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PETITIONER: SEVAKA PERUMAL, ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF TAMIL NADU

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/05/1991

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. AHMADI, A.M. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1463            1991 SCR  (2) 711  1991 SCC  (3) 471        JT 1991 (2)   546  1991 SCALE  (1)914

ACT:      Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 302 read with  section 34  and  section 120-B, 364 and 392 read with  section  397- Enticing  yound boys to bring cash  and  jewellery-Murdering them  for gain and throwing into well etc.-Recovery of  dead body-Whether absolutely necessary to convict accused-Benefit of doubt-Whether a relevant factor in imposing sentence.      Criminal  Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 114  and  133- Evidence of approver-Nature of corroboration required.      Penology:  Award  of  sentence-Showing  undue  sympathy harmful to justice system-Would undermine public confidence- Hence  courts to award proper sentence having regard to  the nature  of  the  offence  and the manner  in  which  it  was executed.

HEADNOTE:      According  to the Prosecution, appellants 1 and 2  have been  friends  and were in the habit of  selling  ganja  and spending money lavishly.  They attempted to commit theft  in their  locality,  but were no successful.   Therefore,  they hatched  a conspiracy to entice boys from affluent  families to  bring  cash and jewellery and murder them  after  taking away  the  cash and jewellary. Likewise, they killed 4  boys, in a span of about 5 years.      Both  of them were charged with offences under  section 120B read with section 34 IPC, section 364 and 392 read with section  397 IPC in all the four cases filed  against  them, and  were convicted by the Sessions Court.  However, in  one case, on appeal, they were acquitted by the High Court.   In another  case,  the death sentence imposed by  the  Sessions Court is pending confirmation by the High Court.      In  the  other  two cases,  both  the  appellants  were sentenced to                                                        712 death  by  the Sessions Court and on appeal the  High  Court confirmed  the  sentence in one case and in the  other,  the High  Court  confirmed  the death  sentence  passed  against appellant  No. 1 and acquitted appellants No. 2 of  all  the charges.      The   appellants   preferred   the   present    appeals challenging the said order of the High Court confirming  the

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sentences  against  them  by contending that  there  was  no proper identification of the dead body and that the approver was  not a reliable witness and since his evidence  did  not receive   corroboration,  it  cannot  form  the  basis   for convicting  the appellants.  It was also contended that  the extreme penalty of death sentence imposed was not justified.      Dismissing the appeals, this Court,      HELD:  1.1 In a trial for murder it is not an  absolute necessity  or  an essential ingredient to  establish  corpus delicti.   The  fact  of  death  of  the  deceased  must  be established  like  any other fact.  Corpus delicti  in  some cases  may not be possible to be traced or recovered.  If  a murder  was  committed  and the dead body  was  thrown  into flowing  tidal river or stream or burnt out, it is  unlikely that  the  dead body may be recovered.  If recovery  of  the dead body, therefore, is an absolute necessity to convict an accused, in many a case the accused would manage to see that the  dead  body is destroyed etc.  and that would  afford  a complete immunity to the guilty from being punished and  the accused  would  escape even when the offence  of  murder  is proved.   What, therefore, is required to base a  conviction for  an offence of murder is that there should  be  reliable and acceptable evidence that the offence of murder, like any other factum, of death was committed and it must be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, although the dead body may not be traced. [717A-D]      1.2  In the instant case, the evidence of PWs. 7 to  10 would  establish  that they have seen the dead body  of  the deceased  in the well and brought it out and the  photograph was  taken at the time of inquest.  It was identified to  be that  of  the deceased by no other than the  mother  of  the deceased. Thus there is no doubt as regards the identity  of the  dead body.  Also the medical evidence establishes  that the  deceased died due to stabbing with sharp  edged  weapon like knife. [717E]      2.  Law  is  settled that an approver  is  a  competent witness  against  the  accused person.  But  the  court,  to satisfy  its conscience, insists as caution and prudence  to seek, as a rule, corroboration to the evidence                                                        713 of  the  approver,  a particips  criminis  from  independent evidence  occular or circumstantial, of general  particulars regarding  the  story  spoken  of by  the  approver  of  the commission  of the crime and the part played by the  accused therein to find whether it is true and worthy of acceptance. The  reliability  of the evidence of an approver  should  be considered from totality of the facts and circumstances.  In one  of  the  two trials there is no  dispute  that  such  a corroborative  evidence  connecting both  the  appellant  is available  which was minutely considered by the trial  court and the High Court and was accepted.  There is infirmity  in that  regard.   In  the  other trial  appellant  No.  2  was acquitted  on the ground that his extra-judicial  confession made  to  PW  23,  the  only  corroborative  evidence,   was disbelieved  by the High Court.  Both the Courts below  gave categorical  finding that PW 1 is a reliable  witness.   The evidence   of  the  approver  received  corroboration   from independent  evidence.  The canopy of the material  evidence from  independent  sources  sufficiently  corroborates   the approver’s   evidence.   He  is  a  reliable  witness.    No infirmity  has been pointed out to disbelieve his  evidence. [719D-H; 720A]      Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, [1952] SCR 377; S. Swaminathan  v.  State of Madras, AIR 1957  SC  340;  Sarwan Singh  v. The State of Punjab, , [1957] SCR 953; B.D.  Patil

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v.  State of Maharashtra, [1963] 3 SCR 830; Md. Hussan  Umar Kochra  etc. v. K.S. Dalipsinghji & Anr., [1970] 1 SCR  130; Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan, [1973] 3 SCC 805 and Abdul Sattar  v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, [1985] (Suppl.)  SCC 599, relied on.      King  v.  Baskervilli,  [1916] 2 K.B.  658  (C.A.)  and Mahadeo v. The King, AIR 1936 P.C. 242, referred to.      3.  In the instant case, it is clear from the  evidence that  the accused indulged in illegal business  of  purchase and  sale of ganja.  They conspired to entice innocent  boys from affluent families, took them to far flung places  where the  dead  body could not be identified.  The  letters  were written  to the parents purporting to be by the deceased  to delude  the parents that the missing boy would one day  come home  alive and that they would not give any report  to  the police and the crime would go undetected.  Four murders in a span of five years were committed for gain in cold  blooded, premeditated and planned way.  In this case the trial of the murder  relating to the two deceased practically took  place simultaneously  by which date the appellants were  convicted for the murder of two other boys.  Therefore, the  reference of  conviction and sentence by the Sessions Court  to  those two cases also are relevant facts. One of the deceased is no other than the nephew of appellants No. 1.  This                                                        714 would establish his depravity and hardened criminality.   No regard for precious lives of innocent young boys was  shown. They  adopted  the crime of murder for gain as  a  means  to living.   As  such  there is no infirmity  in  the  sentence awarded  by  the Sessions Court and confirmed  by  the  High Court. [721D-G]      4. The doctrine of benefit of doubt only would  operate in proof of the commission of the offence.  If there is  any reasonable  doubt,  not the doubt of vacillating mind  of  a Judge,  the  accused  is entitled to  that  benefit  and  be acquitted.  The benefit of doubt again does not enter in the area of consideration of imposing sentence. [720C]      5.1. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do  harm  to  the justice system  to  undermine  the  public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under serious threats.  If the courts did not protect the  injured  the  injured  would  then  resort  to  private vengeance.   It  is, therefore, the duty of every  court  to award  proper  sentence having regard to the nature  of  the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. [721C]      5.2.  The  compassionate grounds such  as  the  accused being young bread-winners of the family etc. would always be present in most casts and are not relevant for  interference with the sentence. [722D]      6. Under section 235(2) when the accused has been given right  to  be  heard on the question of  sentence  it  is  a valuable right. To make that right meaningful the  procedure adopted  would be suitably moulded and the accused given  an opportunity  to  adduce  evidence  on  the  nature  of   the sentence.  The hearing may be on the same day if the parties are ready or to a next date but once the court after  giving opportunity,  proposes to impose appropriate sentence  again there is no need to adjourn the case under section 235(2) to next date.  In the present matters the counsel was  directed by  the  High Court to show any additional  grounds  on  the question of sentence, but the counsel was unable to give any additional ground. [722B-C]

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JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal  Nos. 345-346 of 1991.      From  the  Judgement and Order dated 14.6.1990  of  the Madras  High Court in Referred Trial Nos. 4/89 and 5/89  and Crl. Appeal Nos. 593/89 and 594 of 1989.                                                        715      Raju  Ramachandran, Jaga Rao, Alok Agarwal, Ms.  Malini Bhat and S. Ravindra Bhatt for the appellants.      V.R.   Karthikeyan   and  V.  Krishnamurthy   for   the respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      K. RAMASAWAMY, J. Special leave to appeals granted.      Heard the learned counsel, Sri Raju Ramachandran amicus curiae  for  the appellants and Sri  V.  Krishnamurthy,  the learned  Standing  Counsel for the  State.   The  appellants Sevaka Perumal and Isakkimuthu for short ’A-1’ and ’A-2’  in Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1842/90 are  accused in  Sessions Case No. 283 of 1986 on the file of  the  Addl. Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli Sessions Division and appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1989 and R.T. No. 4 of 1989 by judgment,  dated June 14, 1990 of the High Court of  Madras. Criminal  Appeal  arise out of S.L.P.  (Crl.)  No.  1841/90; Sessions Case No. 284 of 1986 of the same Sessions  Division and  Criminal  Appeal No. 593 and R.T. No. 5 of  1989  dated June 14, 1990 of the Madras High Court respectively, A-1  is the  appellant.  In each case the Sessions  Court  convicted them under ss. 120B, 364, 392 read with s. 397; s. 302  read with  s. 34 I.P.C. and sentenced to death.  In  Crl.  Appeal No.  594  of  1989 and R.T. No. 4 of 1989,  the  High  Court confirmed  the conviction and sentence of death of both  the appellants.   In Crl. Appeal No. 593 of 1989 and R.T. No.  5 of  1989,  the  High  Court  confirmed  the  conviction  and sentenced  of death of the A-1 and acquitted A-2 of all  the charges.      The  case  of  the prosecution in brief   is  that  the appellants  and PW-1, the approver belonged  to  kidarakulam village  and became friends.  A-1 used to bring  money  form the  timber  shop of his brother-in-law (PW-4)  in  Sessions Case No. 284/86 in whose shop A-1 had worked.  They used  to go  to  various  places. A-1 used  to  purchase  ganja  from chenglapatai  and other places and A-1 and A-2 used to  sell them.  Yet they did not have enough money to spend lavishly. They attempted to commit theft in the localities but  became impracticable.   Therefore,  they conspired to  entice  boys from  affluent  families to bring cash  and  jewellery  from their houses; take them to far away places; take their money or jewellery and to murder them for gain.  Pursuant  thereto in 1978 they murdered one Athippan; in 1981 one Chelladurai; in  March,  1982  one  Hariramachandran  and  in  1983   one Christodas.   In Sessions Case No. 283/86, the deceased  boy is Athiappan.  In                                                        716 Sessions   Case   No.   284/86,   the   deceased   boy    is Hariramachandran.   Sessions Case No. 282/86 on the file  of the  Sessions Court.  Madurai Division relates  to  deceased Chelladurai.    Therein  also  we  are  informed  that   the appellants were convicted but on appeal they were acquitted. In  sessions  Case relating to the death of  Christodas,  it also  ended in conviction and sentence of death was  imposed on  the appellants and is pending confirmation in  the  High Court.      It  is sufficient to set out the material fact  leaving out  the minor details in Sessions Case No. 284/86  to  meet

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the  points raised by the counsel for the  appellants.   A-1 enticed  the deceased, Hariramachandran, his  nephew  (elder sister PW-2’ son) to bring jewellery from the house  of PW-2 and PW-4.  The appellants and PW-1 took him to Madurai.   On the  way the deceased went to the house of PW-3  and  handed over one chain to be delivered to his mother and took M.O. 1 chain  with  him.   A-1 had taken a room  in  the  lodge  at Madurai  run  by PW-16.  On coming to know  that  they  were staying in Madurai, PW-2, PW-4, her husband and PW-3 went to the  lodge and the deceased was found threat.   He  informed them  that the chain was with A-1 and he would come  in  the evening  at 8.00 p.m.  After waiting for some time and  when it was getting dark, the ladies went away asking PW-4 to get the  chain and the deceased after A-1’s arrival. While  PW-4 was  waiting the deceased went down stairs and  after  A-1’s arrival told him of his mother’s coming etc. and from  there they went away to Madras,  and having come to know that they left  the place PW-4 left to his village.  On the  next  day they   returned  to  Madurai.   From  there  they  went   to Usilampatti and A-1 then purchased a knife at the Bus  Stand without  the  knowledge  of the deceased  and  proceeded  to Peraiyar  road.  They sat near a jungle stream.   While  A-1 and  the deceased Harirmachandran were sitting near a  stone on the southern side of the road, A-2 and PW-1 were standing at  a distance, A-1 stabbed Harirmachandran in  his  stomach with  a knife and the deceased collapsed on the stone.   A-1 threw away the knife in the river.  He threw the deceased in the nearby well and washed his hands and legs in the stream. They  returned  to Usilampatti Bus Stand.  From  there  they came  to Madurai.  A-1 sold M.O. 1 chain to PW-24  and  gave one  hundred rupees each to PW-1 and A-2.  This evidence  of PW-1 received sufficient corroboration from the evidence  of prosecution witnesses.      Sri Raju Ramachandran contended that the dead body  was admittedly found in a highly decomposed condition.  There is no  proper  identification  of the dead body to  be  of  the deceased. The                                                     717 mother PW-2 identified only with reference to the photograph taken of the dead body.  There is evidence that the deceased wrote  a letter of leaving to unknown  destination.   Unless there   is   proof   that   the   dead   body   belongs   to Hariramachandran,  it  is not safe to convict to  A-1  to  a capital  punishment of death sentence.  We find no force  in the contention.  In a trial for murder it is not an absolute necessity  or  an essential ingredient to  establish  corpus delicti.   The  fact  of  death  of  the  deceased  must  be established  like  any other fact.  Corpus delicti  in  some cases  may not be possible to be traced or recovered.   Take for  instance that a murder was committed and the dead  body was  thrown into flowing tidal river or steam or burnt  out. It  is  unlikely that the dead body may  be  recovered.   If recovery  of  the  dead  body,  therefore,  is  an  absolute necessity to convict an accused, in many a case the  accused would manage to see that the dead body is destroyed etc. and would  afford a complete immunity to the guilty  from  being punished and would escape even when the offence of murder is proved.   What, therefore, is required to base a  conviction for  an offence of murder is that there should  be  reliable and acceptable evidence that the offence of murder, like any other  factum, of death was committed and it must be  proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, although the dead body may  not be traced.  In this case the evidence of PWs.-7  to 10 would establish that they have seen the dead body of  the deceased Hariramachandran in the well and brought it out and

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the  photograph  was taken at the time of inquest.   It  was identified  to be that of the deceased by no other than  his mother, PW-2.  Thus we have no hesitation to hold that there is  no  doubt as regards the identity of the dead  body  and that  the  medical evidence establishers that  the  deceased died due to stabbing with sharp edged weapon like knife.      It  is next contended that PW-1 being an approver,  his evidence must be reliable and must receive corroboration  on all material particulars from independent evidence.  PW-1 is neither a reliable witness nor did his evidence receive such corroboration.    Therefore,  his evidence cannot  form  the basis to convict the appellants.  It is his contention  that in  Hariramachandran’s death case the evidence of  PW-1  was not  accepted  as regards the complicity of A-2 and  he  was acquitted.  Therefore, PW-1 is not a reliable witness.  This contention  too  is  devoid of any force.   PW-1  had  given wealth of details of commission of the crimes.  Under s. 133 of  the  Evidence Act 1 of 1872, an accomplice  shall  be  a competent   witness  against  an  accused  person;   and   a conviction  is not illegal merely  because it proceeds  upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.  Section  114 illustration  (b) postulates that an accomplice is  unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in mate-                                                   718 rial particulars.  In King v. Baskervilli, [1916] 2 K.B. 658 (C.A.)    Lord   Reading,  CJ,  laid  the  test   that   the corroboration  need not be direct evidence that the  accused committed the crime. It is merely circumstantial evidence of his   connection  with  the  crime.   The  nature   of   the corroboration   will  depend  and  vary  according  to   the particular circumstances of each case.  What is required  is some  additional  evidence rendering it  probable  that  the story  of the accomplice is true and that it  is  reasonably safe to act upon. In Mahadeo v. The King AIR 1936 P. C.  242 the judicial committee held that the evidence of an accesory must  be corroborated in some material particulars not  only bearing  upon the facts of the crime but upon the  accused’s implication in it.  This Court in Rameshwar v. The State  of Rajasthan,  [1952] S.C.R. 377 held that it is not  necessary that  there  should  be independent  confirmation  of  every material  circumstance  in the sense  that  the  independent evidence  of  the  case, apart from  the  testimony  of  the complainant or its accomplice should in itself be sufficient to sustain conviction.   All that is necessary is that there should be independent evidence which will make it reasonably safe  to believe that the witness’s story that  the  accused was the one that committed the offence could be  acceptable. The  corroboration  need  not be direct  evidence  that  the accused  committed  the crime.  It is sufficient  if  it  is merely  circumstantial evidence of his connection  with  the crime.   In S. Swaminathan v. State of Madras, AIR  1957  SC 340  this  Court  held  that  corroboration  of   approver’s evidence  need  not  be of a kind which  prove  the  offence against  the accused.  It is sufficient if it  connects  the accused with the crime when the accused had been charged for the  offences  of  conspiracy and of  cheating,  a  specific instance of cheating proved beyond doubt against one of  the accused would furnish the best corroboration of the  offence of the conspiracy.  In Sarwan Singh v. The State of  Punjab, [1957]  S.C.R.  953 relied by Shri Raju  Ramachandran,  this Court held that  the approver must be a reliable witness and the  evidence  must receive sufficient  corroboration.    In that  case  the  corroboration  of  minor  particulars   was accepted  to  be  sufficient  to hold  the  approver  to  be reliable  witness.  In B.D. Patil v. State  of  Maharashtra,

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[1963]  3 S.C.R. 830 this Court held that the conviction  of an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be  said to be illegal, yet the courts will, as a matter of  practice do  not  accept  the  evidence of  such  a  witness  without corroboration  in  material particulars.   There  should  be corroboration  of the approver in material  particulars  and must  be qua each accused.  In Md. Hussain Umar Kochra  etc. v.  K.S.  Dalipsinghji & Anr.,  [1970] 1 S.C.R. 130  it  was held that the combined effect of ss. 133 and 114(b) is  that though a conviction based upon accomplice evidence is  legal the court will not accept such evidence unless it is                                                    719      Corroborated    in  material   particulars.  The corroboration  must  be  from an independent  source.   If several  accomplices  simultaneously  and  without  previous concert giving consistent account of the crime  implicating accused,  the  court may accept the several  statements  as corroborating  each  other.   In  Ram  Narain  v.  State  of Rajasthan, [1973] 3 S.C.C 805 this Court held that s. 114(b) strikes  a  note of warning, cautioning the  court  that  an accomplice does not generally deserve to be believed  unless corroborated  in material particulars.  In other words,  the rule is that the necessity of corroboration is as matter  of prudence  except  when  it is safe  to  dispense  with  such corroboration  must  be clearly present to the mind  of  the Judge.   In  Abdul Sattar v.  Union  Territory,  Chandigarh, [1985] (Suppl.) S.C.C. 599 this Court  further held that  it is not safe to convict an accused on the charges like murder upon  the  evidence  of  uncorroborated  testimony  of   the approver.      Thus the settled law is that an approver is a competent witness  against  the  accused person.  But  the  court,  to satisfy  its conscience, insists as caution and prudence  to seek,  as  a  rule, corroboration to  the  evidence  of  the approver,  a  particips criminis from  independent  evidence occular or circumstantial, of general particulars  regarding the  story spoken off by the approver of the  commission  of the crime and the part played by the accused therein to find whether   it  is  true  and  worthy  of   acceptance.    The reliability  of  the  evidence  of  an  approver  should  be considered from totality of the facts and circumstances.  In the trial of Athiappan murder there is no dispute that  such a  corroborative evidence connecting both the appellants  is available  which was minutely considered by the trial  court and  the High Court and was accepted.  We find no  infirmity in   that   regard.    In  the  trial  of   the   death   of Hariramachandran, A. 2 was acquitted on the ground that  his extra-judicial   confession  made  to  P.W.  23,  the   only corroborative  evidence,was disbelieved by the  High  Court. Both  the courts below gave categorical finding that P.W.  1 is  a  reliable  witness.   the  evidence  of  the  approver received corroboration from independent evidence on  general prosecution  case, namely, P.W. 16 spoke that  the  deceased was  brought by the accused and stayed in the lodge. P.Ws  2 to  4 spoke of A-1 working in their shop, previous theft  by A-1 and M.O. 1 being missing, their attempt to take back the deceased and M.O, 1, the deed body was found in the well and was  taken out as spoke  to by P. Ws. 7to 10.   The  medical evidence  establishes the stabbing with the knife and  death was due to it.  P.W. 24 corroborates A. 1 of selling M.O.  1 chain  and  taking the money.  The canopy  of  the  material evidence from independent sources sufficiently  corroborates the approver’ evidence.                                                        720  PW-1 is a reliable witness.  No infirmity has been  pointed

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out to disbelieve his evidence.      It  is  next contended that the courts below  were  not justified in imposing the extreme penalty of death  sentence under  s. 302, I.P.C. and strongly relied upon the  judgment of Bachan Singh’s case.  It is contended that the  acquittal of  A. 2 giving the benefit of doubt  in  Hariramachandran’s death  trial introduces an element of doubt which should  be extended  to  convert  the death sentence of A.  1  to  life imprisonment.  We find no susbstance in the contention.  The doctrine of benefit of doubt only would operate in proof  of the  commission of the offence.  If there is any  reasonable doubt,  not  the doubt of vacillating mind of a  Judge,  the accused  is  entitled  to the benefit  and  acquitted.   The benefit  of  doubt  again  does not enter  in  the  area  of consideration of imposing sentence.      The   law   regulates   social   interest,   arbitrates conflicting  claims  and demands.  Security of  persons  and property  of  the  people is an essential  function  of  the State.   It  could be achieved  through  instrumentality  of criminal  law.    Undoubtedly,  there is  a  cross  cultural conflict  where  living  law must find  answer  to  the  new challenges  and  the  courts  are  required  to  mould   the sentencing system to meet the challenges.  The contagion  of lawlessenss  would  undermine  social order and  lay  it  in ruins.   Protection  of society and  stamping  out  criminal proclivity  must  be  the object  of  law    which  must  be achieved  by imposing appropriate sentence.  Therefore,  law as  a corner-stone of the edifice of order should  meet  the challenges confronting the society.  Friedman in his "Law in Changing   Society"   stated that, "State  of  criminal  law continues  to  be-as it should be-a decisive  reflection  of social consciousness of society".   Therefore, in  operating the  sentencing  system,  law should  adopt  the  corrective machinery   or the deterrence based on factual  matrix.   By deft  modulation  of sentencing process be  stern  where  it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to  be. The  facts and given circumstances in each case, the  nature of  the  crime,  the  manner in which  it  was  planned  and committed,  the  motive  for commission of  the  crime,  the conduct of the accused and all other attending circumstances are  relevant  facts  which would enter  into  the  area  of consideration.  For instance a murder committed due to  deep seated  personal rivalry may not call for penalty of  death. But  an organised crime or mass murders of  innocent  people would  call for imposition of death sentence as  deterrence. In  Mahesh v. State of M.P., [1987] 2 S.C.R. 710 this  Court while refusing to reduce that death sentence observed thus:                                                        721          ‘It  will  be a mockery of justice  to  permit  the          accused  to escape the extreme penalty of law  when          faced  with such evidence and such cruel  acts.  To          give the lesser punishment for the accused would be          to  render  the  justicing system  of  the  country          suspect. The common man will lose faith in  courts.          In  such cases, he understands and appreciates  the          language  of deterrence more than  the  reformative          jargon’.      Therefore,   undue   sympathy  to   impose   inadequate sentence  would  do  more  harm to  the  justice  system  to undermine  to public confidence in the efficacy of  law  and society could not long endure under serious threats. If  the courts  did not protect the injured, the injured would  then resort  to private vengeance. It is, therefore, the duty  of every  court to award proper sentence having regard  to  the nature  of  the  offence  and the manner  in  which  it  was

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executed or committed etc.      It is clear from the evidence that the accused indulged in  illegal  business of purchase and sale  of  ganja.  They conspired  to  entice innocent boys from  affluent  families took them to far flung places where the dead body could  not be  identified.  The  letters were written  to  the  parents purporting to be by the deceased to delude the parents  that the missing boy would one day come home alive and that  they would not give any report to the police and the crime  would go  undetected.  Four murders in a span of five  years  were committed  for  gain  in cold blooded  ,  pre-meditated  and planned  way. It is undoubted that if the trial relating  to Athiappan  murder had taken place and concluded  earlier  to the  trial  and  conviction  of  other  three  murders,  the subsequent murders are not relevant facts to be  considered. But  in  this  case  the trial of  the  murder  relating  to Athiappan   and  Hariramachandran  practically  took   place simultaneously  by which date the appellants were  convicted for the murder of Chelladurai and Christodas. Therefore ,the reference  of conviction and sentence by the Sessions  Court to  those  two cases also are relevant facts.  The  deceased Hariramachandran is no other than the nephew (elder sister’s son) of A-1. This would establish his depravity and hardened criminality. No regard for precious lives of innocent  young boys was shown. They adopted the crime of murder for gain as a means to living.      Undoubtedly  under section 235(2) of Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  the  accused is entitled to  an  opportunity  to adduce  evidence and if need be the case is to be  adjourned to another date. It is illegal to convict, an accused and to impose sentence on the same day. It is true                                                        722 as contended for the State that under s. 309, third  proviso brought by Amendment Act, 1978 that no adjournment should be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused  person to show cause against sentence to be imposed upon him. Under s. 235(2) when the accused has been given right to be  heard on the question of sentence it is a valuable right. To  make that  right  meaningful  the  procedure  adopted  should  be suitably  moulded  and the accused given an  opportunity  to adduce  evidence on the nature of the sentence. The  hearing may  be  on  the same day if the parties  are  ready  or  be adjourned  to  a next date but once the court  after  giving opportunity  propose  to impose appropriate  sentence  again there is no need to adjourn the case any further thereon. No doubt the Sessions Judge needed to adjourn the case under s. 235(2)  to next date but in the High Court the  counsel  was directed  to show any additional grounds on the question  of sentence  .  The High Court observed that  the  counsel  was unable  to  give  any  additional  ground.  It  is   Further contended  that the appellants are young men. They  are  the bread  winners  of their family each consisting of  a  young wife. minor child and aged parents and that, therefore,  the death sentence may be converted into life. We find no force. These compassionate grounds would always be present in  most cases and are not relevant for interference. Thus we find no infirmity in the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court  and confirmed  by  the High Court warranting  interference.  The appeals are accordingly dismissed. G.N.                                    Appeal  dismissed.                                                        723