07 August 1996
Supreme Court
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DMAI Vs

Bench: PUNCHHI,M.M.
Case number: C.A. No.-000502-000503 / 1988
Diary number: 70403 / 1988


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PETITIONER: V L PATIL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ARJUN HALAPPA NAIKAWADI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       07/08/1996

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. VENKATASWAMI K. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCALE  (5)824

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      The appellant, the aggrieved party in these two special appeals, was  granted/leave limited  to the  question as  to whether the  learned Single  Judge of  the  High  Court  was justified in  passing strictures  against the  appellant. On merit of the matter, the fate of the cases stands sealed.      The reference  to the  appellant in the judgment of the learned Single  Judge is in two capacities : (i) as a party- respondent connected with the merits of the matter; and (ii) his brooding  presence as  a Minister  of the  time to  have influenced the  decision-making of  the  Land  Tribunal,  it being a  land reforms  matter. The  learned Single  Judge in paragraph 4 of his judgment observed as follows :      "But, in this case it appears to me      that    the    regular    procedure      prescribed by  the Land Reforms Act      for conferring  occopation  of  the      lands immediately prior to 1.8.1974      had been abused by the Chairman and      the  members  of  the  Tribunal  to      casue   wilful    loss    to    the      petitioners and  they did  not have      the courage of their convictions to      stand up  to  the  machinations  of      respondent  -   3  (the   appellant      herein)  who   was   admittedly   a      Minister of the State Government at      the   relevant   time."   (emphasis      supplied)      On appeal  to the  Division Bench  of the High Court at the instance of the appellant, the Division Bench in para 31 of its judgment observed as follows :      "As earlier  observed,  we  do  not      find any  direct evidence  to  hold      that the  impugned order was passed      by the  Tribunal at  the behest  of

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    the  appellant  who  exercised  his      influence on  them. But  the  facts      and circumstances of the case leave      no manner  of doubt  that after the      passing  of   a   decree   in   the      partition suit, a determined effort      which was  within the  knowledge of      the appellant,  was made  to defeat      the claim of Naikwadi family, which      in    our     view    was    wholly      unjustified."      The Bench further observed in paragraph 37 as follows :      "Having arrived  at  the  aforesaid      conclusion,  one   question   still      remains  to   be   answered   i.e.,      whether respondent  - 3 (appellant)      exerted  his  extra  constitutional      power and  influence on the members      of the  Tribunal who  yielded -  to      such influence.  On this aspect, it      was very  fairly  conceded  by  Mr.      Bannurmath, learned counsel for the      writ   petitioners, that  there was      no evidence  to  prove  any  direct      link  between   the  appellant  and      members of  the Tribunal. Even  we,      after   going   through   all   the      relevant evidence  find that  there      is no  positive direct  evidence to      prove the  exervising of  the extra      constitutional power  and influence      on the  members  of  the  Tribunal.      That being  so, the  next  question      that   arises   for   consideration      whether there is any circumstantial      evidence on the basis of which such      an inference  can be  drawn. In our      view on the facts and circumstances      of this  case, it would be too much      stretching to  hold that to procure      the   impugned    order   such   an      influence  was   exerted   by   the      appellant  (respondent-3)  himself.      The facts of the case do reveal the      revival of  interest of respondents      - 3  in the land in dispute and the      determined  effort  of  Smt.  Aruna      Devi to  deny the possession of the      Naikwadi family  and  defeat  their      claim. But  these  facts  plus  the      fact that  respondent  -  3  was  a      Minister in  the State  cabinet  by      themselves, in  our opinion  do not      lead to  a positive conclusion that      the impugned  order is  the outcome      of   the    exercise   of    extra-      constitutional power  and influence      on the members of the Tribunal, yet      suspicion is left unerased that the      impugned order may have been passed      to please  respondent-3 or  at  his      behest."      We have  been taken through the other relevant portions of the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as that of the  Division Bench  which reflect  on the conduct of the

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appellant in  his capacity  as a  litigant, for  it was  his lands which  were being  subjected to  the provisions of the relevant Land  Reforms Act.  His conduct as a litigant could definitely be  commented upon by the courts and that part of the order  would have  to sustain, for expunction of remarks cannot be  sought by  a litigant  if those were legitimately made from  the conclusions  and inferences drawn by a court. But, here  we have his name as a Minister brought in to cast a shadow  on the  merits of  the matters and this is a pinch unbearable to the appellant.      It is evident from the afore=extracted passage from the judgment of  the learned Single Judge that the spelled out a direct nexus  between the  conduct of  the  members  of  the Tribunal and  the appellant being a Minister at the relevant time. The Division Bench however could not sustain that view of the  Single Bench  as is  evident  from  the  two  afore- extracted passages  from its  judgment. It  has been  viewed that there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence to prove any nexus between the appellant and the members of the tribunal, The finding was dressed down to be described as an ’usnerased suspicion’  that the impugned order may have been passed to  please respondent  No.3 (the appellant) or at his behest. On  such  infirm  and  shaky  finding,  we  are  not prepared to  sustain the  remarks passed  by the  High Court against the  appellant as  a Minister. In our view, the High Court at both the stages was in error in linking or dragging the appellant’s name as a Minister with the deliberations of the Tribunal.  The tribunal  may have gone wrong or right on the merit  of the  matters but the presence of the appellant as being a Minister at the relevant time could not be linked in any  manner with the legal proceedings. The remarks which reflect the  conduct of  the appellant  as  a  Minister  are hereby expunged  from the  judgments at  all places wherever figuring but  the remarks  confined to  his  conduct  as  an individual litigant shall sustain.      The appeals are partially allowed to the afore extent.      No costs.