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PETITIONER: VENKATLAL G. PITTIE & ANR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BRIGHT  BROS. (PVT.) LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/07/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1939            1987 SCR  (3) 593  1987 SCC  (3) 558        JT 1987 (3)   139  1987 SCALE  (2)115  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1988 SC 184  (13)  D          1988 SC 293  (12)  RF         1989 SC1642  (36)

ACT:     Constitution  of India--Art. 227--Scope of  interference by  High  Court with regard to findings of  facts  by  lower courts and inferior tribunals.     Transfer  of Property Act, 1882--Cl.(P) of  s.  108--The question whether a structure put up by a tenant is a  perma- nent  one or not depends upon the facts of each case and  no hard and fast rule can be laid down.

HEADNOTE:     The appellants, who had let out the premises in question to  the respondent Riled a suit for eviction inter  alia  on the  ground that the tenant had erected unauthorised  struc- tures  of a permanent nature in violation of the  provisions of  cl. (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act,  1882 and s. 13(1)(b) of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates  Control  Act,  1974 and was using  the  premises  for unauthorised  purposes.  The  alleged  permanent  structures consisted  of lofts and rooms which had been constructed  by sinking  pillars  and stanchions into the flooring  and  the tenant admitted that these had been constructed after it had taken  the premises from the landlord. After discussing  the evidence tendered in detail, including the deposition of the architect who had prepared the plan of the constructions  in question and who had deposed that the constructions consist- ed of permanent structures, the Judge of the Court of  Small Causes  held that the structures were of a permanent  nature and  ordered eviction of the tenant on the ground of  perma- nent construction. The respondent’s appeal was dismissed  by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes which, on a detailed  reappraisal  of the evidence on record,  not  only confirmed the decree for eviction on the ground of permanent construction but granted eviction on the ground of change of user  as  well. The respondent went in  appeal  against  the order  of the appellate court. The High Court, dealing  with the matter under Art. 227 of the Constitution, reversed  the concurrent  findings  of the courts below  and  allowed  the

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respondent’s petition.     Allowing the appeal and restoring the order of the lower appellate court, 594     HELD: 1. (a) Interference by the High Courts under  Art. 227 of the Constitution must be within limits. This question has  been  considered by this Court from time  to  time  and principles  laid  down. The power under Art. 227 is  one  of judicial superintendence and it cannot be exercised to upset the conclusions of facts, however erroneous these may be. It is possible that another Court may be able to take a differ- ent  view  of the matter by appreciating the evidence  in  a different manner, if it determinedly chooses to do so.  That will  not be justice administered according to law to  which courts are committed. [605D-E]     (b)  In exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 227’ of  the Constitution, the High Court can go into questions of  facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it. But the High  Court should decline to exercise that jurisdiction  to look  into  the facts in the absence  of  clear-cut  reasons where  the  question depends upon the appreciation  of  evi- dence.  The High Court should not interfere with  a  finding within  the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal  or  court except  where the finding is perverse in law, in  the  sense that  no reasonable person properly instructed in law  could have  come  to such a finding, or there is  misdirection  in law, or view of fact has been taken in the teeth of  prepon- derance  of  evidence, or the finding is not  based  on  any material  evidence  or it resulted  in  manifest  injustice. Except  to the extent indicated above the High Court has  no jurisdiction. [606B-D]     Satyanarayan  Laxminarayan Hegde & Ors.  v.  Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 890; India Pipe Fitting Co.  v.  Fakruddin M.A. Baker & Anr., [1978] 1  S.C.R.  797; Ganpat  Ladha v. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde, [1978]  3  S.C.R. 198; Mrs. Labhkuwar Bhagwani Shah & Ors. v. Janardan Mahadeo Kalan  &  Anr., [1982] 3 S.C.C. 514  and  Chandavarkar  Sita Ratna  Rao  v. Ashalata S. Guram, [1986] 4 S.C.C.  447;  re- ferred to.     2. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for  determin- ing  the question whether a particular structure put  up  by the  tenant is a permanent structure for the purpose of  cl. (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. 1882 as it is dependent  on the facts of each case. One must look  to  the nature  of the structure, the purpose for which it  was  in- tended and take a whole perspective as to how it affects the enjoyment,  the durability of the building, etc.  and  other relevant factors and come to a conclusion. [601D-E; 602D-E]     Surya  Properties Private Ltd. & Ors. v. Bimalendu  Nath Sarkar & Ors., A.I.R. 1964 Calcutta 1 and M/s Surya  Proper- ties Private Ltd.  595 v.  Bimalendu  Nath Sarkar, A.I.R. 1965  Calcutta  408,  ap- proved. Khureshi Ibrahim Ahmed v. Ahmed Haji Khanmahomad, A.I.R. 1965 Gujarat 152 and Ramji Virji & Ors. v. Kadarbhai  Esufa- li, A.I.R.1973 Gujarat 110, referred to.     In  this case, on an analysis of the evidence the  trial court  as  well  as the appellate court had  held  that  the structures were permanent. All the relevant factors had been borne  in  mind by the learned trial Judge as  well  as  the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes. The view taken by  them  was a possible view. A different view  might  have been  taken  but that is no ground which would  justify  the High Court to interfere with the findings. [600F]

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JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 195556 of 1980.     From  the Judgment and Order dated 3/4th July,  1979  of the Bombay High Court in Spl. C.A. Nos. 2052 of 1973 and 132 of 1974.     F.S.  Nariman,  Anil  B. Diwan, P.H.  Parekh,  Ms.  Lata Krishnamurthy and S. Dutt with for the Appellants.     V.M.  Tarkunde  and  H.G. Advani,  Hira  Advani  Kailash Vasudev, Joel Peres and D.N. Misra for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. These appeals, by special leave, by the landlords are directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated 3/4th July, 1979.     Two   questions   arise  for  consideration   in   these appeals--(i) whether the structure constructed by the tenant in the premises in question amounted to permanent  structure leading to the forfeiture of the tenancy of the tenant; (ii) what is the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution on questions  of facts found by the appellate bench of Small Causes Court.     In order to appreciate these questions, it is  necessary to reiterate the relevant facts. The second appellant  being plaintiff no. 2 in the Original Suit leased out the premises involved  herein being a godown measuring 11,500 sq. ft.  at 156 A, Tardeo, Bombay-7. The said pre- 596 mises was given by the landlord to the tenant, the  respond- ent herein-M/s Bright Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd. on lease vide the registered lease dated 14th April, 1947 for a period of  ten years  commencing  from 1st September, 1946.  By  1953,  the respondent company began to fall into arrears in payment  of rent. The respondent-tenant filed an application before  the appropriate Rent Court for fixing the standard rent.     On 14th June, 1958, the advocate of the second appellant sent a notice to the respondent-tenant calling upon them  to pay  up the arrears for the period from September,  1956  to May,  1958 (both months inclusive), as well as  for  earlier arrears of rent of Rs.20,850. On 1st December, 1958 a second notice was issued on behalf of the original plaintiff no.  1 calling upon the respondent to quit and vacate the  premises in  question  on the grounds, inter alia,  (a)  unauthorised construction of permanent nature; (b) obstructing  roadways; and  (c) the damage to walls and floor, and  further  called upon  them to remove the unauthorised construction  and  re- store the suit premises to its original condition.  Inasmuch as  the main factual controversy in those appeals relate  to the nature of the construction alleged to have been made  by the  tenant,  it is relevant to set out what was  stated  in that letter. It was, inter alia, stated that the tenant  had unauthorisedly  committed several breaches of the terms  and conditions  of the lease inasmuch as the tenant had  erected unauthorised construction of a permanent nature and  carried out additions to the demised premises without the consent of the  lessor or the receiver. It was further alleged that  in breach  of  the  terms and conditions of  the  agreement  of tenancy and without the consent of the lessor or the receiv- er, the tenant had occupied portion of the land not let  out to him by obstructing the lessor and the person entitled  to use  the  same and had made construction on the  roadway  by obstructing  and  restricting the passage.  It  was  further alleged  that  the  tenant had  unauthorisedly  and  without

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permission  dug up and mutilated the floors of the  premises let  out to the tenant and had constructed contrary  to  the provisions  of  section 108(0) of the Transfer  of  Property Act,  1882.  The tenant was called upon to remove  the  said unauthorised structures and restore the property, and it was further  notified that failing which the landlord  would  be compelled to take proceedings.     A reply to the said notice issued by the Court  Receiver was sent on 8th December, 1958 from the respondent company’s advocate  saying  that the construction  complained  of  had taken  place  with  the consent and full  knowledge  of  the appellant and the respondent company had spent thousands  of rupees towards the improvement of the suit  597 premises.  Further in reply to the allegation of  damage  to the property, the respondent company had alleged that it had in fact improved the property of the appellant. On or  about 20th December, 1958, the advocate for the appellant  replied to  the above letter once again calling upon the  respondent company to vacate the demised premises.     In  1959, the standard rent application being  R.A.  No. 2214  of 1954 mentioned hereinbefore was  dismissed.  There- upon, the respondent-tenant filed a civil revision  applica- tion.  The appellant filed a suit being suit no. 1450/83  18 of 1959 on or about 31st July, 1959. On or about 8th  Decem- ber,  1965, the appellant made an application for  amendment of  the  plaint to include change of user as  an  additional ground of eviction. The respondent also made an  application for  amendment  to the effect that permanent  structure  had been  made with the knowledge and consent of the  appellant. The said amendments were allowed in December, 1965.     On  or about 31st March, 1967, the trial court  in  suit no.  1450/ 8318 of 1959, ordered eviction of the  tenant  on the ground of permanent construction. Mesne profit from  the date of the decree was also ordered. There was an appeal  to the  appellate  bench before the CoUrt of Small  Causes  and cross  appeal being appeal nos. 323 and 629 of 1967. By  the judgment delivered on 14th June, 1973, the division bench of the Court of Small Causes confirmed the decree for  eviction on the ground of permanent construction and granted eviction on  change of user as well in the cross objection  filed  by the appellant. It also ordered mesne profit from the date of the suit and the monetary claims to the extent of arrears.     The High Court on or about 3/4th July, 1979, by judgment and  order  of the High Court in SCA 2052 and  174  of  1974 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution reversed  the concurrent  findings  of the courts below  and  allowed  the respondent company’s application. Being aggrieved therefrom, the appellants, the landlords have come up in appeal to this Court.     It is, first necessary therefore to consider the  nature of  the structures made and whether these were permanent  or not.  As stated hereinbefore that permanent structures  were constructed was held by the two courts concurrently,  namely the Judge of the Court of Small Causes as well as the Appel- late  Bench of the Small Causes Court; whether by such  con- struction there has been change of user is another question. On the nature of the construction, it is necessary to  refer to the decision of the trial court. 598     The  main  question, however, in these  appeals  is  the jurisdiction  of the High Court to interfere with the  find- ings  of this nature under Article 227 of the  Constitution. The principles are well-settled. Their application, however, in particular cases sometimes present difficulties. But  the

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quest for certain amount of certitude must continue in  this field of uncertain minds and imperfect language.     To the facts, therefore, we must now refer to appreciate the  application of law involved in this case. The  premises in question was let out for use exclusively for business  of manufacture  of plastic articles, wood work and paints  only and  not for any other purpose. it is alleged that it is  no longer  used  for  that purpose but used as  an  office  and storage.     The  trial  court in this case was the  Court  of  Small Causes,  Bombay.  One of the grounds of  ejectment  was  the erection  of permanent structure and it was the case of  the appellant  no. 2 that such erection was against  the  provi- sions  of  section 13(1)(b) of the Bombay Rents,  Hotel  and Lodging  House Rates Control Act, 1974  (hereinafter  called the ’Rent Act’).     Under  clause  (p)  of section 108 of  the  Transfer  of Property  Act, 1882, a lessee may not without  the  lessor’s consent erect on the property and permanent structure except for  agricultural purposes. If he does, then this becomes  a ground for ejectment.     In  this  case  the permanent  structures  alleged  were constructions  of lofts, construction of several  rooms  and construction  of and laying of a new and permanent  flooring as  appears  from the plaint filed in  the  proceedings.  It further  appears  that the tenant had sunk  in  pillars  and stanchions  into the flooring. it was stated in the  deposi- tion  that  these pillars and stanchions  mentioned  in  the plaint  were only those which were the posts supporting  the cabins and lofts complained of and none else. These  pillars and stanchions went along with the construction of lofts and construction  of several rooms, that is cabins. The  learned trial  court  discussed the details and found  those  cabins marked  A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L etc.  There  were lofts  marked  cabins A, B, C, D, E, F, J,  K,  other  lofts marked as F, G, H and I. The third loft over the cabin at  L and the lofts over the portions M & N. These were, according to  the engineer, an architect, Shri Divecha, who was  exam- ined  on behalf of the plaintiff, permanent structures.  The learned judge examined the plan prepared by the said  archi- tect  and his deposition. The learned judge was of the  view that it was clear from the  599 architect’s evidence that lofts A, B, C, D, E, J, K. as well as  the lofts over F, G, H and I were meant to carry  weight of over 100 Ibs. per sq. ft. and this statement according to the  learned judge was not challenged in the  cross-examina- tion.  The  structures over A, B, C, D, E,  J.  and  F.C.H.I cannot  therefore  be called only roofs or tops  of  cabins. They  were nothing but lofts. The structures A, B, C, D,  E, K,  J. so also F, G, H, I, L & M were admitted to have  been constructed  by the tenant after it had taken  the  premises from  the  landlord. The learned judge in his  judgment  has also noted these various facts as to their length and dimen- sions.  He referred extensively to the evidence in the  plan which was marked Ex. MI and the deposition of Shri  Divecha. The  learned Judge taking these factors  into  consideration came  to the conclusion that the cabin lofts and posts  sup- porting  the same were attached to the flooring as  well  as the  walls and columns of the main structures.  Under  these circumstances,  the  learned  judge of the  Court  of  Small Causes was of the opinion that the structures were permanent in  nature. The learned judge, however, held that the  land- lord  had  failed to prove that the tenant had  put  up  any permanent  flooring  at some part of the  suit  premises  as

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alleged. The next allegation was that the tenants had demol- ished  a  portion of the wall in between the two  rooms  and prepared a door at that opening. After discussing the  facts and  the  evidence, the learned judge was of the  view  that there  was  no  question of any  waste  of  the  plaintiff’s property on account of any demolition. He, however, had held that  so far as cabins, lofts and posts supporting the  same by pillars, these were nothing but permanent structures.  So far  as  the digging of the flooring  was  concerned,  after discussing  the  evidence the learned judge  held  that  the plaintiffs had failed to prove digging which led to waste of the property of the landlord. So far as the creation of  the permanent  structure  is concerned, the  same  breached  the terms of tenancy. The learned judge noted that on 1st  Janu- ary,  1948 the defendant no. 1 wrote to the  plaintiff  that the  height of the wooden partition they were erecting,  was specified  within  the plan sent along  with  the  aforesaid letter  which had already been lying ready for erection.  It was contended by the defendants in their written  statements that  they  had obtained consent in respect  of  the  wooden cabins  and partitions in the year 1948. So far  as  section 13(1)(b)  of the Bombay Rent Act is concerned, there  cannot be  any waiver operating against the plaintiffs. It was  the case that some of the permanent structures were there before 1947.  On  examination of the evidence,  the  learned  judge observed  that  Mr. D’silva had stated that the  tenant  had requested  Mahindra  & Mahindra for a design  of  a  slotted angle cabin with a loft, that the same was supplied and  Mr. D’silva  was  the designer who did the work.  Analysing  all these evidence, the 600 learned  trial judge came to the conclusion  that  permanent structures  were carried out without the consent in  writing of the landlords or either of them. Such permanent structure was  outside the tenancy and the landlord had not given  any consent.     The  matter on this issue went up before  the  appellate court  and  the appellate court dealt with  this  again  and discussed  these  allegations.  It was pointed  out  by  the appellate  court that the allegations were that  the  appel- lants  had (a) made an opening by demolishing a part of  the wall dividing the two portions of the demised premises;  (b) constructed  lofts  in the suit-premises, (c) dug  upon  the flooring  of  the premises at various places,  (d)  sunk  in pillars  and stanchions into the flooring,  (e)  constructed several rooms and laid new and permanent floorings in  parts of  the  demised premises at different levels. So  far  con- structing  lofts,  it  was held that these  lofts  had  been constructed  after 1st September, 1946. And in this  context the  construction of cabins and putting up of  pillars  were considered  and the evidence in this respect was taken  into consideration. It was contended that the demised premises in the  lease was described as godown but it was taken  in  the nature  of  several office premises and the  change  in  the improvement  done  to  the same was merely  for  the  better enjoyment of demised premises. In the first place the cabins were made of wooden poles and planks fixed in the floor, and side  walls  of the building with nails,  screws,  nuts  and bolts.  The  appellate  court came to  the  conclusion  that applying the proper test, the cabins were substantial struc- tures  and  substantial improvement to the  premises.  These were durable for long and intended to be used permanently.     The  appellate court also took the question  of  digging and  other relevant allegations. As a result of analysis  of these evidence and materials, the appellate court  confirmed

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the findings of the trial court that the tenant had  erected permanent  structure  on the demised  premises  without  the landlord’s  consent  and that was a breach of the  terms  of tenancy. They also confirmed the finding of the trial  court that the respondents did not waive their rights arising  out of  these acts. They also upheld the finding that there  was no  renewal  of the lease of the landlords and  the  tenants were  not  statutory tenants whose contractual  tenancy  had come to an end by efflux of time by the end of the period of ten  years from 1st September, 1946. They upheld the  decree for possession passed by the trial court.     The  High Court dealing with this matter  under  Article 227  of the Constitution had occasion to refer to  this  as- pect. The High Court 601 referred to the different authorities on this point. We  may briefly take note of some of these.     In  this connection reference may be made to a  decision of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the  case of  Surya  Properties Private Ltd. and others  v.  Bimalendu Nath  Sarkar  and others. A.I.R. 1964 Calcutta  p.  1  which dealt  with  clause (p) of section 108 of  the  Transfer  of Property Act, 1882 and held that this question was dependent on  the facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can  be laid down with regard to this matter. In the absence of  any relevant materials, therefore, the Full Bench found that  no answer  could  be given. in a  slightly  different  context, before Calcutta High Court in the case of M/s Suraya Proper- ties  Private  Ltd. v. Bimalendu Nath  Sarkar.  A.I.R.  1965 Calcutta page 408, Chatterjee, J., one of the judges of  the Division  Bench observed that the phrase  ’permanent  struc- ture’  for  purposes  of clause (p) of section  108  of  the Transfer of Property Act meant a structure which was capable of  lasting  till the term of the lease and which  was  con- structed in the view of being built up as was a building. In that context the learned judge observed that a reservoir was not,  however, a permanent structure for purposes of  clause (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. Sen,  J. of  the  same Bench was of the view that no  hard  and  fast tests could be laid down for determining the question wheth- er  a  particular structure by the tenant  was  a  permanent structure  for the purpose of clause (p) of section  108  of the  Transfer  of Property Act. The answer to  the  question depended on the facts of each case. Chatterjee, J., however, took  the  view that where the tenant  created  a  permanent structure  in the premises leased to him, as the lease  con- tinued  in spite of the disputed structure and the  landlord continued to receive rent till the determining of the  lease by  notice  to quit or thereafter till the  passing  of  the decree for eviction and the fact that he accepted rent  with full knowledge of the disputed structure did not  disentitle him to a decree for eviction.     In  Khureshi  Ibrahim Ahmed v. Ahmed  Haji  Khanmahomad. A.I.R.  1.965  Gujarat,  152,  in  connection  with  section 13(1)(b)  of the Rent Act, Gujarat High Court held that  the permanent  structure must be one which was a lasting  struc- ture and that would depend upon the nature of structure. The permanent or temporary character of the structure would have to  be determined having regard to the nature of the  struc- ture  and the nature of the materials used in the making  of the  structure  and the manner in which  the  structure  was erected and not on the basis of how long the tenant intended to make use of the structure. As a matter of fact, the Court observed, the nature of the structure 602

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itself  would  reflect whether the tenant intended  that  it should exist and be available for use for a temporary period or  for an indefinite period of time. The test  provided  by the Legislature was thus an objective test and not a subjec- tive one and once it was shown that the structure erected by the  tenant was of such a nature as to be lasting  in  dura- tion-lasting  of  course according to  ordinary  notions  of mankind--the tenant cannot come forward and say that it  was erected for temporary purpose.     The  question was again considered in the case of  Ramji Virji  and others v. Kadarbhai Esufali, A.I.R. 1973  Gujarat 110. It was observed that whether the structure was a perma- nent structure was a mixed question of law and fact. It  was held  in  that case that alterations made by a  tenant  like constructing  loft, wooden bathroom, frame and putting up  a new drain being minor alterations which were easily  remova- ble without causing any serious damage to the premises would not amount to permanent structure leading to the forfeiture.     There are numerous authorities dealing with the question how the structure is a permanent structure or not should  be judged. It is not necessary to deal with all these. One must look  to the nature of the structure, the purpose for  which it  was intended and take a whole perspective as to  how  it affects  the enjoyment, the durability of the building  etc. and other relevant factors and come to a conclusion.     Judged  in  the aforesaid light on an  analysis  of  the evidence the trial court as well as the appellate court  had held  that  the structures were permanent.  The  High  Court observed that in judging whether the structures were  perma- nent  or  not, the following factors should  be  taken  into consideration referring to an unreported decision of Malvan- kar  J. in special civil application No. 121 of 1968.  These were  (1) intention of the party who put up  the  structure; (2)  this  intention was to be gathered from  the  mode  and degree of annexation; (3) if the structure cannot be removed without  doing irrepairable damage to the  demised  premises then that would be certainly one of the circumstances to  be considered  while deciding the question of intention.  Like- wise,  dimensions of the structure and (4) its  removability had  to be taken into consideration. But these were not  the sole  tests.  (5) the purpose of erecting the  structure  is another  relevant  factor. (6) the nature of  the  materials used for the structure and (7) lastly the durability of  the structure.  These were the broad tests. The High  Court  ap- plied  these  tests. So had the Trial Court as well  as  the appellate bench of Court of Small causes.  603     All  the relevant factors had been borne in mind by  the learned trial judge as well as appellate bench of the  Court of  Small Causes. Therefore, simply because another view  is possible and on that view a different view is taken, will be interfering  under  jurisdiction under Article  227  of  the Constitution  which is unwarranted. The High Court  was  im- pressed  by  the fact that having regard to  the  facts  and circumstances of the case and further more for efficient and complete enjoyment of the demised premises and for  carrying out  the  business  of manufacturing  plastic  goods,  these structures  had been constructed by the tenant  temporarily. According  to  the High Court, the nature of  the  materials used  and  the  intention of the tenant  were  relevant  and according  to  the  High Court, these  structures  could  be removed  without  doing appreciable damage  to  the  demised premises and these indicated that these were intended to  be part and parcel of the normal part of the building. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the trial court as well as

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the  appellate  bench of the Small Causes Court  had  relied wholly on the basis of evidence of the admission of one  Mr. Pittie  who had admitted that the landlord had knowledge  of these  factors.  The other evidence, according to  the  High Court,. of the Divecha, D’Silva, Kirtikar and Bhansali  were not  at  all given proper and due weight. According  to  the High Court, the High Court had in such circumstances  juris- diction  to  deal with this matter and in  exercise  of  the jurisdiction,  as  the  High Court felt  that  relevant  and material  facts had been ignored, the High Court  set  aside the  order of the court of Small Causes, and set  aside  the landlord’s decree and restored the tenant in possession.     As  mentioned hereinbefore it is not necessary  for  our present purpose to decide whether plaintiffs’ witnesses were properly appreciated. We find all the relevant evidence  had been examined by the trial judge as well as by the appellate bench of the court of Small causes. We find relevant  refer- ence to the evidence of Divecha, and others. We find  refer- ence to the relevant evidence in the deposition at pages 56, 69, 71, 83, 93, to 95 by the trial court as well as in pages 133-36, 152, 167, we find reference to the deposition at  p. 56  of the trial court and pages 62 to 63, as well as 65  to 71  and the Appellate Court at pages 134 and 147.  Similarly the evidence of D’silva who was an employee of Mahindra  and Mahindra as also of Shri Kirtikar, were discussed. It is not necessary to refer in detail to these evidence.     So far as to what extent the factors are structures have been  exhaustively referred to in Surya  Properties  Private Ltd. and others v. Bimalendu Nath Barkar and others  (supra) and M/s Surya Properties 604 Private  Ltd.  v. Bimalendu Nath Sarkar (supra) and  in  our opinion these lay down correct position in law. As a  matter of  fact  the tenant is no longer carrying on  any  business there  but  one Messrs Quality Plastics is carrying  on  the business.  Therefore the original purpose is gone.  In  this connection reference may be made to Annexure IV appearing at page  428  of the Paper Book which is a  letter  dated  both July, 1964 written by the Concord of India Insurance Company Limited to the Secretary. The Insurance Association of India where  it was stated clearly that Bright Brothers  Pvt.  had shifted  to  Bhandup  as from 29th April, 1963  and  at  the relevant  time, they had only their  Administrative  Officer there and they were stocking finished goods in the  premises in  question.  Further, they have recently  installed  their Associate Company’s factory in the said block working  under the name of M/,s. Quality Plastics in the premises in  ques- tion.     Therefore,  in view of the fact that large sum had  been spent  and  considering the standard and the nature  of  the construction and lack of easy removability and the degree of an annexation to the enjoyment for the original purpose,  we are of the opinion that the learned judge as well as  appel- late  bench  of the court of Small Causes  had  applied  the correct principles and came to a plausible conclusion. About the removability of the structure, the High Court was  bound by  the finding of the appellate authority which appears  at page 341 to 344 of the Paper Book. In a case of this nature, the High Court found that they had to enter into this  ques- tion to find the real position whether the proper principles had  been correctly borne in mind. It is  indisputable  that the  finding that has to be arrived at by the court in  this case is a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, if  the basic  factors, for example, there was not proper  apprecia- tion  of the evidence, if the assumption that lofts  per  se

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were not permanent structures then the courts below might be said to have committed error apparent on record and no court instructed  in  law could take such a view. But if  all  the relevant  factors have been borne in mind and correct  legal principles applied then, right or wrong, if a view has  been taken  by the appellate court, in our opinion,  interference under Article 227 of the Constitution was unwarranted.     Interference by the High Court under Article 227 of  the Constitution  must be within limits. This question has  been considered  by this Court from time to time  and  principles laid  down. This Court in Ganpat Ladha v.  Sashikant  Vishnu Shinde,  [1978] 3 SCR 198 expressed the view that  the  High Court  commits a gross error in interfering with what was  a just and proper exercise of discretion by the Court of  605 Small Causes, in exercise of its power under Article 227  of the Constitution. This was unwarranted. The High Court under Article 227 has a limited jurisdiction. It was held in  that case  that a finding as to whether  circumstances  justified the  exercise of discretion or not, unless clearly  perverse and  patently unreasonale, was, after all a finding of  fact and it could not be interfered with either under Article 226 or  227 of the Constitution. If a proper court has  come  to the  conclusion  on  the examination of the  nature  of  the structure,  the  nature of the duration  of  structure,  the annexation  and other relevant factors that  the  structures were  permanent  in nature which were violative  of  section 13(1)(b)  of the Rent Act as well as section 108 clause  (p) of Transfer of Property Act and such a finding, is possible, it cannot be considered to be perverse. In such a situation, the  High  Court could not have and should not  have  inter- fered.     In  India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A.  Bakar  and Anr.,  [1978]  1  SCR 797, this Court  reiterated  that  the limitation of the Court while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution is well settled. Power under Article 227  is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be  exer- cised to upset the conclusions of facts, however., erroneous these may be. It is possible that another Court may be  able to  take a different view of the matter by appreciating  the evidence  in a different manner, if it determinedly  chooses to do so. That will not be justice administered according to law to which Courts are committed notwithstanding  disserta- tion  in  season and out of season, about  philosophies.  In that case, the Court found that the High Court had arrogated to itself the powers of the appellate court.     As early in 1959, in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Others v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, [1960] 1 SCR 890, this  Court found that in that case on the materials  avail- able  before  it that the High Court was wrong  in  thinking that the alleged error in the judgment of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal was one apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by a writ of certiorari and an error which had to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning  on  points  where there may  conveivably  be  two opinions cannot be said to be an error apparent on the  face of  the record. There might have been error in the  judgment of  the appellate bench of the Court of Small Causes but  it is  not an error palpable and apparent, right or wrong  they had come to that conclusion. That was possible or  plausible conclusion. In Mrs. Labhkuwar Bhagwani Shah and Others v. Janardhan 606 Mahadeo  Kalan  and Another, [1982] 3 SCC 5 14,  this  Court reiterated that concurrent finding of facts whether relating

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to jurisdictional issue or otherwise were not open to inter- ference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitu- tion.     This Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram,  [1986] 4 SCC p. 447 held that in exercise of  juris- diction  under  Article 227 of the  Constitution,  the  High Court  can go into the questions of facts or look  into  the evidence  if  justice  so requires it. But  the  High  Court should  decline to exercise its jurisdiction  under  Article 226  and 227 of the Constitution to look into the  facts  in the  absence  of clear cut-down reasons where  the  question depends  upon the appreciation of evidence. The  High  Court should not interfere with a finding within the  jurisdiction of  the inferior tribunal or court except where the  finding is  perverse in law in the sense that no  reasonable  person properly instructed in law could have come to such a finding or  there  is misdirection in law or view of fact  has  been taken  in  the  teeth of preponderance of  evidence  or  the finding is not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. Except to the limited extent indicat- ed above, the High Court has no jurisdiction.     In  this instant case the tests laid down have not  been transgressed  by the court of Small Causes both trial  court as  well  as  the appellate bench. The view it  took  was  a possible  view. A different view might have been  taken  out that  is  no ground which would justify the  High  Court  to interfere with the findings.     In  that view of the matter, we allow the  appeals,  set aside  the judgment and order of the High Court and  restore the  order of the appellate bench of Court of  Small  Causes dated 4th June, 1973. There will be an order for  possession and mesne profits as directed by the Court of Small Causes. The respondents will pay the cost of these appeals. H.L.C.                                               Appeals allowed. 607