  the State,  compared with individuals, should certainly be in  a better  position to achieve the object, namely,  to  improve the  road transport service in all its diverse aspects.   In such  a  situation,  when the  legislature,  which  must  be presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of

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its  own  people,  makes a classification  between  a  State Transport Undertaking and others carrying On the business of transport   services,  we  cannot  say  that  there  is   no reasonable basis for such a classification. But  it is said that s. 68C of the Act and other  provisions of Ch.  IVA thereof confer an arbitrary power upon the State Transport  Undertaking to discriminate  between  individuals and  the  said Undertaking between individuals  and  private undertakings, and between individuals and individuals.   But the  scheme  of Ch. IVA, which has been considered  by  this Court  in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra  Pradesh  State Road  Transport  Corporation (1), evolves  a  machinery  for keeping  the State Transport Undertaking within  bounds  and from acting in an arbitrary manner, for s. 68C lays down the legislative policy in clear and understandable terms and the State  Transport Undertaking can initiate a scheme only  for providing  an efficient, adequate, economical  and  properly coordinated road transport service.  Another condition which it  lays down is that the scheme is necessary in the  public interest.   The  scheme so framed is  published,  with  all- necessary  particulars, in the official Gazette and also  in such  manner  as the State Government  may  direct;  persons affected  by  the  scheme may  file  objections  within  the prescribed  time ; the State Government,  after  considering the objections and (1)  [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319. 652 giving   an   opportunity   to  the   objectors   or   their representatives   and  the  representatives  of  the   State Transport Undertaking to be beard in the matter, may approve or modify the scheme; the scheme so approved or modified  is published.   The  rules  framed under the  Act  provide  for personal hearing.  If the State Transport Undertaking  seeks to  modify  a  scheme,  it will  have  to  follow  the  same procedure  before doing so: see as. 68C, 68D and 68E of  the Act.  It will be seen from the provisions of Ch.  IVA of the Act that the State Transport Undertaking, before propounding a  scheme,  arrives at the decision on  objective  criteria. The  parties  affected  and  the  public  are  given   every opportunity to place their objections before the Government, and  the Government, after following the  prescribed  quasi- judicial  procedure, confirms or modifies the  scheme.   The scheme, before it is finalised, is subjected to public  gaze and  scrutiny  and the validity and appropriateness  of  the provisions  are  tested by a  quasi-judicial  process.   The Government  cannot be equated to a Court; but the  procedure prescribed  accords with the principles of natural  justice. It  is said that the State Transport Undertaking  is  either the  State Government or a corporation, owned or  controlled by  the  State,  and  as  such  the  entire   quasi-judicial procedure prescribed is only a cloak to screen the  exercise of  an  absolute  and arbitrary power on  the  part  of  the Government.   We cannot say that Ch.  IVA is such a  device. The Legislature made a sincere attempt to protect as far  as possible  individual rights from the arbitrary acts  of  the executive.  Once it is conceded that Ch.  IVA of the Act  is constitutionally  good and that the Legislature can  validly make law for nationalization of the road transport  service, the  procedure  laid down for implementing the  said  policy cannot, in our view, be said to be unreasonable.  If in  any particular case the mala fides of the authorities  concerned and  collusion between the State Transport  Undertaking  and the State Government to deprive particular persons of  their right  to  do  road  transport  business  or  to  drive  out particular persons from the trade on extraneous

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                           653 considerations,  are established, that may be a  ground  for striking down that particular scheme.  But the provisions of Ch.   IVA  cannot  be struck down on the  ground  that  they confer an arbitrary power on the State Transport Undertaking and   on  the  State  Government  to  discriminate   between individuals  and  the State Transport  Undertaking,  between individuals   and   private   undertakings,   and    between individuals and individuals. This question was raised in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of  U. P.  (1).  That case dealt with the provisions of the  U.  P. Road  Transport Act, 1951 (U.  P. Act II of 1951). Under  s. 42(3)  of  that Act the Government was  exempt  from  taking permits for its own vehicles and it could run any number  of buses  as  it  liked without the  necessity  of  taking  out permits’  for them.  In furtherance of the State  policy  to establish  a  complete  State monopoly in  respect  of  road transport business, the transport authorities began not only to  cancel the permits already issued to  private  operators but  also  refused  to issue permits to  others,  who  would other.  wise  be  entitled  to  them.   The   constitutional validity  of  that section was questioned.  It may  also  be mentioned  that  though that decision was  given  after  the Constitution  (First Amendment) Act, 1951, it was not  based upon   that  amendment,  as  the  Constitution  before   the amendment  governed the rights of the parties  therein.   In that situation, adverting to the argument based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution, Mukherjea, J., as he then was, made the following observations at p. 731: "  There is no doubt that classification is inherent in  the concept  of a monopoly; and if the object of legislation  is to  create monopoly in favour of the State with regard to  a particular  business,  obviously, the State  cannot  but  be differentiated  from  ordinary  citizens  and  placed  in  a separate  category so far as the running of the business  is concerned  and  this classification would have  a  perfectly rational relation to the object of the statute.", Section 3 of that Act provided that " where the State (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707. 654 Government  is  satisfied  that  it  is  necessary,  in  the interest  of  general public and for subserving  the  common good,  so to direct, it may declare that the Road  Transport Services in general, or any particular class of such service on  any route or portion thereof, shall be run and  operated by  the  State  Government  exclusively  or  by  the   State Government  in  conjunction with railway or  partly  by  the State Government and partly by others in accordance with the provisions of this Act It was contended therein that, as the State  could  choose any and every person it liked  for  the purpose  of being associated with the transport service  and as  there  were  no  rules to  guide  its  discretion,  that provision would offend against Art. 14 of the  Constitution. It  was  pointed  out  on  behalf  of  the  State  that  the discretion  under s. 3 of that Act was not  uncontrolled  as that could Only be done by granting of permits in accordance with  the provisions of the Motor Vehicles  Act.   Accepting the  construction  suggested,  this  Court  held  that   the discretion  to  be  exercised  by  the  State  would  be  a, regulated discretion guided by statutory rules.  But in  the instant case, no liberal construction of the provisions need be  resorted to, for Ch.  IVA of the Act in  specific  terms provides a complete and, in the circumstances,  satisfactory machinery for reasonably regulating the exclusion of all  or some  of  the private operators from the  notified  area  or

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route.  We, therefore, hold that the provisions of Ch.   IVA of the Act do not infringe the equality clause enshrined  in Art 14 of the Constitution. Re. (4): By the next contention the learned counsel  attacks the validity of the scheme on the ground that the Government is  actuated by bias against the private operators of  buses in West Godavari District, and indeed had predetermined  the issue.  In the petitions it was alleged that the  Government had  complete  control over the Road  Transport  Corporation that  the entire administration and control over  such  road transport  undertaking  vested in the Government,  that  the Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh was  its chairman and that, therefore, the                             655 entire scheme, from its inception to its final approval, was really the act of the Government.  On this hypothesis it was contended that the Government itself was made a judge in its own cause and that, therefore, its decision was vitiated  by legal  bias.   That apart, it was also pleaded that  a  sub- committee, consisting of Ministers, Secretaries and officers of  connected departments and presided over by the  Minister in  charge of transport, decided in its meeting  of  January 28,  1960, that under the scheme of nationalization  of  bus service,  the  State  Government would  take  over  the  bus services  in  West  Godavari District  and  Guntur  District before the end of that year and, therefore, the Minister  in charge   of   the   portfolio  of   transport,   he   having predetermined-the issue, disqualified himself to decide  the dispute  between  the State Transport  Undertaking  and  the petitioners.   The  self  same  questions  were  raised   in Gullapalli Nagestvara Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh(1). There,  as  in this case, it was contended  that  the  Chief Minister,  who was in charge of the portfolio of  transport, could  not  be a judge in his own cause, as  he  was  biased against  the private operators.  This Court pointed out  the distinction  between official bias of an authority which  is inherent in a statutory duty imposed on it and personal bias of  the said authority in favour of, or against, one of  the parties.   In dealing with official bias this  Court,  after considering  the relevant English decisions, observed at  p. 587 thus: "These  decisions show that in England a statutory  invasion of  the  common  law  objection on the  ground  of  bias  is tolerated  by  decisions,  but  the  invasion  is   confined strictly  to the limits of the statutory exception.   It  is not  out  of  place  here to  notice  that  in  England  the Parliament is supreme and therefore a statutory law, however repugnant  to the principles of natural justice, is valid  ; whereas  in  India  the law made by Parliament  or  a  State Legislature  should  stand the test  of  fundamental  rights declared in Part III of the Constitution." (1)  [1960] 1 S.C.R. 580. 84 656 Then  this Court proceeded to state that the provisions   of the  Act did not sanction any dereliction of the  principles of  natural  justice,  for the Act  visualized  in  case  of conflict  between  the  undertaking  and  the  operators  of private  buses  that  the State  Government  should  sit  in judgment and resolve the conflict.  Much to  the same effect has been stated by Shah, J., in H. C.  Narayanappa  v.   The State   of   Mysore  (1)  though   in   slightly   different phraseology.  The learned Judge stated : "  It is also true that the Government on whom the  duty  to decide  the dispute rests, is substantially a party  to  the

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dispute but if the Government or the ,authority to whom  the power is delegated acts judicially in approving or modifying the  scheme,  the approval or modification is  not  open  to challenge  on  a presumption of bias.  The Minister  or  the officer of the Government who is invested with the power  to hear  objections  to the scheme is acting  in  his  official capacity and unless there is reliable evidence to show  that he  is biased, his decision will not be liable to be  called in question, merely because he is a limb of the Government." In   the  above  cases  the  transport  department  of   the Government was the transport undertaking, but here the State Road Transport Corporation, which is a body corporate having a  perpetual  succession and common seal, is  the  transport authority.   Though  under the provisions of  the  Act,  the State Government has some control, it, cannot be said either legally  or  factually  that  the  said  Corporation  is   a department  of the State Government.  The State  Government, therefore,   in  deciding  the  dispute  between  the   said undertaking  and  the  operators of private  buses  is  only discharging   its  statutory  functions.   This   objection, therefore,  has no merits.  Nor can we say that it has  been established that the Minister in charge of the portfolio  of transport has been actuated by personal bias.  The fact that he presided over the sub-committee constituted to  implement the  scheme of nationalization of bus services in  the  West Godavari District does not in (1)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 742.                             657 itself  establish  any such bias.  Indeed,  in  the  counter affidavit  filed on behalf of the first respondent the  con- tents and authenticity of the reports of the proceedings  of the  sub-committee  published  in  the  Telu  daily  "Andhra Pradesh " were not admitted.  Even if the sub-committee came to such a decision, it is not possible to hold that it was a final  and’  irrevocable  decision  in  derogation  of   the provisions of the Act. it was only a policy decision and  in the  circumstances  could only mean that  the  sub-committee advised  the  State Government to implement  the  policy  of nationalization of bus services in that particular district. The said decision could not either expressly or by necessary implication involve a predetermination of the issue: it  can only  mean that the policy would be implemented  subject  to the  provisions  of the Act.  It is not suggested  that  the Minister  in  charge  of the  concerned  portfolio  has  any personal bias against the operators of private buses or  any of  them.   We,  therefore,  hold  that  it  has  not   been established that the Minister in charge of the portfolio  of transport bad personal bias against the operators of private buses and, therefore, disqualified himself from hearing  the objections under Ch.  IVA of the Act. Re. (5): The next contention is based upon the  observations of  this  Court in Shrinivasa Reddy v. The State  of  Mysore (1).   After elaborating on the scope of s. 68C of the  Act, Wanchoo, J., observed at p. 136 thus: "Therefore,  the  scheme to be framed must be  ,such  as  is capable of being carried out all at once and that is why the Undertaking  has been given the power to frame a scheme  for an  area or route or even a portion  thereof............  If the Undertaking at that stage has the power to carry it  out piecemeal, it would be possible for it to abuse the power of implementation  and to discriminate against  some  operators and  in favour of others included in the scheme and also  to break  up the integrity of the scheme and in a sense  modify it against the terms of s. 68E." Based  on these observations it is contended that the  State

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Government intended to frame only one scheme (1)  [1960] 2 S C.R. 130. 658 for  the entire district though it was not in a position  to implement  the scheme in the entire district at one and  the same time, but to circumvent the observations of this  Court it  had split up one scheme into seven schemes.   The  first respondent  in its counter affidavit met this allegation  in the following way: "Having  regard to the resources of the Undertaking in  men, material  and money, each scheme has been so framed that  it is  capable of being carried out all at once, and  in  full, without   breaking  its  integrity’  The   State   Transport Undertaking will carry out each of the published schemes  on a date fixed by the State Government for the  implementation of each scheme".  The Minister in his order also adverted to this  aspect and observed: " In this case,  seven  different schemes  have  been framed.  Each scheme is a  separate  and independent  scheme by itself In terms of the  notification, each scheme after approval will come into force only from  a date to be, fixed by the Government.  Though different dates may   be  fixed  for  each  scheme,  each  scheme  will   be implemented in its entirety.  No piecemeal implementation of any  one  scheme  will be done ". Indeed the  order  of  the Minister fixed specific dates from which each of the schemes shall  come  into force.  This Court did not lay  down  that there cannot be any phased programme in the  nationalization of  transport services in a State or in a district; nor  did it  hold  that there cannot be more than one  scheme  for  a district or a part of a district.  The observations of  this Court in regard to the implementation of a scheme  piecemeal were aimed at to prevent an abuse of power by discriminating against some operators and in favour of others in respect of a  single scheme.  In the present case, seven  schemes  were framed not to circumvent the observations of this Court, but only to avoid the vice inherent in piecemeal implementation. Not  only seven separate schemes were framed in  respect  of separate areas of the district, but also the Government made it  clear  that  each scheme should be  implemented  in  its entirety  commencing  from  different  dates.   We  do  not, therefore,  see any legitimate objection to the  framing  of seven separate, schemes. 659 Re.  (6):  This  contention questions the  validity  of  the schemes  on the ground that the Chief Executive  Officer  of the  Andhra  Pradesh  Road  Transport  Corporation  is   not empowered to publish the schemes and, therefore, the schemes were  not  validly  published.  In exercise  of  the  powers conferred  by  S. 68C of the Act, the Andhra  Pradesh  State Road   Transport  Corporation  proposed  the   schemes   and published  them in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, Part  11,  p. 1310.   The  proposed schemes were signed by  Guru  Pershad, Chief Executive Officer, State Transport Undertaking, Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, The relevant  provisions of  the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (Act  LXIV  of 1950) may be noticed at this stage.  Under s. 4 of the  said Act,  " Every Corporation shall be a body corporate  by  the name  notified under section 3 having  perpetual  succession and  a  common seal, and shall by the said name sue  and  be sued ". Relevant portions of s. 12 read: " A Corporation may from time to time by resolution passed at a meeting......... authorize the Chief Executive Officer or General Manager, or any  other  officer  of  the  Corporation  subject  to  such conditions and limitations if any as may be specified in the resolution  to exercise such powers and perform such  duties

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as  it  may  deem necessary for the  efficient  day  to  day administration  of  its business".  Section 13 says:  "  All orders and decisions of a Corporation shall be authenticated by  the  signature  of  the Chairman  or  any  other  member authorized  by the Corporation in this behalf and all  other instruments  issued by a Corporation shall be  authenticated by  the signature of the Chief Executive Officer or  General Manager  or any other officer of the Corporation  authorized in  like  manner  in this behalf".  Relying  upon  the  said provisions,  learned  counsel for the  petitioners  contends that  the  preparation  and publication of  the  schemes  in question under s. 68C of the Act are orders or decisions  of the  Corporation and, therefore, should be authenticated  by the  signature  of  the Chairman or any  other  member  duly authorized  under s. 13 of the Road  Transport  Corporations Act and not by the Chief Executive Officer.  The first 660 respondent  in its counter-affidavit attempted to meet  this contention  by  stating that the Corporation  by  resolution authorized  the  Chief Executive Officer  to  exercise  such powers and perform such duties as it may deem necessary  for the efficient day to day administration of its business  and the   Chief   Executive   Officer  in   exercise   of   such authorization  published  the schemes in the  Gazette.   The first  respondent  relied upon s. 12 of the  Road  Transport Corporations  Act  and not on s. 13 thereof to  sustain  the power of the Chief Executive Officer to publish the schemes. We  have no reason not to accept the statement of the  first respondent  that  there  was  a  resolution  passed  by  the Corporation  in  terms of s. 12 (c) of  the  Road  Transport Corporations  Act.  If so, the only question is whether  the act  of  publishing  the  proposed  schemes  framed  by  the Corporation  in  the  Gazette pertains to  the  day  to  day administration  of  the Corporation’s business.   The  Chief Executive  Officer  has no power under the Act  to  frame  a scheme.   Section  68C  empowers only  the  State  Transport Undertaking to prepare a scheme and cause every such  scheme to  be  published in the official Gazette and also  in  such other  manner  as  the State  Government  may  direct.   The scheme,  therefore,  need not be directly published  by  the Corporation,  but  it may cause it to be  published  in  the official  Gazette.   The act of publishing in  the  official Gazette  is  a  ministerial act.  It does  not  involve  any exercise  of discretion.  It is only a mechanical one to  be carried out in the course of day to day administration.   So understood,  there cannot be any difficulty in holding  that it  was purely a ministerial act which the  Chief  Executive Officer by reason of the aforesaid resolution can  discharge under  s. 12(c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act.   It must  be  presumed  for the purpose of this  case  that  the Corporation  decided the terms of the proposed  schemes  and the  said decision must have been duly authenticated by  the Chairman  or any other member authorized by the  Corporation in  this behalf and the Chief Executive Officer did  nothing more  than  publish  the  said scheme  in  exercise  of  its administrative functions.  We,                             661 therefore,,  hold that the Chief Executive Officer was  well within his rights in publishing the said proposed schemes in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette.  Re. (7): The next argument turns upon the provisions of  r. 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules.  The  relevant part  of the rule reads: " The scheme or approved scheme  to be  published  in  the official Gazette  as  required  under section  68C  or 68D as the case may be, shall  contain  the

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following  particulars:  (i).........  (ii)  the  number  of vehicles proposed to be operated on each route ". In certain schemes the number of vehicles to be operated on each  route was not specified, and one number was mentioned against  two or more routes bracketing them.  When an objection was taken before the Government in regard to this matter, the Minister accepted  it and directed that the scheme might be  modified so  as to indicate the number of vehicles to be operated  on each  route  separately.   The  schemes  were   accordingly’ modified by indicating the number of vehicles to be operated on  each route separately and the approved schemes with  the said  modification were duly published in the Gazette  dated March  21, 1960.  The approved schemes,  therefore,  satisfy rule  4(2),of the Rules, for the approved schemes,  as  duly modified,  contain  the number of vehicles  proposed  to  be operated on each route.  But the point sought to be made  is that  the Minister himself should have fixed the  number  of vehicles  proposed to be operated on each route  and  should not have merely directed the appropriate modification to  be made  in the approved schemes.  It does not appear from  the record  that  there was any dispute before the  Minister  as regards  the apportionment of the number of  vehicles  shown against  two or more routes to each of the routes;  but  the only contention raised was that the bracketing of the number of  vehicles  between  two or more  routes  contravened  the provisions  of r. 4. Though the order of the  Minister  only contains  a  direction, the apportionment of  the  vehicles, between  the  routes  was not made by  the  State  Transport Authority,  but  only by the Government,  for  the  approved schemes  were published not by the Chief  Executive  Officer but 662 by  the  State  Government.  It must be  presumed  that  the allocation also must have been made with the approval of the Minister.  There are no merits in this objection either. Re.  (8):  The next contention is that r. 5  framed  by  the State  Government in exercise of the power conferred  on  it under s. 68(1) is inconsistent with the provisions of s. 68B of the Act and, therefore, is void.  The schemes prepared by the State Transport Authority contain the following note:  " The  frequency of services on any of the notified routes  or within  any  notified area shall, if  necessary,  be  varied having regard to the traffic needs during any period ".  In- deed the said note was practically a reproduction of a  note appended to r. 5. The only question is whether r. 5 and  the note made pursuant thereto come into conflict with s. 68E of the Act.  Section 68E reads: " Any scheme published under sub-section (3) of section  68D may  at  any  time be cancelled or  modified  by  the  State transport undertaking and the procedure laid down in section 68C  and  section  68D  shall, so far  as  it  can  be  made applicable,  be followed in every case where the  scheme  is proposed to be modified as if the modification proposed were a  separate  scheme".   The short question  that  arises  is whether  the variation of frequency of service by the  State Transport Undertaking amounts to a modification of a  scheme within the meaning of s. 68E of the Act.  The rule is not so innocuous  as  the learned Advocate-General  of  the  Andhra Pradesh  contends.   Under  that rule  the  State  Transport Undertaking,  having regard to the needs of  traffic  during any period, may increase or decrease the number of trips  of the  existing buses or vary the frequency by  increasing  or decreasing  the number of buses.  This can be  done  without any  reference to the public or without hearing  any  repre- sentations  from  them.  This increase or decrease,  as  the

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case  may be, ’Can only be for the purpose of  providing  an efficient,   adequate,  economical  transport   service   in relation to a particular route within the meaning of s. 68C. At  the time the original schemes are proposed, the  persons affected by them may file                             663 objections to the effect that the number of buses should  be increased  or  decreased  on a particular  route  from  that proposed  in  the schemes.  The Government may  accept  such suggestions and modify the schemes; but under     this  rule the authority may, without reference to the  public  or  the Government,  modify  the schemes. Learned  counsel  contends that the note only provides for an emergency.  But the  rule and the note are comprehensive enough to take in not only an emergency  but  also a modification of the  scheme  for  any period  which  may extend, to any length of time.   We  are, therefore, definitely of opinion that the rule confers power on  the State Transport Undertaking to modify  substantially the  scheme  in one respect, though that power can  only  be exercised  under s. 68E of the Act in the manner  prescribed thereunder.  This rule is void and, therefore, the said note was illegally inserted in the schemes.  But on that  ground, as  the  learned counsel contends, we cannot hold  that  the schemes  are  void.  The note is easily severable  from  the scheme,%  without  in  any way  affecting  their  structure. Without the note the schemes are self-contained ones and  it is  impossible to hold that the schemes would not have  been framed  in  the manner they were made if this note  was  not allowed  to be included therein.  We, therefore,  hold  that the note should be deleted from the schemes and the  schemes are otherwise good. Re. (9): The last of the arguments attacks the schemes in so far as they include new routes.  The new routes included  in the   schemes  are  Eluru  to  Kovvur,  and   Nidadavol   to Jeelugumilli.   It is argued that the provisions of  s.  68C are  concerned  with the existing routes only.   Support  is sought  to be drawn for this contention from the  provisions of  s.  68C of the Act.  The relevant part of  that  section says: " Where any State transport undertaking is of  opinion that.........  it is necessary in the public  interest  that road  transport services in general or any particular  class of such service in relation to any area or route or  portion thereof should be run and operated by the State 85 664 transport   undertaking............  the   State   transport undertaking  may  propose a scheme............  ".  Now  the contention is that the word " route " in that section refers to  a  preexisting route, for it is said that  the  words  " route  or portion thereof " in the section clearly  indicate that the route is an existing route, for a scheme cannot  be framed  in respect of a portion of a proposed route.  We  do not  see any force in this contention.  Under s. 68C of  the Act  the  scheme may be framed in respect of any area  or  a route  or  a portion of any area or a portion  of  a  route. There is no inherent inconsistency between an " area " and a " route ". The proposed route is also an area limited to the route proposed.  The scheme may as well propose to operate a transport service in respect of a new route from point A  to point B and that route would certainly be an area within the meaning  of  s.  68C.   We,  therefore,  hold  that  s.  68C certainly  empowers  the  State  Transport  Undertaking   to propose a scheme to include new routes. Though some other points were raised in the affidavits filed before us, they were not pressed.

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In  the  result  we  hold that  the  note  relating  to  the frequency  of the services appended to the schemes  must  be deleted  and that in other respects the petitions fail;  and accordingly  they  are  dismissed with costs.   One  set  of hearing fees. Petitions dismissed. 665