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PETITIONER: A.T.S. CHINNASWAMI CHETTIAR ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SRI KARI VARADARAJA PERUMAL TEMPLE & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/09/1995

BENCH: VENKATASWAMI K. (J) BENCH: VENKATASWAMI K. (J) SINGH N.P. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  234            JT 1995 (7)   538  1995 SCALE  (5)484

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T K. Venkataswami, J.      These three  appeals arise  out of  the common judgment and order made in S.T.A.Nos. 174, 181 and 210 of 1974 on the file of the Madras High Court.      The brief  facts leading  to these  appeals as noted in the High Court judgment are the following :-      The first  respondent-temple was the grantee of a minor inam comprising  of lands  bearing old S.Nos. 173 and 175 of the total  extent of  19.58 acres  in Pollachi  village. The terms of  the original  grant as  such were  not  available, however, the  Inam fair register produced in the proceedings showed that  the grant  was a  devadayam religious inam of a permanent character  given rent-free  for the support of the temple. The  Inam was  confirmed in  the year 1863 under the title deed  No. 161. By the Tamil Nadu Minor Inam (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963, (hereinafter called the Act)  minor inams were abolished and Ryotwari settlement was  introduced.   The  Settlement  Tehsildar  No.  II  Gobi Chettipalayam initiated  an enquiry for the purpose of grant of a  Ryotwari patta  under the  provisions of the said Act. The appellants  herein and  also the first respondent temple appeared before  the said Settlement Tehsildar and asked for Ryotwari patta to be issued in their favour in regard to the lands in  their respective  possession.  The  appellants  in particular, contended  before the  Settlement Tehsildar that the first  respondent temple had lost possession of the Inam lands soon  after the  grant as  the lands were alienated by one Thirumalai  Ayyan, pujari  of the temple in whose favour the Inam  Commissioner had  conferred the grant. Be it noted that no sale deed by the said individual was produced by the appellants before  the Settlement  Tehsildar at  the time of the enquiry,  nor before  the appellate  authority or before the High  Court or  even  before  this  Court.  Instead  the appellants placed  strong reliance on a partition deed dated

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17.2.1888 between  three members  of a  joint family by name Kuppanna Mudaliar, Marianna Mudaliar and Lakshmana Mudaliar. Placing reliance  on the recitals in the said partition deed and also  the sale  deeds subsequent  to the  said partition deed executed  by the  successors-in-interest  of  the  said joint family  members, the  appellants  contended  that  the temple had lost its title to the Inam lands.      Though the  Settlement Tehsildar did not agree with the contention of the appellants that the partition deeds relied on by  the appellants could be taken as an alienation by the Inamdar of the lands in question, strangely granted patta to the appellants under Section 8(2) (i) (b) of the Act holding that the  appellants were  in continuous  possession of  the lands for more than 12 years before 1.4.1960.      The appellants  not satisfied  with the  grant of patta under Section  8(2) (i)  (b) of the Act preferred appeals to the  Minor   Inam  Tribunal  (Principal  Subordinate  Judge) Coimbatore claiming patta under Section 8(i) of the Act.      Before the Tribunal, the appellants contended that what was granted to the temple was only melwaram interest and the appellants  alone  were  rightfully  entitled  to  kudiwaram interest and on the abolition of Minor Inams they alone were entitled to Ryotwari patta.      The Tribunal  accepting  the  case  of  the  appellants granted patta under Section 8(i) of the Act in their favour.      Aggrieved by  the grant of patta to the appellants, the first respondent  temple preferred further statutory appeals to the  High Court  which were heard by a Division Bench and the learned  Judges disagreeing with the conclusions reached both by  the Settlement  Tehsildar and the Tribunal reversed their findings and granted patta in favour of the temple.      Aggrieved by  the  decision  of  the  High  Court,  the present appeals are filed by the appellants.      Mr. A.T.M.  Sampath, learned  counsel appearing for the appellants submitted  that the  High  Court  ought  to  have accepted the  contention of  the appellants raised before it placing reliance  on a Division Bench judgment of that Court reported in 1949 (2) MLJ 609 entitled Bagavathi Aiman Temple vs. Krishna  Goundar. Learned counsel further submitted that in  view  of  he  partition  deed  of  the  year  1888,  the subsequent sale  deeds  and  continuous  possession  of  the lands, it  was  established  that  the  appellants  were  in continuous  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the  lands,  and therefore, they  must be  given Ryotwari patta under Section 8(i) of  the Act  on the  basis of  prescription of title to kudiwaram right  by adverse  possession. He  also  submitted that the view taken by the Tribunal that the grant in favour of the  temple was  only of melwaram interest was correct in the facts  and circumstances  of the  case and  the contrary finding given  by the  High Court  is  not  sustainable.  In addition to  the judgment relied on by the appellants before the High Court, learned counsel placed reliance on two other judgments of  the Madras  High Court in STA Nos. 21/1976 and 103/1975 entitled  Peria Alagunachiamman  oil & Ors. vs. The Settlement Tehsildar,  Coimbatore &  Ors. and  Sri Ayirathan Vinayakar Temple  Arumughamangalam vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. respectively.      Contending contra,  learned counsel  appearing for  the first respondent  Temple invited  our attention  to Sections 8(2) (i)  and 44  of  the  Act.  According  to  the  learned counsel, there is nothing on record to show that the inamdar or any  person claiming  through him has legally parted with the title  to the  land. All  the documents  produced by the appellants were  only  transactions  among  the  transferees without establishing  who the  original transferor was. That

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being  the  admitted  position,  according  to  the  learned counsel,  Section  44  of  the  Act  is  attracted  and  the presumption that  follows is that the grant in favour of the Temple  was   both  warams/iruwaram.  This  argument  having rightly been  accepted by  the High  Court, according to the learned counsel for the first respondent Temple, there is no case for interference.      Before considering  the rival  submissions, it  will be useful to  refer to  some of  the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act was enacted as per Preamble "to provide for the acquisition of  the rights of inamdars in minor inams in the State of  Tamil Nadu  and for  the introduction  of Ryotwari settlement in  such inams." Section 3(a) explicitly declares inter  alia   that  as  and  from  the  appointed  day,  the provisions of  the Act  alone shall  be  applicable  to  the minors inams  and that any other existing law on the subject shall be deemed to have been repealed. Section 3( ) declares that all  rights created  by the inamdar in or over his inam before the  appointed  day  shall  cease  and  determine  as against the Government.      Sections 3(g),  8(i) &  (2)  and  Section  44  read  as follows :-      Section 3(g)      "any rights  and  privileges  which  may      have accrued  in the  minor inam  to any      person before  the appointed day against      the inamdar  shall cease  and  determine      and shall not be enforceable against the      Government or  against the  inamdar  and      every such person shall be entitled only      to such  rights and  privileges  as  are      recognised or  conferred on  him, by  or      under this Act."      Section 8(1)      "Subject  to   the  provisions  of  sub-      section (2) every person who is lawfully      entitled to  the Kudivaram  in  an  inam      land immediately  before  the  appointed      day whether  such person  is an  inamdar      appointed day,  be entitled  to Ryotwari      patta in respect of that land."      Section 8(2) :      "Notwithstanding anything  contained  in      sub-section  (1)  in  the  (Tamil  Nadu)      Hindu    Religious     and    Charitable      Endowments Act,  1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 22      of  1959)   and  in   the  (Tamil  Nadu)      Transferred Territory)  Incorporated and      Unincorporated   Devaswoms   Act,   1959      (Tamil  Nadu)   Act  30  of  1959),  the      following provisions  shall apply in the      case of  lands in an iruvaram minor inam      granted for  the support  or maintenance      of a  religious institution  or for  the      performance  of   charity   or   service      connected  therewith  or  of  any  other      religious charity -           (i)  where  the   land   has   been      transferred  by  way  of  sale  and  the      transferred  by  way  of  sale  and  the      transferee or  his heir  assignee  legal      representative or person deriving rights      through  him   had  been   in  exclusive      possession of such land;           (a)  for  a  continuous  period  of

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    sixty years  immediately before  the 1st      day of  April 1960,  such person  shall,      with effect  on and  from the  appointed      day, be  entitled to a Ryotwari patta in      respect of that land;           (b)  for  a  continuous  period  of      twelve years  immediately before the 1st      day of  April, 1960,  such person shall,      with effect  on and  from the  appointed      day, be  entitled to a Ryotwari patta if      he  pays   as   consideration   to   the      Government in  such manner  and in  such      number  of   instalments   as   may   be      prescribed an  amount  equal  to  twenty      times the  difference between  the  fair      rent, in respect of such land determined      in  accordance   with   the   provisions      contained in  the Schedule  and the land      revenue on such land;           (ii) in the case of any other land,      the  institution   or   the   individual      rendering service  shall with  effect on      and from  the appointed day, be entitled      to a  Ryotwari patta  in respect of that      land."           Explanation :-  For the purposes of      this sub-section,  "land revenue"  means      the Ryotwari  assessment  including  the      additional  assessment,  water-cess  and      additional water-cess."      Section 44 :      "In proceedings  under this Act relating      to any  inam granted  for the benefit of      any religious  educational on charitable      institution or granted to any individual      for rendering  service to  a  religious,      educational or charitable institution or      for the  purpose of  rendering any other      service it shall be presumed, unless the      contrary  is   proved,  that   the  inam      consists not  merely of  a grant  of the      melvaram  in   the  land  but  also  the      kudivaram therein."      With this  background, let  us now  proceed to consider the cases before us.      As noticed  earlier, the  Settlement  Tehsildar  though negatived the contention of the appellants that by reason of the partition  deed dated  17.2.1888 and subsequent numerous sale deeds,  it must be deemed that the first respondent had parted with disputed lands, has granted Ryotwari patta under Section 8(2)  (i) (b) on the ground that the appellants were in possession  of the  lands in  question for  a  continuous period of  12 years  immediately before the 1st April, 1960. This view  of the Settlement TEhsildar was rightly set aside by the  High Court  in view  of the  admitted fact  that the appellants miserably  failed to  establish  that  the  first respondent temple (inamdar) has transferred the lands by way of sale  and mere  possession of  lands for  the said period will be  of no  avail. It  may be  pointed out here that the Settlement  Tehsildar   has  rightly  held  that  the  first respondent was  granted a  devadayam  religious  inam  of  a permanent character  consisting of  iruwarams (both melwaram and kudiwaram). This position is also strengthened/supported by  the   statutory  presumption   in  favour  of  religious institution like the 1st respondent herein as per Section 44

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extracted above  especially in  the premise  of  appellants’ failure to  prove the  contrary. Once  the position that the first respondent  temple was  granted both warams, the claim of the  appellants that  they must be granted Ryotwari patta under Section  8(1) must  fail as  there  is  no  scope  for invoking Section  8(1) by  the appellants in view of Section 8(2) extracted above and also on the facts of these cases.      We have  seen earlier  that the Inam Abolition Tribunal on appeals by the Appellants herein held that the temple was granted only  melwaram  and  the  appellants  were  lawfully entitled  to   the  kudiwaram  and  therefore,  entitled  to Ryotwari patta  under Section  8(1) of the Act. This view of the Tribunal  cannot stand  a moment’s  scrutiny in  view of statutory presumption  provided in  Section 44  of the  Act. Further the  Tribunal for  coming to  the  above  conclusion assumed certain  facts which  were either not established or substantiated. Therefore,  very rightly  the High  Court set aside that  view of the Tribunal. We may also point out that the learned counsel for the appellants before the High Court factually did  not support  that view  of the  Tribunal  and therefore, advanced  arguments claiming  title to  kudiwaram right based  on adverse  possession which  also did not find favour with  High Court.  Learned counsel for the appellants reiterated before  us the  claim for  Ryotwari patta  on the basis of  long and  continuous possession  coupled with sale deeds following  partition deed dated 17.2.1888. Here again, the contention  based on  adverse possession is misconceived one. After  coming into  force of  the Act, the right, title and  interest   in  minor   inam  lands   vested  free  from encumbrance with  the Government  and Ryotwari pattas had to be claimed only under the provisions of the Act  not outside the Act. If this position is borne in mind, there will be no difficulty in  rejecting the  contention  based  on  adverse possession. Further in view of Section 3(g) extracted above, the claim of adverse possession cannot be countenanced.      The High  Court has  rightly distinguished  the case on which reliance  was placed  by the  appellants, namely  1949 (21) MLJ  602 (supra)  by pointing  out that that was a case which did  not deal  with a statute like the present Act and High Court  was called  upon in the present case to consider the grant  of Ryotwari patta under the provisions of the Act and not  outside the  Act. As pointed out earlier, before us two more  decisions were cited and we find in both the cases the admitted fact was that the alienation was by the inamdar temple itself.  That makes  all the  difference.  Therefore, those decisions will not help the appellants. At the risk of repetition we may point out that it is an admitted fact that the appellants  have failed  to establish that there was any alienation by  the inamdar to enable the appellants to claim Ryotwari patta  under Section 8(2). The inam in question, as found earlier,  was an  inam granted  for the  benefit of  a religious  institution  and  so  the  statutory  presumption provided under  Section 44  will come  into full play in the absence of  the appellants  proving anything contrary to get over the  said statutory  presumption. In  this context, the decision relied  on by  the first respondent before the High Court and  also relied  on before  us reported  in  Vol.  87 (1974) Law  Weekly p.  652, helps  the first  respondent  in sustaining the  judgment and  order of  the High  Court. The learned judges  have clearly  pointed out  while considering the provisions of Section 8(2) as follows :- <SLS>      "That provision, in our opinion will not      apply to  a case  of alienee. The policy      of the  law, as it stood prior to Madras

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    Act 30  of 1963, was that alienations by      way of  sale would be null and void. The      Madras Hindu  Religious  and  Charitable      Endowments   Act   of   1959   and   its      predecessors provided for resumption and      re-grant of  such alienated service inam      lands. We  have got  to approach  S.8 in      that context.  The policy  of the law in      respect  of   alienated   religious   or      charitable inam  lands is  indicated  in      Sub. S.  2(i) of  S. 8.  The  alienation      should have been made by the inamdar and      the transferee  or his  heir,  assignee,      legal representative  or person deriving      rights through  him should  have been in      exclusive  possession   for  the  period      provided by  Cl.(a) or Cl.(b). These two      clauses lead  to different  results.  If      possession with the alienee is proved as      coming  within   the  ambit   of  Cl.(b)      subject to  payment of  consideration to      the  Government   as  provided   by  the      Section, patta  may be  granted  to  the      alienee. Where a religious or charitable      inam  land   had  been   alienated   but      possession was not proved as provided in      Cl. (i)  of Sub.  S. (2)  of S.  8,  the      alienee will not be entitled to patta."      Lastly, one  argument advanced  by the  learned counsel for the appellants remains to be dealt with, namely, that in any event,  the appellants  are entitled to have patta under Section 8(2)  (i) (b) as granted by the Settlement Tehsildar even though  their claim  for patta  under Section  8(1) was rejected by  the High Court. This was elaborately dealt with by the  High Court  and while  repelling such  argument,  it observed as follows :-      "The entire  scheme and structure of the      Act  as   well   as   the   purpose   of      constituting   the    authorities    and      functionaries   under    the   Act    to      effectively administer the provisions of      this Act  and to carry out the principal      objective of  introduction  of  ryotwari      settlements in  the place  of the  minor      inams in  the State.  In  this  context,      therefore, we  do  not  think  that  the      rules of  procedure applicable  to trial      of suits in courts of first instance and      the  entertainment  of  appeals  against      decree and  orders of  Courts  of  first      instance  provided  under  the  Code  of      Civil Procedure  can at  all be regarded      as applicable  to proceedings  under the      Act.  Mr.   Narayanaswami,  referred  to      section 30(3) of the Act which lays down      that  the   Special  Appellate  Tribunal      shall,  subject  to  the  provisions  of      Section 47-A,  have the  same powers  as      are vested  in a  Civil Court  under the      Code of  Civil Procedure  1908  (Central      Act V  of 1908)  when hearing an appeal.      He also referred to us Section 46 of the      Act which/provides that any order passed      by any  officer, the Government or other      authority  or   any  decision   of   the

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    Tribunal  or   the   Special   Appellate      Tribunal under  this Act  in respect  of      matters to be determined for the purpose      of this  Act shall,  subject only to any      appeal or  revision provided  under this      Act, be  final. But,  we do  not  regard      these provisions  in the  Act as in any,      way restricting  or limiting  our powers      as an  appellate Tribunals  to determine      finally and  effectively the question of      issue of  ryotwari patta  or  any  other      matter  that   may  come  before  us  in      appeal. Section 46 itself indicates that      the orders  to be  passed by the Special      Tribunals and  Appellate Tribunal  shall      not be  liable to  be  questioned  in  a      Court  of  law,  thereby  implying  that      while acting  under Section  30 the High      Court does  not function  as a  Court of      law."      For the  above reasons,  we hold  that  the  Settlement Tehsildar and  the Inam  Abolition Tribunal  fell  into  two different types  of errors  for granting  ryotwari patta  to appellants under  Section 8(2)  (i)  (b)  and  Section  8(1) respectively which errors have been removed and set right by the High Court.      In the  result, the  appeals fail  and are  accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.