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PETITIONER: PARAS RAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/10/1992

BENCH: [J.S. VERMA AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]

ACT: Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: Sections 5,  12-Offence under  Section 25  of the  Arms Act- Conviction under  Section 12 of the T.D.A. Act by Designated Court-Legality-Sentence-Modification of. Arms Act 1959: Section 25  (1B) (a)-Offence  under-Conviction by Designated Court  u/s.  12  of  the  T.D.A.  Act-legality  of-Sentence- Modification of. Interpretation   of    Statutes-Terrorist   and   Disruptive Activities(Prevention)   Act,   1987-Section   5-"Arms   and ammunition"-Construction.

HEADNOTE: On 7.4.1988,  the Police  apprehended the  appellant on the G.T.  Road on  suspicion, and he was found carrying a 12 bore country-made pistol without licence or permit. The District Magistrate issued sanction for prosecuting the appellant  for an  offence under  Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. The Judicial  Magistrate, First  Class ordered  that as the case  should be  tried by  the  Designated  Court  under Section  5  of  the  Terrorist  and  Distruptive  Activities (Prevention) Act,  1987. The  case was  transferred  to  the Additional Judge,  the Designated Court, for Trial, Charging the appellant  for the offence punishable under Section 5 of the T.D.A. Act, 1987. The appellant pleaded not guilty. The Designated  Judge found  that the  prosecution  had brought home  the offence to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt  and   the  appellant  was  convicted  of  an  offence punishable under  Section 5  of the T.D.A. Act and sentenced to undergo  rigorous imprisonment for five  years and to pay a fine  of Rs.  200 or,  in  default,  to  undergo  rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months. Against the judgment and order of the Designated Court, the present appeal was filed. The appellant contended that the prosecution itself did not consider  the case against him to be a fit case to frame a charge  and proceed  under the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 and that it was, therefore, not proper to try and convict thereunder; that a  country-made pistol  fell outside  the ambit  of the Category III(a), of Schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962; that Section 5  of the  T.A.D.A. ACT,  1987 applied  only when  a person was  in possession "arms and ammunition" and that the provisions of Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act did not apply to the appellant. The respondent-State submitted that the prosecution had

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considered the  case to  be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed  against  the  appellant  under  Section  5  of  the T.A.D.A. Act  1987  and  had  requested  the  Magistrate  to transfer the case to the Designated Court for trial. Modifying the sentence, this Court, HELD :  1.01. Section  12  of  the  T.A.D.A  Act,  1987 empowers Designated Court to convict a person of any offence under any  other law  if he  is found to have been guilty of the same  during the course of a trial under that Act and to punish appropriately. [60-E] Jaloba v.  State of Haryana, [1989] SCC Supple. II 197, followed. 1.02. Upon  the authority  of the  judgment in Jaloba’s case, the  appellant was  rightly tried  by  the  Designated Court under the provisions of the T.A.D.A Act, 1987. [59-E] 1.03. That  the evidence  relied upon was of two police officials does  not ipso  facto give rise to doubt about its credibility. On  examination of  the evidence  no reason was found to  question the  conclusion of  the Designated  Court that the appellant was guilty. [60-G-F] 1.04. The  appellant, being  guilty of an offence under Section 25  (1B) (a)  of the  Arms Act,  is punishable  with imprisonment for  a term  which shall  not be  less than one year but  which may  extend to  three years  and he  is also liable to  fine.  In  the  circumstances  of  the  case  the appellant must  undergo rigorous  imprisonment for a term of one year and pay a fine of Rs. 200. [60-H, 60-A] 2.01. The  words "arms  and ammunition" in Section 5 of the Terrorist  and Disruptive  Activities (Prevention)  Act, 1987 should  be read  conjuctively. This  is  not  merely  a matter of  correct grammar  but also subserves the object of the Act. [60-C] 2.02. A  person in possession of both a firearm and the ammunition therefor  is capable  of terrorist and disruptive activities  but   not  one  who  has  firearm  but  not  the ammunition for it or vice versa. [60-D]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 1990.      From the  Judgment and  order  dated  4/5.6.90  of  the Additional Judge,  Designated Court,  Rohtak at  Sonepat  in Sessions Case  No. 42/88,  Sessions Trial No. 18/90 & F.I.R. No. 96 dated 7.4.88, Police Station, Rai.      K.L. Rathee,  Raghu Raman  and S.  Balakrishnan for the Appellant.      Ms. Indu Malhotra for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BHARUCHA, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of  the Additional Judge, Rohtak, being the Designated Court  under   the  Terrorist   and  Disruptive   Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short T.A.D.A Act, 1987) whereby the appellant  was convicted  of an offence punishable under Section  5   thereof  and   sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or, in default,  to undergo  rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months.      The appellant  was apprehended  by Sub-Inspector Rohtas Singh and Head Constable Ram Krishan near the Hilton factory on G.T.  Road in  the State of Haryana on 7th April, 1988 on suspicion. In  the envelope  of wax paper that the appellant was carrying  was found  a.12 bore  country-made pistol  for which he  had no  licence or  permit.  After  the  necessary

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formalities, sanction  was issued on 26th April, 1988 by the District Magistrate,  Sonepat, for prosecuting the appellant for an  offence under  Section 25  of the Arms Act, 1959. On 7th December.  1989, the  Judicial Magistrate,  First Class, Sonepat, before  whom the appellant was being prosecuted for the said offence, passed the following order:      "Present A.P.P for the State.      Accused on bail.      At this  stage it  has come  to  my      notice that  this case  should have      been   tried    by   the    learned      Designated Court under Section 5 of      the   Terrorist    and   Disruptive      Activities (Prevention)  Act, 1987.      Consequently this  case is  sent to      learned Designated Court (Shri B.R.      Gupta   learned    Addl.   Sessions      Judge),   Sonepat.    Accused    is      directed to appear in that court at      12.00  noon  to  day  itself.  File      completed in  all respects  be sent      immediately.           Sd/-J.M.I.C. Sonepat                Announced                7.12.89."      The appellant  was then  tried by  the said  Additional Judge under  Sections 5  of  the  T.A.D.A.  Act,  1987.  The judgment under  appeal noted  that the appellant was charged on 18th  December 1989  by the said Additional Judge for the offence punishable  under Section  5 of  the  T.A.D.A.  Act, 1987, to  which the  appellant pleaded  not guilty. Upon the evidence led,  the said  Additional  judge  found  that  the prosecution had  brought home  the offence  to the appellant beyond reasonable  doubt.  Accordingly,  the  appellant  was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.      The appellant has in his grounds of appeal taken, inter alia,  the   plea  that   the  prosecution  itself  had  not considered the  case against him to be a fit case to frame a charge and  proceed under the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 and that it was, therefore,  not proper  that he  should have been tried and convicted  thereunder. In  the counter  filed by  Khajan Singh, Sub-Inspector, Police Station Rai, it is submitted in reply that  the prosecution  had considered this to be a fit case to  frame a  charge and  proceed against  the appellant under Section  5 of the T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 and had requested the  learned   magistrate  to   transfer  the  case  to  the Designated Court for trial.      It is  not  in  dispute  that  the  provisions  of  the T.A.D.A. Act,  1987 had  been extended to cover the whole of the State  of Haryana by a notification dated 18th November, 1987.      This Court  in the  judgment  in  Jaloba  v.  State  of Haryana, [1989] SCC Supple. II 197 considered the submission that the  Designated Court  had no  jurisdiction to  try the appellant jaloba because he had not been charged with having committed any  offence under  the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985. he had been charged  under Section  25 of  the Arms Act. This Court rejected the  submission noting  Sections 6  and  9  of  the T.A.D.A. Act,  1985 (equivalent  to Sections 5 and 11 of the T.A.D.A. Act,  1987). Section  6 lain  down that if any area notified by  the State  Government under  the  T.A.D.A  Act, 1987, a person contravened any provision or rule made, inter alia, under  the Arms  Acts,  then  he  was  liable  to  the enhanced punishment  provided for  in the section. Section 9 of the  T.A.D.A. Act,  1985 laid down that, not withstanding

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anything contained  in the  Criminal Procedure  Code,  every offence punishable  under that Act or a rule made thereunder was triable  only by the Designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it  was committed. It, therefore, followed that though  the  offence  committed  by  the  appellant  was  in contravention of  Section 25  of the  Arms  Act,  it  became exclusively triable  by the  Designated Court because of the notification made  by the State Government and the operation of Section  6 of  the T.A.D.A. Act, 1985. it was, therefore, futile for  the appellant  to contend  that  the  Designated Court did  not have  jurisdiction to try him for the offence for which he stood charged.      Upon the  authority of the judgment in Jaloba’s case it must be  held that the appellant before us was rightly tried by the  Designated Court under the provisions of the T.A.D.A Act, 1987.      It was  submitted on  behalf of  the appellant that, in any event,  the provisions  of Section 5 of the T.A.D.A. Act did not  apply to  the appellant.  These provisions  applied where  "any   person  is  in  possession  of  any  arms  and ammunition specified in ....Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms  Rules, 1962,  unauthorisedly in  a notified area". Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules reads thus: ------------------------------------------------------------ "III Firearms other than    Ammunition for firearms other those in categories I, II   than those in categories I, II and IV, namely:             and IV, namely: ------------------------------------------------------------ (a) Revolvers and Pistols   Ammunition for fire arms of                             category III(a)". ------------------------------------------------------------      It was  pointed out  that the appellant was found to be carrying a country-made pistol and submitted that a country- made pistol  fell outside  the ambit  of the  said  Category III(a). That  category speaks  in broad  terms of "revolvers and pistols"  and there  is no  reason to exclude a country- made revolver or pistol therefrom.      It was then argued, and, we think, with substance, that Section 5  of the  T.A.D.A. Act,  1987 applied  only when  a person was  in possession  of "arms and ammunition" and that the appellant,  while he  had been  found in possession of a country-made pistol, had not been found in possession of any ammunition. We think that the words "arms and ammunition" in Section 5  should be read conjuctively. This is not merely a matter of  correct grammar  but also subserves the object of the T.A.D.A.  Act, 1987.  A person  in possession  of both a firearm and  the ammunition therefor is capable of terrorist and disruptive  activities but not one who has a firearm but not the  ammunition for  it or vice versa. It is, therefore, our view  that the  provisions of  Sections 5 of the T.A.D.A Act, 1987 could not have been applied to the appellant.      This  is   not  to   say  that   the  appellant  should necessarily have been acquitted. Section 12 of T.A.D.A. Act, 1987 empowers  the Designated  Court to  convict a person of any offence  under   any other any other law it  he is found to have been guilty of the same during the course of a trial under that Act and punish appropriately.      It  was   submitted  that   the  evidence  against  the appellant did not establish that he was guilty of an offence under Section 25 (1B) (a) of the Arms Act, namely, of having in his  possession an  unlicenced firearm., We have examined the evidence  and found no reason to question the conclusion of the  Designated Court  that the  appellant was so guilty. That the  evidence relied  upon was  of two police officials does  not   ipso  facto   give  rise   to  doubt  about  its

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credibility. There  is nothing  on record to show that these police officials  were hostile  to the  appellant and  their evidence was  not  shaken  in  cross-examination.  That  the private party who was called as a witness by the prosecution did not  support it does not, in the circumstances,, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was innocent.      The appellant  being guilty of an offence under Section 25 (1B) (a) of the Arms Acts is punishable with imprisonment for a  term which  shall not be less than one year but which may extent  to three years and he is also liable to fine. In the circumstances  of the  case, we think that the appellant must undergo  rigorous imprisonment  for a  term of one year and pay a fine of Rs. 200.      The appeal  is, accordingly,  allowed in  the aforesaid terms. The  appellant has  already paid  the fine of Rs. 200 and has  served a  part  of  the  sentence  of  imprisonment imposed upon  him, He  is presently  on bail.  The bail  now stands cancelled  and the appellant shall surrender to serve the balance of the sentence of imprisonment. V.P.R. Appeal allowed.