http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 18  

PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KARNAL CO-OP.  FARMERS’S SOCIETY LIMITED ETC.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/03/1993

BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)

CITATION:  1994 AIR    1            1993 SCR  (2) 193  1993 SCC  (2) 363        JT 1993 (2)   235  1993 SCALE  (1)812

ACT: The  Punjab Village Common Lands(Regulation)  Act,  1961/The Punjab Village Lands(Regulation) Haryana Amendment Act, 1980 :  ss.  2,  4, 5, 7, 13/ss, 4, 5,  7-Village  Common  lands- Shantilal  deh’-Vesting  of ill  Panchayat  Exceptions-Civil Court   decrees,  orders  allowing  claims  of  persons   in possession  of certain lands-Enactment by State  Legislature abrogating  Civil Court decrees/orders-Held Legislature  has no  power to abrogate civil court decrees/orders by  a  mere declaration  by  an enactment to that  effect.  A  competent Legislature can make judicial adjudications ineffecting only by altering, removing or neutralising the legal basis in the unamended law on which such decisions were founded.

HEADNOTE: The Punjab Village Common Lands(Regulation) Act, 1961  which operated  in the State of Haryana, provided  for  regulating the   rights   in  village  common   lands   popularly   and colloquially known as ’Shamilat deh’.  Section 13 of the Act barred jurisdiction of civil courts, over any matter arising out of the operation of the Act.  However, Sections 2(g) and 4(3)  provided for exclusion of certain ’Shamilat deh’  from their vesting in Panchayats.  These provisions were utilised by innumerable persons to have recourse to civil courts  and to obtain decrees against the panchayats concerned  pleading that  their  lands and other properties were  excluded  from ’Shamilat deh’ either under clause(g) of s.2 or  sub-section (3) of s.4. Several Panchayats had no objection for grant of decrees  in favour of persons who were not legally  entitled for the decrees. The  State,  in  a bid to get rid of the  decrees  of  civil court, enacted the Punjab Village Common Lands  (Regulation) Haryana  Amendment Act, 1974 and substituted ss.7 and 13  of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961  (The Principal  Act)  and  incorporated  new  ss.13-A  and   13-B therein.    The  substituted  s.7  empowered  an   Assistant Collector  to eject any person in wrongful  or  unauthorised possession  of  land  or other  immovable  property  in  the ’shamilat deh’ of the concerned village vested 194 or  deemed  to  have  been vested  in  Panchayat  under  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 18  

principal  Act and put the Panchayat in possession  thereof. The appellate power was vested in the Collector.  Section 13 barred   jurisdiction  of  civil  court  to   entertain   or adjudicate upon any question as to whether any land or other immovable  property  vests or does not vest in  a  panchayat under   the  Act.   Section  13-A  enabled   the   Assistant Collector, having jurisdiction over the village to set aside civil  court decrees obtained by persons against  Panchavats in respect of land or other immovable property on the ground of  its being excluded from ’shamilat deh’ under clause  (g) of section 2 or any of the grounds mentioned in  sub-section (3) of section 4 after examining the records and hearing the decree-holders. When  the  decrees obtained by several  persons  from  civil courts  were sought to be interfered with by  the  Assistant Collector  and  the Collector, purporting  to  exercise  the powers conferred upon them as a result of the Amendment  Act of  1974,  writ  petitions  were riled  in  the  High  Court challenging the constitutionality of the said provisions. The  High Court held s.13A of the Amendment Act of  1974  as ultra  vires,  allowed the Writ Petitions  and  quashed  the proceedings.   The St,-ate riled civil appeals  and  special petitions before this Court. During  the pendency of the civil appeals and special  leave petitions before this Court which arise due to the Amendment Act  of  1974, the State enacted the Punjab  Village  Common Lands  (Regulation) Haryana Amendment Act,  1980  (Amendment Act  of 1981) to get over the judgments of the  High  Court. It  amended  s.7 and substituted ss.13, 13A and 13B  of  the Principal  Act which had been incorporated by Amendment  Act of  1974  and  further incorporated ss.13C and  13D  in  the Principal  Act.   The  new provisions  were  made  operative retrospectively  from 4.5.1961, the date of commencement  of the  Principal  Act, with the result that  s.13  barred  the jurisdiction  of civil courts retrospectively from  4.5.1961 to  entertain  or adjudicate upon any question  whether  any land  or  immovable property was ’shamilat deh’ or  was  not ’shamilat   deh’  whereas  s.13A  empowered  the   Assistant Collector  to adjudicate any right title or interest in  any land  or  immovable property claimed to have vested  or  not vested in a Panchayat or whether such property was ’shamilat deh’ or not, on a suit filed within two years from the  date of  commencement of the Amendment Act of 1981.  The  Proviso added to s.7 of the Principal Act invested in the Assistant 195 Collector  the exclusive power of deciding the  question  of title  in respect of ’shamilat deh’ whenever raised.   S.13C clothed  the  order  made  under new  ss.13A  and  13B  with finality.  S.13D, being given the overriding effect, enabled the  Asstt.  Collector exercising his powers under  the  new proviso   to  s.7  and  new  s.13A  to  exercise  the   same notwithstanding  any  contrary law,  agreement,  instrument, usage, decree or order of any court or authority.  Section 7 of  the  Amendment  Act, 1981  validated  actions  taken  or decisions  rendered there-under as if the Principal  Act  as amended  by the Amendment Act of 1981 had been in  force  at all material times when such action was taken or a  decision was rendered. Several persons whose decrees obtained from the civil courts were  likely to be interfered with by the authorities  under the  Amendment Act of 1981 challenged the  constitutionality of  its  provisions  by filing writ petitions  in  the  High Court.   It was contended that the State Legislature had  no power  to abrogate civil court decrees and orders passed  in respect of the properties which were executed from ’shamilat

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 18  

deh’  after  the provisions of the Principal Act  came  into force from 4.5.1961, by making a mere declaration under  the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1981 that such decrees or orders  could  be  treated as  nullifies  by  the  Assistant Collector while deciding the claim afresh. The  High Court allowed the writ petitions holding that  the retrospective  abrogation  of  the  jurisdiction  of   civil courts, validly exercised by them from 1961 onwards amounted to  a trenching upon the judicial power by the  legislature, and  fictional  substitution of the provisions  with  effect from   the  4th  day  of  May,  1961  and   thereby   giving retrospectivity   thereto   from   the   said   date,    was unconstitutional.  The State riled the appeals. The  appeals and the special leave petitions arising out  of the Amendment Act of 1974 were dismissed as infructuous. Dismissing the appeals arising out of Amendment Act of 1981, this Court, HELD:     1.1. Under our Constitution no Legislature has the power  to  abrogate  civil  courts’  decrees  or  orders  or judicial adjudications by merely declaring under a law  made by  it that such decrees or orders or adjudications  are  no longer  valid or binding on the parties, for such  power  of declaration  would  be a judicial function which  cannot  be encroached upon 196 by  a  Legislature  and the only way by  which  a  competent Legislature can make the judicial adjudications, decrees  or orders ineffective is by fundamentally altering, removing or neutralising  the legal basis in the unamended law on  which they are based. [pp.213E-G;,216G-H; 217A] Shri  Prithvi  Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr.  v.  Broach  Borough Municipality & Ors., [1970] 1 SCR 368, followed. Government   of  Andhra  Pradesh  and   Kutubullahpur   Gram Panchayat v. Hindustan Machine Tools Lid, [1975] (Supp.) SCR 394; Smt.  Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, [1976]  2 SCR  347  and I.N. Saksena v. The State of  Madhya  Pradesh, [1976] 3 SCR 237, relied on. Misrilal Jain etc. etc. v. State of Orissa & Another, [1977] 3 SCR 714, referred to. Bajinder  Singh and another v. The Assistant  Collector  1st Grade, Guhla, Distt.  Kurukshetra and others, 1983 (85)  PLR 528, approved. Sunder   Dass   v.   Ran?   Prakash,  [1977]   3   SCR   60, distinguished. 1.2. In  the  instant case, the State  Legislature,  by  the Amendment Act of 1981, has not made any provision to include the lands and immovable properties  the subject of the civil court decrees  in ’shamilat deh’ so as to bring them  within the  purview of the principal Act.  But, the provision  made therein  merely directs the Assistant Collector, in  effect, to  disregard or disobey the earlier civil  courts’  decrees and  judicial orders by which it had been held that  certain lands  and immovable properties fell outside ’shamilat  deh’ regulated by the principal Act.  Such provisions inserted by the  Amendment  Act  of  1981 in  the  principal  Act  by  a Legislature are clearly unconstitutional for they are to  be regarded as provisions made by encroaching upon the judicial power. [p.217A-C] 1.3. The High Court was right in holding that the provisions of the Amendment    Act of 1981 which merely authorised  the Assistant Collector to decide the  claims to be made  before him  claiming  certain  lands  or  immovable  properties  as ’shamilat  deh’ vesting in Panchayats ignoring the  judicial orders or decrees, by which any right, title or interest  of private  parties in such lands or immovable properties  were

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 18  

recognised, were unconstitutional. [p.217C-D] 197 1.4. Consequently,  the provisions of the Amendment  Act  of 1981,   insofar   as   they   are   intended   to    operate retrospectively  for  nullifying the adjudications  made  by civil  courts  prior  to that amendment  Act,  are  invalid, inoperative and unconstitutional. [p.217D-E] 1.5. However,  the provisions in the Amendment Act of  1981, can undoubtedly operate prospectively for adjudicating  upon claims to ’shamilat deh’ in proceedings initiated subsequent to the commencement of that Act, if they do not, in any way, disturb the finality of adjudications made earlier. [p.217E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil  Appeals  Nos.  2605, 2607, 2608, 2610, 2611 and 2615 of 1977. From  the  Judgment and Order dated 9.3.76 of the  Punjab  & Haryana High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 6799/74, 91/75, 466,  487, 532, & 2579 of 1975.                             WITH Special  Leave Petitions (C) Nos. 1108 and 3042 to  3095  of 1978. From  the Judgment and Order dated 19.3.76, 6.4.77,  of  the Punjab  & Haryana High Court in C.W.P. Nos.  1413,  1415/76, 5159/75,  164,  136, 138/76, 168/77,  284/76,  369,  237/76, 7448/75  5163//75, 177, 733, 893, 370, 236, 170,  144,  234, 139/76, 4509/75, 235, 368,145, 843/76, 7318/75, 894, 888/76, 5161/75, 1232, 137/76, 4940/75, 231, 238/76, 5522/75,  1197, 233, 163, 166, 5769/76, 5162, 5158, 5429/75, 140, 443,  239, 165, 1203, 734, 232, 889/76, 6562/75, 735 and 743 of 1976.                             AND           Civil Appeals Nos. 1381 to 1387 of 1990. From  the Judgment and Order dated 18.3.83 of the  Punjab  & Haryana  High  Court in C.W.P. Nos. 5264-67/82 &  162-64  of 1983. Avadh  Behari, Mrs. Nisha Bagchi and Ms. Indu  Malhotra  for the Petitioners/Appellants. M.L.  Verma,  S.K.  Bagga, T.V. Mehta,  Seeraj  Bagga,  Mrs. S.Bagga,  Jitendra Sharma, P.P. Juneja, Ms. SJanani, Ms.  H. Wahi  for Gagrat & Co. (NP), G.D. Gupta and A.D.  Sikri  for the Respondents. 198 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALA.   J. The above Civil Appeals and  the  Special Leave  Petitions (Civil) are that of the State  of  Haryana. While  the judgment in Civil Writ Petition No. 6799 of  1974 of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court Kamal Co-op.   Farmers Society  Lid, Pehowa v. Gram Panchayat, Pehowa  etc.,  1976, Current  Law  Journal  (Civil),  417  and  other   judgments rendered  following  it are impugned in Civil  Appeals  Nos. 2605, 2607,2608,2610,2611 and 2615 of 1977 and Special Leave Petitions  (Civil) Nos. 1108 and 3042 to 3095 of  1978,  the judgment in Civil Writ Petition No.565 of 1981. of the  same High  Court  Bajinder Singh and another  v.   The  Assistant Collector  1st Grade, Guhla, Dist(. Kurukshetra and  others, (1983) 85 PLR 528 and other judgments rendered following  it are  impugned  in Civil Appeals Nos. 1381 to 1387  of  1990. Since  common  questions  arise for our  decision  in  these Appeals  and  Special Leave Petitions, all  of  them  could, conveniently be disposed of by this judgment. The High Court’s judgments appealed against in these Appeals and  Special Leave Petitions are since based on its view  of unconstitutionality  of  certain provisions  in  the  Punjab

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 18  

Village  Common  Lands (Regulation) Haryana  Amendment  Act, 1974   Amendment Act of 1974 and the Punjab  Village  Common Lands (Regulation) Haryana Act, 1980  Amendment Act of 1981, which  have  amended the provisions of  the  Punjab  Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act of 1961  the principal Act, it would  be  advantageous  to understand  at  the  outset  the historical   background  of  the  principal  Act   and   the circumstances  which led the State of Haryana to  enact  the Amendment  Act of 1974 and further- to enact  the  Amendment Act of 1981. Villages  in  pre-independent  rural  India  having  village common or communal lands meant for use by the whole  village community  was their common redeeming feature, in that,  the inhabitants   of   the   villages   whose   occupation   was predominantly  agriculture  dependent  on  their   livestock needed  to  give manure to their lands, to  cart  manure  to their lands, to plough their lands and the carry on  several other  incidental agricultural operations,  required  common lands  for  using as pasturagcs,  pools,  ponds,  thrashing- floors, cowdung pits, have stack areas, tethering areas  and the  like.  Villages in the States of Punjab and Pepsu  were of no exception.  With the dawn of independence and rise  in land value even in villages, powerful and greedy inhabitants in   Villages  became  grabbers  of  village  common   lands depriving  their use to the village community.  Some of  the State which were enabled by the Constitution of  199 India   organise  village  Panchayats  as  units  of   self- Government  and encourage growth of agriculture  and  animal husbandry in villages by suitable legislative measures  took prompt  steps to legislate on common lands of the  villages, so  as  to restore such lands for communal  use  and  common benefit  of all the inhabitants of the villages  by  vesting them in their respective Panchayats.  Punjab Village  Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953 and Pepsu Village Common  Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954 are 1954 are two legislative measures enacted by the respective States of Punjab and Pepsu to vest the common lands of villages in their Panchayats for  common benefit and advantage of the whole community of the  village concerned.  When under the States, Re-organisation Act, 1956 Pepsu  State  merged  in Punjab State, the  said  Papsu  Act continued  to operate in the area of erstwhile Pepsu.   When the operation of two legislative measures in the new  Punjab State, which were in come respects not common, was found  to be  undesirable,  the State of Punjab enacted  the  Villages Common  Lands  (Regulation)  Act, 1961  referred  to  by  us already  as  ’principal Act’ and made it  operative  in  the whole territory of Punjab State, with effect from 4th day of May, 1961.  By the principal Act the two earlier Acts  which had covered the field till then were repealed, as well.  The principal  Act,  as stated in its preamble,  sought  by  its provisions  to consolidate and amend the law regulating  the rights  in village common lands popularly  and  colloquially known as ’shamilat deh’ and ’abadi- deh’.  As ’shamilat deh’ was  not defined in the repealed Acts adverted to and  there prevailed  uncertainty as to its nature, the  principal  Act defined’shamilat deh’in section 2(g) thereof in an endeavour to achieve certainty, thus: ’(g) ’Shamilat-deh or Charand’ includes (1)  Land  described in the revenue records as shamilat  deh or charand excluding abadi-deh; (2)  Shamilat tikkas; (3)  Land  described  in  the revenue  records  as  Shamilat Tarafs  Patti,  Pannas  and Tholas  and  used  according  to revenue records for the benefit of the village community  or

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 18  

a part thereof or for common purposes of the village; (4)  Lands used or reserved for the benefit of the  village, community  including, streets, lanes,  playground,  schools, drinking wells or ponds within abadi-deh or 200 gora- deh; and (4a) ’Vacant land situate in abadi-deh or gora- deh not owned by any person’; (5)  Lands  in  any village described as banjar  quadim  and used  for  common  purposes of  the  village,  according  to revenue records; provided that Shamilat-deh or ’charand’  at least to the extent of twenty five percent of the total area of  the village does not exist in the village; but does  not include land which: (i)  becomes or has become Shamilat-deh or ’cherand’ due  to river  action  or has been reserved Shamilat or  charand  in village  subjects  to river action  except  Shamilat-deh  or ’Charand’  entered  as pasture, pond, or playground  in  the revenue records; (ii) has been allotted on quasi permanent basis to displaced persons; (iii)     has been partitioned and brought under cultivation by individual landholders before the 26th January 1950; (iv) having been acquired before the 26th January 1950, by a person by purchase or in exchange for proprietary land  from a cosharer in the shamilat-deh or charand and is so recorded in the jamna-bandi or is supported by a valid deed; (v)  is described in the revenue records as Shamilat  Taraf, Petti,  Panna  and Thola and not used according  to  revenue records for the benefit for the village community or a  part thereof or for common purpose of the village; (vi) lies outside the abadi-deh and is used at gitwar, bara, manure pit or house or for cottage industry; (vii)     is  shamilat-deh or ’charand’ of village  included in the fourteen revenue estates called Bhojas of Naraingarh  201               Tehsil of Ambala District;               (viii)     was   Shamilat  or  ’charand’   was               assessed  to land revenue and has been in  the               individual cultivating possession of cosharers               not being in excess of their respective shares               in  such shamilat-deh or charand or or  before               the 28th January 1950; or               (ix)  is  used  as a place of worship  or  for               purposes subservient thereto."               By section 2(h) thereof meaning of  ’shamilat-               law’ was given thus:               "(h) ’Shamilat-Law means :-               (i)   in  relation  to land  situated  in  the               territory  which  immediately before  the  1st               November,  1956,  was comprised  in  State  of               Punjab;   the  Punjab  Village  Common   Lands               (Regulation) Act, 1953, or               (ii)  in   relation   to  land   situated   in               territory immediately before the 1st  November               1956,  was comprised in the State  of  Patiala               and  East  Punjab  States  Union;  the   Pepsu               Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1954." While  sub-section  (1) of section 3 of  the  principal  Act declared   that   the  Act  shall  apply  and   before   the commencement of the Act the Shamilat Law shall be deemed  to have  applied  to  all lands which  are  ’shamilat  deh’  as defined in clause (g) of section 2 thereof, sub-section  (2) thereof declared that notwithstanding, anything contained in sub-section  (1) of section 4, where any land had vested  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 18  

the Panchayat under the shamilat law, but such land had been excluded  from  ’shamilat deh’ as defined in clause  (g)  of section  2, all rights, title and interest of the  Panchayat in  such  land shall, as from the commencement of  the  Act, shall  cease  and such rights, title and interest  shall  be revested  in  the  person or persons  in  whom  they  vested immediately before the commencement of the shamilat law  and the  Panchayat  was directed to deliver possession  of  such land to such person or persons.  No doubt, sub-sections  (2) and (1) of section 4 delcared that any land which vested  in a  Panchayat  under ’shamilat law’ shall be deemed  to  have been   vested   in   the  Panchayat  under   the   Act   and notwithstanding  anything to the contrary contained  in  any other law for the time being in force or in any agreement, 202 instruments,  custom or usage or any decree or order of  any court  or  other authority, all rights, title  and  interest whatever  in the land which is included in the shamilat  deh of any village and which and not vested in a panchayat under the  shamilat  law’ shall, at the commencement of  the  Act, vest  in a Panchayat.  But sub-section (3) thereof  declared that  nothing contained in clause (a) of sub-section (1)  in sub-section (2) shall affect or shall be deemed ever to have affected  the  (i) existing rights, title  or  interests  of persons who, though not entered as occupancy tenants in  the revenue records, are accorded a similar status by custom  or otherwise,   such   as  Dholidars,   Bhondedars,   Butimars, Basikhupopohus,  Sounjidars,  Muqurridars;  (ii)  rights  of persons  who  were in cultivating  possession  of  ’shamilat deh’, on the date of the commencement of the Act and were in such  cultivating  possession  for more  than  twelve  years immediately  preceding the commencement of the  Act  without payment  of rent or by payment of charges not exceeding  the land revenue and ceases payable thereon; and (iii) rights of a  mortgaged to whom such land is mortgaged with  possession before 26th January, 1950, while sub-section (2) of  section 3 delcared that notwithstanding, anything contained in  sub- section  (1) of section 4, where any land has vested in  the Panchayat  under the ’shamilat law’, but such land has  been excluded  from  shamilat  deh’as defined in  clause  (g)  of section  2, all rights, title and interest of the  Panchayat in  such  land  shall,  as  from  the  commencement  of  the principal  Act,  cease and such rights, title  and  interest shall  be  revested in the person or persons  in  whom  they vested immediately before the commencement of the  ’shamilat law’ and the Panchayat shall deliver possession of such land to such person or persons. Then  section 5 thereof provided for regulation of  use  and occupation, etc, of ’shamilat deh’ lands vested or deemed to have  been  vested in Panchayats while  section  13  thereof imposed a bar on the jurisdiction of civil courts, declaring that  no  civil court shall have any jurisdiction  over  any matter arising out of the operation of the Act. Thereafter, when certain districts of the Punjab State  were carved out to form Haryana State under the Punjab State  Re- organisation Act, 1966, the principal Act came to operate in the newly formed Haryana State.  Section 13 of the principal Act,   as   already  pointed  out,  barred   civil   courts’ jurisdiction  only  over  matters which  arose  out  of  its operation  while the grounds under clause (g) of  section  2 and  the  grounds under sub-section (3) of  section  4  gave enormous  scope  for exclusion of certain  lands  and  other immovable properties from ’shamilat deh’.  These provisions, it ap-  203

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 18  

pears,  were utilized by several persons in the villages  of State  of  Haryana to have recourse to civil courts  and  to obtain  decrees  therefrom in their favour and  against  the concerned  Panchayats  pleading that their lands  and  other immovable  properties  were  excluded  from  ’shamilat  deh’ either  under clause (g) of section 2 or sub-section (3)  of Section  4. Unfortunately, several Panchayats  against  whom such suits had been filed, appear to have had not  objection for  grant  of  decrees in favour of persons  who  were  not legally entitled for such decrees. Obtaining of the said decrees by innumerable persons against the  Panchayats,  establishing  their  title  and  right  to possession  respecting lands and immovable properties  which would  have  otherwise  been ’shamilat deh’  vested  in  the concerned  Panchayats,  appears to have ultimately  led  the State to enact Amendment Act of 1974, in a bid to get rid of the  said decrees of civil courts, as becomes  obvious  from the  nature  of  its salient provisions to  which  we  shall presently advert. Section  2 of the Amendment Act of 1974 by substituting  the provision  in  section  7 of  the  principal  Act  empowered thereunder  an Assistant Collector of First Grade  to  eject any person who is in wrongful or unauthorised possession  of land  or other immovable property in the ’shamilat  deh’  of the  concerned village vested or deemed to have been  vested in  Panchayat under the principal Act and put the  Panchayat in possession thereof, besides vesting in the Collector  the appellate power to hear appeals preferred against the  order of  Assistant Collector of First Grade.  Further, section  4 thereof  substituted  the provisions in section  13  of  the principal Act, which read:-               "13.   Bar  of jurisdiction.  No  civil  court               shall have jurisdiction               (a)   to  entertain  or  adjudicate  upon  any               question  as  to  whether any  land  or  other               immovable property or any right or interest in               such land or other immovable property vests or               does  not vest in a panchayat under this  Act;               or               (b)   in respect of any other matter which any               officer  is empowered by or under this Act  to               determine; or               204               (c)   to  question the legality of any  action               taken  or any matter decided by any  authority               empowered to do so under this Act.’ Then  section 5 thereof inserted new sections 13-A and  13-B in  the principal Act.  Section 13-A enabled  the  Assistant Collector, First Grade having jurisdiction over the  village to set aside civil court decrees obtained by person  against Panchayats in respect of land or other immovable property of the  ground of its beign excluded from ’shamilat deh’  under clause  (g) of section 2 or any of the grounds mentioned  in sub-section  (3) of section 4 with power conferred upon  him under  sub-section  (3) thereof to examine the  records  and hear  the  decree-holder in order to satisfy himself  as  to whether  the copies of the relevant entries of  the  revenue records  in support of the averments made in the plaint  had been produced during the trial of the suit and if  satisfied that  the  copies  of  the said  entries  had  not  been  so produced, to set aside the civil court decree concerned.  It provided  also  for  appeals  being  filed  by  the  persons aggrieved  by  the order of the Assistant  Collector,  First Grade, to the Collector. Section 13-B provided for transfer of suits pending in civil

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 18  

courts  in  respect  of land  or  other  immovable  property wherein  the  relief had been claimed on the ground  of  its being  excluded  from  ’shamilat deh’ under  clause  (g)  of section 2 or on any of the grounds mentioned in  sub-section (3)  of  section 4 against the Panchayat  to  the  Assistant Collector, First Grade. When the aforementioned decrees obtained by several  persons from civil courts were sought to be interferred with by  the Assistant  Collector  of  First  Grade  and  the  Collector, purporting to exercise the powers conferred upon them  under the said provisions Writ Petitions were filed by them in the Punjab   and  Haryana  High  Court  challenging   the   con- stitutionality  of the very provisions in the Amendment  Act of    1974.    The   High   Court   which    examined    the constitutionality  of the impugned provisions in Karnal  Co- op.  Fanners Society Ltd., Pehowa v. Gram Panchayat,  Pehowa etc., (supra) expressed its view in the matter thus:               "The  provisions  of  section  13A  cannot  be               struck  down  on this ground (that  the  State               Legislature  cannot  confer  jurisdiction   on               tribunals to decide matters relating to lands                205               and   matters   relating  to   procedure   and               limitation).   The Legislature  has,  however,               conferred arbitrary and unguided powers on the               Assistant  Collector to set aside the  decrees               of  the civil Courts.  The safeguard  provided               in  section  13-A(3) to the  effect  that  the               Assistant  Collector shall satisfy himself  as               to  whether the copies of relevant entries  of               revenue records in support of averments in the               plaint  had been produced during the trial  of               the  suit, is not a sufficient safeguard,  and               it  may  enable him to discriminate.   He  has               been given almost uncanalised powers which may               amount  to  a carte blanche  to  discriminate.               Consequently, sub-section (3) of section  13-A               is  ultra vires the Constitution.   The  other               sub-sections  in section 13-A  revolve  around               sub-section (3) and are, therefore, also ultra               vires.   It may be mentioned that the  counsel               for the petitioner has not challenged vires of               section 13-B, added by the Amendment Act." Because of the said view expressed by the High Court on  the constitutionality   of  the  impugned  provisions   of   the Amendment  Act  of 1974, it allowed the  Writ  Petitions  in which   the  proceedings  initiated  before  the   Assistant Collector of 1st Grade and the Collector under the Amendment Act   of  1974  had  been  questioned  and   quashed   those proceedings  by  several judgments rendered  in  those  Writ Petitions.  The State of Haryana which felt aggrieved by the said  judgments  of the High Court filed before  this  Court various  Civil Appeals and Special Leave  Petitions  (Civil) questioning  the aforesaid view of the High Court  expressed on the constitutionality of the provisions of the  Amendment Act  of 1974 and the judgments rendered based on such  view, as is indicated by us in the beginning of this judgment. However,  during the pendency of the said Civil Appeals  and Special Leave Petitions (Civil) before this Court, the State of  Haryana took recourse to bringing a legislative  measure to get over the said judgments of the High Court rendered in the  Writ  Petitions.  The said legislative measure  is  the Amendment  Act  of 1981.  Statement of Objects  and  Reasons accompanying  the Bill has given the objects and reasons  as the why the Amendment Act of 1981 was being enacted thus :

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 18  

206               "In  many  places  the shamlat  deh  has  been               occupied  unlawfully by unscrupulous  persons,               acting  some  times  in  collusion  with   the               representative  of  the Gram  Panchayats.   To               combat this evil certain amendments were  made               to    the   Punjab   Village   Common    Lands               (Regulation)  Act,  1961, in  1974.   However,               when  tested in the High Court of  Punjab  and               Haryana,  certain  of  these  provisions  were               struck down,  vide judgment of the High Court.               The   present   Bill  seeks  to   remedy   the               infirmities found by the High Court.  It  also               proposes  to make some incidental  changes  to               the  Punjab Village Common Lands  (Regulation)               Act, 1961, to make some of its provisions more               explicit  so  as  to  ensure  more   effective               implementation." Bringing  into force of the said Amendment Act in the  State of  Haryana  gave  rise  once again, to  a  fresh  flood  of litigation and made the persons whose decrees obtained  from the  civil courts were likely to be interfered with  by  the authorities under the Amendment Act of 1981 to challenge the constitutionality of its provisions by filing Writ Petitions in  the High Court.  The main Writ Petition decided  by  the High  Court is Civil Writ Petition No. 565 of  1981-Bajinder Singh  and  another v. The Assistant  Collector  1st  Grade, Guhla,  Distt.   Kurukshetra and others (supra).   The  High Court on a detailed examination of the constitutionality  of the impugned provisions of the Amendment Act of 1981 relying upon  the decided cases of this Court, of the Federal  Court and of its own expressed its view in the matter, thus :               "that  the  retrospective  abrogation  of  the               jurisdiction   of   civil   courts,    validly               exercised  by  them from 1961 onwards  by  the               impugned  Section  4  of  the  Punjab  Village               Common  Lands (Regulation)  Haryana  Amendment               Act 2 of 1981, clearly amounts to a  trenching               upon  the judicial power by  the  legislature.               Consequently,   the  relevant  part   of   the               aforesaid  section  fictionally   substituting               section  13  with effect from the 4th  day  of               May,  1961  and thereby  giving  retrospective               thereto  from  the said date, is  held  to  be               unconstitutional and is hereby struck down." It is the said view in the judgment which is made the  basis for  207 deciding  the  Writ  Petition  concerned  and  for  deciding similar  Writ Petitions by the judgments of the  High  Court rendered in that regard.  Civil Appeal Nos. 1381 to 1387  of 1990  before  us  are those filed by the  State  of  Haryana aggrieved  by  the said judgments and they are  the  Appeals which we are required to deal with. Before proceeding to deal with the said Appeals of 1990,  it would  be convenient to dispose of Civil Appeals Nos.  2605, 2607,  2608, 2610, 2611 and 2615 of 1977 and  Special  Leave Petitions  (C)  Nos. 1108 and 3042 to 3095 of  1978.   These Appeals of 1977 and Special Leave Petitions (Civil) of  1978 are  those filed by the State of Haryana  aggrieved  against the High Court judgments based on its view of the provisions in section 13A(3) and other sub-sections of that section  of the principal Act, as stood amended by the Amendment Act  of 1974.  But by enacting and bringing into force the Amendment Act  of  1981, the Haryana Legislature has  substituted  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 18  

controversial  provisions  of the principal  Act  which  had stood amended by the Amendment Act of 1974.  Hence, the view expressed  by the High Court in its judgments under  Appeals of 1977 and SLPs of 1978 of the State of Haryana of the  now non-existing controversial provisions, does not survive  for consideration.  Consequently, Civil Appeals of 1977 and SLPs of  1978  are  liable  to  be  dismissed  as  having  become infructuous. As  Civil Appeals Nos. 1381 to 1387 of 1990 which  we  shall now  proceed  to deal with are since  directed  against  the judgments  based  on  the view of the High  Court  that  the material  provisions in the Amendment Act of 1981 are, to  a certain  extent,  unconstitutional  it would  be  useful  to advert  to  them and know the object sought to  be  achieved thereby  before  examining their  constitutionality  on  the basis  of  arguments  of learned counsel for  the  State  of Haryana addressed to us. Section  3  of the Amendment Act of 1981  has  introduced  a proviso  in  sub-section (1) of section 7 of  the  principal Act,  which had stood amended by the Amendment Act of  1974, and it reads               "Provided  that  if in  such  proceedings  the               question  of title is raised’,  the  Assistant               Collector  of  the  first  grade  shall  first               decide  the  question of title  under  section               13A." Then section 4 of the Amendment Act of 1981 has  substituted section 13 of the principal Act, which had stood amended  by the Amendment Act 208 of 1974, and it reads :               "4.  For section 13 of the principal Act,  the               following  section  shall be  substituted  and               shall be deemed to have been substituted  with               effect  from the 4th day of May, 1961,  namely               :-               ’13.   Bar  of jurisdiction   No  civil  court               shall have jurisdiction               (a)   to  entertain  or  adjudicate  upon  any               question whether-               (i)   any land or other immovable property  is               or is not shamlat deh;               (ii)  any land or other immovable property  or               any  right, title or interest in such land  or               other  immovable  property vests or  does  not               vest in a Panchayat under this Act;               (b)   in  respect  of  any  matter  which  any               revenue   court,  officer  or   authority   is               empowered  by or under this Act to  determine;               or               (c)   to  question the legality of any  action               taken or matter decided by any revenue  court,               officer or authority empowered to do so  under               this Act.’" Further, section 5 of the Amendment Act of 1981 has inserted new sections 13A and 13B in the principal at Act by omitting old  sections  13-A  and 13-B, which had  stood  amended  by Amendment Act of 1974, and it reads:               "In  the principal Act, the existing  sections               13A  and  13B shall be omitted  and  shall  be               deemed to have been omitted, with effect  from               the 12th day of November, 1974; and  following               new  sections shall be inserted and  shall  be               deemed to have been inserted, with effect from               the 4th day of May1961, namely

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 18  

             ’13A.  Adjudication.  (1) Any person or in the               case  of a Panchayat, either the Panchayat  or               its   Gram   Sachiv,   the   concerned   Block               Development and Panchayat Officer                209               Social Education and Panchayat Officer or  any               other  Officer  duly authorised by  the  State               Government  in  this behalf,  claiming  right,               title  or  interest  in  any  land  or   other               immovable  property vested or deemed  to  have               been  vested in the Panchayat under this  Act,               may,  within  a period of two years  from  the               date  of  commencement of the  Punjab  Village               Common  Lands (Regulation)  Haryana  Amendment               Act,  1980,  file  a  suit  for  adjudication,               whether such land or other immovable  property               is shamlat deh or not and whether any land  or               other  immovable property or any right,  title               or interest therein vests or does not vest  in               a  Panchayat under this Act, in the  court  of               the  Assistant  Collector of the  first  grade               having  jurisdiction in the area wherein  such               land or other immovable property is situate.               (2)   The  procedure  for deciding  the  suits               under  sub-section  (1) shall be the  same  as               laid  down  in the Code  of  Civil  Procedure,               1908.               13B.  Appeal and revision               (1)   Any person, aggrieved by an order passed               under  section  13A, may, within a  period  of               thirty days from the date of the order, prefer               an  appeal to the Collector in such  form  and               manner,   as  may  be  prescribed,   and   the               Collector   may  after  hearing  the   appeal,               confirm,  very  or reverse the  order  as  the               deems fit.                (2)  The  Commissioner may suo  motu  at  any               time,  call for the record of any  proceedings               before,  or  order  passed  by  any  authority               subordinate   to  him  for  the   purpose   of               satisfying  himself  as  to  the  legality  or               propriety of the proceedings or order and pass               such order in relation thereto, as he may deem               fit.               Provided that no order adversely affecting any               person shall be passed unless he has been  af-               forded an opportunity of being heard.               210               13C.   Finality of orders.  Save as  otherwise               expressly  provided in this Act,  every  order               made  by the Assistant Collector of the  first               grade, the Collector or the Commissioner shall               be  final and shall not be called in  question               in any manner in any court.               13D.  Provisions of this Act to be over-riding               the  provisions of this Act shall have  effect               notwithstanding   anything  to  the   contrary               contained  in any law, agreement,  instrument,               custom, usage, decree or order of any court or               other authority.’               Lastly, section 7 of the Amendment Act of 1981               which is a validation provision, reads :               "7.  Notwithstanding any judgment,  decree  or               order  of any civil court, all actions  taken,               rules  made  and orders or decrees  passed  by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 18  

             Revenue Court, Officer or authority under  the               principal Act as amended by the Punjab Village               Common  Lands (Regulation)  Haryana  Amendment               Act,  1980,  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been               validly taken, made or passed, as the case may               be, as if the principal Act, as amended by the               Punjab   Village  Common  Lands   (Regulation)               Haryana Amendment Act, 1980, had been in force               at  all  material times when such  action  was               taken,  rules were made and judgments,  orders               or  decrees were passed by the Revenue  Court,               Officer or authority." What is sought to be achieved by the above provisions of the Amendment Act of 1981, as seen from their purport is this  : Section  7  of  the principal Act as stood  amended  by  the Amendment Act of 1974, had empowered the Assistant Collector of First Grade to eject any person in wrongful possession of land  or other immovable property in ’shamilat deh’  of  the concerned  village vested or deemed to have been  vested  in its  Panchayat under the principal Act and to put such  land or  other immovable property in possession of the  concerned Panchayat.   But  new  section  13A  of  the  principal  Act inserted  by  the  Amendment  Act  of  1981,  empowered  the Assistant  Collector of First Grade to adjudicate  upon  any right,  title  or interest in any land  or  other  immovable property  claimed  to be vested or not vested or  deemed  to have been vested or not vested in a  211 Panchayat  and such land or immovable property is  ’shamilat deh’  on  a  suit filed within two years from  the  date  of commencement  of  the  Amendment Act of  1981.   Proviso  to section 7 inserted in the principal Act by the Amendment Act of 1981 further invested in the Assistant Collector of First Grade who was empowered under section 7 of the principal Act to eject any person in wrongful possession of land or  other immovable  property  in  shamilat  deh’  of  the   concerned village,  the  exclusive power of deciding the  question  of title in respect of such land or property, whenever  raised. While  new section 13B inserted in the principal Act by  the Amendment  Act  of  1981 created  appellate  and  revisional authorities to sit in judgment over the orders to be made by the Assistant Collector of First grade under new section 13A investing  in  such  authorities  the  needed  appellate  or revisional power, new section 13C inserted in the  principal Act  by the Amendment Act of 1981 provided for  clothing  of the  orders made under new section 13A and new  section  13B with finality.  Then, the above new section 13D inserted  in the  principal Act by the Amendment Act of 1981 enabled  the Assistant  Collector  of First Grade exercising  his  powers under  the aforementioned new proviso to section 7  and  new section  13A,  to  exercise the  same,  notwithstanding  any contrary law, agreement, instrument, usage, decree or  order of  any  court  or other authority, due  to  the  overriding effect given by it.  Further, section 5 of the Amendment Act of   1981   made  new  sections  13A,  13B,  13C   and   13D retrospective  in their operation with effect from  the  4th day of May, 1961, the date of commencement of the  principal Act, itself.  Further more, section 4 of the Amendment  Act, of  1981  barred  the jurisdiction of civil  courts  to  (a) entertain  or adjudicate upon any question whether  (i)  any land  or  immovable  property is ’shamilat deh’  or  is  not ’shamilat deh’; (ii) any land or other immovable property or any right, title or interest in such land or other immovable property  vests  or does not vest in a Panchayat  under  the Act, or (b) to determine any matter which is required to  be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 18  

determined  under  the  Act by any  specified  authority  or officer or (c) to question the legality of any action  taken or any matter decided by the authority or officer  empowered by  the provisions in the principal Act, that too, from  4th day  of May 1961, the date of commencement of the  principal Act itself Finally,  section 7 of the Amendment Act of 1981,  validated actions  taken  or decisions rendered or actions  deemed  to have  taken  or decisions deemed to have renderd  under  the principal Act, as amended by the Amendment Act of 1981. 212 When  the constitutionality of the above provisions  in  the Amendment  Act of 1981 was challenged before the High  Court of  Punjab  and  Haryana,  by  filing  Writ  Petitions,  the question  which  arose  for its  decision  was  whether  the provision  in new section 13 inserted in the  principal  Act barring   the  jurisdiction  of  civil  courts  on   matters enumerated therein retrospectively with effect from the  4th May,  1961, and the provisions in new proviso to  section  7 and  new section 13A empowering the Assistant  Collector  of First Grade to decide on matters covered by the new  section 13  notwithstanding,  that is, by  overlooking  or  brushing aside or disobeying or disregarding civil courts’ decrees or orders  already made on such matters as provided for in  new section  13D  are to be regarded as  constitutionally  valid provisions. Since  the High Court, as already mentioned, took  the  view that  the impugned provisions of the Amendment Act  of  1981 were unconstitutional to the extent they sought to  abrogate the existing civil courts’ decrees or orders and allowed the Writ  Petitions accordingly by the orders rendered in  them, the  State of Haryana feeling aggrieved by the  said  orders has  questioned  their  correctness  in  the  present  Civil Appeals of 1990. It  would now be convenient to turn to the argument  of  the learned  counsel for the State of Haryana  directed  against the   High  Court’s  view  of  unconstitutionality  of   the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1981 and the argument  of learned  counsel  for respondents advanced  supporting  that view. The  High  Court’s view of the  unconstitutionality  of  the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1981 insofar as they  had the effect of abrogating the civil courts’ decrees or orders on lands or immovable properties in ‘shamilat deh’ which had been  made after coming into force of the principal Act  and before  the  Amendment  Act of 1981 was,  according  to  the argument   of  the  learned  counsel  for   the   appellant, unsustainable.  That the State Legislature according to him, when undisputably had legislative competence to enact a  law on ’shamilat deh’, the High Court should have seen that such Legislature  had  the necessary competence to enact  law  on shamilat deh’ retrospectively and, therefore, the provisions empowering the Assistant Collector of First grade to  ignore or  brush  aside or disregard the civil courts’  decrees  or orders  made earlier declaring that the lands or  properties concerned  in  them  as  not  being  ’shamilat  deh’,   were constitu-  213 tional.   Argument of the learned counsel was sought  to  be supported relying upon the decision of this Court in  Sunder Dass  v.  Rant Prakash, [1977] 3 SCR 60,  even  though  some other decisions were referred to incidentally.  On the other hand,  learned counsel for the respondents, who refuted  the argument  advanced  for the appellant, urged that  the  view taken  by the High Court on the unconstitutionality  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 18  

provisions of the Amendment Act of 1981, was required to  be upheld. Haryana State Legislature had the competence to legislate on the  subject of common lands in villages, that is,  land  or immovable  property in shamilat deh’ of the village was  not under  challenge.  Haryana State Legislature could have,  in exercise of its ancillary amending power, legislated on  the subject  of  ’shamilat deh’, retrospectively  was  also  not under  challenge.  What was under challenge before the  High Court was the Haryana State Legislature’s power to  abrogate the  civil courts’ decrees and orders granted in  favour  of certain persons after the coming into force of the principal Act  from  4th May, 1961, to the effect that  several  lands and’  immovable properties in villages formerly regarded  as ’shamilat deh’, were excluded from ’shamilat deh’ under  the principal Act and that they being in possession or enjoyment of  them  were  their  absolute owners,  by  making  a  mere declaration  under  the provisions of the Amendment  Act  of 1981  that  such civil courts’ decrees or  orders  could  be disregarded  or  disobeyed  as nullities  by  the  Assistant Collector of First Grade while deciding claims under section 7 and new section 13A of the principal Act that those  lands or immovable property were ’shamilat deh’ of the village. Under  our  Constitution  no Legislature has  the  power  to abrogate  civil  courts’  decrees  or  orders  or   judicial adjudications  by  merely declaring under a law made  by  it that  such decrees or orders or adjudications are no  longer valid  or  binding  on  the  parties,  for  such  power   of declaration  would  be a judicial function which  cannot  be encroached upon by a Legislature and the only way by which a competent  Legislature can make the judicial  adjudications, decrees  or orders ineffective is by fundamentally  altering the law on which they are based, is well-settled. In  Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Broach  Borough Municipality & Ors., [1970] 1 SCR 388, a Constitution  Bench of  this  Court  considered  the  constitutionality  of  the Gujarat  Imposition of Taxes by Municipalities  (Validation) Act, 1963, which had validated the imposition 214 of tax declared to be illegal by Courts, and held thus               "Granted  legislative  competence, it  is  not               sufficient to declare merely that the decision               of the Court shall not bind, for that is  (it)               tantamount(s)  to  reversing the  decision  in               exercise   of   judicial   power   which   the               legislature  does not possess or exercise.   A               court’s  decision must always bind unless  the               conditions  on  which  it  is  based  are   so               fundamentally altered that the decision  could               not   have   been   given   in   the   altered               circumstances." In  Government  of Andhra Pradesh  and  Kutubullahpur  Grain Panchayat  v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd.,  [1975]  (Supp.) SCR  394, a three judge Bench of this Court  considered  the ambit  of  amended definition of ’house’ in  Andhra  Pradesh Gram  Panchayat  Act, 1964, which  included  retrospectively factories, to get over the High Court’s earlier judgment  by which  it was held that the tax imposed on factories by  the Panchayat under the unamended Act was illegal, and held thus :               "The  Legislature  has  power to  pass  a  law               prospectively as well as retrospectively.  The               Legislature  can  remove  the  basis  of   the               decision  rendered by a court.   The  Amending               Act does not ask the instrumentalities of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 18  

             State  to  disobey or disregard  the  decision               given  by the High Court, but  merely  removes               the basis of that decision." In  Smt.  Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain,  [1976]  2 SCR 347, this Court dealt with the question of Legislature’s competence to validate the matters invalidated by orders  of Courts  by  changing the law.  Ray, C.J.,  adverted  to  the settled legal position, governing such situation, thus               "The  power  of the  legislature  to  validate               matters which have been found by judgments  or               orders of competent Courts and Tribunals to be               invalid  or  illegal is a  wellknown  pattern.               The Legislature validates acts and things done               by  which the basis of judgments or orders  of               competent courts and Tribunals is changed  and               the    judgments   and   orders    are    made               ineffective.......... The effect of validation               is to change the law so as to alter the  basis               of any judgment which might have been given on               the basis of old                215               law The rendering of a judgment ineffective by               changing its basis by legislative enactment is               not  an encroachment on judicial power, but  a               legislation  within  the  competence  of   the               Legislature   rendering  the  basis   of   the               judgment   non-est  Where  invalid   elections               declared  by reason of corrupt practices  have               been  validated by changing the definition  of               corrupt practices in the Representation of the               People Act, 1951, retrospectively the original               judgment is rendered ineffective." In  Misrilal  Jain etc. etc. v. State of Orissa  &  Another, [1977]  3 SCR 714, a seven-judge Bench of this Court,  while considering   the   constitutional   validity   of   certain provisions in Orissa Taxation (On Goods carried by Roads  or Inland Waterways) Validation Act 18 of 1961, where fraud had been attributed to the Legislature, observed thus               "The impugned enactment is a valid exercise of               legislative  power and is in no sense a  fraud               on   the  Constitution.   Since  it  is   well               established   that  the  power  to   legislate               carries   with  it  the  power  to   legislate               retrospectively as much as prospectively,  the               circumstance   that  an   enactment   operates                             entirely  in  the past and has  no  prospectiv e               life  cannot  affect  the  competence  of  the               Legislature to pass the enactment if it  falls               within  the fist on which that competence  can               operate.   As  regards  the power  to  pass  a               validating  Act,  that  power  is  essentially               subsidiary  to the legislative  competence  to               pass  a law under an appropriate entry of  the               relevant  fist  If  the  vice  from  which  an               enactment  suffers is cured by due  compliance               with the legal or constitutional  requirement,               the Legislature has competence to validate the               enactment   and  such  validation   does   not               constitute an encroachment on the functions of               the  judiciary.  The validity of a  validating               taxing   law   depends   upon   whether    the               legislature possesses the competence over  the               subject-matter of the law;" In LN.  Saksena v. The State of Madya Pradesh, [1976] 3  SCR

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 18  

237,  dealing  with  the  well-known  pattern  by  which   a competent   Legislature  could  render  judicial   decisions ineffective observed, thus 216               without  more, directly over-rule, reverse  or               override  a judicial decision, it may, at  any               time   in  exercise  of  the  plenary   powers               conferred on it by Articles 245 and 246 of the               Constitution   render  a   judicial   decision               ineffective.  by  enacting a valid  law  on  a               topic    within    its    legislative    field               fundamentally   altering  or   changing   with               retrospective, curative or neutralising effect               the  conditions  on  which  such  decision  is               based.               of competent Courts and Tribunals by  changing               their basis by legislative enactment is a well               known pattern of all validating Acts In Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash [1977] 3 S. C. R 60 a decision of  this  Court,  on  which  the  learned  counsel  for  the appellant    placed   heavy   reliance   to   sustain    the constitutional ’validity of the provisions in the  Amendment Act  of  1981 which contained a bare  declaration  that  the earlier  judicial adjudication being not valid  and  binding could  be ignored.  The decision does not refer to  anything which  could sustain the validity of a bare  declaration  as the  one with which we are concerned.  In fact,  this  Court was   concerned  in  that  decision  with  a   retrospective amendment made by a Legislature to a law so as to remove the basis  on  which a decree for eviction had been  made.   The Legislative device which had been adopted by the Legislature in that case for rendering the decree of a court ineffective by having recourse to retrospective amendment of the law  so as  to change the foundation of the decree which was  sought to  be  made ineffective, was upheld as  the  right  device. Hence, the decision relied upon for the appellant instead of sustaining the bare declaration with which we are  concerned makes it unsustainable. Thus,  it  becomes clear that a Legislature  while  has  the legislative power to render ineffective the earlier judicial decisions, by removing or altering or neutralising the legal basis  in  the unamended law on which  such  decisions  were founded, even retrospectively, it does not have the power to render ineffective the earlier judicial decisions by  making a  law which simply declares the earlier judicial  decisions as invalid or not binding for such power if exercised  would not be a legislative power but a judicial  217 power which cannot be encroached upon by a Legislature under our Constitution. In  the instant case, the Haryana State Legislature, by  the Amendment Act of 1981, has not made any provision to include the lands and immovable properties  the subject of the civil court’s  decrees,  in  ’shamilat deh’ so as  to  bring  them within the purview of the principal Act.  But, the provision made therin merely directs the Assistant Collector of  First Grade, in effect, to disregard or disobey the earlier  civil courts’  decrees  and judicial orders by which it  had  been held  that  certain  lands  and  immovable  properties  fell outside ’shamilat deh’ regulated by the principal Act.  Such provisions  inserted  by the Amendment Act of  1981  in  the principal Act by a Legislature are, clearly unconstitutional for   they  are  to  be  regarded  as  provisions  made   by encroaching upon the judicial power.  Hence, the view of the High Court that the provisions of the Amendment Act of  1981

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 18  

which  merely  authorise the Assistant  Collector  of  First Grade  to decide the claims to be made before  him  claiming certain  lands  or immovable properties  as  ’shamilat  deh’ vesting  in  Panchayats  ignoring  the  judicial  orders  or decrees,  by which any right, title or interest  of  private parties   in   such  lands  or  immovable   properties   are recognised,  are  unconstitutional requires  to  be  upheld. Consequently,  the provisions of the Amendment Act of  1981, insofar as they are intended to operate retrospectively  for nullifying  the adjudications made by civil courts prior  to that   Amendment   Act,   are   invalid,   inoperative   and unconstitutional.  However, the provisions in the  Amendment Act  of  1981,  can undoubtedly  operate  prospectively  for adjudicating  upon claims to ’shamilat deh’  in  proceedings initiated  subsequent  to the commencement of that  Act,  if they   do  not,  in  any  way,  disturb  the   finality   of adjudications made earlier. For-the  foregoing  reasons,  all these  Civil  Appeals  and Special Leave Petitions fail and are accordingly  dismissed. No costs. R.P. Appeals dismissed. 218