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PETITIONER: GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P.B. VIJAYAKUMAR & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/05/1995

BENCH: MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J) BENCH: MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J) SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1648            1995 SCC  (4) 520  JT 1995 (7)   489        1995 SCALE  (3)613

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:           THE 12TH DAY OF MAY, 1995 Present:           Hon’ble Mr.Justice R.M.Sahai           Hon’ble Mrs.Justice Sujata V. Manohar Mr. K. Lakshmi Narasimha, S.C. for Andhra Pradesh, Mr. G. Prabhakar, Adv. for the Appellant In-person for the Respondent           J U D G M E N T      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION           CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2532-33 OF 1989 Government of Andhra Pradesh                ..... Appellant           VS. P.B.Vijayakumar & Anr.                     ..... Respondents           J U D G M E N T Mrs.Sujata V. Manohar, J.      The Government  of Andhra  Pradesh  in  the  year  1984 decided that  women were  not getting  their  due  share  of public employment.  It  decided  to  take  certain  remedial measures.  On  2.1.1984  it  issued  G.O.Ms.  No.2,  General Administration  (Services-A)   Department   stating   policy decisions taken  by  the  State  Government  in  respect  of reservations for  women in  public services,  to a specified extent. Pursuant  to this  policy decision,  Rule  22-A  was introduced in  the  Andhra  Pradesh  State  and  Subordinate Service Rules  under the  proviso  to  Article  309  of  the Constitution of India. It reads as follows:-      "22-A:  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  these      Rules or Special or Ad-hoc Rules-      (1) In  the matter  of direct  recruitment to posts for      which women  are better  suited  than  men,  preference      shall be  given to  women; (G.O..Ms.MNo.472, G.A. dated      11.10.1985):           Provided that  such absolute  preference to  women

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    shall not  result in  total exclusion  of  men  in  any      category of posts.      (2) In  the matter  of direct  recruitment to posts for      which women  and men  are equally  suited, other things      being equal,  preference shall  be given  to women  and      they shall  be selected to an extent of at least 30% of      the posts  in each  category of  O.C., B.C.,  S.C., and      S.T. quota.      (3) In  the matter of direct recruitment to posts which      are reserved exclusively for being filled by women they      shall be filled by women only."      Sub-rule (2)  of this  Rule is  the subject  matter  of challenge before us. The challenge is by the respondent No.1 who, at  the time  of filing of the petition before the High Court, was  a law  student in Andhra University, Waltair. We are informed  that he  is now  a practising  lawyer. At  the material time,  however, he  had registered  his name in the District Employment  Exchange,  Visakhapatnam.  He  filed  a write  petition   before  the   Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court challenging the  above  Rule  on  the  ground  that  it  was violative of  Articles 14  and 16(4) of the Constitution and had seriously  affected all  male unemployed  persons in the State of  Andhra Pradesh.  A  single  Judge  of  the  Andhra Pradesh High  Court upheld  the validity  of Rule  22-A.  In appeal before  the High Court, however, a Division Bench has struck down  a portion  of Rule  22-A(2) as unconstitutional while upholding  sub-rules (1)  and (3)  of Rule  22-A.  The portion of  sub-rule (2)  which is  struck down  is the last portion of  that sub-rule  containing the  words  "and  they shall be  selected to an extent of at least 30% of the posts in each category of O.C., B.C., S.C., and S.T. quota".      Does sub-rule  (2) of  Rule 22-A violate Articles 14 or 16(4)? Article  14 which  provides that  the State shall not deny to  any person  equality before  the law,  has been the subject matter of interpretation in a number of cases before this Court  as well  as the High Courts. Application of this principle of  equality has  often proved  more difficult  in practice than was anticipted. It has, however, been commonly accepted that the equality clause requires that only persons who are  in like  circumstances should  be treated  equally. Where persons or groups of persons are not situated equally, to treat them as equals would itself be violative of Article 14.  As   a  necessary   fall   out   of   this   principle, classification  among   different  groups   of  persons  and differentiation between such classes is permissible provided (1)  the   classification   is   founded   on   intelligible differential between  the groups  and (2)  such  differentia have a rational nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by   the    statute.   Article    15,   however,   prohibits differentiation  between  classes  on  certain  grounds.  It prohibits the  State from discriminating against any citizen on grounds  only of  religion, race,  caste, sex,  place  of birth or any of them. Clause (3) of Article 15 provides that nothing in  this Article shall prevent the State from making any special  provision for  women  and  children.  In  other words, while Article 15(1) would prevent a State from making any discriminatory  law (inter  alia) on  the ground  of sex alone, the  State, by virtue of Article 15(3), is permitted, despite Article 15(1), to make special provisions for women, thus clearly  carving out  a permissible  departure from the rigours of Article 15(1).      Article  16(2)  provides  that  no  citizen  shall,  on grounds only of religion,   race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth,  residence or  any of  them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against  in  respect  of,  any  employment  or

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office under  the State.  The ambit of Article 16(2) is more limited in  scope than  Article 15(1) because it is confined to employment  or office  under the State. Article 15(1), on the other hand, covers the entire range of State activities. At the  same time,  the prohibited grounds of discrimination under Article  16(2) are  somewhat wider  than  those  under Article 15(2) because Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination on the  additional grounds  of descent  and residence  apart from religion,  race, caste, sex and place of birth. For our purposes, however,  both Articles  15(1) and  16(2)  contain prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex.      The respondent  before us has submitted that if Article 16(2)  is   read  with   Article  16(4)  it  is  clear  that reservation of  appointments  or  posts  in  favour  of  any backward class  of citizens  which, in  the opinion  of  the State, is  not adequately  represented in the services under the State  is expressly  permitted. But  there  is  no  such express provision in relation to reservation of appointments or posts in favour of women under Article 16. Therefore, the respondent  contends   that  the   State  cannot   make  any reservation in  favour of  women in relation to appointments or posts  under the  State. According to the respondent this would amount  to discrimination  on the  ground  of  sex  in public employment  or appointment  to posts  under the State and would violate Article 16(2).      This argument  ignores Article 15(3). The interrelation between Articles  14, 15  and 16  has been  considered in  a number of  cases by  this Court. Article 15 deals with every kind of  State action  in relation  to the  citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled by Article  15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the  ambit of Article 15(1) employment under the State. At the  same time  Article 15(3)  permits special provisions for women.  Both Articles  15(1) and  15(3) go  together. In addition to  Article 15(1)  Article 16(1),  however,  places certain additional  prohibitions in  respect of  a  specific area of  state activity  viz. employment  under  the  State. These  are   in  addition  to  the  grounds  of  prohibition enumerated under Article 15(1) which are also included under Article  16(2).   There  are,   however,  certain   specific provisions in  connection with  employment under  the  State under  Article  16.  Article  16(3)  permits  the  State  to prescribe a  requirement of  residence within  the State  or Union Territory  by parliamentary legislation; while Article 16(4) permits  reservation of  posts in  favour of  backward classes. Article  16(5) permits  a law  which may  require a person to  profess a  particular religion or may require him to belong  to a  particular religious denomination, if he is the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of the religious  or denominational institution. Threrfore, the prohibition against discrimination on the grounds set out in Article 16(2)  in respect  of any employment or office under the State  is qualified by clauses 3, 4 and 5 of Article 16. Therefore, in  dealing with  employment under  the State, it has to  bear in  mind both  Articles 15  and 16 - the former being a  more general  provision  and  the  latter,  a  more specific provision. Since Article 16 does not touch upon any special provision  for women  being made  by the  State,  it cannot in  any manner derogate from the power conferred upon the State in this connection under Article 15(3). This power conferred by  Article 15(3)  is wide  enough  to  cover  the entire range  of State  activity including  employment under the State.      The insertion  of clause  (3) of Article 15 in relation to women  is a  recognition of  the fact that for centuries,

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women of  this country  have been  socially and economically handicapped. As  a result, they are unable to participate in the socio-economic  activities of the nation on a footing of equality. It  is in  order to  eliminate this socio-economic backwardness of  women and  to empower them in a manner that would bring  about effective  equality between men and women that Article 15(3) is placed in Article 15. Its object is to strengthen and  improve the  status of  women. An  important limb of  this concept  of gender  equality is  creating  job opportunities for  women. To  say that  under Article 15(3), job opportunities  for women  cannot be  created would be to out at  the very  root of  the underlying inspiration behind this Article. Making special provisions for women in respect of employment  or posts  under the State is an integral part of Article  15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3), is not whittled down in any manner by Article 16.      What then is meant by "any special provision for women" in Article  15(3)? This "special provision", which the State may make  to improve women’s participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the form of  either affirmative  action or  reservation.  It  is interesting to  note that the same phraseology finds a place in Article  15(4) which deals with any special provision for the advancement  of any  socially or  educationally backward class of  citizens or  Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Article 15  as originally  enacted did  not contain  Article 15(4). It  was inserted  by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951  as a  result of  the decision  in the Case of The State of  Madras v.  Champakam  Dorairajan  (1951  SCR  525) setting  aside   reservation   of   seats   in   educational institutions on the basis of caste and community. This Court observed  that  the  Government’s  order  was  violative  of Article 15 or Article 29(2). It said:-           "Seeing, however,  that clause  (4)      was inserted in Article 16, the omission      of  such   an  express   provision  from      Article 29  cannot but  be  regarded  as      significant." The object  of the  First Amendment was to bring Articles 15 and 29 in line with Article 16(4). After the introduction of Article  15(4),   reservation  of   seats   in   educational institutions has  been upheld  in the  case of  M.R.Balaji & Ors. v.  State of  Mysore (1963  Supp. (1)  SCR 439)  and  a number of  other cases  which need  not be referred to here. Under Article  15(4) orders  reserving seats  for  Scheduled Castes,   Scheduled   Tribes   and   Backward   Classes   in Engineering, Medical and other Technical colleges, have been upheld. Under  Article  15(4),  therefore  reservations  are permissible for  the advancement  of any  backward class  of citizens or  of Scheduled  Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Since Article 15(3)  contains an  identical special  provision for women, Article  15(3) would  also include  the power to make reservations for  woemn. In  fact,  in  the  case  of  Indra Sawhney &  Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217) this  Court (in  paragraph 846) rejected the contention that Article  15(4) which  deals with  a special  provision, envisages programmes  of positive action while Article 16(4) is   a   provision   warranting   programmes   of   positive discrimination. This Court observed:-      "We are  afraid  we  may  not  be  able  to  fit  these      provisions into  this kind  of compartmentalisation  in      the  context   and   scheme   of   our   constitutional      provisions.  By   now,  it   is   well   settled   that      reservations  in  educational  institutions  and  other      walks of  life can be provided under Article 15(4) just

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    as reservations  can  be  provided  in  services  under      Article 16(4).  If so,  it  would  not  be  correct  to      confine Article  15(4) to programmes of positive action      alone. Article  15(4) is wider than Article 16(4) in as      much as several kinds of positive action programmes can      also be evolved and implemented thereunder (in addition      to reservations)  to improve  the conditions  of SEBCs,      Scheduled Castes  and Scheduled Tribes, whereas Article      16(4) speaks  only of  one type  of  remedial  measure,      namely, reservation of appointments/posts."      This Court has, therefore, clearly considered the scope of Article 15(4) as wider than Article 16(4) covering within it several  kinds of  positive action programmes in addition to reservations. It has, however, added a word of caution by reiterating M.R.Balaji  (supra) to the effect that a special provision contemplated  by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and  appointments contemplated  by Article 16(4), must be within  reasonable limits.  These limits  of  reservation have been  broadly fixed  at 50%  at the  maximum. The  same reasoning would  apply to  Article  15(3)  which  is  worded similarly.      In the  light of these constitutional provisions, if we look at  Rule 22-A(2) it is apparent that the Rule does make certain special  provisions for  women as contemplated under Article 15(3).  Rule 22-A(2)  provides for  preference being given to  women to  the extent  of 30%  of the  posts, other things being  equal. This  is clearly  not a reservation for women in  the normal sense of the term. Reservation normally implies a  separate quota  which is  reserved for  a special category of  persons. Within  that category  appointments to the reserved  posts may  be made  in the order of the merit. Nevertheless, the  category for  whose benefit a reservation is provided,  is not required to compete on equal terms with the  open  category.  Their  selection  and  appointment  to reserved posts  is independently on their inter se merit and not as  compared with  the merit  of candidates  in the open category. The very purpose of reservation is to protect this weak category  against competition  from the  open  category candidates. In  the case  of  Indra  Sawhney  (supra)  while dealing with  reservations,  this  Court  has  observed  (at paragraph 836):-      "It cannot  also be  ignored  that  the  very  idea  of      reservation implies  selection of  a  less  meritorious      person. At  the same  time, we recognise that this much      cost has  to be  paid, if the constitutional promise of      social justice is to be redeemed." These remarks  are qualified  by observing  that efficiency, competence and  merit are  not synonymous  and  that  it  is undeniable that  nature has  endowed merit  upon members  of backward classes  as much  as it has endowed upon members of other classes.  What is  required is an opportunity to prove it. It  is precisely  a lack of opportunity which has led to social backwardness,  not merely  amongst what  are commonly considered as  the backward classes, but also amongst women. Reservation,  therefore,  is  one  of  the  constitutionally recognised methods  of overcoming this type of backwardness. Such reservation is permissible under Article 15(3).      Rule 22-A(2),  however, does  not provide for this kind of reservation  for women.  It is  a Rule for a very limited affirmative action. It operates, first of all, in respect of direct recruitment  to posts  for which  men and  women  are equally suited. Secondly, it operates only when both men and women candidates are equally meritorious. This is an express condition of Rule 22-A(2), thus limiting its application. In other words,  it contemplates  a  situation  where,  in  the

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selection test  - whether  it is  written or oral or both, a certain number of men and women candidates have got an equal number of  marks. If  the number  of posts  to  which  these equally situated men and women can be appointed are limited, and all  of them cannot be appointed, then preference to the extent of  30% is  required to  be given  to women.  This is clearly an affirmative action of preference to the extent of 30% for  women. To give an illustration, supposing there are in the merit list, at a certain point in the order of merit, 20 candidates - men and women, who have secured equal marks. There are  only ten  posts  which  have  to  be  distributed amongst these  20 candidates.  In such a situation, 3 out of these 10  posts will be given to women while the remaining 7 posts will  have to  be  allotted  among  the  remaining  17 candidates.  In   such  a   situation  if   there  are   any departmental rules  for giving preference they will operate. For example such rules at times provide that a person who is older in age will be preferred, all other thing being equal. This kind  of preference  may have nothing to do with merit. It may  be merely an administrative guideline to select from amongst  those   who  are   equally  meritorious.  Sometimes educational qualifications  are looked  at to  find out  the marks obtained  by the  candidates in  the  examination.  It could be  that the examination taken by different candidates is of  different times. Nevertheless, these marks are looked at to  select some  candidates out  of a  group  of  equally meritorious  persons.  These  norms  for  selection  out  of equally meritorious  persons, do  not come  into play  under Rule 22-A(2)  for giving  preference to  women.  The  phrase "other things  being equal"  does not  refer to  these other norms for  choosing from out of equally meritorious persons. For example,  it would be somewhat startling to find men and women who  have not  merely got  the same number of marks in the selection  test but are also born on the same day in the same year.  It is  not the intention of Rule 22-A(2) that it would apply  only if  all the candidates have not merely the same number of marks in the selection test but are also born on the  same date, or have identical marks in the qualifying diploma or  degree examination.  The preference contemplated under Rule  22-A(2) will  come into operation at the initial stage when  in the  selection test for the post in question, candidates obtain  the same  number of marks or are found to be equally  meritorious. Rule  22-A(2) prescribes  a minimum preference of  30% for women, clearly contemplating that for the remaining  posts also, if women candidates are available and can  be selected  on the  basis  of  other  criteria  of selection among  equals which  are applied  to the remaining candidates, they  can also be selected. The 30% rule is also not inflexible.  In a  situation where  sufficient number of women are  not available,  preference that  may be  given to them could be less than 30%.      We do  not, however,  find any reason to hold that this rule is  not within  the ambit  of Article  15(3), nor do we find it  in any  manner violative  of Article 16(2) or 16(4) which have  to be  read harmoniously with Articles 15(1) and 15(3).  Both   reservation  and   affirmative   action   are permissible  under   Article  15(3)   in   connection   with employment or posts under the State. Both Articles 15 and 16 are designed for the same purpose of creating an egalitarian society. As Thommen, J. has observed in Indra Sawhney’s case (supra) (although  his judgment  is  a  minority  judgment), "Equality is  one of the magnificient cornerstones of Indian democracy". We  have, however,  yet to turn that corner. For that purpose  it is  necessary that  Article 15(3)  be  read harmoniously with  Article 16  to achieve  the  purpose  for

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which these Articles have been framed.      In the  premises, the  judgment of the High Court in so far as  it strikes  down the  second part of Rule 22-A(2) is set aside  and Rule  22-A(2) is upheld as valid. The appeals are accordingly allowed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.