11 September 1990
Supreme Court
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DMAI Vs

Bench: SAIKIA,K.N. (J)
Case number: C.A. No.-002494-002494 / 1978
Diary number: 61162 / 1978
Advocates: A. SUBBA RAO Vs


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PETITIONER: YADLAPATI VENKATESWARLU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/09/1990

BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)

CITATION:  1991 AIR  704            1990 SCR  Supl. (1) 381  1992 SCC  Supl.  (1)  74 JT 1990 (4)    19  1990 SCALE  (2)519

ACT:     Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act,  1965: Andhra Pradesh (Andhra  Areas) District Municipalities Act,  1920--Sections 2(11), 86, 87 and 391--Vijayawada Municipal Council--Assess- ment   and  levy  property  tax  under  the  old   and   new Acts--Validity of.

HEADNOTE:     Vijayawada Municipality of Andhra Pradesh earlier levied property  tax under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra  Areas)  Dis- trict  Municipalities Act, 1920. That Act’was  repealed  and the new Act known as the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities  Act, 1965 came into force on 2.4.1965. Under the old act property tax  was levied on the basis of gross annual  rental  value, whereas under section 87 of the new Act the basis of assess- ment in owner occupied building was the capital value there- of to be determined in the prescribed manner. Section 389 of the new Act provided that that Act was to be read subject to Schedule  IX which contained transitional provisions in  the rules.  Rule  12 thereof dealt with levy of taxes  etc.  The Government  under  Rule 12 issued a G.O. Ms.  No.  749  M.A. directing that all Municipal Councils shall with effect from 1.4.70  levy the property tax as per the provisions  of  the new  Act,  which date by a subsequent G.O.  was  changed  to 1.10.1970. By another G.O.Ms. No. 81 M.A. dated 30.1.71, the Government  directed  the Vijayawada  Municipal  Council  to continue  to levy the property tax under the  provisions  of the  old Act as rate payers had filed writ petitions in  the High Court and obtained stay. However, by G.O.Ms. 675  M.A., the  G.O.No. 81 was rescinded and the  Vijayawada  Municipal Council  was  directed to collect revised  taxes  under  the provisions  of  the new Act with effect from  1.10.70.  This G.O.  was  rescinded  and by G.O. Ms.  No.  255  M.A.  dated 15.6.73  the Government directed the Vijayawada  Council  to levy  the property tax under the old Act. As a  consequence, the  Vijayawada Municipal continued to levy and enhance  the property tax under the old Act.     The validity of G.O.Ms. No. 255 dated 15.6.73 was  chal- lenged  by  house property owners in the High Court  in  two writ  petitions seeking an order restraining the  Vijayawada Municipal Council from enforcing it. and declaring the  same

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illegal and void. The petitioners’ contention 382 amongst others was that the Government having directed  that the  taxes  be levied under the new  Act,  the  transitional power  under rule 12 stood exercised, and the power to  levy tax  under the old Act had ceased and it was no longer  open to  the government to rescind the previous orders. The  High Court accepted the said contention, but held that in view of the provisions of section 4(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Munici- palities (Fourth Amendment) Act (23 of 1975), which validat- ed  the  actions  taken, those could not  be  challenged  as invalid.  The writ petitions were therefore  dismissed.  Ap- peals to ’the Division Bench, having failed, this appeal has been filed after obtaining special leave. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  The  State’s  power to tax is  derived  from  the Constitution, and the municipality’s power to tax is derived from the State Legislature, which could delegate that  power in  the  manner the Constitution permits  to  the  municipal council, an agent of the State Government and the municipal- ity  cannot  refuse to raise taxes as directed.  The  proper authority  to  determine  what should and  what  should  not constitute a public burden is the Legislature of the  State. This  is not only true for the State itself, but it is  also true  in  respect of each municipality of the  State;  these inferior corporate bodies having only such authority in this regard as the legislature shall confer upon them. [202E-F]     A  statute will not be declared unconstitutional  unless it  is specifically challenged and the principle is  equally applicable  to an enactment authorising levy of a tax for  a public purpose. The power to tax is a sovereign power and is legislative  in character and it has to be exercised  within the  constitutional  limitations. The statutes  relating  to municipal  taxes  may be changed according to  the  existing legislative  rules of State policy unless forbidden  by  the Constitution from doing so. [202G-H]     Irregular assessment may also be regularised with retro- spective effect within the Constitutional limitations. Where the Court has not already declared invalid a taxing  measure which was of doubtful validity, it is permissible for appro- priate legislature to validate it by retrospective  legisla- tion. No legal fiction is involved in such a case. [203A-C]     The  G.O. itself covered the period after the repeal  of the old Act and till the date of commencement of the  fourth amendment  so  that  no interregnum was  really  there.  The assessment  made according to the provisions of the old  Act were validated as actions taken by the Council 383 pursuant  to the impugned G.O. and not under the  provisions of  the old Act which was already repealed. While  referring to  the  old Act, the G.O. did not revive the Act  but  only prescribed  the same procedure as was found in the  repealed Act as a transitory measure. [203B-C]     Janapada  Sabha  Chhindwara  v.  The  Central  Provim’es Syndicate Ltd. and Anr., [1970] 3 SCR 745, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2494  of 1978.     From  the  Judgment and Order dated 9.12.  1977  of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. 465 of 1976. A. Subba Rao for the Appellant.     A.S.  Nambiar, B. Parthasarthy, G. Prabhakar and K.  Ram

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Kumar for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the common Judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismiss- ing two writ appeals and a writ petition. The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) District Municipalities Act, 1920 (hereinafter referred  to as the ’old Act’) was applicable to  Vijayawada Municipality  of Andhra Pradesh and property tax was  levied under  that Act. The Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act  1965 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act’) came into force on 2.4.1965. Section 2(11) of the new Act defined "council"  to mean  "a  municipal  council constituted  under  this  Act." Section 391(1) of the new Act repealed the old Act.  Section 389 of the new Act provided: "389.  Act  to be read subject to Schedule IX in  regard  to first reconstitution of a council etc.: In  regard  to the first constitution of a council  for  any local  area under Section 3. or to the first  reconstitution in accordance with the provisions of this Act, of a  council in  existence at the commencement thereof, and otherwise  in first giving effect to the provisions of this Act, this  Act shall be read subject to the rules in schedule IX." 384 The  Schedule IX to the new Act contained  the  transitional provisions in the rules therein. Rule 12 thereof dealt  with levy of taxes etc. and said: "12. Levy of taxes etc. Any tax, cess or fee which was being lawfully  levied by or on behalf of any council at the  com- mencement of this Act and which may be lawfully levied under this Act, shall notwithstanding any change in the method  or manner  of  assessment or levy of such tax, cess or  fee  be levied by or on behalf of the council at such rate as may be prevailing at such commencement or at such other rate as may be determined by the council from time to time, by a resolu- tion  for the year in which this Act is brought into  force, and unless the Government by general or special order other- wise direct, for subsequent years also."     The result was that tax lawfully levied and continued to be  levied under the old Act had to be continued unless  the council  by resolution determined such other rate from  time to  time,  and unless the Government by general  or  special order otherwise directed under the transitional  provisions. On  18.9. 1969 the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued  G.O. Ms. No. 749 M.A. in exercise of its powers under the  afore- said  Rule  12 of Schedule IX directing that  all  Municipal Councils,  shall with effect from 1.4.70 levy  the  Property tax as per the provisions of the new Act. But due to certain administrative  difficulties the revision could not be  com- pleted  before  1.4.  1970 and  the  Government,  therefore. issued G.O. Ms. No. 293 M.A. dated 18.4. 1970 directing  the Municipal Council to levy the property tax as per the provi- sions  of the new Act from 1.10. 1970. By another  G.O.  Ms. No.  81  M.A. dated 30.1.1971 the  Government  directed  the Municipal  Council  of vijayawada to continue  to  levy  the property tax under the provisions of the old Act as  certain rate  payers had filed writ petition in the High  Court  and obtained  stay. However, by G.O. Ms. No. 675 M.A.  the  G.O. Ms. No. 81 was rescinded and the Vijayawada Municipal  Coun- cil  was directed to collect revised taxes under the  provi- sions  of  the  new Act with effect from  1.10.  1970.  This latter  G.O. Ms. No. 675 was in its turn rescinded  by  G.O. Ms.  No. 255 M.A. dated 15.6.73 whereby the  Government  or- dered  that the Vijayawada Municipal Council shall  continue to levy the property tax under the provisions of the old Act and that G.O. was to be deemed to have come into force from

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1.10.1970. As a result the Vijayawada Municipality continued to levy and enhance the property tax under the provisions of the old Act. It 385 may  be mentioned that under s. 82 of the old Act  property, tax  was levied on the basis of gross annual  rental  value, whereas  under s. 87 of the new Act the basis of  assessment in owner occupied building was the capital value thereof  to be determined in the prescribed manner.     The  G.O.  Ms. No. 255 dated 15.6.73 was  challenged  by house  property owners in the High Court in two  writ  peti- tions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking writ  in  the nature of mandamus or order or  direction  re- straining the Vijayawada Municipal Council from enforcing it and  declaring the same illegal and void. It was inter  alia contended  before the learned Single Judge that  by  earlier G.Os.  the Government having directed that taxes  should  be levied under the new Act, the transitional power under  rule 12 had been already exercised and the power to levy any  tax under  the old Act therefore ceased and it was not  open  to the Government to rescind the previous orders and  re-direct taxes  to be levied under the old Act. That  contention  was accepted observing: "The language of the Rule is clear that once the  Government by a general or special order, otherwise directs, the  power to levy tax under the old Act is exhausted." Even  so, it was held that in view of the provisions  in  s. 4(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities (Fourth Amendment) Act  (23 of 1975) which validated the actions  taken,  those could not be challenged as invalid. The submissions that the Amendment Act was not retrospective and that the enhancement of  the tax was not made following the procedure  prescribed by  law,  were  also negatived holding  that  the  procedure prescribed under the old Act was followed inasmuch as  under the old Act the property tax was levied on the basis of only rental  value whereas under the new Act it was on the  basis either of the rental value or of the capital value, and that under the old Act when tax was being levied on the basis  of rental  value  there was no need to  ascertain  the  capital value of the land and for enhancing the assessment all  that the  authority  had to know was whether there  had  been  an increase  in the rent and Rule 6 of Schedule II which  dealt with the value of the building for the purposes of  property tax  was inapplicable as the levy under the old Act  on  the basis of rental value and enhancement could be done  accord- ing  to the procedure contained in Schedule VII Rule  10  of the  old Act. It was not denied that special notice  as  re- quired under the old Act was given. The writ petitions  were accordingly dismissed. 386     Two  writ  appeals were filed by the  writ  petitioners. Another writ petition having raised identical questions  was heard with the two appeals by the Division Bench. The  Divi- sion  Bench held that the finding of the Single  Bench  that having already given directions by the General Orders  under the transitory provision of Schedule IX Rule 12 the  Govern- ment’s power under that provision ceased and it had no power to  rescind that order and direct that the taxes which  were under the old Act must be continued to be collected was  not challenged  before  it.  The Division Bench  held  that  the Fourth Amendment Act had entrusted to the Municipal Councils the power to tax under the old Act, though that Act had been repealed. It held that though the actions of the  Vijayawada Municipal  Council pursuant to the General Order might  have been  invalid those were validated by s. 4(1) of the  Fourth

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Amendment  Act.  It was also held that the  appellant  could pursue their remedies by way of revision under the new  Act. Thus,  the  Division  Bench having dismissed  the  two  writ appeals  as well as the writ petition by the impugned  judg- ment and also having refused the certificate, the  appellant has obtained special leave.     Mr. A. Subba Rao, the learned counsel for the appellant, submits  that under the old Act the basis for assessment  of property tax was the annual rental value while under the new Act it was capital value. By the G.O. No. 749 the Government having directed that property tax would be levied under  the new  Act,  the subsequent G.Os.passed after  rescinding  the said  G.O.  No. 749 and redirecting assessment  to  be  made under  the old Act were invalid as was held by  the  Single- Bench  and that finding was not challenged before the  Divi- sion Bench. Consequently, it is submitted, during the period from  1969  to  1973 there was no valid law  to  enable  the Municipal  Council to levy taxes under the old Act  and  the actions  under the G.Os. are sought to be validated  by  the Fourth Amendment Act of 1975, but unless the substantive law relating to the method of assessment was also amended retro- spectively,  the invalid actions could not be validated,  as that law could not be deemed to have been in existence by  a legal  fiction.  Council submits that s. 87 of the  new  Act relating to levy of Property Tax was amended so as to  bring it  in conformity with the corresponding provision of s.  20 of  the old Act which prescribed rental value as  the  basis for  assessment. It is pointed out that s. 3 of  the  Fourth Amendment  Act did not contain any indication that the  said amendment was retrospective so as to bring it on the statute book by a fiction prior to 1973 when the invalid  assessment was made. The Fourth Amendment Act came into force only from 10th  June,  1975 which was the date of the  Ordinance.  The amendment of s. 87 of the new Act 387 being  not retrospective in its operation prior to 1973,  it is  submitted  that the invalid assessments could  not  have been validated.     Mr.  A.S. Nambiar, the learned counsel for the  respond- ents, submits that the old Act entitled the Municipality  to collect  the  taxes which had been collected  in  accordance with law and after coming into force of the new Act  accord- ing  to the intermediate G.Os.; and that the  impugned  G.O. Ms.  No. 255 dated 15.6.73 having directed the taxes  to  be levied  and collected in accordance with the old Act,  there was. no infirmity in the Judgments of the High Court.     It  appears  that after the writ  petitions  were  filed challenging  G.O. Ms. No. 255 dated 15.6.73  the  Government issued  the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities (Amendment)  Ordi- nance  1975  (Ordinance 1 of 1975) which became  the  Andhra Pradesh  Municipalities (Fourth Amendment) Act,  1975  which was  deemed to have come into force on the 10th June,  1975. By the said Amendment act not only ss. 85 and 87 of the  new Act were amended but also certain intervening actions of the Municipal  Council were sought to be validated.  Section  85 dealt with levy of tax and sub-section (1) thereof said: "Where the council by resolution determines that a  property tax shall be levied, such tax shall be levied on a11  build- ings  and lands within the municipal limits save  those  ex- empted by or under this Act or any other law." Sub-section (2) provided: "Save  as otherwise provided in this Act and subject to  the provisions  of ss. 81 & 87 and in accordance with the  rules made by the Government in this behalf, these taxes shall  be levied  .....

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Section  2 of the Fourth Amendment Act amended s. 85 of  the new  Act by substituting clauses (a) and (b) of  sub-section (2) excluding the proviso thereto, by the following words: "At such percentages of the annual rental value of lands  or buildings or both as may be fixed by the council." Section 86 of the new Act provided as follows: "86. Levy of property tax on a direction by Government: 388 (1) The Government may, after consultation with the  council by order published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, direct any council to levy the property tax referred to in  sub-section (1) of Section 81 or any class of such tax, at such rate and with effect from such date, not being earlier than the first day of the half year immediately following that in which the order is published, as may be specified in the order. (2) When an order under sub-section (1) has been  published, the  provisions of this Act relating to property  tax  shall apply  as if the council had. on the date of publication  of such order, by resolution, determined to levy the tax at the rate  and with effect from the date specified in  the  order and  as if no other resolution of the council under  Section 81  determining  the rate at which and the date  from  which property tax shall be levied, had taken effect. (3) A council shall not alter the rate at which the property tax  of any class or such tax is levied in pursuance  of  an order under sub-section (1) or abolish such tax except  with the previous sanction of the Government." Section 87(1) of the new Act provided: "87(1)  Every building shall be assessed together  with  its site and other adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereto  unless  the owner of the building  is  a  different person from the owner of such site or premises.,’ By s. 3 of the Fourth Amendment Act in sub-section (2) of s. 87  of  the new Act the following  words  were  substituted, namely: "(2) The annual rental value of lands and buildings Shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which they may reason- ably be expected to let from month to month or from year  to year less a deduction, in the case of buildings, of ten  per cent of that portion of such annual rent which is attributa- ble  to the buildings alone, apart from their sites and  the adjacent lands occupied as an appurtenance thereto; and  the said deduction shall be in lieu of all allowance for repairs or on any other account whatever. 389 Provided that in respect of any building and the land appur- tenant thereto, the fair rent of which has been fixed  under section  4 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent  and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the gross annual rent shall  be the annual amount of the fair rent so fixed." Section 4 of the Fourth Amendment Act sought to validate the actions taken earlier by providing as under: "4(1)  Notwithstanding  anything in the  provisions  of  the principal Act or any order of the Government made under  the rule  12  in Schedule IX to the  Principal  Act,  any,action taken  till  the commencement of this Act by  any  municipal council to continue to levy and collect the property tax  in accordance  with the method or manner or assessment or  levy as  provided  in the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra  Area)  District Municipalities  Act, 1920 or the Andhra  Pradesh  (Telangana Area) District Municipalities Act, 1956, as the case may be, shall  not  be  deemed to be invalid or ever  to  have  been invalid  by  reason only of the fact that  such  action  was taken  by the said municipal council during the period  when the  power in this behalf had not been validly entrusted  to

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it in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act or the rules made thereunder and accordingly: (a)  The levy and collection of property tax made in  pursu- ance of such action shall for all purposes be deemed to  be, and to have always been, made in accordance with law; and (b)  no  suit  or other proceeding shall  be  instituted  or continued  in any court against the municipal  council  con- cerned  or any person or authority whatsoever on its  behalf on the ground only that any such action or levy and  collec- tion was not taken or made in accordance with law. (2)  Notwithstanding anything in sections 85 and 87  of  the Principal  Act  as  amended by this Act,  the  property  tax levied  in accordance with the provisions of  the  Principal Act as it stood before the commencement of this Act by  such of the municipalities as have come into existence after  the commencement  of  the principal Act shall  continue  to.  be levied and collected by or on behalf of the Municipal 390 Council of any such municipality for the year commencing  on the 1st April, 1975 ." Admittedly the validity of the Fourth Amendment Act had  not been  challenged  in the High Court. In fact it  was  passed during the pendency of the writ petitions in the High Court. Mr  Suba Rao’s submission is that s. 3 of the Fourth  Amend- ment Act having not been made retrospective, s. 4 of the Act could not have said that the levy and collection of property tax  made  in pursuance of such action for all  purposes  be deemed to be and to have always been made in accordance with law.     It  is true that only sub-section (2) of Section  87  of the  new Act was substituted as stated above by  the  Fourth Amendment Act. However. once the amendment substituted  sub- section (2) of s. 87 it formed a part of that section.  This amendment  only  provided  the basis of  assessment  and  it itself did not provide for the commencement of such calcula- tion which however might be taken from the other  provisions of  the  new Act or from the General Orders  issued  by  the Government.  Section  4(1) of the Fourth Amendment  Act  ex- pressly validated any action taken till the commencement  of that  Act notwithstanding anything in the provisions of  the new  Act  or in any Government Order made under rule  12  of Schedule IX of the new Act and the Municipal Council  should continue to levy and collect the property tax in  accordance with the method or manner of assessment or levy as  provided in  the  old Act and those acts shall not be  deemed  to  be invalid  or ever to have been invalid by reason only of  the fact that such action was taken by the said municipal  coun- cil during the period when the power in this behalf had  not been  validly entrusted to it in accordance with the  provi- sions  of the new Act or the rules made thereunder and  that the levy and collection of property tax may in pursuance  of such  action shall for all purposes be deemed to be, and  to have  always  been, made in accordance with  law.  From  the above  provisions of s. 4( 1 ) of the Fourth  Amendment  Act there is no doubt that the legislature intended to  validate the actions taken under the general orders and under the old as  well  as  the new Act. It may be  interpreted  that  the impugned  G.O. having been validated, the tenure covered  by it  must  also be held to have been covered by it,  so  that there was really no interregnum in the process or  procedure of assessment of property tax.     Mr.  Subba Rao relies on Janapada Sabha,  Chhindwara  v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Anr., [1970] 3  SCR 745.  In  that case in 1935, the  Independent  Mining  Local Board, Chhindwara con-

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391 stituted under C.P. Local Self Government Act, 1920 resolved to  levy a cess on coal extracted within the area at 3  pies per  ton. The sanction of the Local Government, as  required by s. 51(2) of the Act, was obtained for the levy. In  1943, the  levy was enhanced to 4 pies, in 1946 to 7 pies  and  in 1947 to 9 pies. The validity of the enhanced levy was  chal- lenged  and this Court, in appeal, held that  the  increased levy  would also require the previous sanction of the  Local Government  and such sanction not having been obtained,  the levy  at  a rate higher than 3 pies was illegal.  The  State legislature  thereafter  enacted the Madhya  Pradesh  Koyala Upkar  (Manyatakaran) Adhiniyam, 1964. Section 2(a) of  that act  defined  "Board" to mean the independent  Mining  Local Board, Chhindwara and its successor body the Janapada  Sabha Chhindwara,  the appellant, constituted under the  C.P.  and Berar  Local  Government  Act, 1948.  Section  2(b)  defined "cess"  to  mean "a cess imposed by the  independent  Mining Local  Board  Chhindwara or its successor" Section  3(1)  of that  Act provided that ’notwithstanding a judgment  of  any court, cesses imposed, assessed or collected by the Board in pursuance  of  the notifications specified in  the  Schedule shall.  for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have  been validly  imposed. assessed or collected as if the  enactment under which they were issued stood amended at material times so as to empower the Board to issue the said  notifications. In the Schedule were specified three notifications enhancing the rate of cess. On the question whether the enhanced  levy was validated by the 1964 Act, this Court held that the  Act did  not give legal effect to the imposition of cess at  the enhanced rates. It was pointed out that the text or even the nature  of the amendments was not disclosed  though  Section 51(2)  of  the  1920 Act could not be deemed  to  have  been repealed  by the 1964 Act, because the latter Act, in  terms was  limited  in its application to the  Independent  Mining Local Board, Chhindwara, and its successor body and only  in respect  of the three notifications specified in the  Sched- ule. An Act so limited in its application to one Local Board and  to  specified notification could not  repeal  the  sub- section which applied to all Boards. Nor was there  anything to indicate that notifications issued by the appellant-Board without the sanction of the State Government must be  deemed to  have been issued validly. It was held that such  an  in- tendment could not be implied without express language, in a taxing statute. It was further observed that it was open  to the  legislature within certain limits to amend  the  provi- sions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what the  law shall  be deemed to have been. But the Legislature, in  that case  attempted to overrule or set aside a decision  of  the Court.  It  was not open to the Legislature to  say  that  a judgment  of  a Court properly constituted and  rendered  in exercise of its powers in a matter brought 392 before  it  shall be deemed to be ineffective  either  as  a precedent  or between the parties. That case is,  therefore, clearly  distinguishable  from the instant  case  on  facts. Firstly,  in  the instant case there is no question  of  any judgment  of any Court having been overruled or  set  aside. The  Single Bench Judgment was passed on 23.3.76,  that  is, after  the Amendment Act which came into force  on  10.6.75. Secondly  the language of Section 4(1) is very clear  as  to the  intention of the legislature as to the contents of  the amendment. What the amendment in the instant case did was to amend the new Act and also validate actions taken under  the G.O.  impugned in the case. What was prescribed by  the  im-

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pugned  G.O. was the same as was prescribed by the  old  Act which  itself stood repealed by the new Act.  The  procedure thus prescribed was one under the G.O. and not under the old Act, and Section 4(1) validated those actions without reviv- ing the repealed old Act itself but by amending the new  Act and validating the transitory measure taken by virtue of the Government’s orders issued under the transitional  provision Schedule IX, of the new Act particularly Rule 12 thereunder. The  validity of Section 4(1) itself having not  been  chal- lenged, it was not open for the Courts to give. an interpre- tation contrary to the clear and unequivocal language of the Section.  The rule is that an amendment Act must be read  as if  the  words of amendment had been written  into  the  Act except where that would lead to an inconsistency.  (Shamarao V.  Parulekar  v.  The District  Magistrate,  Thana  Bombay, [1952] 3 SCR 683 at 689) Power of the legislature to pass  a law includes the power to validate actions  retrospectively, of  course, within Constitutional limitations. It is apt  to remember  that the State’s power to tax is derived from  the Constitution and the municipality’s power to tax is  derived from  the State Legislature which could delegate that  power in  the  manner the Constitution permits  to  the  municipal council,  an agent of the State Government, and the  munici- pality cannot refuse to raise taxes as directed. The  proper authority  to  determine  what should and  what  should  not constitute a public burden is the Legislature of the  State. This  is not only true for the State itself but it  is  also true  in  respect of each municipality of the  State;  these inferior corporate bodies having only such authority in this regard as the legislature shall confer upon them. A  statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it is  specifi- cally challenged and the principle is equally applicable  to an enactment authorising levy of a tax for a public purpose. The power to tax is a sovereign power and is legislative  in character  and it has to be exercised within  the  Constitu- tional limitations. The statutes relating to municipal taxes may  be changed according to the existing legislative  rules of  State policy unless forbidden by the  Constitution  from doing so. Irregular assessment may 393 also  be regularised with retrospective effect  within.  the same  Constitutional  limitations. Where the Court  has  not already  declared  invalid  a taxing measure  which  was  of doubtful validity, it is permissible for appropriate  legis- lature to validate it by retrospective legislation. No legal fiction is involved in such a case. Mr. Subba Rao’s  submis- sion has, therefore, to be rejected.     We  find force in the submission of Mr. Nambiar in  this regard.  The  G.O. impugned before the High Court  has  been covered  and  validated by the above  provisions,  the  G.O. itself  covered the period after the repeal of the  old  Act and till the date of commencement of the Fourth Amendment so that  no interregnum was really there. The  assessment  made according to the provisions of the old Act were validated as actions  taken by the council pursuant to the impugned  G.O. and  not under the provisions of the old Act which  was  al- ready repealed. While referring to the old Act, the G.O. did not revive the Act but only prescribed the same procedure as was found in the repealed Act as a transitory measure.     The  validity  of s. 4(1) of the  Fourth  Amendment  Act having not been challenged before the High Court, we do  not find  any  infirmity in the impugned judgments of  the  High Court.     In  the result, this appeal fails and is  dismissed  but under  the facts and circumstances of the case  without  any

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order as to costs. Y. Lal                                Appeal dismissed. 394